

MODERN FAR EASTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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In Memory
of
HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR

HISTORICAL NOTE

In 1934, when the late Professor Harley F. MacNair * first started work on this book, it was his intention to present for students in American colleges and universities a comprehensive discussion of far eastern history in the twentieth century. In his original plan he did not intend to limit the book to political history and the relations of the nations of the Far East with each other and with the nations of the West. Rather he hoped to write a lengthy introduction to the developments of the present century in which the economic, social, and cultural developments within the Far East and between the countries of eastern Asia and the West would receive more than a word in passing. The twentieth century itself was to receive similar treatment. Since he had already written a number of books and articles relating to international relations and to the political aspects of China's recent history, this new book, he had hoped, would include the generalizations derived from two decades and more of intense study and intimate acquaintance with eastern Asia, its peoples, traditions, and cultures.

Circumstances and the passage of time, however, often alter the best laid plans of scholars as well as the rest of mankind. The materials that were originally to be a part of the first chapter of the introduction had grown by 1937 into the book entitled *The Real Conflict between China and Japan* (Chicago). Thereafter, the outbreak of hostilities in China took a heavy toll of the treasure house of time ordinarily left to the practicing teacher at the end of the day's duties. Public addresses, radio broadcasts, and government work filched from Professor MacNair the quiet hours needed for contemplation and writing. With the passage of years, demands upon his time became increasingly more pressing and more fatiguing. By the time of the attack upon Pearl Harbor in 1941, the chapters on international relations to 1923 (chapters II through VIII) had been completed. At this point Professor MacNair put down his pen and plunged into the work of wartime.

Personal problems and the tensions of the hectic war years gradually sapped his strength to the point where he came to realize that he would probably never live to carry his ambitious project to completion. It was at this point that he called upon me, one of his former students, "to complete the book and see it through the press." The chapters already writ-

* For an excellent account of his life and works see the memorial article by Maurice T. Price, "Harley Farnsworth MacNair," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, VIII (November, 1948), 45-63.

ten, his notes, and his files of material were placed in my hands with the admonition that I should feel perfectly free to use them as I would my own. Moreover, it was arranged through the generosity of Houghton-Mifflin Company that we might draw freely for the new book upon those parts of H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931) which bore the earmarks of Professor MacNair's paternity. The same privilege was kindly accorded to us by the University of Chicago Press, the publishers of *The Real Conflict between China and Japan* and *China in Revolution* (Chicago, 1933). At this time it was decided also to limit the book to international relations with emphasis upon the far eastern rôles of the United States and Russia. It was also decided that it should relate the domestic developments of the countries of the Far East only in so far as they bore directly upon the evolution of foreign relations. No attempt has therefore been made at any point to treat in detail the political, economic, social, and cultural evolution of eastern Asia. As it now stands, the book is far more limited in scope than was originally intended.

Before his death in 1947, Professor MacNair had read individually the first seventeen chapters of the book. Chapter I draws heavily, as he intended it should, upon *The Real Conflict*; chapter IX is based largely upon the final chapter of *Far Eastern International Relations* with certain emendations and additions. Although written separately and expressly for this book by Professor MacNair, chapter X is quite heavily indebted to *China in Revolution*. Essentially therefore the chapters telling the story before 1931 (with the exception of chapter XI) were written by Professor MacNair expressly for this book or were compiled by me from the works mentioned above. The last ten chapters of the book (with the exception of one section in chapter XII) were written by the undersigned. In all chapters the responsibility for revision of statements, documentation, and excision belongs exclusively to me.

DONALD F. LACH

PREFACE

Based to a great extent upon the experiences of the authors as teachers, *Modern Far Eastern International Relations* is designed as a text for the courses in far eastern history usually offered in American colleges and universities at the Junior, Senior, and graduate levels. It endeavors to emphasize the areas and the time span customarily treated in such courses; it is hoped, however, that it does so without becoming overly subservient to custom. For example, the discussion centers upon the twentieth century but deals at some length also with the political impact of the West upon the Far East in the nineteenth century. Since the book concentrates upon foreign relations, the discussions of domestic developments are designed mainly to make the problems of international affairs as intelligible as possible. Moreover, the relations of America and Russia with the countries of eastern Asia have been stressed on the assumption that the immediate and future problems of the Far East will be affected in no small measure by the decisions taken in Moscow and Washington. The maps and illustrations have also been co-ordinated with the text both in terms of their placement in the book and with regard to the points emphasized in the text. So that authority and references might be easily available, the footnotes have been placed at the bottom of the pages on which the footnote numbers appear.

As is generally the case, the authors are heavily indebted to many others for aid, direct and indirect. Since it is not possible for me to know all those whom Professor MacNair consulted for advice and criticism, I am afraid they must accept our thanks while remaining anonymous. In the years from 1943 to the present, my wife has devoted long hours to the weary tasks which the wives of writers are so frequently called upon to perform. Our grateful thanks to her. I wish also to acknowledge valuable advice, particularly about the imposition of limits, from Professor Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell University. For penetrating criticism of the whole book, and for saving us from numerous mistakes in the discussion of economic problems we wish to thank Professor Hans H. Bernt of Elmira College. Most especially, however, I wish to express our gratitude to Professor Earl H. Pritchard of the University of Chicago for patient hours of discussion, for reading with care and circumspection the entire manuscript, and for giving us the full benefit of his specialized knowledge in the preparation of the maps. To many of our students, and especially to Mr. Herbert Spielman for criticisms of chapters IX and XII, we wish to express our sincere appreciation. Al-

though the persons mentioned above, and undoubtedly many who are not mentioned, aided greatly in the shaping of the book, the authors herewith release them from all responsibility for the final product.

DONALD F. LACH

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PART I

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE WEST UPON THE FAR EAST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER I

THE FAR EASTERN SCENE

Most Westerners "discovered" the Orient when the Japanese launched their attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Until then, many Occidentals, like the old lady described by Goldsmith, had felt that the Oriental was a strange creature "born far away from home." This was not because the Westerner was more unintelligent than the rest of humanity, but merely because the average individual anywhere is ignorant of those not of his own kind. Even with the establishment of closer relations in the last century, Oriental and Occidental continued to find each other surprising and unpredictable in action and thought. While the differences between East and West have frequently been exaggerated, mutual understanding and appreciation have always been difficult to achieve because of the formidable, and still not completely conquered, barriers of geography, language, divergent traditions, and conflicting objectives. To an important degree this failure in understanding has contributed to and continues to aggravate many of the disagreements, conflicts, and wars marring international relations. As an effort to provide the Western student with a factual background for the study of recent international affairs, this chapter deals in brief compass with some of the major characteristics of the region and the separate countries of the Far East.

When discussing the "Far East," individual authors use the term in differing ways. Some include India and everything to the east; others treat mainly the lands of continental Asia and Japan without more than incidental reference to the insular areas of the south Pacific. As used here, the "Far East" will refer to China and its neighboring satellites, the other less important lands on the continent east of India and north and south of China, the Japanese islands, and the main island groups of the Pacific basin. As an integral part of Russia, Siberia will receive only indirect attention, since its history is best understood in connection with Russia's eastward expansion. Detailed accounts of India, Australia, and New Zealand will also be omitted, for their recent past is most advantageously studied with relation to, and as a part of, Great Britain's imperial—or commonwealth—organization. By focusing constantly upon China, Japan, and adjacent areas, it is hoped that sufficient light may be shed to illuminate the history, and particularly the international relations, of those lands which, to many Westerners, appear remote and forbidding.

It generally shocks non-Orientals to learn that Asia, in addition to being the largest of the continents, is also the home of more than one-half the world's population. On the eastern side of the continent, approximately 500,000,000 Chinese live in a land of mountains and rivers about two-thirds the size of continental United States. South of China live a total of about 150,000,000 people in the continental countries of Burma, Siam, Malaya, Indo-China, and the East Indies. About one-half of this total are citizens of the new Republic of Indonesia. North of China, in Siberia from the Ural mountains to the sea, there live but an estimated 18,000,000. On the five main Japanese islands, the census of 1950 reported more than 85,000,000 people. An additional 30,000,000 live in Japan's former insular possessions, about 8,000,000 of whom reside in Formosa. The peoples of the Manchurian area number about 40,000,000. Korea has a population of about 29,000,000. In the vast area of the Pacific basin relatively few people live on the numerous mountainous and volcanic islands. Only 21,000,000 live in the Philippines, and just over 500,000 reside in the Hawaiian Islands. In summary, the far eastern area as here conceived includes a total population estimated at 800,000,000 human beings at various stages of civilization.

Agriculture is the major mode of production throughout the area, although considerable industrial development has been undertaken in Japan, Manchuria, and eastern Siberia during the twentieth century. Most of the far eastern peoples live close to the soil, follow carefully traditions of long-standing in their everyday life, and generally leave government in the hands of an elite ruling class. Although under considerable foreign pressure to change over the last one hundred years, the great civilizations of eastern Asia have only reluctantly and gradually accepted instruction from the West. The peoples of China, Japan, and southeastern Asia continue even yet to cling to a host of their traditional beliefs and to many of their familiar ways.

CHINA

As the largest and most important country in eastern Asia, China has for thousands of years influenced the history and culture of the entire region. The earliest historical records available make it plain that a fairly advanced civilization, which later came to be called Chinese, existed in the Yellow River area as early as 1500 B.C. In the millenniums following, the Chinese expanded southward to the Yangtze, to Kwangtung, and even into Siam and the islands of the south Pacific. In ancient times they also invaded the Korean peninsula and subsequently had a profound influence upon the civilizations which gradually developed in Korea and Japan. Occasional rulers also pushed the empire's boundaries farther to the north and the west, where they were usually confronted by the

militant, nomadic tribes of central and northern Asia. Relations with, and wars against, these nomadic tribes form a long and complicated chapter in China's evolution.

Until the sixteenth century, the land frontiers and the border regions were China's most exposed and vital portals. Thereafter, the threat to China of invasion from the sea became increasingly important, and finally decisive, for the industrial revolution had given the seafaring Westerners a decided edge in their dealings with peoples not possessing the latest in warships and firearms. With Nippon's ready acceptance of industrial techniques, China, for all its geographical bulk and population, was gradually eclipsed in the twentieth century by the technical superiority of Japan as well as by that of the Western nations. Concessions, leaseholds, and spheres of interest were carved out of China as its ancient and outmoded institutions gradually crumbled under the impact of the new and astounding attack from the "Eastern Sea."

In understanding China's failure to meet the challenges of the West and Japan, it is important to appreciate some of that country's fundamental problems. Throughout history the Sons of Han have been tillers of the soil. Basic to all of China's ills is the fact that too many people have sought to forage for their existence on too little land. Despite adversities, the Chinese have persisted in their effort to wring a living out of the soil. They have never been seriously attracted to the grazing or hunting habits of the Mongols and Manchus north of the Great Wall. Although the Chinese agriculturists generally withstood invasions on their inland frontiers, at certain times, particularly when China was experiencing internal disorder, the "outer barbarians" were successful in penetrating the Celestial Kingdom. Rebellions within the country occurred usually as a result of overpopulation, overtaxation, and landlordism in the main farming areas. Ferment, caused either by natural disasters or bad government (or both), has repeatedly given invaders their golden opportunity.

Although there were many small landholders, the large and important gentry usually dominated the agricultural scene¹ in China, at least until the victory of the Communists in 1949. In the days of the empire, the landlord families were the ones best able to subsidize their intelligent sons during the long and tedious years of preparation for official examinations. Since few other means of entry to government service were open before the twentieth century, training in the Confucian Classics and successful completion of a series of trying examinations were the prerequisites to official posts. Thus, close identification of the landed

¹ On land tenure see especially J. L. Buck's *Chinese Farm Economy* (Shanghai, 1930) and his *Land Utilization in China* (Shanghai, 1937). Consult also Fei Hsiao-tung and Chang Chih-i, *Earthbound China* (Chicago, 1945) and G. F. Winfield, *China: the Land and the People* (New York, 1948).

literocracy with the mandarinat formed a working political and social organization that dominated the economy and administration of the country. Under the non-Communist republic, the wealthy landlords of semi-feudal China continued to have a decisive voice in the government; only on special and comparatively infrequent occasions have the masses had a determining effect upon national policy. It must, however, be borne in mind that the literocracy was not static: there was in China no "aristocracy" which maintained itself through the centuries; "old" families declined as "new" families rose to influence.

Numerous industrial plants were opened in China during the first half of the twentieth century, but at least three-fourths of the population continued to hope for existence from dirt-farming. The great majority of these live and work in the overcrowded coastal and river valley provinces. For centuries the farms in these areas have been worked intensively. Almost every inch of the rich land in Shantung, for example, has come under the plow. Although new agricultural techniques might possibly help to expand production, it is questionable whether China by itself will be able in the foreseeable future to produce enough to feed adequately its teeming millions. Rice in the south, and kaoliang, millet, and soybeans in the north are produced in abundance when the elements are not perverse and when peace and partial order reign. Even at peak production, however, the overpopulated farms of China are scarcely able to produce sufficient food for domestic needs.

During recent years, Nationalists, Communists, and some foreigners have advocated rapid industrialization as a possible solution to China's pressing economic problems.² Although new industries can certainly be developed with foreign financial aid, the mineral wealth—particularly iron—usually basic to a great industrial economy is simply not there. Even if it were, the vast distances and the poor means of transportation available would hamper industrialization for a long time to come. In their search for industrial power, both Nationalists and Communists have undertaken large-scale hydroelectric projects. While recognizing the need for China to develop certain types of industry, foreign observers have warned that tremendous population increases might be looked for with the achievement of greater industrial capacity and the growth of larger cities. Such a phenomenon could scarcely be welcomed by either the Chinese or the non-Chinese world.

Equally perplexing are the political changes that have come to China in our century. To 1911, the ancient dynasties acted as the nominal

² For an outline of the Kuomintang's plans for industrialization see Wu Ching-chao, "Economic Reconstruction and Planning: Wartime and Post-War," in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *Voices from Unoccupied China* (Chicago, 1944), pp. 65-80; for Communist plans, see *infra*, pp. 560-62, 563.

central government. Thereafter, various leaders and groups attempted to re-unite China under a republican government. To 1949, no group succeeded in establishing peace and order in all parts of the country, although the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek dominated the political arena from 1928 to 1949. Semi-feudal conditions, poor means of transportation and communication, and the old problem of decentralized control made next to impossible the immediate organization of China as a modern national state. As in earlier times, China existed mainly as a geographical and cultural expression rather than as a political entity until the Communist take-over. Whether the Communists will be successful



Chinese Farmer and His Water Buffalo. C N S Photo, Paul Guillumette, Inc.

in their effort to weld China into unity remains a question for the future. For their first five years of control they claim notable advances toward centralized authority.

Although generally unimportant in the determination of high political and fiscal policies, the common people have been a part of, and a determining factor in, the creation of one of the world's greatest civilizations. Various factors combine to explain why the Chinese think and act as they do. Until modern times the inhabitants of the provinces north of the Yangtze River have been but little influenced by the sea; rather have they been affected by the generally arid, yellow-colored, and dusty agricultural lands on which they have toiled and by the equally—or even more—arid grazing lands beyond the Great Wall, from which, during untold centuries, “barbarians” have pressed to seize from them their harvests. Cold

winds sweeping down upon them from the north, northwest, and northeast have also conditioned life in northern China.³

Ancient China was cradled in the north. Mainly in the valleys of the Yellow and the Wei rivers the earliest highly developed civilization, and the first states, appeared. Connections were maintained by these early northern states with the southern part of what in modern times has come to be known to Westerners as Manchuria. The student, therefore, who surveys Chinese history as a whole, and who reflects upon the ancient inhabitants of the land, thinks primarily of the people of the north: big-boned, tall, well-formed, somewhat apathetic, leisurely in thought and action—but characterized by a dogged tenacity and perhaps unique combination of fatalism, good humor, and dignity.

In contrast to the north, the provinces south of the Yangtze, especially Kwangtung, have been of peculiar significance during the last one hundred years. Here is to be found a different world. In the Yangtze Valley, and in southern China generally, the climate, during a considerable part of the year, is wet and hot. The land is richly green and lush.⁴

It was, perhaps, unfortunate that, prior to 1842, the chief meeting place of western Europeans and Americans with the Chinese should have been the province of Kwangtung, many of whose inhabitants are more emotional than those farther north. On the average, the Cantonese are often smaller physically and more agile mentally—but it does not follow that they have better minds—than their brothers in the north. Although the northerners have been materially affected or overrun by periodic invasions from the north and west, for some two thousand years the southerners also have been affected, largely through channels of trade, but also through those of religion, by an influx of foreign ideology and alien blood, partly Asiatic, partly European. During the last century this influx has been broadened, intellectually no less than materially, by the development of the British Crown Colony of Hongkong into a potent base for dissemination of Western influences. Moreover, from Kwangtung and Fukien millions of emigrants have gone to foreign countries by way of the sea.⁵ It has been those provinces, therefore, which have been most influenced by Western thought.

In addition to climate, the placement of China is indirectly and in part responsible for several distinctive qualities of the people. The

³ For further elaboration of this factor consult, *inter alia*, the works of Ellsworth Huntington: in particular *Civilization and Climate* (3rd ed.; New Haven, 1924) and *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston, 1907); also C. Chu, "Climatic Change, during Historic Time in China," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, LXII (1931), 32-40 (cited hereafter as *JNCBRAS*); R. T. Meyer, "The Aridity of North China," *JNCBRAS*, LXIII (1932), 65-80 [with bibliography].

⁴ For a charmingly whimsical legend dealing with climatological differences between northern and southern China consult Alice Tisdale Hobart, *By the City of the Long Sand* (New York, 1926), pp. 3-7.

⁵ Consult H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, 1924).

physical map of Asia shows that intramural China is by nature cut off from ease of intercourse with the rest of the world. Seas, mountains, plateaus, and deserts made it extremely difficult for distant peoples to come into intimate contact with the Chinese until the nineteenth century. This is not to overlook their struggles with invaders from the north—particularly the Hsiung-nü, the Mongols, and the Manchus, or the occasional relations by land and sea, existent for more than two millenniums, between the Chinese and western and southern Asia. It was mainly from the north, however, that those came who desired “to water their horses in the streams of the south” and to profit materially and culturally from the civilization of their more advanced neighbors. Not rarely did they succeed; but until modern times those who came, vast in numbers though they might be, were inferior in culture to those whom they conquered physically. Although contributing to the composite Chinese mind and body, their cultural and physical absorption by those whom they had conquered by arms invariably followed.

The geographical placement and subcontinental proportions of the Celestial Empire, with accompanying miscegenation, helped it to become the gestator of a “world” civilization which illumined that part of Asia lying north and east of India and Persia and south of Siberia, even as the Mediterranean area contemporaneously enlightened the West. Contributions on a limited scale were, of course, made to Chinese culture from the west and south, even as they were made by both Far and Middle East to the western Asiatic and Mediterranean world. In the main, however, China’s traditional culture was autochthonous and became increasingly a source of proud satisfaction to those who evolved it and to those who basked within its light.

For centuries, during which difficulties of travel were all but insuperable, numerous embassies arrived at the court of the Son of Heaven to present compliments and gifts from the rulers of their respective lands. The kingdoms of Tibet, Nepal, Burma, India, Ceylon, Indo-China, Malaysia, the East Indies, the Philippines, the Liu-ch’ius, Japan, and Korea sent missions. With condescending grace, the envoys who came to Peking were received in later times in Protection of Harmony Hall, reserved for audiences granted to tribute bearers. To their masters were dispatched gracious and admonitory replies and gifts of value greater than those received—gifts such as were fit for the Lord of Ten Thousand Years, swaying the Ten Thousand Kingdoms, to confer upon his loyal and humble vassals. Often included were patents of investiture for the rulers of tributary states and copies of the Chinese calendar, which latter was generally used in the lands of the extreme East. To both the Chinese and their neighbors the tributary missions were also valuable

trading enterprises.⁶ Numbers of students and scholars also journeyed to China and returned to their own less advanced peoples to serve as channels of light and learning. Not until the seventeenth century, and then with extreme circumspection, was the idea suggested to the Chinese, by European Jesuits, that there were peoples who equaled them in culture and civilization—an idea to which most of those so informed reacted without notable enthusiasm.

In dealing with foreigners, the Chinese assumed that China was the center of the world and that all foreigners—Occidental and Oriental—must be managed as “barbarians.” To the Westerners the Chinese appeared to be colossally arrogant and hopelessly conceited. Imbued with confidence in their own racial and national worth—not to say superiority—and the physical strength of the states from which they had come, the Westerners were not inclined to admit the reasonableness, or accuracy, as applying to themselves, of the ancient categories. Nevertheless, they were referred to as “barbarians” and treated as inferiors until they manifested their strength by arms just about one century ago.

“Barbarians” in the Chinese view should be held as far off as possible. If, however, they insisted upon coming to the country, even to the imperial court, overt objections should not be raised; they should be treated kindly but with decision; the majesty of the Celestial Empire and the fact that it alone possessed civilization should be impressed upon them; regularity of intercourse, which might ultimately lead to familiarity, should be minimized by refusal of favorable consideration to requests made by them; the indisputable fact that Heaven had not endowed “barbarians” with capacity to master the deep mysteries of Chinese culture should be made clear; on the departure of their missions a guard should accompany them to the frontier to insure their exit. Above all, “barbarians” must not be permitted to remain within the Celestial Empire. As one rotten apple corrupts a barrel of sound fruit, so “barbarians” must inevitably corrupt the purity and perfection of Celestial culture. Commingled pride and fear forbade for centuries that the limpid stream be sullied by alien infiltrations. Taught by the sages that mediation, diplomacy, and compromise were preferable to force in individual and in national crises, and prone to quote the ancient saying that “good metal is not used for nails nor good men for soldiers,” China was ideologically and materially unprepared to defend itself against the arms and “will to power” of nineteenth-century Europe when the latter resorted to force in answer to the Celestial assumption of universal sovereignty based on cultural supremacy.

The last dynasty to rule in the traditional fashion was the alien

⁶ For a particularly enlightening discussion see J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. T'eng, “On the Ch'ing Tributary System,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, VI (1941), 135-246.

Manchu (or Ch'ing) dynasty. In 1644 a descendant of the House of Gioro seated himself upon the Dragon throne and inaugurated a regime that held power until 1912. Like previous emperors of China, the Manchu rulers were theoretically unlimited in their personal power. In practice, however, the emperors had to delegate their authority to kinsmen and eunuchs, as well as military and civilian leaders. Unlike the Chinese dynasties, the Manchu introduced a dual regime at all administrative levels. Chinese officials held a great numerical preponderance in both military and civil administrations. Duality emanated at the outset from the twofold recognition on the part of the Manchu invaders that, inexperienced as they were in the complexities of administrative machinery, and constituting but a small minority of the vast population of the state which they were building, they could not hope to hold their gains and maintain their rule unassisted.

The Manchus had not won China by their own efforts alone. The conquest itself was largely brought about, and participated in, by Chinese within and without the Great Wall. As on earlier occasions, when their empire had been conquered in whole or in part by outsiders, it was a case of the Celestials, by rivalries and disunity, defeating themselves rather than one of simple conquest by invaders. Even so, in the construction of the Manchu empire a long generation passed before the whole of intramural China was brought under their yoke in 1681.⁷

In the military organization, Manchu and Chinese Bannermen, and Chinese provincial militia, held the empire for the alien dynasty for approximately two centuries. As a result of the attacks of the Taiping rebels in the mid-nineteenth century, the peace-weakened Bannermen and provincial militia were found wanting as a defense establishment and as a peace preservation corps. Thereafter, provincial bodies of "braves"—volunteers and irregulars—were organized and led by civilian governors and viceroys. To the best of their ability, these troops guarded the empire until in part overcome by the Japanese in 1894-95. At this point an attempt was made to organize a "New Model" army. After the organization of the Republic, despite valiant attempts on the part of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, no effective national army was formed.⁸ The Communists since 1949 appear to have overcome this problem and have successfully organized a strong and effective armed force. The evidence for their strength was clearly established in the course of the Korean war of 1950 to 1953.

Even more notable than in the case of the military was the duality

⁷ A thorough and scholarly discussion may be found in Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore, 1942).

⁸ For an interesting analysis of China's armed forces by an expert military observer see E. F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency* (New York, 1940).

which prevailed throughout the civil administration of the Ch'ing empire. Here, too, a majority of the officials were Chinese who, in general, rose to power through passing literary examinations. In the two great councils in Peking, the *Nei-ko* (inner cabinet, or grand secretariat) and the *Chün-chi-ch'u* (committee of national defense, or board of strategy, or council of state, or grand council), Chinese, in varying numbers, always had membership. They were similarly represented on the six boards: civil office, revenue, rites or ceremonies, war, punishments, and works. Each of these had two presidents and four vice-presidents, offices equally divided by law between Manchus and Chinese. As regarded the provinces which were practically kingdoms—and not petty kingdoms at that—many of the governors and viceroys were Chinese. In yet greater proportion was this the case with subordinate provincial officials.⁹

Unfortunately, to all but a numerically insignificant minority of the missionaries, merchants, and diplomats who approached China in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the social and philosophical foundations of the empire were completely unknown. Assuming that direct relations with the imperial court, including contact with the emperor and correspondence and personal acquaintance with the high officials, would solve the problems that arose in the provinces (since the latter were thought to be ruled autocratically by Peking), the Westerners made effort after effort to establish relations with the capital so that pressure, when such appeared needful, might be exerted at the top. They were completely ignorant of the fact that the Chinese people have never for long tolerated what the West understands by the term “centralized government” (witness the difficulties encountered by Yüan Shih-k'ai and Chiang Kai-shek during the republican period). Nor did they realize by the middle of the nineteenth century that for the alien Manchus to permit envoys of the “barbarian” states of the outer regions to *reside* in Peking was to confess to the people, whom they had conquered two centuries earlier, that they were no longer strong enough to repel the foreigner—which, in turn, was to intimate that the Mandate of Heaven was being withdrawn and to invite, in consequence, repeated outbreaks against their rule. What appeared to the Europeans stupid obduracy and false pride on the part of the imperial government in refusing to act in accord with the logic of international polity was to the Manchus and their Chinese colleagues a matter of political—and even physical—life and death.

The full story of the decline and fall of the Ch'ing dynasty and the traditional system of imperial government in China has yet to be told. Although the rest of the world failed at the time to appreciate the importance of the death struggle wracking the last of China's dynasties, its

⁹ For a general survey of imperial political institutions see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, 1950), chap. III.

collapse in 1912 can be viewed in retrospect as one of the most crucial historical events of the early twentieth century. That the universal empire could not meet the challenges of the West had become increasingly more apparent with the passage of every year after 1800. The successful attacks of the foreigners in the years from 1839 to 1860 helped to shake the faith of the Chinese in their traditional institutions. An anti-dynastic war launched by the Taiping rebels in 1851 highlighted the feebleness of the Peking regime. In a belated effort to learn from the West, military and political leaders like Tsêng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang urged their compatriots after 1860 to imitate Western arms and machinery. No serious efforts at reform of China's institutions or ideological foundations were undertaken, however, until after the humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894-95. At about the same time, a revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen got under way that called openly for the defeat of the alien Manchu dynasty and for the establishment of a Chinese Nationalist regime. Increasingly, the Chinese majority, as in the Boxer rebellion of 1900, sought to place blame for China's weakness upon the Manchu and the Western foreigners.¹⁰ While seeking comfort by shifting responsibility, the Chinese held tenaciously, despite the sincere efforts of reformers, to their traditional ways of life.

In the years which have passed since the Ch'ing dynasty sank into oblivion, it has become increasingly clear that the Manchus were not the sole agency of conservatism and reaction in the country. Scores and hundreds of Chinese hurried back to the land of their ancestors from overseas—from the Philippines, British Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Cuba, the United States—in 1912 and succeeding years, eager, on the expulsion of the alien rulers, to contribute to the building of a new China. Welcome as were their material resources built up in foreign lands, their modern ideas were looked upon generally by their countrymen with suspicion and dislike. Abroad, they had been cultivated as hosts for political conspirators who might from time to time find it advisable to travel for reasons of "health" or to "observe Western institutions," or as subscribers to the cause of revolution. In China of the new dispensation they were too often, for their own comfort or the good of the young republic, looked upon as interlopers, unfriendly critics, and rival seekers for office. And so, disillusioned, many of the overseas Chinese, citizens by birth of foreign countries, turned their backs on the land of their dreams to resume the business of life and the pursuit of happiness under the protection of other governments.

In the light, then, of what has been said concerning the customs, institutions, ideals, and ways of thinking of the Chinese with relation

¹⁰ See especially the arguments advanced in Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (New York, 1947).

to their government in both the distant and the more recent past, and in the light of the advances, material and nonmaterial, made by the West since the sixteenth century, it is not surprising to observe that frequently the problems arising out of the relations of the Middle Kingdom with foreign states and peoples during the last hundred years have been solved—in so far as they have been solved—by the imposition of the will of the Westerners, by that of the Japanese, or by the Communists with their imported ideology. Nor is this to imply that the will of the foreigner has always, or even generally, been an evil will as regards its effect upon the Chinese people. Objective study of China's difficulties shows a fairly even distribution of responsibility for conflict between natives and aliens.

In spirit, the Chinese people have never assented to the Western concept of the family of nations, based as it is upon the ideal of legal equality of states.¹¹ Indeed, they have frequently referred to it disparagingly as the Christian idea of international organization. Most Chinese (again it must be stated that foreign-born—and/or modern—educated Chinese form, in part, an exception to this generalization), like the Ch'ien-lung emperor and his officials, held at least until 1949 that their country is the center of the world, the hub of the universe; that theirs is the only civilization worthy of the name; that other civilizations and nations are of small import when weighed in the balance with China's civilization and objectives. Under the Communist regime this spirit presumably continues strong, even though the Chinese Communists freely admit their debt and devotion to the Soviet fatherland. The marvel is not that China has been faced with difficulties which have taxed its ability to survive but that it has not been confronted with more crises—and perished. That it has not, indeed, passed to the limbo of departed empires to join its earlier contemporaries, Rome, Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria, is due to the sterling worth of the blue-gowned, unlettered people, their vast numbers, and their high degree of social integration, rather than to the attainments of the transient satin-gowned, or frock-coated, or uniformed officialdom of the empire, the republic, or the Communist regime.

China presents the case of a country which was, and yet remains, a world in itself. To all intents and purposes it is a continent inhabited by a people, part of whose ancestors had become highly civilized and literate at least as early as the fourteenth century B.C., whereas others left the feudal age behind more than two thousand years ago; by a people also who were accustomed to think of the emperor as being far away, and who acted—in accord with local custom—largely to suit themselves. The civilization of the Middle Kingdom, mainly self-evolved, may, like that of the West, be termed a world civilization. Whether it will finally

¹¹ See for discussion of this point Werner Levi, *Modern China's Foreign Policy* (Minneapolis, 1953), chap. I.

adapt itself to the Communist world remains a vital question still to be definitively answered.

MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA, SINKIANG, AND TIBET

From ancient times China suffered repeatedly, as already remarked, from attacks launched by the men of the semi-arid plateau and mountain lands in the north and west. In the third century B.C., the Great Wall was constructed, in part by the linking together of earlier walls, to defend the agriculturists of China from invasion by the pastoral peoples of the north. To the west, China is guarded by the almost impassable land of Tibet and the difficult desert and arid stretches of Sinkiang. None of these natural frontiers, however, was able for long to withstand incessant penetration and repeated attacks from the mounted warriors of the central Asian tribes. Few armies, however, crossed Tibet and Sinkiang on their way into either India or China. It was rather down the Wei and Yellow river valleys of the north that the plateau tribesmen pressed for century after century. The Mongols, however, were the first peripheral people ever to achieve anything like complete hegemony over the Middle Kingdom. Again in the seventeenth century, four hundred years after the Mongol invasions, the Manchus succeeded in overthrowing the native Ming rule and in establishing the Ch'ing dynasty. Little wonder that China has been ever conscious of her land frontiers and has sought at all times to control the states on her inner borders.

Repeatedly, great and powerful Chinese emperors sent expeditions into the borderlands to protect the peoples living on the fringes of the Middle Kingdom and to pacify the turbulent tribal world. Although Chinese armies pushed westward as far as Afghanistan, the Celestial people were never able to establish permanent hegemony in the peripheral areas. By continued contact between the Chinese and the tribesmen of the borderlands, the benefits of Confucian civilization were gradually transmitted to the pastoral peoples. During periods of strength, therefore, China was paramount; during periods of weakness and internal strife the border peoples, profiting from knowledge gained by contact with the Chinese, would exert more and more pressure upon China.

Although China in recent times has generally claimed legal rights of sovereignty in the borderlands, it became increasingly difficult for the Chinese to maintain actual control. Tibet and Sinkiang, for instance, have an intimate defense relationship to India as well as China, whereas Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria possess attractions for both China and Russia. After the Chinese revolution of 1911-12, the status of the border territories became confused in the extreme. In 1913, Tibet, with English encouragement, declared its independence and maintained it until 1950, when the Chinese Communists reconquered the land of the Dalai

Lamas. Russia had long been interested in acquiring "special interests" in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. With the Russian revolution of 1917, however, the Japanese were given an opportunity to establish a more secure footing on the Asiatic continent by expanding their hold from Korea into Manchuria, Siberia, and Mongolia. The crisis of 1931-33 resulted in the establishment of a Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria. Meanwhile, however, the U.S.S.R. also had gradually tightened its economic hold upon Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia while recognizing China's sovereignty in both territories. In 1945, Outer Mongolia became independent but remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. Japan, as a result of the Second World War, has lost its control over Manchuria. Legally, China retains sovereignty in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. The precise international status of Tibet is hard to determine, but China now possesses control over this mountainous land.

KOREA

Lying south of Siberia and Manchuria, the Korean peninsula juts out from the Asiatic mainland and points like a dagger at the heart of Japan. Surrounded on three sides by the sea, Korea is separated on the north from Manchuria by the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Its total area, including the islands lying immediately off its coast, is nearly equal to that of Great Britain. The eastern coast, like the eastern coast of Italy, is a mountainous ridge and almost destitute of harbors; the western coast is low country studded with excellent harbors and landing places facing on the Yellow Sea. The Tadong and Han rivers flow across most of the peninsula's breadth and divide it into three approximately equal areas. Korea's two most important cities, P'yongyang and Seoul, are located at the mouths of these two important and navigable rivers.

From ancient times Korea has been a high road for egress from, and entrance to, the continent. Strategically located where the conflicting interests of Russia, China, and Japan have traditionally converged, Korea's destiny during the last seventy-five years has been in the hands of alien powers. Indeed, Korea's earlier history was also marked by periodic struggles for hegemony between conquerors from both China and Japan. Technically under Chinese suzerainty from ancient times until 1895, Korea became the first victim of modern Japanese imperialism. After the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, Japan eliminated China and Russia as competitors and by 1910 had completed the annexation of this vital area.

Under Nippon's control, Korea was used primarily as Japan's first steppingstone to continental conquest. Korea's own problems were given scant attention by the insular overlords. Despite severe repression, how-

ever, a vital spark of Korean nationalism was kept alive, and periodically fanned into a bright light, by a persistent nationalist movement.

JAPAN


Across the Eastern and the Yellow seas from China and Korea dwells a people differing radically in mental traits from the inhabitants of the continent. In many instances, nevertheless, so physically similar are many of the three national groups that they cannot be told apart even by natives of their respective countries.

Outstanding characteristics of the Japanese are their physical vigor and decisiveness of action; their spirit of scientific inquiry and general inquisitiveness; their suave formal courtesy and aesthetic appreciation; their ability to imitate and to take on with remarkable rapidity something more than a veneer of alien culture; their bravery and stoicism unto death; their martial spirit on and off the field of battle; their tendency to map out a far-reaching program accompanied by patience in awaiting opportunity to put it into effect; their pride of race; and their intense patriotism.

As in the case of China, the inhabitants of Japan have been profoundly influenced by climate. The major part of the archipelago lies in the temperate zone and stands high on the energy map, whereas China is only medium. The cold winds from the north, which have a benumbing effect on northern China, are tempered in Nippon by the comparatively warm Japan Sea and by the Japan (or Black) Current in the Pacific. The terrific typhoons and the earthquakes which wreak havoc are not without compensating effect: struggles with the forces of nature render the Japanese nervously active and fit them for struggle with their neighbors.

Not having constituted in the past a continental power, and not having been the producers of a "world" civilization, the people and rulers of Japan—with a few notable exceptions—were not affected, to a degree comparable with those of China, by overweening assurance and blissful self-satisfaction at the periods in which they were brought into contact with the Western world. Manifestation of such pride was, generally speaking, reserved for a later period. While suspicious that the Westerners were "barbarians," the Japanese were not as serenely certain that this was so as were their Korean and Chinese neighbors. Moreover, in the middle years of the nineteenth century, they profited at a crucial moment in their own development from the humiliations administered to China by England, France, and Russia. Convinced by what they saw rather than by anterior hypotheses, they set to work with peculiar assiduity to learn the secrets of Western power and to apply the open-sesame to their own land.

Like the Chinese, the sons of Nippon have also lived mainly from the land. Moreover, in recent times, the farms of Japan have likewise been terribly overpopulated. Intensive methods in agriculture have availed but little in relieving population pressure. Only one-sixth of the gross area of the islands is arable, whereas at least two-thirds of the people are directly dependent upon farming. In general, the agriculturists have had to turn more and more frequently to side-line occupations in an effort to supplement farm incomes. Sericulture, home indus-



Terraced Paddy Fields in Japan. Photo by Natori, Black Star

tries, and fishing have enabled many rural Japanese to stave off imminent starvation, after other methods of relieving population pressure—such as emigration—had failed. Despite his serious predicament, the Japanese farmer, however, has generally been more prosperous than his Chinese, Korean, or Indonesian neighbors.

Although Japan began after 1868 to build its industries, the effort to convert Nippon from an agricultural to an industrial nation was never completely successful.¹² As in China, the mineral resources of the island empire were never sufficient for independent industrial development.

¹² On this subject see chap. X of Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York, 1949).

Raw materials, such as coal, iron, and oil, were always inadequate. Dependence of its industrial plants upon imported raw materials profoundly affected Japan's policy with respect to exporting nations. The United States and Great Britain in particular were able, if they so desired, to hold a "big stick" over Japan, for Nippon's economy was notably allergic to embargoes on necessary raw materials and to boycotts against the products of its industry. In part, the policy of expansionism during the thirties and forties of the twentieth century was aimed at freeing Japan from economic dependence upon the Western commercial nations.

The rise of Japan, in half a century, from an insignificant medieval kingdom to the rank of one of the great powers of the world is a source of mystery to all save those who have studied the records and pondered upon the mentality of the Japanese people prior to the nineteenth century. Aside from their ethnic composition—Malay, Mongol, and Ainu—and the effects of their geographical setting, the key to the mystery is the cultural revolution through which some of their ancestors passed in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian era.

The flowering Chinese culture of the Sui (589–618) and T'ang (618–906) periods influenced the ruling class of Japan as vitally during the Middle Ages as have the cultures of Europe and the United States in modern times. Perhaps more so. Contributions from China and Korea to the native culture of Japan, over a period of five or six centuries, came to a climax in A.D. 645. In that year a revolution was begun by an act of violence which had for its basic objective the Sinicization of the country. This was continued by generally peaceful methods, the outcome of which was the integration in Japanese social and political life of Chinese thought and institutions on a considerable scale. The leaders of the movement were an imperial prince, Naka, who is remembered officially as Tenchi Tennō, and a noble, Nakatomi Kamatari, who later founded the great house of Fujiwara. It was notable that, upon the abdication shortly thereafter of Empress Kogyoku, Naka did not ascend the throne. He chose, through two reigns following, to remain in the background, carrying on in comparative obscurity his great experiment; thus he risked no embarrassment to the throne in the event of opposition or failure. In 668, only three years before his death, and when all danger was past, he assumed the imperial title.

During the greater part of the next five centuries a line of Fujiwara nobles, descendants of Kamatari, wielded administrative power. On fairly numerous occasions the *tennō* were minors who abdicated on approaching maturity. During the period 1086–1192 a system of administration existed known as *insei*, by which retired *tennō* ruled—to an uncertain degree—from their palace-monasteries. From the last decade of the twelfth century to 1868 (with the exception of the period *ca.* 1573–

1603 when two military geniuses—Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi—who did not assume the title of *Shōgun* [generalissimo], despite their wielding of its powers, in turn administered the country), Japan was ruled by the *bakufu*, or military government, of successive *shōgun*. Scarcely, however, had power passed, in 1192, from the *tennō* at Kyōto to the first Minamoto *shōgun*, Yoritomo, in Kamakura, than it began a retreat farther into the shadows to rest for a time with the Hojo *shikken*, or military regents for a *shōgun*, thus paralleling in the military government the earlier appointment of regents for child and adult emperors in the civil administration of Kyōto.

The principles of duality and invisibility thus illustrated have been carried over in several ways, two of which may be mentioned, under the system of government evolved after the Restoration of 1868. That government received its parliamentary form in the Constitution of 1889. In the person of Prince Saionji Kimmochi there survived until 1940 an extraconstitutional body known as the *genrō* (elder statesmen) which for two generations made and unmade cabinets regardless of parliamentary majorities and theories of government. Besides this extraconstitutional agency, the defense ministers had a peculiar and practically independent status within the Japanese government and cabinet. The not uncommon instances of statements emanating from the foreign office, or from members of the diplomatic corps, apparently being given the lie direct by subsequent developments, are less explicable on the assumption that Japanese officials are more mendacious than are those of other governments, than on the seldom realized fact that the portfolios of defense in the Japanese cabinet were held by professional men, military and naval, who were not under the control of the premier and his civilian colleagues and who could even force the resignation of the latter. The premier or the foreign minister proposed, but the military, in whole or in part, disposed—as the outbreak in Manchuria of September, 1931, and that in northern intramural China in the summer of 1937 clearly demonstrate. This results in dual diplomacy known to Nipponese as *niju gaiko*.

The habit of inquiry of the Japanese and their assiduity in the acquisition of new knowledge, characteristics which have never been more conspicuously displayed by any people and which deeply impressed the Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, taken in conjunction with the powerful seventh-century precedents set by Naka and Kamatari, serve largely to account for the partly intellectual but largely physical revolutions which have taken place during the last century in the Empire of the Rising Sun. To rear modern or semi-modern physical superstructures—governmental, military, and commercial—is, however, less difficult than to remove ancient mental foundations and substitute therefor new ways of thought and action. This homely truth

was brought forcefully to the attention of the American occupying forces and agencies at the end of the Second World War.

In this connection is to be observed one of the basic difficulties of Nippon, as well as a hindrance to Western comprehension of conditions in that country: to a surprising degree Japan has been modernized; to a perhaps more surprising degree, it has not. Its leaders, including the Meiji emperor (1867–1912), during the latter half of the nineteenth century developed a strong will to change and exerted that will with a considerable degree of success. But it is impossible for a people to change fundamentally overnight, and, historically speaking, seventy or seventy-five years is less than a night. In Japan there is a relatively thick crust of modernity; the upper stratum of modernism, however, rests on the bedrock of antiquity and medievalism, and, often, to use a geological figure, slips and quakes cause faults—to the consternation of native and foreigner. It may, indeed, be suggested that the Nipponese suffer more keenly and more often from mental and moral quakes than they do from earthquakes.

The Japanese, equally as proud of national and cultural traditions as the Chinese, have been far more nationally minded. Although smaller in number than the Chinese and geographically extremely limited in scope, they have been united by a zealous patriotism and devotion to their emperor to a degree not apparent in any other country. A newcomer to the capital of Japan is likely to be first impressed by the location of the imperial palace in the heart of the city. The dignified and almost austere beauty of the buildings in their spacious grounds, enclosed by dry-masonry stone walls overshadowed by ancient pines mirrored in a moat, is impressive. Second only to the aesthetic impression created by the imperial residence is that of inconvenience to one who would cross from one side of the city to another by a Euclidian shortcut. It cannot be done: one must go around. Accordingly, the position of the palace and its imperial occupants are ever present in the minds of Tokyo residents. Even during their days of bitter defeat, the Japanese remained loyal to their emperor. In making peace in 1945, the Japanese surrendered everything but the imperial institution.

The significance formerly attaching to the person and the position of the emperor has been the subject of protracted controversy between Nipponese authorities on constitutional law and history. One group placed the emperor above the constitution and ascribed to him, in accord with *kokutai*, absolute power, frankly and definitely identifying the emperor with the state; the opposing group claimed that the emperor was but an organ of the state. To 1945, at least, the sacrosanctity of the imperial person pervaded the daily life of common people and officials. Textbooks provided by the department of education instilled the doctrine

in the minds of the young. The imperial portrait, exposed to view on occasion in the schools, was more highly valued by officials than the lives of the children who paid their respects to it—as is shown by the hero-worship offered those teachers who from time to time risked, or sacrificed, their own lives and those of their pupils by turning first to rescue the portrait when schoolhouses burned. No one was permitted to look down upon the emperor as he passed swiftly through the streets of his capital or by special train through the country. Horrified amazement and disapproval were expressed at the Western custom of placing the photographic likenesses of their rulers on postage stamps which likenesses are struck by clerks in canceling the stamps. Since 1945, however, the emperor has, temporarily at least, been reduced to the stature of a mortal.

As in many of the Pacific island groups, not only was Nippon's ruler the head and heart and soul of the state, but he was officially proclaimed as a divine being descended from the sun-goddess, Amaterasu Omikami. His nameless family has occupied the throne from prehistoric times. Despite the fact that the emperor as an individual has historically taken comparatively slight part in the administration or the policy-formation of the country, the significance of his position as the pivot in Japanese polity can hardly be exaggerated. This has not been the case, without exception, as study of Japanese history clearly demonstrates. The *tennō*, *tenshi*, or *kōtei* of Japan was an institution rather than a person; the office and the imperial family had been sacred for at least fourteen hundred years. Individual holders of the office have been subjected, however, to alternate ups and downs; through the centuries prior to the modern period many "Heavenly sovereigns," as previously mentioned, were forced to abdicate while several died tragic deaths. Nevertheless, throughout the long life of the empire on but one occasion has a subject (the eighth-century Buddhist monk, Dōkyō, who was the lover of the reigning empress, Kōken) openly aspired to the throne. And, even he, on being informed that the divine oracle at Usa in Kyushu disapproved, did not push his plans to completion.

Ideology with respect to the imperial position in modern times, and the foundations of its contemporary strength, are, as far as enunciation of theory is concerned, to be traced to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The *de facto* authority of the *tennō*, however, in so far as it existed in reality, dated only to the Restoration of 1868. Interestingly enough, recrudescence of the Nipponese version of divine right of kings was bound up with a reaction against Chinese political thought, accompanied by a feeling of scorn for the Chinese who had so elaborated their systems of ethics and philosophy and had so often overthrown their imperial houses.

Living under such an absolutist system, the ordinary Japanese was

overly conscious of the vast gulf separating him from the *tennō* and the nobility. As in the case of every other people, the Nipponese have been conditioned in their attitudes and policies by a concatenation of historical circumstances. Economic problems, social habits, geographical location, and religious traditions combined to form their ideological pattern. Until well past the middle of the nineteenth century, the Japanese were living under medieval conditions and feudal government. At the time, therefore, when it became desirable for them to change from isolation to participation in the life of the family of nations, they were reasonably well qualified to make a start because of the administration and the discipline under which they had lived for centuries. They were accustomed to obey arbitrary commands issued by both local and national authorities. They were motivated by a strong sense of nationalism and a highly developed spirit of patriotism and *tennō*-adulation. They were consumed, moreover, by a zealous determination to save their country from Western aggression and to develop it into a world power by any and all methods. They would, if necessary, stoop—and they have, indeed, on many occasions, stooped—to conquer.

When, in the middle years of the nineteenth century, the Nipponese were forcefully confronted by representatives of a civilization less admirable in their eyes but more effective in technique than their own, they did what their ancestors had done. In the ancient period, notably during the first seven centuries of the Christian era, when the Yamato leaders had realized that Chinese civilization was superior to that of Nippon, the people had changed. In the nineteenth century farsighted statesmen believed that the way of the future was the way of the West; again the people acquiesced. Wholeheartedly they set to work to bring over everything desirable for the modernization, stabilization, and strengthening of their country. They wasted no energy in worshipping a glorious past but laid the foundations of a brilliant future by acting upon the theory of testing what appealed to them and holding fast only to what was expedient. Consequently, in entering upon world relationships, they quickly became able to assume most of the duties of, as well as to demand the rights due, a sovereign member of the family of nations. Out of defeat the Nipponese since 1945 have rapidly begun rehabilitating their land, and have once again taken a prominent place in world affairs.

Nevertheless, there still survive in Nippon divers feudal, clan-military aspects of life. In so far as the country has been revolutionized, it has been so mainly along technical-material lines; to a minor degree only has the revolution been cultural and ideological. Despite tendencies toward, and actualities of, surface modernization in Nippon, students of its history and observers of its daily life are constantly impressed by

the existence of an inner life which resists change, a hard core which has never been completely dissolved by the acid of alien learning.¹³

OCEANIA

To the east and south of Japan, the Pacific Ocean covers an area greater by far than the total land area of the world. Its vast expanse is dotted intermittently by thousands of islands of all sizes. In the Pacific certain archipelagos, such as Japan and the Philippines, originated as volcanoes. Other islands, large and small, are little more than masses of coral which have been formed above the water's surface by subterranean pressures.¹⁴ In certain areas—particularly north of the equator—bits of land appear in groups, such as the Carolines or Marianas. Nearer the Asiatic mainland the islands are generally larger and more densely populated.

Between the international date line—the 180th degree of longitude—and Asia, Indonesians ("Island Indians") and Melanesians ("Black Islanders") predominate. In the northern sector of this oceanic area the inhabitants are mostly Indonesians of Malay origin, as in Borneo and the Philippines. The Melanesians live in the southern sector, and are predominantly negrito in origin, as in the Solomon Islands. The Micronesians ("Tiny Islanders") live north of the Melanesians in such groups as the Marianas and the Carolines. East of the international date line, the light-brown Polynesians ("Many Islanders") live in the Samoan and Hawaiian groups; they appear to be a hybrid stock developed by the intermixture of Caucasian, Negroid, and Mongolian peoples.

The natives of the Pacific isles probably migrated in numerous waves from various parts of the Asiatic continent, and possibly from South America. The Polynesians have attained the highest degree of culture; the Melanesians appear to be the most primitive. Pidgin English is probably the only trait that tends to unify the peoples of Oceania, where diversity and division are the most unvarying features of life. Native languages and dialects are counted by the hundreds and thousands, while religions and cults are almost equally numerous.

Europeans have adventured and traded in the Pacific islands ever since the voyage of Magellan more than three hundred years ago. It was not, however, until the nineteenth century that Oceania was systematically partitioned by the Western powers. During the years since the "White Man" has become overlord, the natives and their cultures

¹³ The most profound analysis of Japan's reaction to foreign influence is G. B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950).

¹⁴ For detailed data consult R. W. Robson (ed.), *The Pacific Islands Year Book* (American reprint; Springfield, Mo., 1944). Also see F. M. Keessing, *The South Seas in the Modern World* (New York, 1941); Fairfield Osborn (ed.), *The Pacific World* (New York, 1944).

have gradually been disappearing. In the Second World War, the Pacific and its islands were the battlegrounds for some of the bitterest engagements fought between Japan and the United Nations.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

South of Japan, within a few hours' steaming of Formosa (Taiwan) and about five hundred miles southeast of Kwangtung, lie the Philippine Islands. These islands, with the Malay Peninsula to the southeast, form the southern gate to the coast of Asia from the Indian and the southern Pacific oceans. The archipelago includes more than seven thousand islands, many of which contain less than one square mile of territory. More than nine-tenths of the total land area of one hundred fifteen thousand square miles lie in eleven islands, the largest being Luzon.¹⁵

Close as the islands are to the Asiatic coast and the Japanese archipelago, their commercial, as well as their strategic, importance is clear. Chinese are known to have visited the islands during the T'ang and Sung periods (between A.D. 906 and 1127) and very probably several centuries earlier. In later periods, Chinese intercourse with the Philippines increased in value and importance, many Chinese intermarrying with the natives and taking up permanent residence in the islands. As had the Koreans and the Japanese, so did the Filipinos derive important aspects of their earlier civilization from China.

During the sixteenth century, the Philippine Islands became the scene of serious quarrels between Spanish and Portuguese explorers and adventurers. The Spaniards looked upon the islands as the western boundary of their sector of the colonial world, while the Portuguese considered that they formed the eastern boundary of their overseas world. This conflict, along with many others, was partially resolved in 1580 when the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were temporarily consolidated.

As a Spanish possession until 1898, the civilization of the island peoples was, and to a great extent still is, a mixture of Malayan, Chinese, and Iberian strains. Roman Catholics and Mohammedans are the two largest organized religious groups, whereas the older and more backward tribal groups still cling to primitive superstitions and beliefs.

Long before the islands were wrested from Spain's control in 1898-99, widespread discontent with that country's rule had existed among the islanders. Pressing domestic issues were disregarded by the Spaniards. Even the most elementary reforms were viewed as subversive. Popular demonstrations against the Spanish overlords were often accompanied by requests for help from outside. When American forces occupied the archipelago, the most bitter disappointment of the native rebels was the

¹⁵ For a general description and the early history of the Philippines consult chaps. I and II of W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass., 1945).

decision of the United States to annex and govern the islands as a colonial possession.


Although Spanish and American control of the Philippines was resented, Western organization helped immeasurably in bringing to the islands many of the devices and techniques that improve and prolong life. Perhaps the spiritual and the material rewards of beneficent colonialism have been as many and as important as the spiritual and physical discomforts that accompany alien rule. The long march toward independence and self-government, however, finally came to an end on July 1, 1946, when the United States voluntarily permitted the Filipinos to govern themselves and to attempt to determine their own future.

SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

Burma, Indo-China, Malaya, Siam, and the islands of the Indonesian archipelago constitute the area usually called southeastern Asia. Here numerous racial and cultural streams from continental Asia, Japan, and Europe merge with the native and indigenous cultures of the Pacific basin.¹⁶ Ordinarily, no sharp line can be drawn between the intermixed peoples of north and south. In the semi-continental northern sector, however, the inhabitants are mainly of Malayan ancestry with strong Mongolian admixtures; in the maritime southern sector, the peoples are principally of Malayan origin with decided Negrito and Papuan traits and features. In the continental countries, Buddhism and its attendant rites and customs prevail, whereas in the insular groups of the south, Mohammedan and Arabic beliefs and customs predominate. Although such differences in heritage exist, a fundamental unity based on geography, kinship, customs, and economic organization exists in parallel with the elements of diversity.

Situated in the tropics astride the equator, southeastern Asia has luxuriant natural vegetation. Cultivated crops, however, have ever been difficult, largely because of excessive rainfall. Nevertheless, southeastern Asia is one of the few rice surplus regions of the Far East and has, therefore, vital importance to rice-importing countries like Japan and China. Along the seacoast and in the lowland areas, the heat and humidity are oppressive for many months of the year. In the hot months, wealthy natives and foreigners usually seek refuge in the northern mountains where temperature is a matter of altitude rather than season. During the summer, all of southeastern Asia receives ocean winds from the south, southeast, and southwest; during the winter, land winds blow from the north, northeast, and northwest. By taking advantage of these monsoons, early sailing vessels in this area were able to traverse the seas with comparative ease and regularity.

¹⁶ See especially, *inter alia*, Bruno Lasker, *Peoples of Southeast Asia* (New York, 1944).



Western Expansion into Southeastern Asia, 1900

More than one thousand years ago oriental peoples traveling by land and sea were attracted by southeastern Asia. The Siamese, for instance, are descended in considerable part from the Lao-Thai, a group which originated in southwestern China and, migrating to Siam between the sixth and thirteenth centuries, merged with the Khmers. Arab traders from India and the Near East invaded the maritime areas of southeastern Asia centuries before the Europeans first made their appearance in the Straits of Malacca in the early sixteenth century. Under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese adventurers and merchants also appeared more frequently than ever before in the marketplaces of the south.

Like earlier and later Asian invaders, the Europeans were particularly attracted by the natural wealth of what Pliny the Elder (A.D. 23-79) had referred to as the "Golden Chersonese" located far to the east of the Roman Empire. Spices from the Indies were sought in particular by the early European explorers. In more recent times, the area has been one of the world's richest in the raw materials necessary to industrial nations. Rubber and tin especially are to be found in quantities unrivaled by other world sources. Rich supplies of manganese, oil, and tungsten also help to make southeastern Asia one of the world's key economic areas.

Since the sixteenth century, the struggle to control and exploit the lands and the peoples of tropical Asia has been one of mounting seriousness. At first, the Portuguese and the Dutch strove for supremacy with but occasional interference from the Spanish and the French. During the eighteenth century, the English defeated the French in India and laid the foundations for their great Indian empire. To defend India's eastern approaches and to maintain communications with China and in the Pacific, the control of the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca was necessary. At the crossroads of travel north and south, east and west, the Malay Peninsula from the dawn of history has been a melting pot of humanity and a land of chaos.

Out of this confusion the empire-builders of Great Britain gradually brought order. By 1790, the British had acquired Penang near the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca. After protracted negotiations, Sir Stamford Raffles, in 1824, acquired the island of Singapore at the tip of the Malay Peninsula as a permanent possession of the English East India Company. In the same year, he also obtained control of Malacca from the Dutch in exchange for several unimportant bits of territory in Sumatra. In this fashion England gained control of the route from India to the Far East and, incidentally, acquired a considerable interest in the development of Malaya's rich natural resources.

Thereafter, the British extended their hold over Burma, while France, in the second half of the nineteenth century, gradually annexed Indo-

China. Between the English and the French areas of predominance, little Siam was forced to play one great power off against the other in order to retain a precarious independence. By the dawn of the twentieth century the Dutch in the Indies, the British in Burma and Malaya, and the French in Indo-China, presided over the future of southeastern Asia. The white man had become predominant in the tropics, and a major factor to reckon with in other parts of the Far East.

CHAPTER II

THE ADVANCE OF THE WEST AND RUSSIA

The historian of the Far East two or three centuries hence, when he composes himself for a survey of the interrelations of East and West during the half millennium following the fifteenth century, will appreciate the significance of the nineteenth century with a considerably greater degree of clarity than any now living can hope to achieve. He may remark that developments in the relations of Westerners and Russians with the peoples of eastern Asia from about 1500 to 1800 constituted a long and important prologue to a short, but exciting, drama played mainly in the nineteenth century. This drama, the leads for which were enacted for the most part by Europeans, unfolded itself on the fringes of Asia. Conceivably the first half of the twentieth century may be regarded as having constituted the epilogue of the play in which the leading roles passed from non-Asiatic to Asiatic actors—whereas the latter half of the century may be found to have witnessed the opening of a sequel the reverse in plot and action of that which preceded it.

The prologue to the drama enacted in the Far East during the nineteenth century need not be considered in detail. The Europeans approached the eastern extremities of Asia by land and by sea during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; they struggled bitterly among themselves, and on occasion with Orientals, for a foothold in eastern Asia, exhausting in the process the channels of diplomacy, religion, and war. With the exceptions, however, of Russia in the wilderness of Siberia, of the Dutch in the East Indies, and of Spain in the Philippine archipelago, they held, at the end of the century of Enlightenment, relatively little of a physical nature in the Far East—and not much more of a nonphysical—to compensate them for their pains.

For a few years in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the first of the seventeenth the outlook for a partial Europeanization of Japan appeared bright—then (1636–41) the *de facto* government of Japan closed its doors to Westerners,¹ leaving but one tiny window partly open to the Dutch. The Japanese themselves were strictly forbidden to leave their country. During approximately the same period, the Jesuits in China were acting as cultural liaison officers between the civilizations of East and West. Their prospects, too, were bright; then occurred the Rites Controversy, lasting a century (*ca.* 1635–1742), and the hands

¹ Carefully limited relations continued with the Chinese and Koreans.

of the clock, in so far as the West was concerned, were pushed back while China remained comparatively little affected.

To be sure there were by 1800 a few European footholds on and off the coast of eastern Asia. The Dutch, who had established themselves in Java early in the seventeenth century, but who had been expelled from the No-Man's Land of Formosa in 1661, continued to trade at Deshima in Nagasaki harbor after the closure of Japan to other Europeans. The Portuguese were ensconced at Macao where they had been since about 1557. Both peoples were, however, under the legal and actual control of the native rulers of the respective areas occupied by them. Tourane in Annam and Pulo-Condore off the coast of Cochinchina had been ceded to France in 1787 and constituted the foundation of the French position in Indo-China. Three years later the small island of Penang, off the southwest coast of the Malay Peninsula, was ceded to Great Britain. It alone constituted evidence of the march of Britain from India to the extreme Orient.

At the turn of the nineteenth century no Asiatics and few, if any, Europeans could have imagined the course which international events were to take during the next one hundred years. Continental Europe was engrossed with the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte; the tiny republic of the United States of America was not vitally interested in Asia. Although some of its nationals had for years participated in the Canton trade, the United States was not interested strategically or territorially in the lands across the Pacific.

Two Western powers were, nevertheless, manifesting a continued and increasing interest in the Far East which they were to maintain throughout the century. In the north, Russia, pressing east and south by land and by sea, constituted a source of disturbance to China and to Japan. At the southeastern tip of the Asiatic continent Great Britain, absent-mindedly as far as London was concerned, with great prescience as regards its administrators in the East, was slowly but surely securing and fortifying the maritime route leading to the farthest East.

Despite these encroachments, the year 1800 found eastern Asia as a whole in a relatively quiescent state. In the Malay archipelago the Dutch were in a parlous condition; in 1798 the powers of their East India Company had been taken over by the Netherlands government, and the company—which had paid no dividends since 1782—had been abolished. In the Philippines, with the exception of fear lest the English again seize the islands, as they had done in 1762, the Spaniards had little to worry them aside from Moro piratical raids. In Annam a civil war was drawing to a close. The year 1801 was to witness a temporary restoration with the aid of a French volunteer force from India of unity to the old Annamite Grand Empire of the South. To the west, Siam, having expelled French

missionaries by 1780, and being no longer in danger of Burmese invasions, was distinctly on the upgrade. In Japan, the administrative machine of the *bakufu*, established two centuries earlier by Tokugawa Iyeyasu, was yet working smoothly, although the government was distinctly on the decline. Despite occasional sufferings of the people from natural calamities, the Tokugawa era was a period of peace for Japan, marred but slightly by the actions of Russians in the distant, thinly populated, and but little known islands of the far north. In Korea, the rulers at Seoul were motivated by one idea—to have as little as possible to do with foreigners, their governments, persons, trade, religion, ideas, or institutions. Korea had borne the brunt of several invasions by her neighbors and stood determined to preserve her peaceful isolation.

The Manchu-Chinese empire and its far-flung state-system of dependencies and vassal kingdoms had never appeared more secure from external danger than it did in the year 1800. The long and glorious Ch'ien-lung reign (1736–95) had but recently drawn to a close. During this period the boundaries of the empire had been extended to the west farther than at any time since the glorious days of the T'ang (618–907). Manchuria, the ancestral home of the dynasty, and Mongolia, both Inner and Outer, were parts of the empire. Burma, Siam, Annam, Laos, Sulu, Liu-ch'iu and Korea were sending periodic tribute missions to Peking. Three quarters of a century earlier (1724) Christianity, the disturbing religion of the Europeans, had been banned and driven underground. Meanwhile, a handful of "barbarian" traders from the West were carrying on trade at Canton under the strict control of Chinese officials, while a precarious residence for a few was maintained at Macao near-by—like-wise under native sovereignty. In the eyes of the Chinese and their Manchu rulers, England was no more than an equal of Sulu and Liu-ch'iu. The same was true of Holland which was listed as a vassal of the Great Emperor. With the Russians only had there been any relations on a basis of apparent equality.

In reality, nevertheless, the great days of Ch'ing rule were finished and the Chinese empire was distinctly on the decline, but this none suspected—least of all the Manchus. The inept rulers who followed the Ch'ien-lung emperor were to attempt ineffectually to control what their predecessors had gained; this in the face of alien waves of commercialism, militarism, religion, and philosophy which were to sweep over the East during the next one hundred years. For the moment, however, such clouds as appeared on the horizon were no larger than the proverbial man's hand. China was supreme on a pinnacle of power, the center of the world. The Far East as a whole was at peace and looked to the Celestial Empire as the fount of culture and the source of authority.

EUROPEAN CONQUESTS IN SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

While Napoleon's armies held Europe in thrall, the Dutch and British advanced their banners in southeastern Asia and struggled with each other for control of the Indies. Although the British won temporary control in the islands, the Indies were returned in 1816 to the Dutch as part of the international bargain arranged at the Congress of Vienna. As compensation for her open-handedness in Europe and Asia, and as recognition of her imperial and maritime ambitions, England received overseas commercial and naval bases, such as Cape Colony and Ceylon, which guaranteed her control of the sea lanes to India. Meanwhile, ambitious British planners of empire, like Sir Stamford Raffles, laid the foundations for Britain's control of the sea lanes from India to the Far East.

The Vienna settlement, while setting the broad lines for a peaceful resolution of European and overseas problems, left many issues for bilateral negotiation between the Dutch and the British. Both cherished ambitions in southeastern Asia, but no clear line of demarcation had been drawn between their respective spheres of influence. As a first step toward the settlement of these issues, Raffles in 1819 negotiated with the Sultan of Johore for the transfer of the island of Singapore to the British East India Company. Five years later he added Malacca to the British chain of naval and commercial outposts on the route from India to the extreme Orient. In 1824, he also helped to bring about an Anglo-Dutch settlement which left the Dutch free to develop the Indies without interference, and left the British free to push ahead with their plans for controlling the sea route to China and for extending their coastal footholds back into the hinterlands of southeastern Asia. Bits of territory were exchanged to exclude Britain from the islands and the Dutch from the continent. On the basis of this settlement the Dutch looked forward to incorporating all of Borneo into the Netherlands Indies but agreed in 1847 to divide with the English. A generation later (1884-85) the great island of New Guinea to the east of Borneo was divided among the Dutch, British, and Germans. The Dutch, nevertheless, continued throughout the nineteenth century to preside over the destinies of most of the Indies from their administrative center of Batavia on Java.

Meanwhile the Malay Peninsula, Siam, and Burma, long listed as vassals of China, were feeling the impact of the British Empire. Contemporaneously with the Anglo-Dutch exchange of territory in 1824, Burma fought its first war with the British; as a result the latter gained Assam and the Tenasserim. With the former annexation Britain drew closer to Tibet and China proper; with the latter, to Siam, and gained control of the long upper half of the west coast of the Malay Peninsula.

By the Anglo-Burmese wars of 1852 and 1885-86, all of Burma was absorbed into the British Empire regardless of the tenuous claims of China to suzerainty.

Having gained by 1824 complete dominance of the main route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and, in 1842, having added Hongkong off the south coast of China to their possessions, the English proceeded to the further aggrandizement of their position on the Malay Peninsula. In 1867, between the second and third wars with Burma, they incorporated Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Wellesley Province, and the Dindings into the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements. Thus Great Britain assumed control of one of the chief tin producing areas of the world. In 1885 the State of Johore, to which Singapore had originally belonged, accepted British protection. Eleven years later the Federated Malay States, including Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, came into being as a British protectorate. The logic of events pointed at the close of the century to absorption by the British of the Malayan states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, Kedah, Legah, and Rahman, parts or the whole of which were in vassalage to Siam. To rid itself in part of the system of extraterritoriality and other special privileges enjoyed by British subjects, Siam relinquished these states to Great Britain by the treaty of March 10, 1909, and they became part of the Non-Federated States. And so an exceedingly rich area of fifteen thousand square miles, with a population of about one million people, was added to British Malaya—plus additional reservoirs of tin, gold, rice, and rubber.

While the English and the Dutch were engaged in defining their spheres of influence and consolidating and expanding their empires in the rich and strategic southern parts of the Far East, certain Frenchmen were not forgetful of their country's losses in India in the middle years of the eighteenth century, or of the foothold in Indo-China which their ancestors had obtained in 1787.² Most of the French, however, with the exception of a limited number of missionaries, were too busily employed in Europe to pay much attention to eastern Asia. Until well past the middle of the nineteenth century the clearly defined interests of France in the East were manifested only in the field of religion, the government having long claimed the right to protect Roman Catholic missions.

Problems arising out of Christian propaganda were to constitute the excuse seized upon by France in building a new empire in Indo-China and in the furtherance of commercial and political interests in the Middle Kingdom. The murder of a French priest in China in 1856, and of a Spanish Dominican bishop in Annam in the following year, resulted,

² For details on Indo-China see T. E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indo-China* (Chicago, 1936). More recent data in R. Stanley Thomson, "The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Cambodia," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IV (1944-45), 313-40; and the same author's "Siam and France, 1863-70," *ibid.*, V (1945-46), 28-46.

respectively, in the co-operation of France with England in the Second Anglo-Chinese War (1856–60) and the dispatch of a Franco-Spanish expedition to Annam in 1858. In June, 1862, Tu-duc, the emperor of Annam, was forced to submit to a treaty by which the French were ceded the three eastern provinces of Cochin-China and given the right to penetrate the interior by way of the Mékong River. Moreover, the emperor promised never to cede to any power other than France any part of his dominions. In the following year a French protectorate was established over Cambodia. Over this kingdom suzerainty was claimed by both Annam and Siam. In 1867 the French were able to annex the three remaining provinces of Cochin-China.

France now controlled the entire Mékong River south of its passage between Siam and Laos; unfortunately, however, it was found that the Mékong did not provide a satisfactory trade route to the provinces of southwest China as the French had hoped. In Tonkin, to the north, is the Red River which French explorers had discovered by 1871 to be an easy route to Yünnan. But Annamite officials refused to permit the use of the Red River, and hostilities ensued. Failing to obtain support from the French governor to whom he appealed for aid, Emperor Tu-duc called in Chinese forces to his assistance. With this aid he temporarily checkmated the French.

On account of the losses and exactions resulting from the Franco-Prussian war, France was in no condition to use force on a grand scale in Annam—but diplomacy was not impracticable. Now was created another precedent of significance in the modern history of the Far East: the thread which held Annam to China in nominal vassalage was to be severed by France, the complete independence of the Empire of the South being recognized. This was accomplished by treaties signed at Saigon in March and August, 1874—the first of peace and alliance, the second commercial. France extended its protection over what was left of the empire after Annam had recognized the complete sovereignty of France over Cochin-China. The Catholic religion was granted complete toleration and many additional privileges. Extraterritoriality was instituted under control and jurisdiction of the French Resident. Ports were opened to trade, the Red River becoming a passage to Yünnan for the French.

China was doubly affronted: by the transfer of Annamite allegiance to France and by the attempts of the French to open trade relations with Yünnan. Nor was Annam happy over the new state of affairs: it continued to dispatch tribute missions to Peking and attempted to establish closer relations with Spain and Siam—which France watchfully prevented. During the years 1880–82 China unavailingly protested. In August, 1882, following the death of Emperor Tu-duc and the accession of an

infant to the throne, the treaty of Hué was imposed by France upon Annam. The latter now recognized anew its status as a French protectorate and agreed that France should control its foreign relations. Cochin-China was enlarged. French Residents were henceforth to administer Tonkin. Annam proper was to be autonomous, except for customs and public works. The Red River was to be controlled by French military posts as long as this might appear desirable.

Out of the *mélange* of armed strife and diplomacy, in which French, Annamese, and Chinese troops and officials were engaged in the decade 1873-83, the inglorious Franco-Chinese war of 1883-85 resulted. This was little more than a continuation of sporadic fighting, alternating with diplomacy, which had characterized the preceding period, but from it France emerged with what it had for a generation been seeking. By the treaty of Tientsin of 1885, and the subsequent conventions of 1887 and 1895, China not only surrendered to France suzerainty over Annam but ceded bits of its own territory; treaty ports in Yünnan and Kwangsi were opened; tariffs on goods imported over the Tonkin frontier were materially lowered. Moreover, a preferred position for France was agreed to with respect to the building in the future of railways in the south.

To summarize completely the development of French empire in the extreme east it is necessary, as it was with reference to the British in Malaya, to turn again to Burma and Siam. One of the major causes of the third war of the British against Burma in 1885-86, following swiftly upon conclusion of the Franco-Chinese war, was the attempt of the Burmese ruler to aid the French at the expense of the English. Late in 1885 it appeared that English trading interests were to be supplanted by those of France. Accordingly the Burmese king was taken prisoner, his realm was annexed, and Siam found itself wedged between two empires administered by the French and the English.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Siam had enjoyed a relatively high degree of success in steering clear of entanglements with Europe. Far from granting extraterritoriality, the Siamese had made it exceedingly clear that aliens were to be in every way, and on all occasions, subject to officials of the royal government. Not until 1885, and then with limitations, was extraterritoriality granted the English in the Bowring treaty. The most-favored-nation clause was incorporated in the same agreement. Opium might be admitted without duty, other imports paying only three per cent *ad valorem*; exports were to pay according to a schedule affixed to the treaty. Alarmed by the encroachments of Great Britain in Burma and the Malay Peninsula, the Siamese had confidentially offered Townsend Harris in 1856 a monopoly of trade in exchange for the protection of an alliance with the United States. This offer had not been taken up.

Great as was the danger from the English in the west and south, it was equally great from the French to the east. Following a British refusal to agree to a French proposal of 1885 for the neutralization of Siam, the French in the following years developed what were called "legitimate aspirations." Thereafter it seemed likely for a time that Siam as a political entity would cease to exist. France took up Annam's dispute with Siam over control of Laos. Political and military unrest resulted which gave the French an opportunity almost to double their Asiatic empire at the expense of Siam. Following the death, in June, 1893, of a French military inspector, at the hands of the Siamese Frontier Commissioner, France rushed a flotilla to Bangkok which threatened to bombard the capital, while French land forces advanced from Annam to seize several Laotian towns.

By the resulting treaty of Bangkok, signed in October, 1893, Siam surrendered the islands in the Mékong and the territory to the east of that river south of the twenty-third degree north latitude and withdrew all troops and police from the right bank of the Mékong to a distance of more than fifteen miles. In addition, an indemnity of two million francs was imposed on Siam. By article viii of the treaty, the French acquired the right to throw a mantle of extraterritoriality over their Asiatic, as well as their European, subjects. In this expansion of extraterritoriality from judicial to political objectives the French were followed to a lesser degree by the English. The French, however, did not stop with extraterritorializing their own Asiatic subjects. They shortly decided to protect certain classes of Chinese immigrants to Siam who were encouraged to register at French consulates. The *resortissants*, as the protected Asiatics were known, increased in three years from two hundred to thirty thousand and the influence of France was correspondingly augmented.

Growth of the French empire, physically and nonphysically, bade fair to bring France and Great Britain face to face in the Far East, a possibility which the latter, sensitive with respect to India, could not envisage with equanimity. In 1895 the English entered upon negotiations with the French which were concluded on January 15, 1896, by the signing of a convention. The two powers now guaranteed the independence of Siam. England, converted to the idea suggested by the French eleven years earlier, agreed with France to the neutralization of the rich Menam River basin constituting the heart of the country, and other river basins in the north and south. Spheres of influence of the French east of the Mékong and of the British in the west were outlined. The two signatories also agreed jointly to use influence to obtain from China equal economic status in Yünnan and Szechuan.

Eight years later in 1904, another treaty between the two European powers redefined more explicitly their respective spheres of influence in

Siam. The French sphere was now recognized to have advanced westward from the Mékong to the Menam and south to the Gulf of Siam; that of Great Britain was to be to the west of the Menam and the Gulf. In the same year, a new Franco-Siamese treaty was substituted for that of 1893; in 1907 an additional convention was signed. Battambang and Angkor were given up to Cambodia by Siam apparently without serious protest, because ethnically the territories were never Siamese. France returned certain small territories to Siam and agreed that the Asiatic *resortissants* might be subjected in another decade to the courts of Siam. Moreover, France now renounced all designs on territory recognized as Siamese. Great Britain followed suit in 1909, as earlier mentioned, by persuading Siam to relinquish suzerainty over several Malay states in the south (where the Siamese were never firmly entrenched anyway) in exchange for concessions with respect to extraterritoriality.³ By 1909 all danger of further territorial losses to Siam had passed and the small state was apparently content with its bargains. The country had been rendered more compact by the cession to its neighbors of something over 100,000 square miles but, as a state, little smaller than France and enjoying the good will of its neighbors, it had remained sovereign, gone far on the road to prosperity, and made great advances toward ridding itself of extra-territoriality.

During the years in which the frontiers of Indo-China had been pushed northward and westward at the expense of China and Siam, respectively, the rulers of France's eastern empire had been engaged in attempts to solve their problems of administration. French policy after 1890 was set by Residents and implemented through native channels. The dignity and nominal authority of the imperial court of Annam were restored. In 1894 the control of the new empire was handed over to the Ministry of Colonies after having been supervised in turn by the Ministry of the Marine and the Ministry of Commerce. In 1897 a French Resident-Superior, who was responsible to the Governor-General, was appointed over Tonkin. This arrangement was instituted by Governor-General Paul Doumer (1897-1902) who centralized the administration of Indo-China under a federal form of government. During his term of office Kwangchow Bay was leased from China in April, 1898, for a period of ninety-nine years as a naval station; thus France advanced a stage further into south China. Kwangchow Bay was administered as one of the six units of the French empire in the east. Until the end of the Second World War the other units consisted of the direct colony of Cochin-China, ruled by a governor, and the four protectorates of Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos—each under a Resident-Superior. At the

³ See L. P. Briggs, "The Treaty of March 23, 1907 between France and Siam . . .," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, V (1945-46), 439-54.

top was the Governor-General assisted by a Secretary-General and a Government Council for all Indo-China.

At the close of the nineteenth century France had all but completed the conquest of an Asiatic empire almost half again the size of the "stepmother" country with a population of approximately twenty million. This was accomplished in almost exactly fifty years—1857–1907—in the face at times of great popular opposition in France itself. That something more than Indo-China was aimed at was indicated by Jules Ferry in 1883. "It is not a question of the future of tomorrow," said he, in defending his policies in Tonkin, "but of the future of fifty or a hundred years, of that which will be the inheritance of our children, the bread of our workers. It is not a question of conquering China. But it is necessary to be at the portal of this rich region in order to undertake the pacific conquest of it."⁴ To this conquest—pacific or otherwise—attention must now be directed.

WESTERN PENETRATION OF CHINA TO 1860

Malaysia, Burma, Siam, and Indo-China were of tremendous commercial and strategic value; compared to the potentialities of the vast and rich empire of China, however, they appeared to fade almost into insignificance. While the Europeans had launched drive after drive, commercially and religiously, against China for more than three centuries, it was not until the nineteenth that the walls of that empire, physical and nonphysical, began to crumble. In the final successful, and essentially commercial, charge it was the English—first to pass through and enjoy the profits of the Industrial Revolution—who took the lead. As early as 1635 they had appeared in China. Developing their trade slowly under monopoly of the East India Company, which sought advantages of trade through peace, it was not until more than two centuries later, after the company had been deprived of its monopoly, that the First Anglo-Chinese War occurred.

The government of the self-sufficient Manchu-Chinese empire was but little interested in the "barbarian" traders from the West and the commodities which they imported. Secure in the belief that China needed nothing from Europe, its object was to keep them at something more than arm's length and to control them rigidly by rule. Outsiders might have contact with China only on China's terms. That the rulers of the empire sincerely believed they held the whiphand was shown by their callous treatment of the Macartney (1793) and Amherst (1816) embassies and by their readiness to suspend trade when their strict rules

⁴ Quoted by, and from, N. D. Harris, *Europe and the East* (Boston, New York, 1926), p. 360.

were broken.⁵ Strictness of their trading regulations may be illustrated by reference to the rules forbidding the merchants to bring women to the factories at Canton, where alone, after 1757, foreigners were allowed to trade; to hire Chinese servants; to use sedan chairs; to row on the river; to present petitions to officials; to go inside the walls of Canton; and to remain in their factories—between the walls and the river—out of the trading season.

In and after 1729 foreign opium, imported by the Portuguese and other Westerners, as well as by Asiatics, supplemented that produced in China. For this foreign commodity, as for no other, there developed an increasing demand. To meet this demand and to effect a more advantageous balance of payments in their trade with China, English and Americans in the last years of the eighteenth century began to carry considerable quantities of opium to Canton, 1070 chests being imported in 1796. Between 1835 and 1839 no fewer than 30,000 chests entered annually. In this trade the British led.

Despite unrestricted impositions upon foreign trade, rigid control of the traders themselves, and reiteration of imperial edicts, in and after 1800, forbidding trade in opium (to which neither the foreigners nor the local officials paid much attention), foreign trade flourished. By the second third of the nineteenth century, nevertheless, three sets of factors combined to bring about a war which resulted in a fundamental change in the relations of China with the Western world: first, long-time dissatisfaction on the part of Westerners generally with their ignominious position, socially, economically, and politically, was drawing to a head; second, perennial opposition on the part of English would-be traders with China to the monopoly of the East India Company resulted in the abolition by parliament of that monopoly, in 1833, and the throwing open of the trade to all Englishmen who might care to participate; third, the opium problem was approaching a climax.

Specifically, the crux of the matter lay in the removal, in 1834, from the English East India Company, a commercial body, of the authority to deal with China, and the assumption of that authority by the government of Great Britain. A sovereign, national state could not indefinitely tolerate cavalier treatment of its subjects and officials by the government of a state presuming to "sway the ten thousand kingdoms," and which admitted the existence of no equal. Because of these conditions the First Anglo-Chinese War was fought between 1839 and 1842. China

⁵ E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland, *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (From the 16th to the 20th Century)* (London, 1914), *passim*; H. B. Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China* (Oxford, 1926), IV, *passim*; E. H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750-1800* (Pullman, Washington, 1936), *passim*; J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* (Cambridge, 1953), chap. I.

went down to defeat, and in the process the shell of China was pierced and cracked.

The immediate outcome of the struggle was the signing by China of four treaties in the years 1842-44. In conjunction with the increasing weakness and corruption of the Manchu-Chinese bureaucracy and the Manchu dynasty, these treaties formed the cornerstone of the structure which was to hold the empire in thrall for an indefinite period and all but bring about its dissolution at the close of the century. The treaties of Nanking (1842) and the Bogue (1843) were with England; those of Wanghia and Whampoa (1844) were with the United States and France, respectively. By its first treaty England collected an indemnity of \$21,000,000 silver and received the island of Hongkong. By the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause in the commercial treaties of 1843-44, and inserted unilaterally in all but one of the later treaties,⁶ the nationals of the treaty powers were guaranteed equal enjoyment of the rights and privileges granted by China to any one of them. By the early years of the twentieth century, there were eighteen such powers.

In addition to these points the following were settled: five ports, hereafter spoken of as "treaty ports," were to be opened to foreign trade and residence, namely Canton, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai. Foreign consuls might be appointed to each who, in addition to their ordinary duties, should have jurisdiction over their respective nationals in both civil and criminal cases; thus the foundations were laid for the far-reaching system of extraterritoriality. Equality was stipulated as between foreign and Chinese officials of corresponding rank. The Cohong, or Chinese trade monopoly at Canton, was to be abolished, and a uniform and moderate tariff on exports and imports was to be imposed. Additional channels for indirect communication with Peking were provided. Finally, preparations were made for a renewal of missionary work by the inclusion in the American treaty of an article granting foreigners the right to buy Chinese books and employ Chinese teachers. No effort was made in these treaties to legalize or effectively regulate the opium trade. Opium was to remain a bitter problem for the next two decades.

In connection with the negotiation of the American treaty highlights were thrown on the question of most-favored-nation status. On October 8, 1842, American Commodore Lawrence Kearny expressed in writing to Ch'i Kung, the Manchu viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, his hope that American citizens would "be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nation most favored."⁷ He received a reassuring but

⁶ Not until the exchange of ratification of the Sino-Japanese treaty of Shimonoseki, on May 8, 1895, did Japan obtain most-favored-nation treatment for its subjects.

⁷ *Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 139*, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21. For exhaustive discussion of the relative responsibility of Americans, English, Manchus, and Chinese for treaty incorporation

indefinite reply. Early in 1843 the Commodore therefore seized the opportunity to state that his government would "demand" for its merchants whatever was granted by the emperor "to the traders from other countries." Nor was such a request out of harmony with China's traditional system of treating all "barbarians" equally. The formal incorporation of the principle which motivated English, Americans, Chinese, and Manchus is to be found in article viii of the Anglo-Chinese treaty of the Bogue of October 8, 1843. This reads in part: ". . . should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the Subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British subjects. . . ." ⁸

The American envoy, Caleb Cushing, landed in Macao on February 24, 1844, on his way to negotiate a treaty with China. Cushing's main object in China was, by the negotiation of a treaty, to insure permanently for American traders in China treatment equal to that meted out to other foreign nationals. Not until July 3, and after he had expressed himself in correspondence with the acting viceroy of Kwangtung "with extreme plainness and frankness" and relieved himself, as he reported, of "all the harsh things which needed to be said," did Cushing succeed in signing a treaty at Wanghia near Macao. Article ii of the treaty provides the safeguard sought by the envoy:

Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purpose of Commerce will pay the duties of import and export prescribed by the Tariff. . . . They shall in no case be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any other nation whatever. . . . And if additional advantages or privileges of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal, and impartial participation in the same.⁹

of the most-favored-nation principle, see T. Kearny, "Commodore Lawrence Kearny and the Open Door and Most Favored Nation Policy in China in 1842 to 1843," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April, 1932), Whole No. 189, pp. 162-90, and the same writer's "The Tsiang Documents Elipoo, Ke-Ying, Pottinger and Kearney and the Most Favored Nation and Open Door Policy in China in 1842-44; An American Viewpoint," *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, XVI (1932-33), 75-104; also T. F. Tsiang, "Notes and Suggestions: The Extension of Equal Commercial Privileges to Other Nations than the British after the Treaty of Nanking," *ibid.*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (October, 1931), 422-44, and the same writer's "A Note in Reply to Thomas Kearny," *ibid.*, XVI, 105-109; also see T. Kearny "Commodore Kearny and the Opening of China to Foreign Trade," *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, 111 (1936), 323-29. For the Chinese viewpoint on American aims see Earl Swisher (trans. and ed.), *China's Management of the American Barbarians* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 102-29.

⁸ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, 2 vols., published at the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs (2 ed., Shanghai, 1917), I, 393.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 677-90. See also E. H. Pritchard, "The Origins of the Most-Favored-Nation and the Open Door Policies in China," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, I (1941-42), 161-72.

The safeguarding principle here incorporated was preserved in all subsequent Sino-American agreements including the commercial treaty of November 4, 1946.

In the American view, if the Westerners in the East had rights, they had obligations also. Washington looked with disapproval upon seizure of territory from, or attacks upon the independence of, China—and later of Japan and Korea. It became a policy of the United States to support the nations of Asia in their struggle to maintain their independence; coincident with this, however, developed a resolution to hold the governments of these lands fully responsible to the duties of sovereignty in their relations with other governments. Accordingly, while opium was specifically declared in the Cushing treaty to be contraband and its importation into China by Americans penalized by confiscation of vessel and cargo, the enforcement of this provision was left to China as a sovereign state. In theory the policy appeared worthy of praise. China's inability, however, if not unwillingness, to function as a sovereign state was demonstrated by its failure to enforce its laws relating to opium; and the ineffectiveness of American policy in point of fact was made completely evident during the next few years.

It is to be remembered that it was not the United States but Great Britain which took the lead in negotiating with China along the lines just mentioned. To an uncertain degree Americans might have enjoyed the fruits of English victory—at least theoretically—without bothering to negotiate a treaty. 'Without a treaty, however, they would have had no opportunity to put into play their slowly forming policy of encouraging China to maintain its independence; nor would they have been able to find a complete diplomatic equivalent for the cession to Britain of Hongkong, a city which was developing as a military and naval base. The United States wanted no territory, but determination that its nationals should enjoy privileges not less valuable than those enjoyed by other aliens called for an equivalent. In the Cushing treaty these were gained by definite provisions for trade along the China coast from one treaty-port to another. From the latter, mainly, grew the foreign coast-wise trade which provided another troublesome issue in China's subsequent relations with the Westerners.

As a result of China's defeat by arms, a process was thus set in motion that transferred unilateral decisions from the hands of the Chinese to those of the Westerners. In other words, the era of "barbarian" relations was succeeded by the beginning of the era of "unequal" treaties. Viewed from the West, China was gradually forced to accept the Western conception of international relations, to enter into trade, and to begin an era of accommodation to the demands of modernity. On their side, the Chinese, faced by superior strength, strove to effect a settlement with

the Western powers not too far removed from the traditional methods of "barbarian management." To pacify the outsiders, the Manchus, who never officially considered the Canton trade as being important to China, consented to the expansion of trade relations in the hope of bringing the "barbarians" by gradual measures into a kind of psychological subjection to China.¹⁰

The five treaty ports and Hongkong provided the Westerners after 1842 with their footholds in China. From Canton northward along the coast to Shanghai, foreign establishments for business, religion, and pleasure set the tone of life in the treaty ports. Cut off from their own countries and left frequently for many months on their own resources, the Westerners looked to the British consuls as community leaders, judges, and negotiators with the Chinese. Little direct contact developed between the insulated foreign communities and the Chinese, and where it did, friction rather than harmony marked such relations. In their negotiations with the Chinese the consuls were required to invent means of dealing with officials trained in the Confucian tradition and little inclined to accept many of the major premises of international conduct considered right and normal in the West. Worried by what they considered to be the deviousness of the Chinese, the consuls soon learned to take a stand on disputed issues and to maintain it firmly no matter to what extremes the "barbarian-experts" of China might resort to bring about the psychological subjection of the foreigners. Behind the consuls' actions there always existed the implied threat of turning to "gun-boat diplomacy" should negotiations permanently break down. In this implied threat, understood by both parties, reposed the strength of the Western position.

Matters for negotiation were numerous as each side maneuvered for position in the silent struggle of the decade after 1842. Behind many of the misunderstandings lay the difficulty of accurate communication, differences about the interpretation of the same words and ideas, and variances in objectives. For example, to the Chinese the principle of the most-favored nation was thought of as part of the program of playing one "barbarian" off against the other; to the Westerners the equality of treatment provided for in the most-favored-nation principle was a guarantee that no nation should be able to monopolize China or its markets. Nor were the Westerners above playing Chinese off against Chinese. Cantonese were employed by the consular agencies and business firms to act as intermediaries between the Westerners and the Chinese of Fukien or Shanghai. In a sense the Cantonese invaded the more northern provinces as allies of the Westerners, though at times the Cantonese did not hesitate to work both sides of the street in their search for gain.

¹⁰ On China's reactions see Fairbank, *op. cit.*, especially p. 112.

They were particularly valuable as intermediaries in the illicit opium traffic that continued to complicate China's relations with the West in the middle of the nineteenth century.

As a result of such divergences, the treaty structure of 1842-44 began to break down almost as soon as it was completed. At Canton the tension was particularly acute. While the treaties called for the end of the Co-hong (merchant-guild) monopoly of trade, the same Chinese merchants continued to do business at the same stands and in the old way. The Hoppo, or the tax-farmer of the imperial court, continued to administer the customs as before, and the Manchu officials continued to demand extraordinary and heavy taxes from the Chinese merchants at Canton. Efforts on the part of the British community at Canton to see the old order changed met with both passive and active resistance by the Chinese. British demands to enter the city walls of Canton to do business aroused stubborn opposition, and after 1848, punitive actions were taken by both sides. A slowing down of trade aggravated the tensions and caused the Western merchants to press even harder for the quick resolution of outstanding issues. The Westerners felt, although perhaps without sufficient reason, that *likin* (the internal transit tax) was detrimental to foreign trade; the Chinese equally resented the invasion of the coastal trade by the foreigners, as well as their growing tendency to interfere in Chinese affairs and to supply Chinese rebels with arms and other forms of aid.

By 1850, trade on the China coast, whether in opium or legal commodities, had become involved with the domestic uprisings sweeping southern China. In the treaty ports native hostility to the foreigners produced unrest and fear. At Ningpo and Amoy legal trade almost ceased as piracy, extortion, and smuggling became the order of the day. The British in China were further threatened at mid-century by the increased activity of American and Portuguese merchants. Bound to uphold the treaties, the British consuls felt compelled to punish the smuggling activities being carried on by their own nationals. The effect of such actions, however, was to drive the traffic into the hands of Britain's competitors. Faced by what seemed an impossible situation, the British government gradually abandoned its efforts to uphold the treaty structure or even to revise it through the available diplomatic channels. Indeed, when Lord Palmerston in 1850 endeavored to communicate with Peking, his overture was met by austere silence. In appealing over the head of the imperial commissioner at Canton, Palmerston accomplished nothing and only incited the Manchu government to a stiffer anti-foreign program.¹¹ It was after this rebuff that Britain decided officially in 1851 to follow a policy of consular noninterference in China.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 378; for the Chinese documents relating to America see Swisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-204.

Palmerston's decision was but the first step toward the new war which broke out in 1856. Life for the foreigners in China became complicated in the extreme by the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion in 1853 and by the rebels' seizure of Amoy. In an effort to preserve the trade and to keep the treaty ports open, the foreigners resolved on a policy of co-operation to meet the threat to their positions, and at the same time to press for treaty revision. The Americans, British, and French, spurred on by the ideas of Rutherford Alcock, the British consul at Shanghai, also set up a customs house to take the place of the Chinese administration which had collapsed under the impact of civil war. While remaining officially neutral in the rebellion, the powers watched carefully over their trade interests and sought to keep trade on a legal basis by the establishment of the provisional system of collecting customs obligations in the name of and for the Peking government. By 1854, although after numerous embroilments with the provincial authorities, the foreign inspectorate of customs was set up at Shanghai. In return for a promise to pay back duties, Peking officially agreed to this unique establishment for the collection of China's revenues from foreign trade. Even before the outbreak of war therefore, the system of joint Chinese and Western administration of trade and the treaty ports had begun to emerge.

Early in October, 1856, hostilities were renewed by the British to avenge an insult to their flag administered by Commissioner Yeh in connection with the affair of the *Lorcha Arrow*. The government of Napoleon III, in pursuit of glory and empire, shortly allied itself with that of England because of the judicial murder of a French Catholic priest. The United States and Russia were invited to co-operate with England and France but declined, not because they were too proud or noble to fight, but because they could obtain their objectives with less trouble and by more agreeable means. By the autumn of 1860 the Second Anglo-(Franco) Chinese War had ended. Five additional treaties, three conventions, and new tariff and trade regulations were now added to the treaty structure to guide China along the way which Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would have it follow. The tariff and trade regulations had been completed in November, 1858. The opium traffic, which had no direct connection with the second war, was completely legalized on the triple initiative of China,¹² the United States, and Great Britain. The Yangtze was opened to steam navigation.

Several stories had now been added to the structure of foreign rights and interests in China—while a few units of the Chinese edifice had been completely removed. Indemnities totaling sixteen million taels had been imposed by Britain and France. Eleven treaty ports had been

¹² J. K. Fairbank, "Legalization of the Opium Trade Before the Treaties of 1858," *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, XVII, No. 2 (July, 1933), 215-63.

added to the five earlier opened. The extraterritoriality system had been expanded and solidified. Foreigners might travel hereafter for pleasure or trade in the interior if provided with passports. Foreign ministers might now reside in Peking, and foreign relations were no longer to be conducted through the Bureau of Dependencies, but through a newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tsungli Yamen. The latter, during the next generation, was to become in reality the cabinet of the empire. Foreign envoys were not to be called upon to perform derogatory ceremonies. Foreigners were no longer to be officially termed "barbarians." Diplomatic correspondence was to be conducted in the languages of the negotiating powers, the foreign text being authoritative. Viceroy and governors might no longer refuse interviews with foreign officials. Consuls and vice-consuls were equated to *Tao t'ais* and prefects, respectively, and were to be treated accordingly.

Not the least significant result of the treaty settlement of 1858-60 was the new status of Christianity and its missionaries. Prior to this period both Catholics and Protestants had lacked treaty basis for work outside the five original treaty ports; in consequence they were exceedingly anxious to have opened to them legally the vast vineyards of the interior. By the American and the French Treaties of Tientsin of 1858, the French Convention of Peking of 1860, and later agreements, missionaries were enabled to reside and work in the interior. With the exception of the diplomats residing in Peking, missionaries alone among foreign nationals had this right. Foreign influence was expanded many-fold by the penetration of the extraterritorialized Christian workers who, Catholic and Protestant, tended on numerous occasions to extend the system of extraterritoriality over their converts and to interfere in the judicial administration of native officials.

During the period 1850-65—more than covering the period of the Second Anglo-Chinese War—the Taipings, who had risen in Kwangtung and Kwangsi and were attempting to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty, swept northward into and through the Yangtze valley and all but reached Tientsin and Peking. Owing to the vigor with which the Peking forces attacked the rebels, and in part to the decision of the Western powers not to intervene on behalf of the Taipings, and finally to the decision of the Western powers to aid the imperial government with which they had established treaty relations, the Manchus were able ultimately to end the rebellion and retain the Mandate of Heaven until 1912. On the conclusion of the war of England and France against China in 1860 with its accompanying treaty settlement, and the extinction of the Taiping Rebellion in 1865, the Celestial Empire was given a respite, comparatively speaking, from aggressive attentions by the West.

RUSSIA'S EASTWARD EXPANSION TO 1860


In describing the nineteenth-century advance of western Europeans into eastern Asia by way of the sea, Russia was seldom mentioned. For purposes of clarity, it is desirable to consider the progress eastward by land of that vast conglomeration of peoples as a unit independent of, and comparatively little connected with, the Western world. To a remarkable degree throughout its history Russia has played a lone hand.

On account of its geographical position, its racial admixture, and its state policies, the empire of the tsars was Eurasiatic in a sense which has applied to no other political entity. To a degree it was European in its culture; to a degree it was Oriental; but to the greatest degree it was *Russian*. Like China, Russia is a world in itself. Because of its land hunger, its desire for maritime power—for which warm water outlets are necessary—its desire in recent years to spread a new ideology, and its distinguished ability to assimilate divers peoples and cultures by granting a degree of cultural autonomy, Russia constitutes a cause of perennial unrest, fear, stimulation, and sometimes hope in the extreme east as well as in other parts of the world.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, Russians had seriously begun to explore and conquer in Siberia. Ivan IV was the first ruler who referred to himself as "Siberian Tsar." By 1639 the Russians had reached the Sea of Okhotsk and were facing the Pacific. Their subsequent push was toward the south and was motivated in part by the spirit of exploration and in part by the desire to establish contact with the reputedly wealthy empire of China. In 1644, when the first Manchu emperor ascended the throne of China, Russian explorers were descending the Amur River. While an outpost was being established on the Amur, the Russians explored the Sungari and Ussuri rivers, and shortly came face to face with the Manchus and the Chinese. A struggle for control over the Amur region followed which was temporarily ended in 1689 by the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk (Nipchu): the first treaty between China and a European state and one which was negotiated as between essentially equal states.¹³

The Russians by the Nerchinsk arrangements were excluded from the Amur and from the southern slope of the Khingan Mountains, but their hold on the lands to the north of the mountains was officially recognized. The boundaries farther to the east were left undefined until 1858-60. After Nerchinsk, Tsar Peter the Great proclaimed the trade with China a state monopoly, and Russia sought in the eighteenth cen-

¹³ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, I, 3-13. For a discussion of the controversial articles in the treaty see W. Fuchs, "Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag von Nertschinsk vom Jahre 1689. Eine textkritische Betrachtung," *Monumenta Serica*, IV (1939-40), 546-93.



Foreign Holdings and Spheres of Influence in China about 1900

tury to build commercial and religious relations with the Peking government. A number of treaties and agreements to this end were concluded in the course of the eighteenth century. Among the several matters dealt with in these compacts outstanding were the delimitation of the boundaries in the neighborhood of Kiakhta, arrangements for carrying on of transfrontier trade, provisions for the suppression of brigandage with extradition for criminals, and permission for the opening of a legation in Peking after 1727. Occasional Russians were received in Peking during the eighteenth century, while in 1730 and 1733 Chinese missions were sent to St. Petersburg—the only ones sent by China to a foreign government until 1870.

From the first third of the eighteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth, Russian pressure upon the Manchu-Chinese empire was not conspicuous. However, expansion of the Russians eastward and south-eastward in their search for fur-bearing animals and food had not passed unnoticed. With the appearance of their vessels in the northern waters of Japan fear was aroused among the sons of Nippon that another invasion from the continent was in the making. By 1700, Kamchatka had been explored, and the Russians had learned of the Kurile Islands. In 1739, Petropavlovsk was founded on Kamchatka incidental to the Bering expeditions (1725–41), while contemporaneously (1738, 1739, 1742) Martin Spanberg, one of Bering's captains, led three expeditions to the Kuriles. By 1777 the Russians were actively surveying the waters north of Japan. During the next year a group of them seeking trade went to Nemuro, on the eastern tip of the island of Yezo. They were told to return the following year for a reply—at which time they were informed that trade was restricted to Nagasaki. Shortly thereafter, other Russians began to colonize in Yezo and the Kurile group. News of these developments reached the Tokugawa government at Yedo (modern Tokyo) as early as 1739. Not until 1780 and 1785, however, were Japanese missions of investigation sent to the southern Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, respectively. In 1786 the *shōgun's* government was informed that Kamchatka, which was looked upon as a Nipponese dependency, was under Russian control and that the situation in Yezo and the Kuriles was serious. Nothing was done immediately, however, on account of domestic issues in Yedo. Russian immigration therefore continued without interference.

In 1792–93, there appeared a Russian vessel with Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked in the Aleutian Islands a decade before. Commander Adam Laxman was anxious to repatriate these Japanese in the hope that trade relations might be established between Russia and Japan. Again the Russians were referred to Nagasaki—and the *bakufu* commissioners proceeded shortly to remove Russian boundary posts on

the Kurile island of Urup, northeast of Yezo, in an attempt to break up a Russian settlement. In 1804 the first Russian legate to Japan arrived at Nagasaki. This was Nicholas Rezánov (1764–1807), head of the Russian-American (Fur) Company. By patent of Tsar Paul issued in 1799 the company held dominion over the coast of Northwest America northward from latitude fifty-five, and over the islands from Kamchatka to Japan as well as from Kamchatka to Alaska. Rezánov's aim was a treaty with Japan by which food supplies might be obtained for the fur company. He failed. In revenge for this and for the treatment accorded him by the Japanese, he sent, two years later, two small vessels with about sixty men to ravage the northern Japanese islands. During the years 1806 and 1807, this area was terrorized by the Russians.

Among the reactions to Rezánov's revenge were the placing of the northern islands under the direct control of Yedo, until 1821, and the garrisoning of the area with some two thousand warriors. When in 1811, the Russian warship, *Diana*, appeared off the coast of Yezo on a surveying expedition, and a handful of men landed on Kunashiri, the Japanese were able to prevent the Russian plans from being realized by taking the group captive and holding them for more than two years. Their release was effected following the receipt by Nipponese officials of a Russian disavowal of responsibility for the forays of 1806 and 1807. An agreement was then reached by which the Kurile island of Urup was recognized as a neutral area, the north and south of which Russia and Japan respectively would control. Sakhalin was not mentioned.

During the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825–55), renewed pressure in the Far East began. This was due in part to the increasingly important relations between England, France, and the United States with China and Japan, and in part to the vigorous and strong-willed personality of the tsar himself and that of his representative in eastern Siberia, Nicholas Muraviev. From maritime commercial intercourse with China enjoyed by the three Western powers mentioned, Russia was expressly forbidden on the ground of its having a virtual monopoly of the overland trade in the north. Desire for participation in the lucrative sea trade, for a more definite settlement of frontiers, and for additional territory resulted in Muscovite activity during the middle years of the nineteenth century.

In 1847 the tsar appointed Nicholas Muraviev to the post of Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. During his tenure of office, Russia made a renewed effort to gain control of the Amur region. Access to the Amur would shorten the line of communication between European Russia and its extreme eastern possessions and would prevent eastern Siberia from falling into the hands of England, an eventuality which Russia greatly feared. In August, 1850, the Russian flag was raised near

the mouth of the Amur, and Nikolaievsk was founded. As China was exerting no authority on the northern bank of the river, several other towns were founded during the next few years, including Blagoveshchensk. Muraviev had in 1849 decided to transfer the Russian naval base in the east from Okhotsk to the magnificent harbor of Petropavlovsk on the southeastern coast of that great peninsula. Contemporaneously with Muraviev's decision, Nevelskoi discovered for the Russians what the Japanese explorer, Mamiya Rinzō, had learned more than a generation earlier, namely, that Sakhalin is an island instead of part of the mainland. Its position opposite the mouth of the Amur, with ice-free approaches from the south, rendered it of strategic importance; accordingly, during the years 1852-53, renewed exploration and colonization were undertaken on the island by Nevelskoi and his aides.

Approach of Russian power toward Japan by the double route of Kamchatka and Sakhalin kept alive fears in the minds of the Japanese at a time when renewed pressure on the part of the Western powers was being exerted at their front doors. In the face of Japanese opposition Nevelskoi asserted Russia's rights to Sakhalin on the dubious basis of the Sino-Russian treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), claiming the island as a prolongation of the basin of the Amur. With a handful of men, Nevelskoi continued his explorations. He also founded posts to the southward on the coast of the mainland until he had almost reached Korea.

During this period there came clearly into view the working of two factors which were, for long, outstanding in the history of Russia's expansion in the Far East, namely, Anglo-Russian rivalry and the pursuit of divergent policies within the Russian government itself. Fear of the growing power of Great Britain in China, including alarm lest the British seek control of the Amur, in conjunction with the desire of Russia to participate in the maritime trade with China has been mentioned as important in far eastern international relations. In the middle years of the century, Count Nesselrode, Russia's foreign minister, opposed entanglements with China which, in the event of war in Europe, might embarrass Russia. Nevelskoi's actions would have resulted in a court martial for going beyond his orders had it not been for the support of Muraviev and the personal protection and pardon bestowed upon him by Tsar Nicholas. In January, 1854, when clouds presaging a storm over the Crimea were lowering, the tsar freed Muraviev from dependence on the foreign office by granting him plenary diplomatic power in the Far East. The governor-general immediately set to work to vindicate the trust reposed in him. In 1854 Muraviev opened a steamer service on the Amur and himself led a flotilla carrying more than eight hundred men with artillery down the river to strengthen the defenses of Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. When, in the same year, as a side issue

of the Crimean War, an Anglo-French attack was made on the Russian naval base in the Far East, it was repulsed with serious losses and a consequent strengthening of Russian power and influence in eastern Asia.

Contemporaneously with advances of Muraviev and Nevelskoi in the extreme east, their confreres were peacefully pressing southward in Central Asia. On the northwestern borders of the Manchu-Chinese empire, at Kuldja (Ili) and at Tarbagatai (Chuguchak), a trade, having value to the Russians second only to that at Kiakhta, had been developing for years. In view of the various agreements by which Russo-Chinese commercial and other relations farther to the east had been regulated since 1689, as well as of the treaties which had been signed by China with the English, Americans and French in the years 1842-44, it was but natural that the trade in the Middle East between the two powers should be regulated by treaty. This was accomplished at Kuldja on August 6, 1851, the agreement being negotiated as between powers of equal rank. Henceforward Russian merchants might come to trade at Kuldja and Tarbagatai between April 6 and December 22. They were to be subject to the control of a consul appointed by their government while Chinese traders were to be supervised by an official of the Ili administration. Land for factories and cemeteries was to be allotted to the Russians at both marts, and they were to be allowed to hold religious services; they were not, however, to circulate outside their factories without permits from their consul. With one essentially insignificant exception the trade was free of duties.¹⁴

The facility with which representatives of the tsars in the East carried out their designs in the middle of the nineteenth century is striking. Throughout these years, in which Russia was pressing eastward and southward by settlement, the court of Peking remained complacent about Muraviev's activities. While domestic issues and the military pressure of Great Britain and France upon China during the war of 1856-60 account for this in part, the basic explanation for Manchu-Chinese complacency appears to have been twofold: first, the Russians were interested in areas far from Peking in the north and west, areas which had rarely been closely bound to China, although in part under the suzerainty of the empire, and, second, coming from the north by land, the Russians were looked upon as Asiatics rather than as Europeans. Figuratively speaking, the Russians used methods which the Chinese and the Manchus understood more easily than they did those of Western Europeans and Americans who reached China proper by way of the sea. The general forthrightness of policy and action of the Westerners and their assertion of equality with China differed from the more indirect, suavely

¹⁴ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, I, 70-80. The dates mentioned herein are new style unless otherwise indicated.

“oriental” methods and manners of the Eurasiatic Russians who for the most part were considered as being involved in nothing more serious than age-old border forays.

In May, 1858, while the envoys of Great Britain and France, accompanied by those of Russia and the United States, were pounding their way toward Tientsin, where four treaties were to be signed in the following month, Muraviev was holding a conference with representatives of China at Aigun in northern Manchuria. Sounding alarms of potential British seizure of the Amur, and using threats, Muraviev, on May 29, obtained the consent of the Chinese to his treaty; by its terms the territory on the north bank of the Amur, from the mouth of the Argun to that of the Amur, was ceded to Russia. On the south side of the Amur, as far as the Ussuri, Chinese sovereignty was recognized by Russia. The territory between the Ussuri and the sea, later known as Primorskaya, was to be held jointly by the two empires until a boundary should be agreed upon. The Amur, the Sungari, and the Ussuri rivers were to be navigated only by Chinese and Russians, and trade was to be permitted across the border.¹⁵ By this agreement Russia was handsomely compensated for losses sustained in the Crimean War. Nor was this all.

Admiral Count Putiatin in the preceding year had attempted to reach Peking. His object was the negotiation of a treaty by which Russians should enjoy the privilege of most-favored-nation treatment, including that of maritime trade with China. Refused permission to go to the capital, Putiatin joined the envoys of the powers waging war on China. He proceeded to Tientsin with them, where on June 13, 1858, fifteen days after the successful negotiation by Muraviev of the treaty of Aigun, he signed the first of the four treaties of Tientsin between China on the one hand and Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and France on the other. By the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause in article xii, Russia was henceforth to enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the powers of the West.¹⁶ Not yet, however, was the Eurasiatic colossus satisfied.

In negotiating the treaty of Aigun in 1858, Muraviev had first advanced the claim that the territory east of the Ussuri should be recognized by China as belonging to Russia—a claim which the Chinese had declined. Earlier the Russians had heard of a magnificent bay far south of the Amur. This, in 1859, was visited by the indefatigable Muraviev himself. At his command it was occupied on July 20, 1860. The foundations of Vladivostok—Ruler of the East or Dominator of the East—were laid, and the bay was named for Peter the Great.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 81–82.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 85–100.

As a consequence of the Russo-Chinese treaty of Tientsin of 1858, Count Ignatiev was sent to Peking as envoy. In the following year the war between China and the Anglo-French allies—which had been ended, supposedly, by the signing of the treaties of 1858—was renewed. In October, 1860, the Europeans marched into the Chinese capital shortly after the emperor and his court had departed hurriedly for Jehol. The continuation of the war offered the Russians an opportunity to expand their hold over the trans-Ussuri territory by permitting Ignatiev to act in a mediatory capacity between China and its enemies. Russian arms were offered while threats were made that a Russian fleet might appear if the desired territory were not ceded. While the Peking area was occupied by French and English, and the Manchu dynasty was in danger of annihilation, Ignatiev on the one hand advised the allies not to press China too hard, and, on the other, advised the Manchus to make peace immediately. The allied forces had no intention of remaining in Peking during the winter of 1860; indeed, they were as anxious to leave as the Chinese and Manchus were to have them depart. For the Anglo-French evacuation of the capital early in November, the Russian diplomat claimed the credit; in payment for doing what he had not done, he obtained the cession of the trans-Ussuri territory with its coast line of some six hundred miles. In this area was located the recently founded town of Vladivostok to which, in 1872, the Russian naval base was transferred from Nikolaevsk. Thus, from Okhotsk to Petropavlovsk to Nikolaevsk (after the allied attack of 1854) to Vladivostok, the Japanese watched the advance toward their homeland of the Russian naval base.

Although the European allies had fought a war mainly to force the Chinese to implement the rights and privileges stipulated in the treaties of 1842–44, and only secondarily to obtain new ones, the Russians, by diplomacy and the incorporation in their treaty of Tientsin of the most-favored-nation clause, had obtained the same treaty rights and, in addition, had annexed a rich and vast territory which borders Manchuria on two sides and cuts it from access to the Sea of Japan. The only territory taken by either of the allied powers was the tip of the Kowloon peninsula which Britain annexed for the protection of Hongkong. Thus, by 1860, Russia was well established in northeastern and Central Asia and was in a position to figure prominently in the future of eastern Asia.

THE REOPENING OF JAPAN

By the middle of the nineteenth century Japan had become, and was to remain for a few years, the chief center of attention in the Far East. This country, to which an article of some thirty words in length was devoted in the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1768–71),

had kept its doors closed to Westerners, except a few of the Dutch, with almost complete success from *ca.* 1641 until 1854. Numerous attempts on the part of the Russians, British, Americans, French, and Dutch, during the first half of the nineteenth century, to persuade the Japanese to change their attitude toward foreigners had, successively and ignominiously, failed. By the middle of the century, however, a co-ordination of internal and external factors forced a change. Internally, the new learning introduced by the Dutch and their employees had had a profound influence upon a small but growing minority of intellectuals. The relations between, and the influence of, the two courts at Kyoto and Yedo had undergone a revolutionary change. A revival of the study of the history and institutions of old Japan had disclosed the fact to many of the country's leaders that the Tokugawa *shōgunate* was, in practice if not constitutionally, an usurping agency and that basic loyalty was due to the emperor in Kyoto rather than to the *shōgun* in Yedo. Had there been no interference on the part of the West in the affairs of the realm, radical changes in the government could probably not have been avoided indefinitely.¹⁷

The time had come, however, when Japan could no longer be permitted to live in blissful isolation. China had been opened to intercourse with the West; and the West, like Alexander of old, was sighing for new worlds to conquer. The United States had taken a large portion of the North American continent extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific in its stride—yet found itself by no means breathless. The development of steam, with its substitution of the freighter for the clipper, rendered additional ports of refuge and coaling stations more than ever a necessity. Occasional harsh treatment in Japan of shipwrecked mariners engaged in the whaling industry of the northern Pacific or in other pursuits; insults to the American flag flown by vessels engaged hopefully in attempts to persuade Japan to unbar its doors; the lure of adventure in a mysterious land believed, since the days of Marco Polo, to contain vast riches—all these led to the determination of Americans to lead the procession which should reopen Nippon's gates once and for all. If friendly, but firm, persuasion would turn the trick, good; if not, guns could be used as keys.¹⁸ There were precedents.

One of the chief reasons for the interest of the United States in both the Pacific Islands and Japan was a desire for protection of whale fisheries, and the men engaged therein, in the northern Pacific. Growth of American trade in the Pacific and the Far East also subjected American nationals to the dangers not only of shipwreck but of ill-treatment in

¹⁷ Especially consult G. B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950), chap. XI; and Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York, 1949), chap. IV.

¹⁸ Cf. Amy Lowell, "Guns as Keys" in *Can Grande's Castle* (Boston, New York, 1918), pp. 49-97.

case they were forced to land on the inhospitable shores of Nippon. Had the Washington government been seeking a cause for a naval, instead of a diplomatic, attack on Japan, it would have had no difficulty in finding such in the treatment accorded shipwrecked Americans in that country.

When Matthew Galbraith Perry, with four war vessels, appeared in the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853, he had in mind to secure from Japan three concessions: protection of the persons and property of shipwrecked Americans; the opening of one or two ports to trade; and the right for citizens of the United States to purchase supplies, coal in particular. Experiences of Americans during two generations throughout the area under discussion had convinced them, and at last their government, that gentle speech and good wishes unaccompanied by what a later president termed the "big stick" were of little use. Accordingly, the Japanese were now to be assured of America's desire for the friendship of Japan but that "no friendship can long exist between them unless Japan should change her policy and cease to act towards the people of the United States as if they were her enemies." If peaceful arguments availed naught, Perry was to "change his tone" and inform the Japanese "in the most unequivocal terms" that the American government would insist upon humanitarian treatment for its citizens and that "if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practiced . . . they will be severely chastised."¹⁰

Perry was no less determined than Cushing to insist upon the full equality of his country with that of any on the globe. He insisted upon the receipt in a correct manner of President Fillmore's letter; he would have no dealings with an official of rank lower than his own; he refused to approach the Japanese by way of Nagasaki or through Dutch mediators. With dignity commensurate with his mission, he landed at Kurigahama and surrendered the president's letter to two high officials. He then sailed away having announced his plan to return, with augmented squadron, the following year to receive an answer. From Japan he sailed to the Liu-ch'iu Islands to procure coal for his ships. Thence he dispatched one of his commanders to take possession of part of the Bonin Islands, five hundred miles south of the main Japanese island. To the Bonins the United States thereafter laid vague claim until the year 1873.

Perry's actions with reference to the Liu-ch'iu and the Bonin Islands give evidence of the far-reaching plans held by him personally for the future development of his country in the Pacific and the Far East. Considering this area as a unit, he felt that one policy should govern

¹⁰ Quoted by, and from, Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922), pp. 263-64

the actions of his government with reference to it. A treaty with Japan was, in his eyes, but one more step in a program of entering into relations with other countries and islands of the East so as to block the "unconscionable government" of England, as he termed it, in its eastward expansion. Perry differed from Cushing in avowedly seeking territorial offsets to Great Britain.

On March 31, 1854, a treaty was duly signed at Yokohama (although it is called the treaty of Kanagawa), and the gates of Japan were swung partly open without the active use of guns.²⁰ Shimoda was to be opened immediately to American ships, and Hakodate a year later, at which provisions were to be supplied to American vessels; shipwrecked travelers were to be cared for; provisions for extraterritoriality were intentionally omitted but, subject to the just laws of the empire, Americans were to be as free in Japan as in other countries; although provisions for business transactions were included, those for obtaining coal were inadequate; an American consul or agent might, after the lapse of eighteen months, reside in Shimoda; finally, inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause safeguarded American interests from the dangers of European monopolistic devices in the future.

Treaties and conventions with the English, the Russians, and the Dutch followed in less than two years. These and the Perry treaty were "pacts of friendship" by which Japan and the nations of the West entered upon a bowing acquaintance rather than agreements by which Japan was opened freely to the commerce of the world. The next step was the making of treaties by which trade between Japan and other nations might be carried on freely. Again the United States, in the person this time of Townsend Harris, led the way. With no warships behind him—save those of the powers on the China coast, of the presence and meaning of which the Japanese were not ignorant—Harris obtained a convention on June 17, 1857, and a commercial treaty on July 29, 1858.²¹ By the former, *inter alia*, Nagasaki was made a port of call, and Shimoda and Hakodate were opened to the residence of Americans; moreover provision was made for the enjoyment by Americans of extraterritorial rights in criminal cases—general extraterritoriality having been granted to Russian nationals on a reciprocal basis in 1855 and to the Dutch on a unilateral basis in January of the following year.

Harris' treaty of 1858 provided for the residence of an American envoy in Yedo; for the opening within the next few years of additional ports, and the appointment of more consuls; for the leasing of land in the treaty ports and the erection of buildings, including those for re-

²⁰ William H. Malloy (compiler), *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, 1910), I, 996-98.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 998-1010.

ligious uses; for freedom of trade unsupervised by Japanese officials; for extraterritoriality in both civil and criminal cases; finally, a "conventional" tariff—in which the importation of opium was prohibited—was included which could be changed only by altering the treaty itself. This meant that Japan temporarily lost the sovereign right to alter its tariffs, the consent of the co-signer of a treaty being required for a change of duties. Again the Dutch, the Russians, and the English immediately followed suit along with the French, the Portuguese, the Germans, and other Westerners during the next few years. Not until 1888 was Japan to negotiate a treaty with a Western government, that of Mexico, on a basis of equality, and not until 1911 was the government of the country to become again a free agent with respect to tariffs.

The years following the signing of the treaties were full of strain for Minister Harris; the Japanese were in the midst of a domestic revolution and among them were groups violently anti-foreign, bent on expelling all Westerners and doing away with the treaties. It was more than possible that the European powers might resort to war in defense of their rights and that partition of Japan might result. Harris gave all possible moral aid to Japan in its struggle to preserve its entity and modernize itself, while striving to hold the Japanese government to a performance of its international duties. Following a series of murders of Westerners, the English, French, Dutch, and Prussian representatives in Yedo (Tokyo) withdrew early in 1861 to Yokohama. With the retirement of Harris in 1862 and the waging of the Civil War in the United States, the leadership of the Western diplomats gradually passed to Great Britain. Secretary of State Seward instructed the American minister "to preserve friendly and intimate relations with the representatives of other Western powers in Japan. You will seek no exclusive advantages, and will consult freely with them upon all subjects, inasmuch as it is especially necessary, at this time, that the prestige of Western civilization be maintained in Yedo as completely as possible."²² Acting on the tenor of these instructions, the American minister joined the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands in signing a protocol on May 30, 1864, in which was stated their decision to act in concert upon their treaty rights. In August, the Americans participated in an allied attack on the Choshu feudatory to open the Straits of Shimonoseki and to vindicate foreign treaty rights in the face of attempts to ignore or abolish them. President Lincoln approved American participation in this move to co-operate with the powers of Europe. On June 25, 1866, the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States and the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands signed a joint tariff con-

vention with Japan by which revision of duties was made dependent on the approval of all the treaty powers. This extreme and, on the whole, unfortunate instance of American diplomatic co-operation with the European powers in Nippon had no parallel in the Middle Kingdom.



The Meiji Emperor of Japan. Brown Brothers

The difficulties experienced by the foreigners were mainly side reactions to the domestic revolution then sweeping Japan. From 1863 to 1868, the *shōgunate* was under constant attack by the western clans of Satsuma and Choshu for failing to protect the country, expel the foreigners, and provide the emperor with sound advice. Even after the clans had been forced to acknowledge the superior strength of the foreigners, they persisted in their attacks upon the *bakufu*. In 1867, the last of the Tokugawa *shōguns* was forced to retire from office, and on January 25, 1868, the restoration of imperial rule was formally enacted. Yedo was

renamed Tokyo in 1868, and in the following year the imperial residence was moved from Kyoto to Tokyo. The Meiji Restoration constituted a victory for the western clans, and their leaders became for the next generation and more the emperor's top advisers. Brought up in an atmosphere of feudalism and civil strife, the Meiji statesmen found adaptation to modernity a trying and tedious task. While suffering repeated setbacks, the new regime nevertheless made surprising progress in transforming Japan from a feudal, decentralized state to a semi-modern, centralized state within the short span of a single generation.

The early Meiji regime was troubled by an almost depleted treasury, by a people who were still internally divided, and by the need to rush change in an effort to escape compromising foreign demands. It was patently clear to most Japanese that their old administrative and feudal order had become obsolete. There was, however, almost no preparation for the swift changes demanded by the times. While striving to preserve its customary social and cultural institutions, Japan after 1868 concentrated upon modernizing its political, economic, and military institutions. The remnants of feudal administration were gradually cleared away as centralized government took over. After 1870, a thoroughgoing reorganization of the defense establishment was undertaken. Plans for a constitutional monarchy bore fruit in 1889 with the promulgation of the Meiji constitution. Meanwhile, the government had begun to subsidize commercial and industrial enterprises as Japan also sought to compete economically with the Western nations. In this controlled revolution the common people of Japan had almost no determining voice. The construction of the new army, the making of constitutional government, and the transformation of the economy were changes carried out in large part by the clan leaders.²³

In 1871 China was made aware for the first time in centuries that it had to take into account the rise to power of an Asiatic people. In that year the Japanese signed with China a treaty of peace and amity in Tientsin in which Japan gained commercial rights in part similar to those enjoyed by Westerners.²⁴ No longer was Japan to be listed as a vassal of the Middle Kingdom. To its chagrin, however, Japan failed to get inserted the most-favored-nation clause and obtained only a greatly modified form of extraterritoriality. To rid themselves of their own unequal treaties and to demonstrate their equality with the West, it was necessary for the Nipponese to prove their superiority over China. The Sino-Japanese treaty of Tientsin of 1871 was too nearly one between

²³ For details consult Yanaga, *op. cit.*, chaps III-XII; and Sansom, *op. cit.*, chaps XI-XVI.

²⁴ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, II, 507 ff.

equal powers. To enhance its position first of all at the expense of China, Japan concentrated attention upon two vassal kingdoms of the former, namely, the Liu-ch'iu archipelago and Korea. The first-named had long maintained a system of double vassalage to China and to Japan; the second looked to the Celestial Empire alone as suzerain, but also sent tribute missions to Japan.

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF KOREA

For a dozen years after the renewal of intercourse by Japan with the West, Korea remained a hermit kingdom. The only European influence felt therein was exerted by French Roman Catholic missionaries. Three of them, including a bishop, were decapitated in 1859. In 1864 a twelve-year-old boy, known thereafter as Yi Hyeung, acceded to the throne. His father, who was extremely reactionary and intensely opposed to everything foreign, immediately seized the regency under the title Tai-wen-kün. Two years later (March, 1866) nine more French priests, again including a bishop, were beheaded. The French *chargé d'affaires* in Peking now announced the decision of his government to annex Korea, and a naval expedition was dispatched in October. Nothing constructive was accomplished, and it soon became evident that the French were more interested in Indo-China than in Korea. Attempts on the part of Americans, Germans, Russians, and Japanese to open the country to foreign intercourse during the next five years were no happier in outcome for their participants than the French gesture of conquest had proved.

The Japanese, however, had numerous reasons for perseverance and proceeded to avail themselves accordingly. Not the least significant objectives were prestige, which would accompany success on the part of the Nipponese after failure by the Westerners; desire to forestall the latter in Korea; and manifestation to the world of the superiority of Japan to the rest of eastern Asia. In February, 1876, a Japanese-Korean treaty was signed by which Korea was expressly recognized as an "independent state" with the "same sovereign rights" as those of Japan.²⁵ Three ports were opened to trade, and extraterritoriality in criminal cases was granted. The agreement was largely unilateral and similar to those which Japan and China had had to sign with the Western powers.

Treaties between Korea and other foreign states, including America, England, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France, were negotiated between 1882 and 1886. These agreements in general, and that with the United States in particular, were approved by Peking as forming potential obstacles in the rise of Japan to a position of unique influence in the

²⁵ *British and Foreign State Papers, 1875-1876*, LXVII (London, 1883), 531.

peninsula. But they aroused the fears and anger of important elements at the Korean court and elsewhere; exacerbated court relations at Seoul; and led to perennial plottings and counterplottings among the representatives of the powers, especially China and Japan. In 1882, and again in 1884, riots occurred which ended with attacks upon the Japanese legation in the Korean capital. On both occasions, Japan imposed indemnities on the country, and war between China and Japan was averted with difficulty—in part, because the Chinese were embarrassed by the contemporary trouble with France over Tonkin.

After twenty-two years of persevering efforts, Nipponese statesmen were able, in 1894, to negotiate with Great Britain, and in 1899, to obtain the implementation of a treaty providing for the gradual resumption by Japan of its full powers as a sovereign state.²⁶ Provision was made for the abolition of British consular jurisdiction in 1899. The conventional tariff was retained for about sixty commodities, but on other goods tariff dues were to be decided upon by the Japanese government. British shipping might still participate in the coasting trade, and perpetual leases in the foreign settlements were confirmed.²⁷ During the next four years similar treaties were signed with some of the leading states of Europe; these were to go into force simultaneously in 1899. Henceforward the most-favored-nation clause in Japanese treaties was to be reciprocal and unconditional.

By 1894 Japan was prepared to force a settlement of the Korean issue by war with China. One week after the signing (July 16, 1894) by England of the master-treaty, the Japanese seized the royal palace at Seoul and the persons of the Queen and her children; overthrew the government of King Yi Hyeung; re-established his father, the Tai-wen-kün, in the regency; and started hostilities against the Celestial Empire. The war was waged in Korea, Manchuria, intramural China, and on the adjoining seas. It constituted, in reality, Japan's first challenge to Europe.

As the price of peace, and to prevent the fall of the capital into the hands of the ubiquitously victorious Japanese, China was forced, by the treaty of Shimonoseki²⁸ of April 17, 1895, to agree to the complete independence and autonomy of Korea; to cede to Japan the Liaotung peninsula in southern Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels; to open four new treaty ports—Shasi, Chungking, Soochow, and Hangchow—and the waterways leading

²⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers, 1893-1894*, LXXXVI (London, 1899), 39-52; also H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), pp. 371-82.

²⁷ Not until March 25, 1937, were arrangements made between Japan and the United States and England for the liquidation of these leases as of April 1, 1942.

²⁸ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, II, 590 ff.

to them; and to agree to a new treaty of commerce. By the treaty of Shimonoseki and by the commercial treaty signed at Peking on July 21, 1896,²⁹ Japan gained a footing in China equal to that previously obtained by the nations of the West. In addition to other rights and privileges, the Japanese were to enjoy specifically extraterritoriality and the most-favored-nation clause. Not only this, they outdistanced the nationals of the Western powers by receiving the additional right to carry on industries and manufactures in the treaty ports, a privilege which China had hitherto declined to confer. By the most-favored-nation clause this privilege accrued to citizens of all the treaty powers. Thus the Westerners profited from the lessons which they had given Japan. Gratitude for this favor was, notwithstanding, completely overshadowed by their alarm at Nipponese expansion toward the mainland.

On April 23, 1895, six days after the signing of the Shimonoseki treaty, Russia, Germany, and France through their representatives in Tokyo "advised" that the Liaotung peninsula be returned to China. The basis of their argument was that its annexation by Japan would constitute a menace to Peking, "render illusory the independence of Korea," and threaten "peace in the Far East."³⁰ Forced to accede, Japan by imperial proclamation of May 10 agreed to restore the Liaotung area to China. By convention of November 8 following, China agreed to pay an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels for Japan's retrocession.

The fifty-seven years from 1854, which witnessed the signing of the Perry treaty and the reopening of Japan to intercourse with the West, to 1911, by which period extraterritoriality had been abolished and tariff autonomy had been regained, are unparalleled in the history of any country. In less than six decades Nippon had passed through a series of revolutionary changes brought about largely, but by no means wholly, by the impact of the West. Outwardly it had changed from a medieval, feudal kingdom, in danger at times of complete extinction, to a semi-modern empire with a rigid constitution and a strong army and navy. It had defeated its one-time suzerain, China, and upset the *status quo* of the Orient. A great European power, Russia, which had for more than a century threatened it from the north, had likewise come into conflict with Japan in northeastern Asia. Finally, it had profited so successfully from its study of Western commercial, diplomatic, and military strategy that it, too, had entered upon the way of imperialism. In addition to such trifles as the Liu-ch'iu archipelago and Formosa, it had begun to dominate the neighboring Korean empire and establish a powerful

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 604 ff.

³⁰ P. Joseph, *Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1804-1900* (London, 1928), pp. 91-92 and chap. V; also Baron R. R. Rosen, *Forty Years of Diplomacy*, 2 vols. (London and New York, 1922), I, 133-41, 191-92; W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1935), I, 186-91.

strategic and commercial position in southern Manchuria. To attain a partial comprehension of certain of these changes, attention must again be turned to the Chinese Empire.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR CONCESSIONS IN CHINA


The nakedness of the Celestial Empire had been uncovered by the Japanese as had that of no power in the history of the world which was destined to survive, and it appeared that no curse was attached to those who gazed upon it. Not, however, in defense of the territorial integrity of China had the three military powers of Europe intervened but in that of their own interests. These were clearly threatened by the rise of an Asiatic state which, once established on the mainland, might stop the advance of Europe and even rob the Westerners of their earlier winnings. Less than two months after participating in the triple intervention, France presented the first of its statements. On June 20, China granted to it an option on the mines of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yünnan; agreed to the extension of French railways from Indo-China northward; and confirmed a tariff greatly reducing dues on goods passing the southern frontier.³¹ In the following month six French and four Russian banks collaborated with the Russian Ministry of Finance in a thirty-six year loan to China of 400,000,000 francs at four per cent to aid in payment of the indemnity to Japan. Slightly less than three years later another installment was paid to France in the form of a ninety-nine year lease to the Bay of Kwangchow.


Russia also had a bill to present at Peking. Inasmuch as travel and transportation on the waterways of Siberia were slow, the idea of a transcontinental railway was broached by both Russian and foreign promoters as early as 1858. By 1890 European Russia had three rail lines leading to the Urals. In Siberia in 1891, Russia had begun constructing a railway which would link Vladivostok with St. Petersburg; in December, 1895, eight months after the signing of the Shimonoseki treaty, the first section was opened. In the same month the Russo-Chinese Bank, a Russian corporation largely supported by French financiers, was chartered. On June 3, 1896, Li Hung-chang and Prince Lobanov signed a fifteen-year treaty of alliance by which Russia was granted the right to build a railroad across northern Manchuria.³² The bonds for this, like those for the loan of 1895, were to be guaranteed by Russia.³³ By 1898, trains were run between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk at the confluence of the Ussuri and Amur rivers, and between Irkutsk on Lake Baikal to

³¹ J. V. A. MacMurray (Compiler and Editor), *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), Vol. I, No. 1895/5, pp. 28-30 (cited hereafter as MacMurray).

³² *Ibid.*, I, 81-82.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-77.





Eastern Asia about 1904

Europe. It was not until 1904 that the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria was completed.

In March, 1895, the month in which Sino-Japanese peace negotiations were opened at Shimonoseki, the Russian Mediterranean squadron was ordered to the north Pacific. In November, 1895, the Russians received from China the right to winter in the Bay of Kiaochow. They availed themselves of this privilege for one season only. In return for his concessions, Li received in 1896 a defensive alliance with Russia to be in force for fifteen years and directed against Japan. When, in March, 1898, China formally leased to Germany the Kiaochow territory, Russia, having at first objected, acceded for the reasons largely that it had no legal claim upon the area and because Manchuria was more desirable from the viewpoint of solidarity of expansion.

By two conventions signed, one in March, 1898, at Peking,³⁴ the other in May, at St. Petersburg,³⁵ Russia obtained a lease for twenty-five years to the southern tip of the Liaotung peninsula which included Port Arthur and Talienwan—now Dairen—and the right to extend the Chinese Eastern Railway south from Harbin to Port Arthur. The Peking convention provided for the prolongation of the lease “by mutual consent of both Governments.”³⁶ Russia was now ensconced in the seat from which Japan had been ejected three years before; thus the stage was set for a war between the rivals which, less than six years later, was to supplement diplomacy and constitute Japan’s second challenge to Europe.

In Korea, Russia also faced Japan at the end of the century. By a convention of 1884 with the Seoul government, Russia entered the affairs of the peninsula, and at once began to contest with Japan for control of the Korean king. After Japan’s victory over China in 1895, Nippon sought assiduously to consolidate its position in Korea. In 1896, when the Korean king, fearful of Japan’s purposes, fled to the Russian legation for protection, the Russians in return for favors granted obtained mining and timber concessions in Korea. The desperate king in his search for friends sought to win American support by granting mining concessions to American entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the scramble for concessions in China partially diverted Russia’s attention away from Korea. By the Nishi-Rosen protocol of April 25, 1898, Russia agreed not “to obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.”³⁷ The pronounced interest of the Land of the Rising Sun in the Land of the Morning Calm was thus recognized by Russia. Com-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 119–21.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

³⁷ Further details in Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925), pp. 96–103.

plete success in Manchuria having been attained, Russia renewed in 1899 its campaign against Japan in Korea.

Germany had long been planning an advance into China and was not unmindful of the advantages derived by France from dead missionaries. For reasons of national pride, and in partial preparation for possibly divinely aided eventualities, Germany had informed the French representative in Peking in 1891 that thereafter Roman Catholic missionaries of German nationality would receive the protection of their own government. Germany had been excluded from participation in the indemnity loans of 1895 and felt indignant. It alone had failed of reimbursement for the pains of intervention. At the moment when the Germans had determined to wait no longer for the bestowal of a mark of gratitude from the dilatory and somewhat fatigued court of Peking, it appeared as if the "good old German god" of the Kaiser's affection had at last awakened to his duties: two Catholic missionaries of the right nationality were murdered on November 1, 1897, in a village in the extreme southwestern section of Shantung—the province already earmarked by the Germans. The officials at Kiaochow were not prepared for the descent of the Germans when they arrived on November 14, four days after the murders became known. Not understanding the occasion of the appearance of the newcomers the officials received them with hospitality but shortly fled over the hills to the hinterland. Less than a week later Russian warships, presaging the advance of Russia into the Liaotung peninsula, appeared at Port Arthur.

On March 6, 1898, Germany having presented its "bill" began receipt of "payment in full."³⁸ A lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years, was granted for Kiaochow; to safeguard against unforeseen contingencies promise was made that "should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiao-chow [Kiao-chow] Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiao-chow, and to cede to Germany a more suitable place."³⁹ Mining and railway concessions in Shantung were also obtained as was a preferential position for German merchants and manufacturers with respect to the provision of funds, personnel, and materials for Chinese projects throughout the province of Shantung.

Five days before the signing of the Kiaochow convention the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank had been enabled to organize a forty-five year loan of £ 16,000,000 at four and a half per cent. To cover the three great loans of 1895–98 the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs were hypothecated; for the German loan part of the salt and likin revenues had to

³⁸ R. A. Norem, *Kiaochow Leased Territory* (Berkeley, Calif., 1936), chaps. I, II; Joseph, *op. cit.*, chap. IX; W. L. Godshall, *Tsingtau Under Three Flags* (Shanghai, 1929), chap. IV.

³⁹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1898/4, Section I, Article V, p. 114.

be pledged. The customs service was headed by a British subject who, in case of default on the German loan, would take over the administration of six salt and likin collectorates in the Yangtze Valley.

England, thoroughly disapproving the upset of the *status quo* in China which imperiled its commercial position, had not since 1895 been idle. The leading British financial institution in the extreme east, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, had provided a thirty-six year loan to China in 1896 for £ 16,000,000 at five per cent. The advance of France from Indo-China into the southern provinces, of Germany into Shantung, and of Russia to the Liaotung, which appeared definitely to foreshadow the break-up of the Chinese empire, caused serious alarm in London. On February 25, 1898, the British government provisionally declined an informal offer from Peking of a lease to Weihaiwei, on the Shantung promontory north of Kiaochow. A month later, however, when it had become evident that nothing short of hostilities could keep the Russians out of Port Arthur, Downing Street changed its mind and hastily, with the threat even of force, set to work to lease Weihaiwei. A convention for the lease of the port was signed on July 1, "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia."⁴⁰ Contemporaneously, on June 9, a lease of the remainder of the Kowloon peninsula opposite Hongkong, with neighboring islands and waters, for ninety-nine years was taken.⁴¹

Earlier in the year (February 11), Great Britain, following a precedent established by itself in 1846,⁴² had received from Peking on request a declaration of eternal nonalienation of "any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other power. . . ." Similar declarations regarding other areas were shortly made to France with regard to Hainan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yünnan, and to Japan with regard to Fukien. Of the powers demanding nonalienation declarations, Japan was "the only one that did not assert that her motive in so doing was to preserve the territorial integrity of the Chinese State."⁴³ An assurance had also been given London that, as long as the trade of Great Britain with China remained greater than that of any other country, a British subject should continue to hold the post of Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 1898/14, pp. 152-53; also Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-300.

⁴¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, No. 1898/11, pp. 130-31.

⁴² By article iii of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of the Bogue, April 4, 1846, the imperial government promised Great Britain that the island of Chusan "shall never be ceded to any other foreign power."

⁴³ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

⁴⁴ Although China obtained tariff autonomy in 1930, and Great Britain thereafter no longer led in the foreign trade of that country, a British subject was retained as Inspector General of Customs until 1938. As England desired that a British subject should head China's customs service, so France contemporaneously made known the desire that one of its citizens should head China's postal service. Not until May 28, 1911, were the customs and postal services divided—when the latter was placed under a Ministry of Posts and Communications over which were placed a Chinese Director-General and a French Co-Di-

In addition to these buttresses to the British imperial structure in the Far East, concessionaries of the empire by late 1898 had procured contracts for 2800 miles of railway construction in China—not all of which were carried out. The British minister, moreover, had obtained the opening of new treaty ports and additional “inland waters” to steam navigation. In the spring of the following year the International Settlement at Shanghai—predominantly, but far from exclusively, British—(and the French “concession” also) was greatly enlarged. Everything considered, England had not come off badly.

It must also be recorded that during the period 1895–1902 France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and Belgium developed areas known as “concessions” at one or more of the treaty ports, including Newchwang, Tientsin, Amoy, Foochow, and Hankow. As indicated earlier, in several cases they, and Americans too, obtained contracts for the building of railways, not all of which were carried into effect. Nor should the demand of Italy, supported by Great Britain, in March, 1899, for the cession of a naval station at San-mên Bay on the Chekiang Coast be overlooked. Partly because of the attitude of Russia and Japan, the latter of which had marked Fukien as being within its sphere, China summoned courage to refuse the Italian demand. So the will of Italy had to be accepted in lieu of the deed, and the Italians fell back on a declaration of policy purely commercial in nature.⁴⁵

While the drive of the Europeans for footholds and profits in the Far East became ever greater in scope during the second half of the nineteenth century, and Japan, turning from seclusion to expansion, evolved from an exploited to an exploiting nation, the role played by the United States in China, Korea, and Japan between 1860 and 1897 had been unspectacular. In Japan the lead had been taken generally by English diplomats: in China the same was generally true. With the latter, during the early years of the century, American trade had ranked second only to that of Great Britain; between the First and the Second Anglo-Chinese Wars it had expanded rapidly. During the next four decades American missionary work developed apace while commercial ventures declined. Trade with Japan rose from nil to two per cent of the American total, that with China dropped from three per cent to less than two—and several venerable American business houses in China closed their doors. Upset of the *status quo* in China in and after 1894 caused by the Sino-Japanese war and the scramble for concessions bade fair to exclude, or greatly reduce, surviving American commercial interests in the Middle Kingdom before the end of the century. Nevertheless, without the death

rector-General, the Frenchman being the actual executive. Following the establishment of the National Government at Nanking in 1928 the French executive was made officially subordinate to the Chinese Director-General.

⁴⁵ Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp 428–31.

of a missionary, or the wresting of territory from China, a partial balance of power in the East was restored in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War.

AMERICAN EXPANSION IN THE PACIFIC REGION

The advent of the United States in the Far East in 1898 had been preceded by a steady growth of American interests and ambitions in the Pacific region that dated back to the founding years. When it is recalled that in the Jamestown period of Virginia's history attempts were made to discover a route to the Pacific Ocean by way of the Chickahominy River, and that before the War of the Revolution Americans purchased ginseng from the Indians to exchange for China tea from British vessels, it is not surprising that an American vessel, the "Empress of China," with a cargo of ginseng should have sailed from New York to Canton in 1784. While trade with China slowly expanded during the last years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth century, Americans were exploring and trading in many other parts of the Pacific area. Traffic in the Pacific basin and along the west coasts of the Americas, in and after 1783, not only aided in the establishment of the China trade, but in the spread of knowledge among Yankee sea captains of the location of ports, and conditions prevailing, in the whole Pacific area. Among the islands visited in these years were the Hawaiian, the Marquesas, Fanning, Fiji, Galapagos, and the Bonins.

American trading and whaling expeditions covered a considerable part of the Indian and the Pacific oceans during the first half of the nineteenth century. Missionaries, too, began to work in the islands of the Pacific as well as in Malaya and China. Shipwrecks were numerous; mutinies of the motley crews were common; at least a few of the traders were more shrewd than honest in their dealings with natives, and not all of them were motivated by equalitarian and humanitarian theories. The treatment of natives by Americans, as well as of Americans by natives, left at times a great deal to be desired. Altogether it became increasingly necessary for the government of the United States to assume oversight, protective and restraining, of its nationals in the Pacific area. This it was not unduly anxious to do; although a few proposed the dispatch of government expeditions to the Pacific for the purposes of discovery, exploration, and protection of American interests, the majority were either neutral or opposed.

In the quarter century after 1844, the progress of the United States toward the far eastern area was steady. In the Oregon country, in California, in Mexico and Central America, in Hawaii, in Japan, in Alaska and the Aleutians, the influence of the United States continuously expanded. While Commodore Kearny in China was demanding most-

favored-nation treatment for Americans and Caleb Cushing was preparing to undertake the negotiation of his treaty, the problems of Texas and Oregon were becoming critical. Before these were solved California had become an issue. In June, 1846, the Oregon question was settled by treaty with England. The United States now had a clear title to the territory facing the Pacific which was later to be included in the states of Oregon and Washington.

Americans were also watching with considerable interest the developments in the Sandwich Islands. Missionaries, merchants, and sailors warned Washington repeatedly by mid-century that the British and French had designs upon Hawaii and its neighboring islands. To forestall easy annexation of the island group closest to its Pacific shores the United States in 1849 proclaimed that it would "never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe. . . ." ⁴⁶

A cause, and an effect, of the growing intimacy between the United States and Hawaii was the growing interest of the American government in Japan. One of the chief reasons for the interest of the United States in both Hawaii and Japan was a desire for protection of whale fisheries, and the men engaged therein, in the northern Pacific. Meanwhile, the Americans in China increasingly followed a policy of co-operating with the European powers as the Taiping rebellion and the stubborn determination of Peking endangered the trade and treaty arrangements concluded between 1842 and 1844. In Japan, leadership of the Western powers was held in the main by the United States from 1854 to 1862—from the time of Perry through the ministry of Townsend Harris. With the retirement of the latter, leadership gradually passed to England. This was due in part to the domestic situation in the United States during those years. The policy of the American government with reference to China and Japan remained essentially the same throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century whether or not its representative assumed leadership of the diplomatic corps. The United States could afford to move slowly in the extreme east, and even follow the lead of others, as long as its economic condition did not become one of dependence on foreign markets and was one essentially of maintaining the *status quo*. It could not afford, however, to permit its nationals to have a position less favored than those of any other nation.

Acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian archipelago gave to the United States the strategic position in the Pacific which it had conspicuously lacked during the Civil War; it also brought the country into closer proximity to the lands of eastern Asia. On March 30, 1867, Secretary

⁴⁶ Statement by Secretary of State Daniel Webster as quoted by W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations* (New York, 1916), I, 519.

Seward was able to negotiate a treaty with Baron Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington, for the purchase of Alaska and the Aleutians for \$7,200,000. The ceremony of transfer took place on the following October 18 at Sitka.

In the preceding August (1867), the Midway Islands, northeast of Hawaii, had been occupied by the American navy. These had been discovered by an American eight years earlier. Plans were made in 1869 for the development there of a harbor for the purpose of preventing European occupation in these parts and for the protection of mariners and other travelers. It was decided that such a work would be too costly and the matter was dropped. The United States continued, however, to hold the islands which, a generation later, were to serve as a cable base and, in 1935, to become an air base.

This period also witnessed renewed attempts to annex the Hawaiian Islands: in the years 1867, 1868, and 1871. As a less desirable alternative there was the possibility of establishing commercial reciprocity—"if the policy of annexation should really conflict with the policy of reciprocity," said Seward in 1867, "annexation is in every case to be preferred."⁴⁷ But the time was not yet ripe for either of these, and for a period neither was accomplished.

In both China and Japan the policy of the United States had, by 1869, not only been formulated but acted upon on more than one occasion. Briefly stated that policy looked toward maintenance, by diplomatic means, of independence and territorial integrity of the states of the Far East, opening of their doors to foreign trade and other relations, most-favored-nation treatment for American nationals, and the holding of eastern lands to observance of their specific treaty obligations and their general duties as members of the family of nations. During the period 1856 to 1860 Great Britain was decidedly in the lead; after the treaties and agreements of those years were signed the British government could afford the appearance of resting on its oars. The American minister to China, Anson Burlingame, took the lead, supported by England, in working out a policy of co-operative action among the powers dealing with China. Their common policy denounced interference in the internal struggles of China beyond whatever was necessary to maintain treaty rights. Burlingame's leadership, however, in diplomatic planning was more apparent than real; there was in Peking, in addition to the British minister, a British subject, Robert Hart, who, occupying the strategic post of Inspector General of Customs, undoubtedly played a greater diplomatic role than is likely ever to be proved fully by documentary evidence. Nevertheless, in 1867, Burlingame, after retiring as American minister, received a commission from the Chinese emperor as his ambassador extra-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 524.

ordinary to all of the courts of the world. From 1868 to 1870, the Burlingame mission traveled to America and Europe. Through new treaties and agreements, Burlingame helped China to obtain milder treatment and more sympathetic consideration from the Western nations. For example, the American treaty of 1868 with China guaranteed the Manchu rulers that the United States would not subject them to heavy pressure to modernize the country rapidly and that the United States would refrain from interfering unduly in the internal affairs of China.

In the eastern Pacific and the lands facing thereon, the policy and program of the United States were just as clear cut but more vigorous. Predominance in, and control of, a considerable part of the area became the aim of the American government. The Monroe Doctrine might shield North and South America from European aggression, but there was nothing in it to prevent the United States from annexing lands following war or purchase. "Manifest destiny" led the Americans across the continent to California and Oregon; it also urged them to seek control of short cuts across Mexico and Central America to the Pacific.

The presidential message to Congress of December 21, 1823, which outlined the Monroe Doctrine, contained a warning to Russia not to undertake the acquisition of new colonies on the North American continent. Equally repugnant to Washington forty years later was the possibility that control of Alaska and the Aleutians should be retained by any power other than the United States. Determination was also expressed that neither England nor France, nor any other European power, should obtain control of the Hawaiian Islands. When, in November, 1843, the English and the French governments adopted a self-denying pact, declaring that they would never "directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form" possess themselves of the islands, they were not joined by the United States. Clearly the policy of the United States to 1869 with respect to the Pacific area and the lands on both sides of the Pacific, and the program for putting it into effect, were far from being either supine or aimless.

While the Seward policy regarding the Pacific basin and China was being worked out, the United States had meanwhile become keenly interested in linking its east and west coasts by transcontinental rail lines. Important to the construction of the Central Pacific and Union Pacific railroads was an adequate supply of labor. In 1848, the first Chinese immigrants had reached San Francisco; four years later they were arriving by the thousands, and resentful alarm was aroused in California. At first, they sought work as gold miners, but state taxes were soon imposed upon foreign miners. In 1855, Governor Bigler denounced Chinese immigration, even though the federal government hoped to utilize Chinese labor in building the projected railways.

Seward ran into two major obstacles in tapping the labor supply from China: official discouragement by the Manchu government of the overseas emigration of its subjects and opposition by California to the influx of large numbers of Chinese. Soon the problem of imperial opposition no longer counted, and by 1880 the United States had obtained an agreement with China limiting Chinese immigration. Thereafter, the American Congress passed a number laws further circumscribing the entry and residence privileges previously extended to Chinese laborers. In 1894, a Sino-American agreement "absolutely prohibited" Chinese laborers from entering the United States for ten years. From 1904 to 1943 agreement on Chinese immigration broke down, and in those years the problem was handled by the United States as a purely domestic question.

With the retirement of Townsend Harris in 1862, the United States gradually abdicated its leadership in Japan to Great Britain. In Nippon's struggle for equality, individual Americans gave notable aid, but Washington followed a policy of watchful waiting. American influence at Tokyo waned, and it was the Anglo-Japanese treaty of July, 1894, which became the master treaty in Japan's rise to equality with the Western powers. The United States, which had been the trail blazer, became a follower by signing with Japan a treaty on November 22, 1894, similar to that signed in July by England.⁴⁸

Unlike the British the American treaty provided for no tariff concessions, although, as long as European powers demanded such, the United States was free to profit thereby on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause. By 1899, however, the extraterritoriality problem was solved, essentially, as was twelve years later that of tariff autonomy. The contribution of the United States toward solution of these problems and the bringing of Japan into the family of nations was far from small—a fact of considerable significance in the light of relations between the two states after the year 1905.

Interest of the United States in Korea was aroused in the year 1866 by news of developments having to do with the wrecking of Americans on the coast of that inhospitable country. Fundamentally the situation did not differ greatly from that which had led to the dispatch of the Perry expedition to Japan thirteen years earlier. Several efforts were made in the seventies to establish relations with Korea. Warlike and peaceful overtures failed to open Korea. With the failure of the direct approach, the United States approached Korea's overlords. In 1880 Commodore Shufeldt attempted to open negotiations with Korea through Japanese channels. He failed. Accordingly, the next attempt was made through China. With the aid of Li Hung-chang, Shufeldt negotiated a treaty with Korea in May, 1882. It will be remembered that six years earlier

⁴⁸ Malloy, *op. cit.*, I, 1028–36.

(1876) Japan had imposed upon Korea a treaty which recognized its full sovereignty, although China claimed Korea as a vassal state and the latter acknowledged the relationship. Japan's diplomacy was thereafter strengthened immeasurably by the signing of the Shufeldt treaty inasmuch as no dependent-state clause was incorporated in that document; thus a significant step was taken toward the disruption of the long-standing suzerain-vassal relations between China and Korea.

From the time of the signing of the Shufeldt treaty in 1882 Korean authorities, ignorant of international law and custom in the modern world, interpreted the promise of good offices contained therein as being much more than it was—namely a promise to mediate when the parties to a dispute approve—and tended to think of the United States as essentially the ally and protector of Korea. Such a position Washington had no idea of filling—not always being as sentimentally inclined as many Americans and others have given it credit for being. When Minister H. M. Allen was appointed in 1897 by President McKinley to represent the United States in Korea, he was informed by Secretary of State Sherman that there was:

reason to believe that rival purposes and interests in the east may find in Korea a convenient ground of contention, and it behooves the United States and [its] representatives, as absolutely neutral parties, to say or do nothing that can in any way be construed as taking sides with or against any of the interested powers. And such particularity would not only be in itself improper but might have the undesirable and unfortunate effect of leading the Koreans themselves to regard the United States as their natural and only ally for any and all such purposes of domestic policy as Korea's rulers may adopt.⁴⁹

Use its good offices when called upon by the Korean government, the United States would do, but intervene, or become the ally of Korea, it had no treaty obligation to do and would not.

THE UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER

The years 1898–1900 witnessed the converging of four outstandingly important lines of development of American interests in the Pacific area. By the settlement of the generation-old Samoan difficulty in these years; by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and that of the Philippines and Guam; and by the enunciation of the Open-Door policy, the United States definitely asserted its position as a Pacific and a far eastern power.

Contemporaneously with the growing interest of Americans and their government in the Hawaiian Islands, during the third quarter of the

⁴⁹ Quoted by, and from, Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 506. For additional detailed information see Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884–1905* (Madison, Wis., 1944), especially chap. IX.

nineteenth century, there was developing a somewhat similar, though less pronounced, interest in the Samoan Islands which had been visited by the American Commodore Wilkes in 1839. Strategically located in the south Pacific, this archipelago constitutes a trade-route crossing between Panama, California and Hawaii, and New Zealand and Australia. In both Hawaii and Samoa there evolved a triangular interest on the part of foreign nations. In the former it was on the part of England, France, and the United States; in the latter a vigorous Germany was substituted for an eager, but less determined, France. By 1850 these three nations had their commercial agents at Apia in Samoa. In trade with the islanders the Germans shortly took the lead.

During the next two decades, there developed a triangular struggle: plotting and counterplotting among themselves and with the foreigners, and accompanying or alternating these plots with civil wars, were the native chieftains; trade rivalries continued between the Americans, English, and Germans; diplomatic struggles, verging on warfare, were carried on among their governments and representatives. At the end of 1888, a critical situation prevailed in Samoa as a result of hostilities between the Germans and a native group. President Cleveland, insisting "that the autonomy and independence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved according to the treaties made with Samoa by the powers. . .,"⁵⁰ ordered Admiral Kimberly thither from Panama on the flagship "Trenton." Contemporaneously, Prince Bismarck, favoring a peaceful solution to the problems involved, was preparing for a renewal at Berlin of negotiations which had been suspended at Washington some eighteen months earlier. When the American admiral reached Apia on March 11, 1889, he found there two United States ships of war, three German ships, and one English. He also found strained relations between the American and the German captains which, but for his own conciliatory attitude and the intervention of a hurricane on March 16, might have precipitated local German-American hostilities but which, contrary to contemporary popular opinion, could scarcely have caused war inasmuch as neither government wanted it and both were planning a conference.⁵¹

The conference among Germany, England, and the United States held at Berlin with respect to Samoa sat from April 29 to June 14, 1889. Out of this ensued a treaty of the latter date to which Samoa also assented. By it the independence and neutrality of Samoa were provided and a *condominium* was established to safeguard the rights therein of Britain, Germany, and the United States. In the eyes of some Americans this constituted an "entangling alliance" of a type in which their government

⁵⁰ Message to Congress, January 15, 1889; J. D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908* (Washington, 1908), VIII, 805.

⁵¹ G. H. Ryden, *The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa* (New York, 1933), p. 444.

had not been involved since the revocation in 1800 of the alliance with France.⁵² Likewise, since the *condominium* failed to bring harmony to Samoa or in the relations of the participating governments, the treaty of 1889 constituted a step toward final partition of the archipelago and the ultimate annexation by the United States of additional territory in the Pacific.

The final act of the drama was introduced by the contemporaneous conclusion of the Spanish-American War and the death of King Malietoa Laupepa in August, 1898. Malietoa had been replaced on his throne by the three powers, in December, 1889, following his deportation by Germany, in 1887, in favor of Tamasese. On the king's death one group of Samoan chiefs elected Mataafa as his successor; another group chose the late king's son, Malietoa Tanu. The chief justice of Samoa, at this time an American, whose office had been created as a result of the Berlin conference of 1889, decided in favor of Tanu—whereupon a civil war ensued. The English and the Americans favored Tanu; the Germans supported the more popular Mataafa. As had been the case a decade earlier, while war raged in Samoa the powers united in the *condominium* were preparing for a friendly and, this time, final settlement of the status of Samoa. Three commissioners representing, respectively, the United States, Germany, and England, reached Apia on May 13. The problem of the much-sought kingship was solved, on June 10, by a proclamation of the commissioners abolishing the office—King Tanu and his rival, Mataafa, having expressed approval. The commissioners, individually and jointly, came to the conclusion that tripartite government should be abolished and the islands divided. Accordingly, on December 2, 1899, a convention was signed at Washington—with exchange of ratifications on February 16 following—by which Germany and Great Britain renounced, in favor of the United States, all rights to the islands of Samoa lying east of the 171st meridian. These included Tutuila with its magnificent harbor of Pago Pago; the remainder of the archipelago, constituting by far the larger part, went to Germany, Great Britain being compensated elsewhere by that empire.

Over its share of the spoils Germany immediately declared a protectorate which was maintained until 1914. Following the outbreak of war New Zealand seized western Samoa. By the treaty of Versailles, the former German islands became a mandate under the administration of New Zealand. Not as simple was the disposition of American Samoa in which the naval station of Tutuila was developed. President McKinley at once placed the new possession under control of the department of the navy and, in the absence of congressional action, a long line of naval officers governed this domestic territory for more than a generation. On

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 519; cf. also Malloy, *op. cit.*, II, 1576–89

April 17, 1900, the islands of Tutuila and Anuu were ceded to the United States by the high chiefs of the first-named; not until July 14, 1904, did the chiefs of the three Manua islands cede their territory—and not until a quarter of a century later (February 20, 1929) did Congress bestir itself sufficiently and long enough to pass a resolution accepting, ratifying, and confirming the cessions of 1900 and 1904. By this action the United States formally annexed the islands which it had been ruling since 1900 but which technically had been independent as declared by the agreement of Berlin of 1889.⁵³

From 1900 to the incorporation of the islands in the American Pacific mandate, the Samoans found themselves in an anomalous condition: citizens of a domestic not a foreign territory, they owed allegiance to the United States but were not American citizens; their vessels could fly the American flag but could not obtain American registry. The constitution and laws of the United States did not extend to American Samoa. The governor of the islands was the commandant of the Tutuila naval station who was appointed by, and held office at the pleasure of, the president of the United States in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. This situation prevailed despite much criticism, some study, and the appointment of a commission which reported to President Hoover in January, 1931, with recommendations for the making of basic changes. A measure of self-government at local levels was thereupon granted, but the islands remained subject to the Navy Department.⁵⁴

As with Samoa, the war of 1898 brought the question of Hawaii to a conclusion. The United States in 1875 had acquired a guarantee of nonalienation from the ruler of Hawaii. Thereafter, Americans invested more heavily in the islands' sugar industry, and in 1882 the United States leased Pearl Harbor as a naval base. Meanwhile, missionaries and investors urged the United States to annex the islands, despite the known opposition of several of the European powers to such an American move. Further stimulus to association with the United States was provided by a great influx of Chinese immigrants, as native Hawaiians and Americans increasingly became concerned that Hawaii might be attracted to the "Asiatic system."

In 1891 the Hawaiian king died in San Francisco. He was succeeded by his sister, Liliuokalani, whose policies resulted in January, 1893, in a bloodless revolution fomented largely by American citizens. The result of the revolution was the forced abdication of the queen, an appeal to President Harrison to annex the islands, and the establishment

⁵³ Ryden, *op. cit.*, p. 579.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 579–81; also F. M. Keesing, *Modern Samoa* (London, 1934), pp. 128–40, and the same writer's "Samoa: Islands of Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, IX, No. 26 (February 28, 1934), 294–304. For later data see R. W. Robson, *The Pacific Islands Handbook*, 1944 (New York, 1945), p. 70.

of a Provisional Government headed by Sanford B. Dole, an American jurist. Meanwhile, the annexation question had become a partisan issue in American politics, and President Cleveland, Harrison's successor, turned his back on annexation. In the presidential campaign of 1896, McKinley raised again the annexation issue, and upon becoming president sought to revive the Congress's interest in it. The matter hung fire, however, until after the outbreak of the Spanish-American war. In the excitement attending the war, Hawaii was annexed on July 6, 1898, by a joint resolution of the two houses of Congress. Despite pro-



Scene at Iolani Palace, Honolulu, August 12, 1898. President Sanford B. Dole of the Republic of Hawaii has just yielded up the sovereignty of the Republic of Hawaii to Minister H. M. Sewell, United States Minister to Hawaii. R. J. Baker Collection

tests from Japan and Great Britain, two days later it officially became "a part of the territory of the United States." In April, 1900, Congress authorized the creation of the Territory of Hawaii.

Although the American government had been interested in Pearl Harbor and Pago Pago for a quarter of a century, it had taken no steps to supply itself with a naval base in the Far East. This was not for lack of interest or foresight on the part of naval officers as has earlier been made clear by the actions and recommendations of Commodore Perry. It is striking, however, that Alfred T. Mahan in his numerous writings seems not to have taken special notice of the Philippines. When the Spanish-American War began, Commodore Dewey, with the American far eastern squadron, was at Hongkong. In accordance with the

law of neutrality the British officials requested the departure of the squadron by April 25. Shortly after the sinking of the U. S. battleship "Maine" in Havana harbor on February 15, Commodore Dewey had been ordered to be ready to attack the Spanish naval force in the Philippines. He destroyed the squadron on May 1, but left Manila itself unmolested until August 13. In the meantime, Lodge, Mahan, and Roosevelt were laying foundations in Washington for their policy of "large."⁵⁵

The United States was not the only enemy of Spain in the islands at this time. For years there had been carried on by the Filipinos a more or less vigorous struggle against the Spanish rulers. The *insurrectos* were now encouraged by the Americans in their anti-Spanish attitude and activities.

Germany's relations with England and the United States in Samoa during this period have been described. Prior to, or during the course of, the war Germany was apparently attempting to purchase not only the Philippines but also the Caroline, the Marshall, the Marianas, and the Pelew islands from Spain. The four last-named groups—with the exception of Guam—were sold by Spain to Germany on February 12, 1899, immediately after the approval by the American Senate of the Treaty of Paris.

In the disposition of the Philippine Islands the McKinley administration had to take into account contemporary relations of Europe to the Far East as a whole and to China in particular. Now, at the close of the century, with rapid development in China of alien domination through leased territories, spheres of influence, and nonalienation agreements, an opportunity came to the United States to obtain a balance in part, without reversing its century-old policy, or, in its estimation, committing an injustice to the Philippine Islands and their inhabitants. President McKinley denied having had "any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition" of the islands. The truth of this claim would appear to be vindicated by the lapse of time—May 1 to August 13—between the battle of Manila Bay and the taking of the city of Manila and by the fact that, although the president—after lengthy discussions with his business and religious advisers—instructed the peace commissioners, on September 16, to require "the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon, and equal port and trade rights with the Spanish in all unceded territory in the islands,"⁵⁶ almost six weeks

⁵⁵ See A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), pp. 13–15. On the role of the American navy see W. R. Braisted, "The Development of the Far East As an American Naval Problem" (Doct. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 1950), especially chaps. I, II, and III.

⁵⁶ Quoted by, and from Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 621. For further details on the American attitude see J. W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898* (Baltimore, 1936), especially chaps. VII and VIII.


passed before Secretary Hay cabled the commissioners to demand the cession of the entire archipelago.

To understand why the United States should have reversed its policy with reference to annexation of territory in the Far East, three factors have briefly to be considered—namely, the domestic American, the Filipino, and the international, situations. The seeds of imperialism scattered earlier had germinated, rooted well in Republican soil, and now, in little over a generation, were bearing a fine crop of fruit. From the American viewpoint there were the strategic, religious, and commercial aspects to be considered. Pearl Harbor and Pago Pago supplemented by Manila and Guam would eventually give the United States a strategic position in the Pacific—provided that they were adequately fortified. Protestant groups also welcomed annexation because it opened to them a new area for missionary endeavor. Commercially, the Philippines would be a balance in the China trade to the territorial holdings of the European powers on the eastern fringe of the Asiatic continent. The fact that the United States had, during the post Civil War generation, changed from a basically agricultural to a basically manufacturing nation helps also to explain the attitude adopted by President McKinley.


Regarding the problem from the point of view of the Filipinos, it may be stated that Spain had done little, if anything, during the three and a half centuries of its hold upon the archipelago to prepare them for independence and self-rule. Not until the close of the eighteenth century had there developed in the islands anything that could be described as a feeling of nationality. The Hispanicized Christian peoples of the lowlands had almost nothing in common with the Moro (Mohammedan) tribesmen of the southern islands and the Igorote (pagan) tribesmen in the northern mountains of the island of Luzon about whose salvation Mrs. McKinley evinced such solemn concern. To have detached the Philippines from Spain and granted independence at once would have been to invite their conquest immediately or ultimately by the Europeans or the Japanese or both.

On December 10, 1898, the Spanish-American treaty was signed at Paris. Spain relinquished to the United States ownership of the Philippines and the island of Guam which had been taken by force of arms. For the former twenty million dollars was paid, not as purchase money but in payment for works of permanent value bestowed upon the archipelago and in lieu of assumption of Spanish debts there and in Cuba by the United States. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Washington on April 11, 1899.⁵⁷


⁵⁷ Malloy, *op. cit.*, II, 1690–95. Consult also Leslie W. Walker, "Guam's Seizure by the United States in 1898," *The Pacific Historical Review*, XIV (1945), 1–12; and Pearle E. Quinn, "The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines," *The Pacific Historical Review*, XIV (1945), 290–302.



AMERICAN EXPANSION IN THE PACIFIC AREA TO 1904



Annexation was followed by rebellion of the Filipinos under the leadership of Aguinaldo who, earlier bought off by Spain, had been encouraged by the Americans in 1898 to continue his struggles against the Spanish. A two-year struggle came to an end by his capture in February, 1901. By the war, and the subsequent treaty of Paris, the United States became clearly a Pacific and far eastern, as well as a world, power.



John Hay. Pach Bros.

Although faced by an insurrection in the Philippine Islands from January, 1899, to March, 1901, increasing interest of the United States in China was demonstrated in the autumn of 1899. The year which marked the passing of extraterritoriality in Japan marked also the enunciation by the Washington government of a definite policy with respect to China known since as that of the Open Door.

The scramble for concessions in China which bade fair to end in its partition could scarcely fail to arouse the Washington government to action. During the generation which had passed since Anson Burlingame's ministry in Peking (1861-67) the policy of co-operation fostered by him had died of inanition. At the close of the century the United States had to decide between playing a lone hand in China—

with the probability of being pushed out of the game—and making at least a feint toward co-operation. The latter was chosen. On September 6, 1899, less than five months after the ratifications of the treaty of Paris had been exchanged, Secretary of State Hay instructed the American ambassadors to England, Germany, and Russia to seek, from the governments of these countries, formal assurances “that each in its respective spheres of interest or influence—

First. Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called ‘sphere of interest’ or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said ‘sphere of interest’ (unless they be ‘free ports’), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such ‘sphere’ than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its ‘sphere’ on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such ‘sphere’ than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.⁵⁸

On November 13, 17, and 22 the same assurance was requested from the governments of Japan, Italy, and France, respectively.⁵⁹

The so-called Hay policy of the Open Door was not new: it was a restatement, with specific application, of the most-favored-nation policy which from the beginning had motivated both American residents in China and their home government. Nor was it primarily Secretary Hay’s policy; President McKinley had used the term “open door” which Hay did not use in his notes in 1899—a year before the dispatch of the notes to the five European and one Asiatic governments. Nor was it peculiarly American: Lord Palmerston, in his instructions to the two Elliots dated February 20, 1840, had cautioned them to “bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government do not desire to obtain for British subjects any exclusive privileges of Trade, which should not be equally extended to the Subjects of every other Power.”⁶⁰ Correlatively, the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1843 contained the most-favored-nation clause. In 1899, Lord Charles Beresford advocated a “commercial alliance or understanding based on the principle of the open door,” and proposed an alliance of Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and Germany

⁵⁸ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1899, pp. 132–33.

⁵⁹ For the replies of the powers see *inter alia* W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (Baltimore, 1927), I, 70 ff., and Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

⁶⁰ Quoted by, and from, H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1910), Vol. I, Appendix B, p. 630.

"with a definite understanding on the integrity of China, so that the door can be kept open."⁶¹ During the ambassadorship of John Hay in London (April, 1897–September, 1898), Lord Salisbury, Premier and Foreign Secretary, had officially suggested to him the desirability of an Anglo-German-American alliance having for one of its objects the defense of the integrity of China and the Open Door. Personally approving the idea, the ambassador realized that it was impossible of implementation, since in international relations the United States Government was perennially unwilling to offer a *quid-pro-quo* or to assume the kind of responsibility which an agreement to maintain the integrity of China would imply.

Most significant of all with respect to the immediate origins of the official enunciation of Open-Door doctrine by the United States were conferences held during the summer of 1899: one between Alfred E. Hippisley, a commissioner of English nationality formerly in the Chinese Maritime customs service, and Secretary Hay; another between Hippiisley and Hay's friend and adviser, W. W. Rockhill.⁶² During, and following, these conferences, in July and August, Hippiisley made suggestions, verbally and in writing, constituting the essence of the specific recommendations incorporated by Rockhill in a memorandum to Secretary Hay under date of August 28. These the latter embodied in his circular note of September 6.

The work of Hippiisley, Rockhill, and Hay perhaps slowed continental European action in China. This was beneficial to the United States no less than to China; otherwise Washington would not have exerted itself as it did. Although the terms "sphere" and "sphere of interest" were placed in quotation marks, their existence was clearly recognized by the United States without protest. Nor was China consulted, or asked to participate in keeping its doors open.

It is tolerably clear that the Open-Door policy as laid down in 1899 brought about no revolution in America's policy nor did it effectively guarantee the territorial integrity of China. The United States had conceded nothing and had entered into no "entangling alliance" in making the start it had made. Hay's notes had aroused further American interest in China, and they subsequently helped to set the tone of American policy in the twentieth century.⁶³

⁶¹ *Japan Times*, January 22, 1899, quoted by, and from Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 641 n.

⁶² T. Dennett, *John Hay—From Poetry to Politics* (New York, 1933), pp. 290–92. On Rockhill and Hippiisley see Paul Varg, *Open Door Diplomats: the Life of W. W. Rockhill* (Urbana, Ill., 1952), chap. IV.

⁶³ For a critical discussion of the influence of Hay's notes see George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951), chap. II.

THE CENTURY'S END IN THE FAR EAST

Diplomatic, military, cultural, and commercial impacts upon China of the Western powers and of Japan during the last quarter of the nineteenth century terminated in two upheavals during the years 1898–1901. The objective of both was the salvation of the empire; in conjunction, they may be considered as stages in a far-reaching and fundamental revolution. Between June 11 and September 22, 1898—contemporaneously with the struggle in China for concessions, the further consolidation by Japan of its position in Korea, and the lull in the Philippine Islands following the battle of Manila Bay—the Kuang Hsü emperor instituted a series of sweeping reforms in an endeavor to save his empire from complete domination by foreigners, Western and Eastern. This resulted instead in his fall from power accompanied by the restoration to official authority of his aunt, the empress dowager, Tzū-hsi.⁶⁴

Change of rulers was followed by change of method but not primarily by alteration of objectives. Not by basic and disturbing reforms, which interfered with the perquisites and honors of officialdom, was the empire to be protected from alien assaults, but by reorganization of the military arm. To supplement the regular forces of the empire, Tzū-hsi, late in the year 1898, ordered the restoration of the old militia bands. From these, and from secret societies originally anti-Manchu, the Boxers and their collaborators evolved in 1899 and 1900. They attacked Christian converts and, disregarding the law of nations, attempted to expel, or extirpate, the foreigners from northern China, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria.⁶⁵

In May, 1900, numerous hostile acts were committed by anti-foreign forces in northern China. On the last day of the month armed guards for the legations were taken up to the capital from Tientsin. So threatening became the situation in Peking that, on June 9, the British and American ministers telegraphed to the admirals of their respective countries off Taku. British Admiral Seymour headed an international force of 2156, including 112 Americans, for relief of the legations. The force failed to reach Peking and fell back on Tientsin.

⁶⁴ J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, *China Under the Empress Dowager* (London, 1914 and the Peking ed. published by H. Vetch, 1939), chaps. X–XV; R. F. Johnston, *Twilight in the Forbidden City* (London, 1934), chaps. I–III. For the best account of the reform movement see M. E. Cameron, *The Reform Movement in China* (Stanford, 1931).

⁶⁵ On the Boxers see P. H. Clements, *The Boxer Rebellion* (New York, 1915); J. J. L. Duyvendak, Translator, *The Diary of His Excellency Ching-Shan* (Leiden, 1924), and William Lewisohn, "Some Critical Notes on the So-called 'Diary of His Excellency, Ching Shang,'" in *Monumenta Serica*, II (1936–37), 191–202; for Duyvendak's own attack upon the genuineness of the Ching-shan diary see his articles in *T'oung Pao*, XXXIII (1937), 268–94, XXXV (1940), 403–04, XXXVI (1940), 85–86; A. H. Smith, *China in Convulsion*, 2 vols. (New York, 1901); G. N. Steiger, *China and the Occident: The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement* (New Haven, 1927); B. L. Putnam Weale [(B. L. Simpson)], *Indiscreet Letters from Peking* (London, 1906).

To keep in touch with the Seymour force, with Tientsin, and with Peking, the other admirals, with the exception noted below, decided they must control the Pei-ho (North River) leading to Tientsin. They issued an ultimatum calling for the surrender of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho by the early morning of June 17 and, the Chinese opening fire before the ultimatum expired, captured the forts. American Admiral Kempff refused to co-operate in this enterprise on the ground that his country and China were not at war, and that such an act would unite China against the foreigners and endanger many lives in the interior. In this decision he was upheld by President McKinley.

Partly on account of seizure of the forts and partly for other reasons, the foreign envoys and all other foreigners were ordered, on June 19, to leave Peking within twenty-four hours. On the twentieth a declaration of war was ordered, the German minister was murdered, and firing on the legations began. From then until mid-August, when the fall of the capital was brought about by the concurrent attacks of Japanese forces and those of the Western powers, the foreigners in Peking were in a state of siege.

On July 2, 1900, during the Boxer seige of the Legations and the Pehtang Cathedral in Peking, the French government proposed that the powers should agree upon the maintenance in China of the territorial *status quo*. On the following day Secretary Hay dispatched a circular telegram to the American representatives in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo, The Hague, and Lisbon in which he defined

the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens. . . . If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. . . . The purpose of the President, is . . . to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and

administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. . . .⁶⁶

In Secretary Hay's note a broadening of the Open-Door policy is to be found in the reference to "the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." In addition, the old policy of fostering the independence of Asiatic states was strengthened by the definite enunciation of the aim of the United States to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity" which had been clearly foreshadowed in the Seward-Burlingame treaty of 1868. The use of the word "concurrently" instead of, for example, "co-operatively" is also noteworthy.

In spite of their expressions of approval of this policy several of the powers seized the opportunity for aggressive action presented during the following months. Most conspicuous were the Russians in South Manchuria, and at Tientsin, where they seized a concession of one thousand acres. This was followed by demands of Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Austria for new concessions or enlargement of old ones; the next year similar demands were made by British and Germans. Since 1861 the United States had claimed a concession at Tientsin over which it had never assumed control. Lest they be shut out from trade there, the Americans now considered assuming control of the area earlier allotted to them, but finally decided that it should be added to the British concession, subject to the right of recall at any time. Thus, from the beginning, the possibilities of twisting the meaning of the principles of equal economic opportunity and of China's territorial and administrative integrity, and diplomatically preventing their application, became evident.

Humiliated on innumerable occasions since 1839, especially in 1860 and 1894-99, China—or, rather, part of China—turned at bay and fought the world. The world was victorious, and the Manchu-Chinese empire was ground in the dust. Speaking realistically, all that saved it from dissolution were the jealousies and fears of the powers for each other. Following months of bickering and jockeying, the Protocol of Peking was signed on September 7, 1901, by representatives of China and eleven of the interested powers.⁶⁷ China was required, *inter alia*, to mete out punishment in varying degrees of severity to the living and dead officials held responsible for the outbreak; to rehabilitate the memory of five who had died as a result of their opposition to the dowager empress and the Boxers; to suspend examinations in forty-

⁶⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1901, Appendix, p. 12.

⁶⁷ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, I, No. 1901/3, pp. 278-84 ff.

five cities where foreigners had suffered or died; to agree to exclusive control by the powers of the legation quarter in Peking and permanent stationing therein of foreign guards; to prohibit membership in anti-foreign societies; to keep open the route between Peking and the sea, connected with which were the destruction of certain forts and foreign military occupation of points on the way; to pay an indemnity to the powers of 450,000,000 taels, and to assent to a revision of the commercial treaties. Thus, at the dawn of the twentieth century, China's future of internal upheaval and foreign intervention lay in rough sketch. Nor was it long before the outlines would be filled in with the heavy black strokes of the pencil of time.

A survey of the Far East at the end of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth discloses a very different situation from that which had existed one hundred years earlier. In the East Indies the Dutch had built up a vast and rich empire. In the Malay Peninsula the British were supreme; its southern extremity, Singapore, the potential Gibraltar of the East, controlled for England the main southern approaches to China and Japan. The old Grand Empire of the South, Annam with its dependencies, retained but the shadow of its former greatness, being under the firm control of France which had completely detached Cochinchina and ruled it directly as a colony.

Siam had retained its independence partly by virtue of the ability of its royal family, partly by the will of its neighbors, England and France, the former of which had no intention of allowing to disappear a buffer state of value on the confines of its Indian empire. But Siam had lost a considerable amount of territory claimed by it and was to lose more; in addition the extraterritorial system therein was yet intact. Several years were to pass before the kingdom could breathe in peace and establish itself on a sound foundation of complete sovereignty.

The Philippine Islands had passed from the Spanish to the American empire. Spain had vanished from the Pacific and the Far East while the United States, a Pacific and an Asiatic power, was working in defense of the territorial and administrative integrity of China as it had for that of Japan a generation earlier.

China had lost suzerainty over most of its tributary states, including Liu-ch'iu, Indo-China, Burma, Nepal, Siam, Sulu, Laos, and Korea. Its hold on Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet was giving way before the advances of Japan, Russia, and England in one or more of these areas. The nucleus of the empire, south of the Wall, was so weakened by internal corruption and alien interference that it seemed ready to disappear as a political entity.

Korea had changed officially from a kingdom to an empire, having been opened, against its will, to foreign intercourse and loosed, also

against its will, from dependence on China, its former suzerain. It had served as a diplomatic and military battleground for Japan and China a few years earlier and was now serving in a similar role along economic and political lines for Japan and Russia. Imperial dignity could not prevail over internal decay and external aggression; even the pretense of independence was in 1910 to give way to Japanese annexation.

Russia, not content with the privileges in China enjoyed by the other treaty powers and with the Maritime province and Vladivostok which faced toward the practically closed Sea of Japan, was pressing into Mongolia and through Manchuria. With Peking, its influence at the end of the century was paramount as a result of the Sino-Russian treaty of alliance of 1896, the first alliance concluded by China with a Western state.

The unknown, and generally unsuspected, quantity in eastern Asia was Japan, which had defeated China, stepped into Manchuria—and then stepped out again; which, in 1898, had earmarked Fukien in the south for future attention; which was simultaneously guaranteeing and undermining Korea's independence; which had marched gloriously with the allies to capture Peking in 1900; which was to break all precedents by forming an alliance with the powerful British Empire in 1902 and then to enact the role of David to Russia's Goliath two years later—and reverse the tide which had swept over Asia from the West in the preceding century. Japan, the land of a fanatically patriotic people of extraordinary, if regimented, ability, patience and perseverance—a people with leaders of long memory and deep-laid plans—was indeed the unpredictable quantity at the dawn of the twentieth century.

PART II

FROM BOXERISM TO JAPAN'S
INVASION OF CHINA
1900-1931

CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

LINKING OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC

Most striking in the history of far eastern politics in the nineteenth century was the advent of the United States in a position of unqualified importance. The negotiations of Caleb Cushing in 1844 had set the lines of American policy toward China, and a decade later Commodore Perry had inaugurated the United States policy toward Japan. In both instances the American attitude was benevolent but sternly correct. After the Civil War in the United States had ground to a conclusion, American business and governmental groups began steadily to increase their interests and expand their holdings in the Pacific and in eastern Asia. The effort of the European powers to divide China during the last decade of the nineteenth century forced the Washington government to announce as policy the traditional American concern about equality of economic opportunity and its vital interest in the maintenance of China's territorial integrity.

Contemporaneously with manifestations of its interest and growing power in Pacific and far eastern areas, the United States was making additionally clear its position with reference to the joining of the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans by a canal. For centuries the desirability of such a route had been discussed; from time to time, for seventy-five years, the government of the United States had evinced concern. Prior to the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer convention of 1850 the Americans had assured Great Britain that although they sought "no exclusive privilege for themselves, they could never consent to see so important a communication fall under the exclusive control of any other great commercial power."¹ President Hayes, in the phraseology of President Grant, summarized governmental opinion of the United States as being the desire for "an American canal under American control."² In the early 'eighties attempts, more vigorous than diplomatic, were made by Secretaries of State Blaine and Frelinghuysen for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. President Cleveland, in the late 'eighties, reversed the policy of

¹ Quoted by, and from, R. J. Taussig, "The American Inter-Oceanic Canal: An Historical Sketch of the Canal Idea" in *The Pacific Ocean in History*, ed. by H. Morse-Stephens (New York, 1917), p. 130.

² Quoted by, and from, W. F. Johnson, *Four Centuries of the Panama Canal* (New York, 1907), p. 73.

his predecessors, with reference to the construction and management of a canal "by any single power," an action similar to that which he was later to take in the case of Hawaii.

It remained for the Spanish-American War to demonstrate to the United States the necessity, in times of emergency, for a short route between the two oceans. In February, 1900, the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, designed as an amendment, or supplement, to the Clayton-Bulwer convention, was placed before the Senate. Had this agreement been implemented, the United States, while obtaining the right to construct, operate and regulate the canal, would have agreed to its neutralization to be guaranteed by the powers and would have consented never to blockade or fortify it. The Senate so amended the treaty before ratifying it in December that the English government declared it unacceptable.

On November 18, 1901, the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed;³ more fortunate than its precursor, it was approved, without amendment, less than a month later. The Clayton-Bulwer convention was now abrogated and the right of the United States to construct a canal under its sole control was recognized by England. The rights also of the United States to fortify the canal and to blockade it in time of need were implicit in the agreement, though not actually stated, and were confirmed by the British foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne, in a separate memorandum. The American government had at last obtained from England everything it desired; all that Great Britain required was that the conditions laid down, including payment of tolls, for the use of the canal should be "just and equitable" and apply equally to all nations, including the United States.

Now followed the so-called "battle of the routes" to decide whether the canal should cross Nicaragua or Panama. After much dispute within and without Congress the Isthmian Canal Law⁴ (Spooner Act) went into effect in June, 1902. By this the president was authorized to acquire, within a "reasonable time" and for \$40,000,000, the property of, and the rights conceded by Colombia to, the (French) New Panama Canal Company and to negotiate a treaty with Colombia for the control in perpetuity of the land needed for the canal. Should this prove impossible he was to undertake the construction of the canal across Nicaragua.

Comparatively little trouble was encountered in bargaining for the purchase of the French rights, but negotiation with Colombia proved another matter.⁵ At the outset negotiations were interrupted by the out-

³ W. N. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions etc. between the U. S. and Other Powers* (Washington, 1910), I, 782-84.

⁴ 32, *Stat. L.*, 481.

⁵ J. C. Frechoff, *America and the Canal Title* (New York, 1916), pp. 34 ff.; W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations* (New York, 1916), II, 316-19, and the same writer's *Four Centuries of the Panama Canal*, pp. 131-49; A. L. P. Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplo-*

break in Panama, in the summer of 1902, of one of the fifty-three revolutions which in the period 1850–1903 marked the development of that area.⁶ To prevent the blocking of traffic on the transisthmian railway, American marines were landed in September, in accordance with the treaty of 1846, but without customary consultation with the Colombian government. Irritated at what he interpreted as an affront to the sovereign dignity of his country, General Concha, the Colombian minister, declined, late in November, to accept Secretary Hay's proposals. Thereupon the Colombian representative was recalled, early in December, following a complaint by Hay to Bogotá.

The secretary of state now warned the Colombian government that unless an agreement could be reached the United States might turn to the Nicaraguan route, and, by virtue of the treaty of 1846, prevent canal construction in Panama. Dr. Tomas Herran, Colombian *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, was appointed to continue negotiations. Possibly less sensitive on matters of sovereignty, and personally favorable to canal construction, Dr. Herran centered his attentions largely on questions of finance.⁷

By the Hay-Herran treaty of January 22, 1903, distinct limitations were placed on Colombian sovereignty. It is not surprising that the United States Senate, on March 17, 1903, approved the Hay-Herran treaty without amendment—nor is it strange that the Colombian Congress, in session for over three months (June 20–October 31), failed to express its approval. Prior to Tokyo's negotiations with Peking in 1915, perhaps the most extraordinary pressure ever exerted by one sovereign power over another in time of peace was that of the Washington government on Bogotá prior to the convening, and during the session of, the Colombian Congress in 1903.

The Roosevelt administration was insistent that the "treaty should be ratified exactly in its present form, without any modifications whatever," and that the United States would be justified "in considering any modification whatever of the terms of the treaty as practically a breach of faith on the part of the Government of Colombia, such as may involve the very greatest complications in the friendly relations which have hitherto existed between the two countries."⁸ On August 12, the Hay-Herran treaty was definitely rejected by the Colombian senate; on October 31 the Congress adjourned and negotiations between Colombia and the United States for

macy (New York, 1928), pp. 314–23; T. Dennett, *John Hay* (New York, 1933), chap. XXX; H. C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean* (Chicago, 1927); D. G. Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Area* (Boston, 1934).

⁶ T. Roosevelt, "The Panama Canal," in *The Pacific Ocean in History*, p. 144.

⁷ See *The Story of Panama Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives* (Washington, 1913). Also consult *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1903, pp. 133–64.

⁸ *Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 474*, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 423, 424.

the construction of an isthmian canal were forever ended—although, for the nonce, Bogotá did not realize this.

The long drawn out, and finally unsuccessful, negotiations at Washington and Bogotá had been watched with increasing irritation by President Roosevelt; by the French Canal Company; and by Panama, the territory most immediately concerned. Prior to January, 1902, the president had, on the whole, favored Nicaragua as the site of the canal; the decision of the French company to offer its concession to the United States for \$40,000,000 (instead of \$109,141,000, as earlier demanded) appears to have constituted the main factor in swinging him to favor Panama, now presumably the cheaper site.

The spokesmen on behalf of the French company—which bade fair to lose all if Nicaragua were chosen—were the American attorney, William N. Cromwell, and a French engineer, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, who worked constantly and ubiquitously, directly and deviously, above and below the surface on behalf of the unknown stockholders of the French company. Bunau-Varilla—who had been professionally engaged on the canal and was a shareholder in the company—had persuaded the president of the company that \$40,000,000 was preferable to memories of what might have been. He had frightened Americans at the thought of a canal which might be destroyed by Nicaraguan volcanoes⁹ and he had helped divert public opinion in favor of Panama.

The Colombian department of Panama had every reason to want the canal and to object to the attitude of Bogotá. From 1739 to 1903 it had alternated between independence and membership in the union of territories known, after 1863, as Colombia. To the year 1885 the right of Panama to secede had been recognized in the constitutions of Colombia; after that date it had not, and this had constituted a cause for insurrection on various occasions before 1903.

As Colombian public opinion, during the spring months of 1903, registered increasing opposition to the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty, the attitude of Panama toward Bogotá became a matter of concern to the latter. It was clear that the Panamanians wanted the canal. On August 15, three days after the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian Senate, Beaupré reported that "the Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly imbued with the idea of an independent republic that they have been more or less indifferent to the fate of the treaty."¹⁰

Until the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian senate, on August 12, negotiations had been conducted by the state department. Shortly thereafter the president personally took the lead.¹¹ Taking into account

⁹ H. F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1931), pp. 306–07.

¹⁰ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1903, p. 184.

¹¹ See Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 339, n. 27.

the possibility of difficulty with Colombia he had, a few days before the United States Senate approved the Herran treaty of March 17, ordered the dispatch to strategic areas in South America of a small group of military officers in civilian clothes "to map out and gather information concerning the coasts of those portions of South America which would be of special interest . . . in the event of any struggle in the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea."¹² At the time he took this action President Roosevelt hoped for ratification of the treaty by Colombia. Three days after its rejection he received, on August 15, a memorandum on the subject of canal construction in the isthmus prepared by Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University. In this it was argued, on the basis of article xxxv of the treaty of 1846, that the government of the United States had the right "to build the canal . . . not only for itself but for the world"; that, under the circumstances prevailing, the United States government was not subject to disabilities faced by a private company; and that Colombia was "not in a position to obstruct the building of the canal." Such reasoning appeared cogent to the president; by mid-September he was intimating to certain of his friends that Colombia would not be further consulted with respect to Panama. He had determined to recommend "to Congress to take possession of the Isthmus by force of arms; and . . . I had actually written the first draft of a message to this effect—" ¹³ when the revolution in Panama rendered it no longer necessary.

Within a week President Roosevelt received reports from two of the officers who had been scouting in the Caribbean area, including the Isthmus, and who had returned to Washington full of enthusiasm over the coming revolution.¹⁴ With respect to such a possibility the president was non-committal, but issued instructions that naval vessels should appear at the isthmus. On November 2, two vessels were ordered to the Atlantic side, and one to the Pacific side, of the Isthmus with instructions to "maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force, either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama. Government force reported approaching Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing, if in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict."¹⁵ To justify these orders on the basis of the treaty of 1846 would be extremely difficult.

On November 4 a *de facto* government was established in Panama City. On that day the commander of the "Nashville" in accord with his orders and the provisions of the treaty of 1846, landed fifty marines

¹² Quoted by, and from, Pringle, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

¹³ Quoted by, and from *ibid.*, pp. 316-18.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 321; also Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 330, and T. Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

¹⁵ Quoted by, and from, Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 330; cf. also H. C. Hill, *op. cit.*, chap. III.

at Colon to prevent disorder on the part of the bereaved Colombian army and to prevent its use of the railroad to Panama City.

Without waiting for the Panamanians who were en route to Washington to negotiate a substitute for the Hay-Herran treaty and who might wish, in the interests of the new state, to revise the financial offers earlier made to Colombia and the French company, Bunau-Varilla, on November 13, presented himself to President Roosevelt as accredited minister of Panama. In the words of Tyler Dennett, biographer of Secretary Hay:

. . . amid the creaks and groans of twisted precedents, which would admirably fit the needs of Japan if some day she were to find it profitable to deal with a similarly created Filipino provisional government, and which have already served in the case of Manchukuo, he was received by the president as minister plenipotentiary with power to negotiate a new canal treaty.¹⁶

With respect to this illuminating analogy a few observations may be made. First, the history of the relationship of Panama to Colombia, as indicated above, is notably different from that of Manchuria with China—as is made clear elsewhere in this study. Furthermore, the declaration of independence by Panama *preceded* the generally negative action of American forces there, whereas the opposite was the case in Manchuria with respect to the actions of the Japanese. Little or no opposition to independence, or to the government which was established consequent upon its proclamation in Panama was manifested by Panamanians, whereas the same cannot be said with respect to a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of Manchuria. Moreover, the conspiracy which resulted in the creation of the state of Panama, although aided by Bunau-Varilla and Panama Railroad Company officials, was one composed and led by natives of the Isthmus, long accustomed to revolution, to prevent an irreparable loss which they feared Panama would suffer as a result of the attitude and actions of Bogotá. Such was not the case in Manchuria where, obviously and—on occasion—admittedly, the lead in both conspiracy and actions was taken not by natives.

The actions of the Panamanians themselves rendered it unnecessary for President Roosevelt to take the action which he declared he was prepared to have taken—action similar in essence to that taken by the Japanese in the absence of moves by the inhabitants of Manchuria such as had been taken by the Panamanians. The *ethics* of Americans, connected with the revolution in Panama, and of Japanese, involved in the outbreak in Manchuria, were similar; the *actions* taken were only partly so. From the viewpoint of morality, as contrasted with legality, there is little to choose. Roosevelt and the Japanese based their actions, in

¹⁶ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

the cases under consideration, upon will to power without undue regard to legality: both claimed a mission on behalf of civilization. The results of the plans of each were essentially the same—except that on the earlier occasion, there being no League of Nations, the powers readily followed suit in the granting of recognition to the new state whereas on the later occasion they did not.

The second anniversary of the signing of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, November 18, 1903, was marked by the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla convention between the United States and the new republic of Panama.¹⁷ By it the former promised to maintain the independence of the latter which in turn granted to its protector “in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed . . .” also of “any other lands and waters outside of the zone . . . which [might] be necessary and convenient for the construction . . . of the said enterprise.” Within the canal zone and its “auxiliary lands and waters” the United States was granted “all the rights, power and authority . . . which [it] would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory. . . .” The canal was to “be neutral in perpetuity” and to be opened in accord with the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The United States assumed the duty of protecting the canal and was granted the right to use necessary means in so doing. The rights of the United States now granted, or which might be granted in the future, were guaranteed against future impairment. Finally, as a means of protecting the canal, Panama agreed to “sell or lease to the United States lands adequate and necessary for naval or coal-ing stations on the Pacific coast and on the western Caribbean coast . . . to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.” In addition to guaranteeing its independence, the United States agreed “to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars (\$10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States . . . and also an annual payment during the life of this convention of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars (\$250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine years after the date aforesaid.” The convention was ratified and went into effect on February 26, 1904, having been approved, unseen, by the government of Panama on the preceding December 2.

An Isthmian Canal Commission was immediately appointed by President Roosevelt to make plans and preparations for canal construction and to supervise their execution. On June 1, 1904, the United States took over authority in the Canal Zone and work began at once.

¹⁷ Malloy, *op. cit.*, II, 1349–57, especially Articles ii, iii, xviii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, i and xiv.

On August 15, 1914, slightly over a fortnight after the beginning of the First World War, and approximately ten years after the institution of operations by the Americans, the Panama Canal was opened to traffic. As of June 30, 1913, the total direct charges to construction were \$185,316,000; other expenditures not directly chargeable to construction (for example the sums paid to Panama and to the French canal company, and for incomplete fortifications, sanitation, administration, the Panama Railroad, etc.) brought the costs to \$298,985,000. As of December 31, 1921, which marked the end of the "period of construction and development," the total costs were \$355,734,673, including \$101,294,309 for defense.¹⁸

Diplomatic negotiations carried on by the United States and Colombia during the Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and Harding administrations, for a settlement of the issues raised in 1903, resulted in a treaty, ratified by the United States in 1921 and by Colombia in 1922, in which—without expression of regret—the former agreed to pay the latter the sum of twenty-five million dollars and to place Colombia on a plane of equality with the United States in the use of the Canal.¹⁹ It was not solely a troubled national conscience which brought about this settlement. Colombian oil helped to soothe the troubled waters.²⁰ Colombia finally recognized the independence of Panama on May 15, 1924.²¹

With the completion of the project the eastern and western coasts of the United States were no longer separated, in a maritime sense, by the long and dangerous route around South America. The sea route from New York to San Francisco was shortened by considerably more than half; the route from New York to Yokohama via Panama is shorter by 3359 miles than that by Suez. The naval strategy of the United States was revolutionized, being based until 1931 on two fleets: one stationed on the Atlantic, the other on the Pacific coast. With control of the Panama Canal and ownership of Hawaii, the domination by the United States of the eastern Pacific was made manifest. In the western and southern Pacific, and in the Far East, its influence became correspondingly greater.

Construction of the Panama Canal did not complete the plans of the United States government with respect to strengthening its position in the land and sea areas of Central America. Eventuating from negotiations begun in December, 1912, a convention was signed on August 5, 1914, by which, for \$3,000,000, to be spent in accord with Washington's wishes, Nicaragua granted to the United States, in perpetuity, exclusive canal rights within its territory; leased, for ninety-nine years, the Great Corn

¹⁸ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

¹⁹ *League of Nations Treaty Series*, No. 263, IX, 303-11.

²⁰ Pringle, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-32; J. F. Ripsey, *The Capitalists and Colombia* (New York, 1931); Chester Lloyd Jones, "Panama Canal" in *Ency. of the Social Sciences*, XI, 556.

²¹ C. P. Howland (ed.), *Survey of American Foreign Relations* (New Haven, 1929), p. 209.

Island and Little Corn Island in the Caribbean; and granted the right, also for ninety-nine years, to establish an American naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific coast of Nicaragua. The leases and grant were subject to renewal, upon expiration, to a "further term of ninety-nine years" while the areas included were to "be subject exclusively to the laws and sovereign authority of the United States during the terms of such lease and grant, and of any renewal or renewals thereof." ²²

The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate having earlier refused to approve an amendment to a treaty signed in 1913 by which an American protectorate over Nicaragua would have been established, and this provision having been omitted in the convention of 1914, the Senate advised ratification on February 18, 1916. President Wilson ratified it on June 19 and ratifications were exchanged three days later. The Convention, popularly known as the "Bryan-Chamorro Treaty," was proclaimed on June 24, 1916, despite the protests of Costa Rica and El Salvador. The former objected to the granting of canal rights by Nicaragua without prior consultation with its government; the latter claiming part ownership in the Gulf of Fonseca, held that its independence would be menaced by the establishment of an American naval base in that area. Despite shortening of many traffic routes which would be brought about by cutting a Nicaraguan canal, the costs involved for construction and fortification—estimated in 1931 at \$722,000,000—and the capacity of the Panama Canal have thus far prevented its construction, although renewed discussion of the project has been periodically reported in the American press.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

One of the reasons for the avoidance by Japan of an attitude of irreconcilability with respect to American annexation of the Hawaiian and the Philippine islands in 1898 was its desire for American friendship and support in its aims and actions in Korea following the Sino-Japanese War. From the period of the signing of the Schufeldt treaty, in 1882, to the annexation by Japan, in 1910, Korea was a shuttlecock of the powers. Not only Japan, but Russia as well, desired the approval of the United States and investment of American capital. The latter was shy, however, and a contract for a railroad which Americans obtained with Russian aid was carried out in co-operation with Nipponese. The latter suggested that American capital should be introduced into Korea under their guidance—a type of suggestion which, *mutatis mutandis*, Japan, repeatedly advocated

²² *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1914, *op. cit.*, CVIII, Pt. II, 520-22; also *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1914, 1915, *passim*.

with respect to China during the thirties and forties of the twentieth century.²³

Aggressive policies and actions of Russia in China, particularly in Manchuria, and in Korea contributed largely to the signing on January 30, 1902, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In this the Open-Door policy, and American far eastern policy in general, seemed to gain additional strength. The preamble explicitly stated the special interest of the contracting parties "in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations. . . ." ²⁴ The purity of motive was slightly adulterated by reference in the first article to the "special interests" of both countries in China and the "peculiar degree" to which Japan was interested in Korea. The new alliance produced two immediate counter moves: the application to the Far East of the previously existent Dual Alliance of Russia and France,²⁵ and the signing, on April 8, 1902, of a Russo-Chinese convention. By the latter, Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, and agreed to withdraw its military forces within certain time limits.²⁶ This it failed to do.

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the United States was more deeply interested in Manchuria than in Korea. In 1901-02 considerable friction developed between Americans and Russians in the Manchurian open port of Newchwang which was controlled by the latter. To prevent Russia from gaining for itself a permanent position of exclusive privilege in Manchuria, the United States in 1903 asked China to open three new cities, Tatungkow, Mukden, and Harbin, to foreign trade. To block this, Russia, in April, attempted to force upon China what is known as the "convention of seven points" as precedent to any move toward withdrawal from Manchuria. By this China was required, *inter alia*, to refuse to open new treaty ports in Manchuria, to forbid foreign consuls to be stationed there, and to employ no foreigners other than Russians in the northern China service. The United States government immediately protested to Peking against these demands, and reserved for later consideration the others made by St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, Russia vigorously denied existence of the "convention of seven points"—as, twelve years later, Japan was to deny existence of the Twenty-One Demands. One

²³ Cf. T. F. Millard, *Our Eastern Question* (New York, 1916), pp. 286-90. In addition for America's foreign relations see A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), chaps. III and IV; T. A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford, 1934).

²⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XCV (1901-1902), 83-84.

²⁵ J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements, etc.*, I, 325-26, note. For an excellent detailed discussion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance see W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1935), Vol. II, chap. XXIII.

²⁶ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1902-3, pp. 326-31; H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1918), III, 417-20.

result of the exceptionally tortuous and obscure diplomacy regarding this matter was the throwing of the sympathy, and more than moral support, of President Theodore Roosevelt to the side of Japan when war with Russia began in 1904. Finally, on July 11, 1903, Russia officially withdrew its opposition to the opening of new Manchurian ports—with the exception of Harbin—and the Chinese government agreed to a treaty with the United States providing for the opening of new ports in Manchuria.²⁷

Notwithstanding the desire to “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity,” expressed in Hay’s note on July 3, 1900, the prime object of the State Department was to safeguard American interests rather than the territorial integrity of China. Writing to President Roosevelt on May 1, 1902, Hay remarked:

We are not in any attitude of hostility towards Russia in Manchuria. On the contrary, we recognize her exceptional position in northern China. What we have been working for two years to accomplish, if assurances are to count for anything, is that, no matter what happens eventually in northern China and Manchuria, the United States shall not be placed in any worse position than while the country was under the unquestioned dominion of China.²⁸

Japan, on the contrary, felt that its future was at stake. Met by Russian evasion, deceit, procrastination, even insolence on almost every occasion of attempting a mutual solution of the difficulties in Korea and Manchuria, Japan struck on February 8, 1904, and declared war afterward, as, ten years earlier, it had done in the case of China, and thirty-seven years later, in the case of the United States.

The main objective of the Russo-Japanese War was control of Korea and China. During its course the United States, while officially neutral, was in reality, through President Roosevelt’s actions, a spiritual ally of Japan. The president was particularly fearful that Russian possession of Manchuria would be but the beginning of a systematic effort to limit American commercial enterprises in northeastern Asia. To express his dislike, Roosevelt referred to the czar as “a preposterous little creature.” Japan, the president asserted, was “playing our game.” While favoring Nippon, President Roosevelt recognized that that nation might cause trouble to American possessions in the Pacific and the Far East; he feared also that it might swing away from Anglo-American co-operation to alliance with Russia. Welcome, therefore, was an assurance drawn from Japan that it would not interfere with the Philippine Islands.

²⁷ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1903, pp. 46–77, 84–85, 708–11; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1903–5, Article xii, Pt. 2, p. 430; Morse, *op. cit.*, III, 321–23, 344–46, 421–26.

²⁸ Quoted by, and from, Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925), pp. 135–36; see also T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (3d ed.: New York, 1949), chap. XXIV; also *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1902, pp. 916–26.

On July 29, 1905, without the knowledge of the United States ambassador to Tokyo, Premier and Foreign Minister Count Katsura held a diplomatic conversation with American Secretary of War William Howard Taft, who was acting as the President's personal representative. The consequent "agreed memorandum" received the president's approval two days later. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads:

Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his [Taft's] views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbour any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines. . . .

The Premier then suggested the desirability of a good understanding or an alliance in practice, if not in name ". . . between these three nations [Great Britain, Japan, and the United States] in so far as respects the affairs in the Far East." To this Taft replied that the consent of the Senate was necessary for even a "confidential informal agreement," but that

he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States was so fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take [it].

The Premier then intimated his country's plan to assume control of Korean foreign affairs so that Japan might not be forced to enter "upon another foreign war." To this Taft, while disclaiming any "authority to give assurance," stated his approval of Japanese plans and his belief that President Roosevelt "would concur in his views in this regard. . . ." Tyler Dennett, who in 1924 made known to the world the existence of this agreement, comments:

President Roosevelt believed that when Russia was defeated in the Far East Japan conferred a benefit upon American interests. The distinctive feature of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy was that he did not ignore the implied obligation. He was prepared, in return, to help Japan—he was prepared to have the United States make some payment for the advantages which Americans enjoyed in Eastern Asia. It has been rare to find American statesmen who would follow President Roosevelt in this very honorable principle. Perhaps the most conspicuous characteristic of American policy in the Far East, viewed in the large, has been the desire to get something for nothing. Possibly in assenting to the agreed memorandum he displayed a willingness to pay too much. He really assented to something like a blank check, for he did not have the foresight to require a bill of particulars as to the meas-

ures which would be taken under the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance to maintain the peace of the Far East—measures which turned out to be inimical to American interests. However, the fact that the diplomacy was bungled does not affect the fact that the principle of statesmanship was sound.²⁹

The effect of the Taft-Katsura secret agreement was to make of the United States, unknown to the American people, a "sleeping partner" in the Anglo-Japanese alliance during the remainder of Roosevelt's administration. It aided in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Far East; it strengthened the position of the United States in that area: possibly it retarded momentarily the drawing together of Russia and Japan which the president dreaded as a precursor of further attacks on the integrity of the Chinese empire.

Informed of the willingness of Russia and Japan to make peace, Roosevelt, on April 20, 1905, suggested the desirability of direct negotiations between the warring nations. At the same time he made clear his expectation that Japan should abide by the doctrine of the Open Door in Manchuria and return that area to China. To this, Foreign Minister Baron Komura assented five days later. On May 31, Japan formally requested that President Roosevelt should invite the belligerents to enter upon direct negotiations. Identic notes were sent from Washington on June 8 in which the two powers were urged to appoint plenipotentiaries for the consideration of peace terms.

The resulting conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, lasted from August 10 to September 5. As foreshadowed in the Taft-Katsura discussions, and by other developments as well, Japanese "paramount political, military, and economical interests" in Korea were recognized by Russia in the treaty. Both nations agreed to evacuate Manchuria which, with the exception of the Liaotung peninsula, was to be administered exclusively by China; the peninsula was to be leased to Japan. Chinese sovereignty and the Open Door were recognized. The railway from Port Arthur to Changchun was to be transferred to Japanese control. Over the demands of the Japanese for indemnity and territorial compensation the conference all but disbanded in the period August 16–29. Having brought about the conference by his good offices, President Roosevelt now intervened to bring about a treaty agreement.³⁰ To the Tsar, to the Kaiser, and to the Japanese plenipotentiaries he presented such cogent reasons that on August 29 an agreement was reached: the Japanese dropped their claims for indemnity and offered to restore the northern part of Sakhalin to Russia. The

²⁹ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 2. *Current History*, XXI, 21; for a sketch of the life of Katsura, see C. Collum, "Prince Katsura" in *The Contemporary Review*, CIV (November, 1913), 656–62.

³⁰ Cf. Dennis, *op. cit.*, chap. XIV.

On July 29, 1905, without the knowledge of the United States ambassador to Tokyo, Premier and Foreign Minister Count Katsura held a diplomatic conversation with American Secretary of War William Howard Taft, who was acting as the President's personal representative. The consequent "agreed memorandum" received the president's approval two days later. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads:

Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his [Taft's] views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbour any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines. . . .

The Premier then suggested the desirability of a good understanding or an alliance in practice, if not in name ". . . between these three nations [Great Britain, Japan, and the United States] in so far as respects the affairs in the Far East." To this Taft replied that the consent of the Senate was necessary for even a "confidential informal agreement," but that

he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States was so fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take [it].

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³⁰ Cf. Dennis, *op. cit.*, chap. XIV.

Russian plenipotentiaries agreed to the cession to Japan of southern Sakhalin and to the repayment to Japan of the costs involved in acting as host to Russian war-prisoners in that country—a sum later agreed upon which approximated \$20,000,000. The treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5.³¹

Japan's failure to maintain its pose of altruism throughout the negotiations, plus developments in Korea and Manchuria during the next half decade, served to turn from that empire a considerable part of the sympathy and admiration which had been so potent in the American attitude during the preceding generation.

JAPANESE ANNEXATION OF KOREA

While the construction of the Panama Canal was going forward, and other preparations were in process whereby the position and influence of the United States in both the eastern and western Pacific would be strengthened, conditions in the Far East, which affected American interests and policies, were changing. American bankers had aided Japan to finance its struggle with Russia while the government at Washington had viewed with something more than complacency the defeat of the colossus of northern Eurasia. Japanese policy in Korea had even been contemplated by the United States without any considerable loss of equanimity, contrary as it appeared—and later proved—to be with respect to that part of American policy which called for maintenance of the independence and integrity of eastern Asiatic states. Nevertheless, the treaty of Portsmouth had no sooner been signed than Japanese-American relations cooled; in no long time they underwent strain. Japanese statesmen might admit the wisdom, and even the necessity, of their government's relinquishment of indemnity claims upon Russia; the people were critical of President Roosevelt's intervention. As on earlier occasions Japan, for the nonce, had little to hope for from the United States—except a solution of the immigration problem and quiescence in the Far East—and gradually turned its diplomatic attention elsewhere.

A long chain of understandings, agreements, treaties, and alliances affecting eastern Asia and the positions of the powers, including the United States, in that area evolved from the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the ensuing Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. Of these not the least significant was the secret Katsura-Taft "agreed memorandum" of July 29, 1905. Apparent as it becomes from a reading of this document that Roosevelt sacrificed Korea to American peace of mind regarding the Philippines, such is not the case. In reality, the independence of that country had been destroyed during the preceding quarter of a century by the inept-

³¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1905–8, pp. 522–28.

titude of its monarch and officials in the face of putrescent domestic conditions and the aggressive policies of the powers, particularly Japan and Russia. Specifically the signing of Korean-Japanese protocols on February 23, and August 19/22, 1904,³² had introduced a protectorate over Korea in everything but name and had rendered of no value the good-offices clause in the Schufeldt treaty of 1882. By the earlier of the protocols Korea had become an ally of Japan and had agreed to follow the advice of the latter in administrative affairs in exchange for guarantees of national independence and integrity and the safety of the imperial family; in the later protocol Korea agreed to consult Tokyo before negotiating agreements with foreign nations and to accept a Japanese adviser with controlling powers over all finances and a foreign diplomatic adviser to be nominated by Tokyo. Marshall Viscount Hasegawa shortly took over control of military affairs. It was in the light of these developments, and of the international situation, that President Roosevelt, on January 28, 1905, wrote to Secretary Hay: "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence."³³ He proceeded to wangle a promise from Tokyo, with respect to the Philippines, *not* in exchange for a promise not to interfere in Korea but in exchange for informing Tokyo of the essence of a decision which he had reached six months earlier.

That the United States, in the person of its president, was not the only power which had given up hope for Korea's survival as a sovereign state was made clear in the renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance of August 12, 1905. Whereas the "Empire of Corea" had been listed with China in the preamble of the agreement of January 30, 1902³⁴ as an entity "the independence and territorial integrity" of which were to be maintained, no reference to Korea was made in the preamble to the second alliance. Instead, that distracted country became the subject of an article (iii) reading:

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.³⁵

Japan's paramouncy in Korea was recognized by Russia also in the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905.³⁶

On the night of November 17, following, after the imperial palace in Seoul had been surrounded by Japanese police and gendarmes, Marquis

³² *British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit.*, 1904-05, XCVIII, 843.

³³ Quoted by, and from, Dennett in *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 110.

³⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, I, No. 1902-3, p. 324.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 1905-06, p. 517.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 1906-08, Article ii, pp. 522-23.

Ito, Viscount Hasegawa and Minister Hayashi, by the use of threats, imposed upon Korea a convention of protectorate.³⁷ Thereby, Tokyo assumed control of Korean foreign relations and installed a Japanese resident-general for the purpose. A week later the American minister to Seoul was instructed to close his legation.

Appeals to the United States and the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration proved fruitless. The immediate result of the appeal to the Hague was the forced abdication of the Korean emperor in favor of his weak-minded heir, Yi Chuk. Inasmuch as the leading Nipponese officials in both Tokyo and Seoul felt that the time for annexation was not fully ripe, another convention was signed on July 24 by which the Korean government was brought under the control of the Japanese resident general.³⁸ Only the passage of a decent interval and the negotiations of a few additional agreements with Korea and with the powers were necessary in preparation for annexation. On August 22, 1910, the necessary steps having been taken, a treaty of annexation was signed; by promulgation one week after, formal announcement was apparently made that Korea as a name and as a state had disappeared from the map of Asia. It had become the Japanese dependency of Chōsen—a long line of official declarations, promises, guarantees, and treaty clauses stipulating Korean independence and territorial integrity to the contrary notwithstanding.³⁹

RUSSO-JAPANESE *Rapprochement*

Although Tokyo was engaged in solving the problem of Korea during the period 1904–1910, definite advance was also being made by Japan in Manchuria. This was the outcome of its failure in the years 1897–1903 to come to an agreement with Russia (whereby Russia might leave Nippon a free hand in Korea in exchange for Nippon's leaving Russia equal freedom of action in Manchuria) and of the ensuing war which was ended by the treaty of Portsmouth.⁴⁰ With the implementation of that instrument, Japan returned to southern Manchuria from which it had been evicted in 1896 by the tripartite intervention of Russia, Germany, and France. By the Komura treaty, signed at Peking on December 22, 1905,⁴¹ China agreed to the provisions contained in the treaty of Portsmouth regarding Manchuria. Nippon now quickly entered upon consolidation of its position in a manner which, reminiscent of Russia, more than threatened the

³⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XCVIII, 1139–40.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, CI, 280.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, CIII, 992–93; also Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp. 522–29; S. K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York and London, 1918), chap. XI, and pp. 441–44.

⁴⁰ E. B. Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 17–22.

⁴¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1905–18, pp. 549–74.

principles of the Open Door and appeared to prepare for a repetition in southern Manchuria of the history of Korea.⁴²

Tokyo's success, however, was contingent upon the establishment of actual, and not merely official, friendly relations with St. Petersburg. Prior to the actual consummation of the alliance with England, in 1902, Elder Statesmen Yamagata and Ito had opposed the project and had advocated a rapprochement with Russia. On the conclusion, in 1905, of the war with Russia they renewed their efforts for an agreement with that country. Alexander Iswolsky, minister to Tokyo, 1900-03, and foreign minister in St. Petersburg, 1906-10, had long worked for conciliation of Japan.⁴³ The latter, allied with England which, since 1904, was linked with France in the *entente cordiale* (France in turn, being bound by alliance to Russia), and increasingly irritated with the United States over the immigration problem, while simultaneously doubtful as to American policies with respect to Manchuria, on June 10, 1907 signed at Paris an agreement and a declaration with France and, on July 30, at St. Petersburg an open convention and a secret agreement with Russia. Agreeing to "respect the independence and integrity of China," the signatories of the Franco-Japanese agreement announced, nevertheless, their "special interest" in the maintenance of peace and order in the—unspecified—"regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation. . . ." Each was to support the other in maintaining "peace and security in those regions, with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of . . . [each] in the Continent of Asia."⁴⁴ Although not published, it was understood by the signatories that the areas affected by their influence and propinquity were: for France, the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan; for Japan, the province of Fukien plus Manchuria and Mongolia.⁴⁵ Simultaneously with the signing of this agreement Ambassador Kurino and Foreign Minister Pichon signed a declaration by which Japanese in French Indo-China and Indo-Chinese subjects and protégés in Japan were accorded most-favored-nation treatment.

In negotiating these instruments with Japan, France was doing what it could to erase from the retentive memories of the leaders of that rising power its participation in the tripartite intervention of 1896 and other actions which might conceivably lead to a threat to its position in Indo-China.

⁴² For complaints of Secretary Root *re* Japanese actions in Manchuria in 1906, *cf.* Den-
nis, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-20. See for a complete discussion of America's rôle in Russo-Japanese
competition for Manchuria the doctoral dissertation of Arthur P. Kruse, "The Territorial
Integrity and Administrative Entity of China as a Phase of the Far Eastern Policy of the
United States" (Univ. of Chicago, 1948)

⁴³ A. Iswolsky, *Recollections of a Foreign Minister* (London [1920]), p. 5.

⁴⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1907/7, p. 640. For an analysis of this agreement,
see E. B. Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33.

⁴⁵ Price, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

It has been suggested that it was also outlining a formula for Russia and Japan to follow in their *rapprochement*—one which, while offering lip-service to the principle of the Open Door, would consolidate their respective positions and unite them in further aggressions on the periphery of the Chinese empire.⁴⁶ In any case, the Franco-Japanese agreements of June 10 and the Korean-Japanese convention of July 24 constituted interludes in the Russo-Japanese drama eventuating from Portsmouth.

On July 30, 1907, less than two years after the signing of the treaty of Portsmouth, the former, and still potential, enemies drew together, by the signing of two conventions, one public, the other secret, with results which gradually demonstrated the sound foundation of Roosevelt's apprehension of their conjoint exploitation of the Manchu-Chinese empire. By the public convention the contracting parties engaged "to respect the actual territorial integrity" of each other and recognized

the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire, and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach.⁴⁷

The term *status quo* was undefined in the document. That the term "Empire of China" had a special meaning was made clear, later, by the secret agreement signed simultaneously—but not published until 1918, after the fall of the tsardom.

By the secret convention, the two powers fixed upon a line of demarcation north and south of which Japan and Russia, respectively, would not encroach.⁴⁸ Thus Manchuria was definitely divided into spheres of influence. Russia also recognized "the relations of political solidarity between Japan and Korea" and agreed "not to interfere with nor to place any obstacle in the way of the further development of those relations" while Japan agreed "to extend in all respects most-favored-nation treatment" to Russia, its nationals and their interests in Korea "pending the conclusion of a definitive treaty." Finally, Japan recognized the "special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia" and agreed not to prejudice such interests.⁴⁹

The summer of 1907 which witnessed the consolidation of the Japanese position with respect to France, Korea, and Russia witnessed also, on August 31, the signing of an Anglo-Russian convention relating to Persia,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28–33

⁴⁷ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1907/11, pp. 657–58.

⁴⁸ For this line, consult Price, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Additional Article; also V. A. Yakhontoff, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East* (New York, 1931), p. 376: Supplementary Article.

⁴⁹ Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–08.

Afghanistan, and Tibet.⁵⁰ This relieved the old tension between the contracting parties which had been largely responsible for the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902.

The general effect of this series of agreements, in addition to those specifically noted, was the exclusion of Germany from participation in the domination of the Chinese empire which Japan, England, France, and Russia were to enjoy in defiance of American policy, particularly that of the Open Door.

DIPLOMATIC BYPLAY OVER MANCHURIA

The German emperor and the Chinese government viewed with misgivings the diplomatic trend in the Far East. Ignorant of the Japanese-American "agreed memorandum" of 1905, but aware of increasing friction between Americans and Japanese over the immigration of the latter into Hawaii and the Pacific coast states, both Germany and China in 1907-08 considered the possibility of a German-Chinese-American agreement or alliance which should serve as an offset to those of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Japan, and help to prevent the threatened partition of China.⁵¹

Contemporaneously a deeply interested observer of developments in Korea and Manchuria was Willard D. Straight: in 1905 vice consul and secretary to the last American minister in Seoul and in 1906-08 consul general of the United States at Mukden.⁵² With the aid of E. H. Harriman, American financier and railway magnate, Straight hoped to prevent a repetition of the history of Korea in Manchuria by the introduction there of American investments on a considerable scale. In 1905 Harriman conceived the idea of joint Japanese-American ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, which should be operated under the laws of Japan, as part of a Harriman-controlled round-the-world system of transportation.⁵³ A preliminary understanding with Marquises Ito and Katsura was negotiated on October 12, 1905; the signing of the Komura treaty, at the end of December, however, so far strengthened the position of Japan as to render it unnecessary for that country to take the American into partnership. The latter was therefore shortly informed, in a message implying that it was sent as a result of Chinese opposition, that the memorandum of October 12 was "of no effect" ⁵⁴ an implication the truth of which was denied in 1908 by T'ang Shao-yi who declared that Baron Komura had never consulted China with respect to the Harriman-Ito-Katsura railway plan. In 1906

⁵⁰ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1907/16, pp. 674-78.

⁵¹ Cf. L. J. Hall, "The Abortive German-American-Chinese Entente of 1907-8" in *Journal of Modern History*, I, No. 2 (June, 1929), 219-35. Consult also Alfred Vagts, *Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik* (New York, 1935), II, chap. XVII.

⁵² H. Croly, *Willard Straight* (New York, 1925), chap. VI.

⁵³ G. Kennan, *E. H. Harriman: A Biography*, 2 vols. (Boston and New York, 1922), II, chap. XVIII.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Japan organized the South Manchuria Railway Company with a capitalization of £ 20,000,000 of which two-fifths were borrowed in England in 1907-08.

While Japan and Russia were agreeing in 1907 upon their spheres of influence in Manchuria, and Japan's advance in its sphere was becoming ever more notable, Peking decided to tighten its hold by reorganizing the hitherto separate provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang into a viceroyalty. This was accomplished in June, 1907, Hsü Shih-chang, "blood-brother" to Yüan Shih-kai, being appointed viceroy, while T'ang Shao-yi, one of Yüan's protégés, who had served him as secretary when the latter was imperial resident in Korea, became governor of Fengtien. With these officials United States Consul-General Straight conferred on the subject of introducing American capital into the new viceroyalty for railway construction—which China had contemplated since 1898—and other purposes. He learned that, for financing such projects, Governor T'ang favored the founding of a government bank with a capitalization of gold \$20,000,000. Because of the financial panic of 1907, Harriman was unable to consider Straight's recommendations of Governor T'ang's plan. Somewhat amended the project was taken up again in 1908.

Contemporaneously the plan of Kaiser William II for an agreement between his government and those of China and the United States appeared to be taking definite shape. On October 17, 1907, the German ambassador to Washington, Baron Speck von Sternburg, was instructed to state to the American president and secretary of state that in his personal opinion Germany would be ready to form an alliance with China and the United States for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of China and the Open Door. Roosevelt appeared to favor a naval alliance with Germany and an understanding, not an alliance, for joint action with China and Germany in case of need.⁵⁵

During the first six months of 1908, Peking was considering the desirability and the method of proposing an understanding with the United States. On May 25 of that year the United States government made the first remission to China of part of its Boxer indemnity claims.⁵⁶ Early in August Governor T'ang Shao-yi was chosen to go to Washington for the avowed purpose of thanking the government. His real purposes were two-fold: to lay the foundations of an understanding between his own government and those of Germany and the United States, and to float a \$20,000,000 loan to establish a bank in Manchuria which, as planned by Viceroy Hsü, Governor T'ang and Consul-General Straight, should finance mining, timber, agricultural and railway developments. It was even

⁵⁵ L. J. Hall, *loc. cit.*, pp. 223-26.

⁵⁶ Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 710; also P. J. Treat, *The Far East* (New York, 1928), p. 359.

hoped that the remitted Boxer indemnity funds might be used in Manchuria.⁵⁷

When Governor T'ang reached Washington it was too late: the Japanese had preceded and forestalled him. Whether he would have been more successful had he been sent six months earlier is, however, open to doubt. President Roosevelt was not a great admirer of the China of his day, while for Japan he had considerable admiration and respect. He was, moreover, willing to play the give-and-take game of diplomacy. From a letter which he wrote, December 22, 1910, to his chosen successor, President Taft, it becomes apparent that in order to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Japanese immigration issue he was willing to give Japan a relatively free hand in Manchuria:

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. . . . I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement; but, as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the Open Door policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention.⁵⁸

How correctly the ex-president interpreted the signs of the times was made clear by Japan twenty-one years later.

To lessen the strain between the United States and Japan over the immigration issue, a Gentlemen's Agreement was negotiated in 1907 and went into effect in February, 1908.⁵⁹ Restricting Japanese labor—and to a degree other—immigration, this remained in force until nullified by the immigration act of 1924.⁶⁰ In the autumn of the same year, 1908, while Governor T'ang was on his way to Washington, the American navy, on

⁵⁷ Croly, *op. cit.*, chap. VII, also p. 272.

⁵⁸ Quoted by, and from, Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, pp. 320–21. With regard to Roosevelt's policy of "balanced antagonisms" see chap. V of E. H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895–1914* (Philadelphia, 1946).

⁵⁹ Treat, *op. cit.*, pp. 514–15.

⁶⁰ For details of this act see *infra*, pp. 216–18.

its journey around the world, visited Japan (October 18–20); simultaneously the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Baron Takahira, was engaged in negotiating with Secretary of State Root a hasty exchange of notes. These were signed on November 30, the day of Governor T'ang's arrival in Washington. They were shown to him at noon, the signatures being attached four hours later.⁶¹

The Root-Takahira Notes must be read in the light of Roosevelt's policy with reference to the Pacific area as a whole and not, as has usually been the case, merely in that of his policy with respect to the Far East. During the years 1907–08, while the Panama Canal was far from completion, the president, determined to strengthen the navy and keep it efficient, gave evidence in word and act of alternating periods of fear that war with Japan would occur and confidence that it would not. His objection to the entrance into the United States of Japanese laborers from Hawaii, Canada, Mexico, and Panama constituted one of the factors in his negotiation of the Gentlemen's Agreement.⁶² He interested himself in the defense problems of the Pacific Coast, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam, and, despite the existence of the "agreed memorandum" with Katsura of 1905, he issued directions in 1907 to the commanding general in the Philippines with reference to the holding of the archipelago in case of attack by Japan. For a time he even toyed with the idea of promising the Philippines "at the earliest possible moment . . . a nearly complete independence," under certain conditions—this as a means of removing "a temptation from Japan's way. . . ." Nevertheless, he would prefer to see the United States "fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress."⁶³ At the end of the year he dispatched the fleet on its round-the-world cruise. Declaring his belief that war would not result, he ordered the commanders to be prepared for all emergencies.

Baron Takahira, in the introductory remarks to his note to Secretary Root, omitted reference to the Far East, referring specifically only to "the region of the Pacific Ocean" in which his country and the United States held "important outlying insular possessions." In the preliminary remarks of Secretary Root's official reply, after a reference to the region of the Pacific, is found the statement that the United States welcomed also "the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation . . . respecting the Far East. . . ." The five points outlined in the notes for a "common aim, policy and intention" were as follows. 1. The "wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of . . . [Japanese

⁶¹ Croly, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

⁶² Pringle, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

⁶³ Letter to Secretary of War Taft, Aug. 21, 1907. Quoted by, and from, Pringle, *op. cit.*, pp. 408–9; see also M. A. de Wolfe Howe, *George von Lengerke Meyer* (New York, 1920), pp. 362, 365, 366, 383, 385.

and American] commerce on the Pacific Ocean." 2. The "maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned, and . . . the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." 3. The firm resolve of both governments "to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region"—which "region" was apparently the Pacific since neither party held "territorial possessions" in China. 4. The determination "to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire." 5. Intercommunication regarding useful measures should "the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined" be threatened.⁶⁴

In the original draft of Baron Takahira's note no reference, it is said,⁶⁵ was made to the territorial integrity of China; in the final draft the qualifier "territorial" was omitted. It is doubtful whether the term "status quo" referred to China as it clearly did to the Pacific. Soothing to the official mind of Washington, with respect to American insular possessions in the Pacific, the Root-Takahira Notes may have been, but their effect in Manchuria was otherwise. Their negotiation, preceded by the deaths of the Chinese emperor and the grand empress dowager on November 14, and 15, respectively—which in turn presaged the imminent fall from power of Yüan Shih-kai, the patron of T'ang—contributed to the futility of the T'ang mission, to the collapse of the plan for a German-Chinese-American agreement, which should safeguard China, and to the enhancement of Japan's strength and the general weakening of American influence in southern Manchuria and Peking.⁶⁶

RAILWAY AND FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY

Evidence of this was not long delayed. During the month in which the notes were signed the possibility that Russia would sell the Chinese Eastern Railway was intimated to American capitalists. On receipt of this information, confidential inquiry was made in Tokyo as to the willingness of Japan to sell the South Manchuria Railway in the event of Russia's sale of the Chinese Eastern. To this Japan replied in January, 1909, with a decided negative.⁶⁷

Three months later William Howard Taft, sometime governor-general of the Philippine Islands and more recently Secretary of War in the Roosevelt Cabinet, succeeded Roosevelt as president of the United States; as

⁶⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1908-19, pp. 769-71.

⁶⁵ Croly, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁶⁶ L. J. Hall, *loc. cit.*, pp. 234-35; also E. B. Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42.

⁶⁷ Croly, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-79. For the Russian attitude see the discussion in Zabriskie, *op. cit.*, chap. VII.

Secretary of State he chose Philander C. Knox. The new administration was, of course, not bound by the "agreed memorandum" of 1905 with Japan; by its nature, this held only as long as Roosevelt occupied the White House. President Taft and Secretary Knox were more inclined than had been Roosevelt, Hay and Root to take a strictly legal, even doctrinaire, point of view and to revert to an earlier and less realistic type of diplomacy. Conditions in the Far East shortly directed thither the attention of the chief executive and the State Department.

The first occasion had to do with the Hukuang railway loans and the formation of the Four-Power Group. As far back as 1898 and 1900 an American syndicate, the American-China Development Company, had received a concession for the construction of a railroad which should link Hankow and Canton, it being agreed that the rights conferred by China could not be transferred to non-Americans. Nevertheless, by the end of 1903, a majority of shares in the company had been purchased in the open market by Belgians who thereupon assumed control. Peking indignantly annulled the concession; Washington protested, shortly announcing that the Americans had regained control of a majority of the shares. Financial difficulties and opposition by the gentry of Kwangtung, Hupeh, and Hunan constituted additional obstacles to the construction of the road. Finally in 1905, at a considerable financial loss the Chinese government bought the American interests. An attempt on the part of native groups, in the provinces mentioned, to construct the road without foreign aid failed.

With the lapse of time plans for railway construction were broadened to include not only the linking of Hankow with Canton but also with Chungking in Szechwan. An Anglo-French syndicate organized in 1905 for railway construction in the Yangtze valley, was forced, in the spring of 1909, to admit a German group. In May, the Anglo-Franco-German syndicate signed a contract with Peking for the construction of the Hukuang railways to the south and west of Hankow. This project, with its involved ramifications, was, less than three years later to constitute one of the immediate causes for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.

Prior to 1909, the United States and Great Britain countenanced no attempts on the part of their nationals to hinder the progress of the Japanese in Manchuria by working to keep "open" the "door" in that area. With Taft's accession to the presidency in the spring of 1909, however, and with Straight serving temporarily in the Department of State, a change of program for American policy in the Far East was entered upon: where Roosevelt had looked to Tokyo to block St. Petersburg in its advance upon the Chinese empire, President Taft tended to play Russia against Japan, and to give positive encouragement to American financial interests not only in Manchuria but in China south of the Wall. From residence, travel, and personal observation in the Orient President Taft was informed of con-

ditions in China inside and beyond the Wall. To a limited degree at least he was influenced by Straight and Harriman.⁶⁸

The initialing of the Hukuang railway loan contract on June 6, 1909, aroused President Taft to action. A powerful group of American financial interests, including Harriman, under the leadership of J. P. Morgan and Company, wished to participate on a basis of equality with the English, French, and Germans in the lending of funds for, and construction of, the Hukuang railways. To this the European bankers and Chang Chih-tung, director general of the Hukuang railways, were opposed⁶⁹ and long drawn out negotiations proved fruitless. Accordingly, Washington referred to the promise given Minister Conger in September, 1904, by the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, that in the event of China's desire for foreign capital to construct a railway from Hankow to Szechwan British and American financiers should have equal and prior opportunity to bid. Furthermore, on the basis of the Sino-American treaty of 1903, Washington was directly interested in safeguarding the financial status of China, which was affected by the terms of the Anglo-Franco-German loans for the Hukuang railways. Therefore, President Taft decided to take the unusual step of appealing personally to Prince Ch'un, the Manchu regent in Peking.⁷⁰ This he did by cable on July 15, 1909. The imperial government acquiesced, as did the European syndicate. In May of the following year it was agreed at Paris that the construction of the railways from Hankow to Canton and Hankow to Szechuan should be divided equally as should the loan of £6,000,000, "and any supplementary loans," to the Chinese government.⁷¹

The second and third attempts of the Taft administration to influence affairs in the Far East, particularly in Manchuria, were less successful than the first. The assertion by Russia of the right to assume what was in reality political jurisdiction over Chinese and foreign nationals residing in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone and the cities and towns along that line—particularly in the city of Harbin—had, in 1908, brought from Secretary Root a sharp, but unavailing protest. Consequently, Secretary Knox determined upon another protest to Russia simultaneously with his proposal to the British foreign office to consider alternative plans for a "complete commercial neutralization of Manchuria." The two documents were dispatched on November 6, 1909: that to Russia was as fruitless, except as an irritant, as had been the protest of Secretary Root; that to

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-57, 271; also J. G. Reid, *The Manchu Abdication and the Powers* (Berkeley, Calif., 1935), pp. 26, 32 ff., 280.

⁶⁹ Reid, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-43.

⁷⁰ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1909, p. 178, also pp. 146-49, 167.

⁷¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 886-87; also *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1910, pp. 280-82, 291; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 87-88, Reid, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-22; T. W. Overlach, *Foreign Financial Control in China* (New York, 1919), pp. 202-10, 227-36.

England had in appearance, more public—but, in reality, no more successful—results.

The alternative plans proposed were as follows. (1) The Russian and the Japanese railroads in Manchuria should be purchased by China and aided financially by the powers; they should then be supervised by nationals of the co-operating powers and materials and employes should be procured from these nations "upon an equitable basis *inter se*." (2) Great Britain and the United States might give diplomatic support to China in the construction of a line from Chinchow to Aigun which would approximately parallel the South Manchuria railway but at no point be nearer to it than one hundred fifty miles. They might invite

the interested powers friendly to complete commercial neutralization of Manchuria, to participate in the financing and construction of that line and of such additional lines as future commercial development may demand, and, at the same time, to supply funds for the purchase by China of such existing lines as might be offered for inclusion in this system.⁷²

In his reply of November 25, Sir Edward Grey, while expressing approval of the "general principle" of the first plan, suggested temporary postponement of its consideration. As for the alternative plan, he briefly suggested the desirability of Japanese participation in the Chinchow-Aigun line.

Secretary Knox next instructed the United States representatives in Peking, Tokyo, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Paris to broach his scheme to the governments to which they were respectively accredited. China and Germany expressed approval. Russia and Japan refused definitely to have anything to do with neutralization: the former on the ground that there was no need for it and that Russian interests would suffer; the latter on the ground that the plan was not in accord with the Treaty of Portsmouth, that it provided for a system not to be found elsewhere in China, and that divided responsibility would work to the disadvantage of the public and the service.⁷³ France agreed with Russia and Japan.

The proposed Chinchow-Aigun line was also blocked by Russia and Japan during the early months of 1910. This was followed, on July 4, by the second step in the formal rapprochement of the quondam enemies: the signing of two more conventions, the one public, the other secret. In neither of these was mention made of the independence and territorial integrity of China nor of the principle of equal opportunity. Without entering upon a detailed analysis of these conventions, or a comparison of them with those of 1907,⁷⁴ it may be said that their negotiation was,

⁷² *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1910, pp. 234-35.

⁷³ Further details on Russia's attitude in Paul Varg, "W. W. Rockhill" (unpublished doctoral dissertation; Dept. of History, University of Chicago, 1947).

⁷⁴ For such an analysis see Price, *op. cit.*, chap. IV.

in the main, the direct and immediate outcome of Secretary Knox's attempt to thwart Russo-Japanese development of exclusive positions in Manchuria. They constituted notices to the powers, particularly to the United States, of the unity of Russo-Japanese policy in China's three northeastern provinces. Moreover, where three years earlier the contracting parties had announced their engagement "to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle [that is, of equal opportunity] by all the pacific means within their reach," in 1910 they publicly declared that in case the *status quo* were menaced by any event they would "in each instance enter into communication with each other, for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they may judge it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*."⁷⁵ In other words, henceforth Russia and Japan would not, necessarily, limit themselves to "pacific means" in the face of a threat to the existing situation in Manchuria. Japanese annexation of Korea by treaty took place on August 22, exactly seven weeks after the signing of the Russo-Japanese conventions of 1910.

The failure of the Taft-Knox diplomacy in Manchuria brought into bold relief changes in the Far East which five years had made. More than ever was it demonstrated that this area had to be considered from the standpoint of world politics. Ex-President Roosevelt's letter to President Taft, earlier quoted, was written after the neutralization plan for Manchuria had failed. The tendency toward abstract legal and ethical theorization, rather than the facing of disagreeable facts, is to be observed in Secretary Knox's reply to the ex-president:

. . . Why the Japanese should think that we ought to accept the observance by them of one treaty right due from them to us as an offset for the disregard by them of another treaty right due from them to us I cannot understand. . . . I still believe that the wisest and best way for all concerned is for us to stand firmly on our pronounced policy and let it be known on every proper occasion that we expect fair play all round. The Japanese Government certainly is not indifferent to public opinion, and it is much better that we should continue to try to bring Japan's policy in China up to the level of ours, where we may differ, than to lower our policy to the level of hers. There are indications that we shall in the future receive more support for our policy from Great Britain than we recently have had. . . .⁷⁶

The secretary's reason for the hope here expressed was his knowledge of reports that British nationals in the Far East were critical of London's Manchurian policy with reference to Russia and Japan. In his observa-

⁷⁵ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1907/11, Article ii, p. 658, and No. 1910/1, Article iii, p. 804.

⁷⁶ Quoted by, and from, Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, pp. 321-23.

tions, however, Knox demonstrated his failure to comprehend the diplomatic changes of the previous three years. Regardless of the approval or disapproval of its nationals in China, England, by renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, and the signing of the Russian convention of 1907, had given evidence of its decision to treat the Far East from the viewpoint of the welfare of the empire as a whole. England was bound to Japan, and Japan and Russia were now allies. Knox's diplomacy forced Russia and Japan to admit officially, if indirectly, that their declarations and promises to China and the United States with reference to the Open Door were worthless. To China it was made evident that the way of the weak on occasion is considerably harder than the way of the transgressor. To the student of diplomacy it became apparent that in a naughty world the realistic if, possibly, less ethically-minded Theodore Roosevelt was able to go further than the legally—(and morally)—minded Taft and Knox.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION (1911-12)

Among the factors contributing to the anti-Manchu and Republican revolution which, in its military phase, began in China one year after the annexation of Korea, were the Hukuang railway loans. Officials, students, and others in several of the provinces feared that growth of foreign influence in the Yangtze valley might have an effect similar to that witnessed in Manchuria where, since 1898, Manchu-Chinese sovereignty had become steadily more unclear and shadowy. For years before the outbreak of revolution in 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his co-conspirators had obtained refuge, financial aid, and other encouragement from time to time in Japan. Nevertheless, there was no unity of thought among the Nipponese about the objectives of the revolutionaries. Expulsion of the Manchus was one thing, although many Japanese disapproved of that, setting up a republican form of government was another; while the ensuing rise to dictatorial power of Yüan Shih-kai, an opponent of Tokyo in Korea prior to 1894, introduced still another disagreeable factor. To Japanese officialdom in 1912, the idea of a Chinese republic was almost as distasteful as was that of a Communist-Soviet state in parts of China half a generation later. Tokyo proposed co-operation to its British ally in maintaining a constitutional monarchy in Peking. To the United States it advocated

establishing practically a Chinese rule under nominal reign of the Manchu Dynasty, thus insuring on the one hand due respect for the rights of the Chinese people and checking, on the other, the arbitrary exercise by the Manchus of their power, and dismissing the impracticable idea of a republic.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 56-57, also pp. 50, 53-55, 58-60, 64-65.

The governments of both countries hesitated to take positive action and Premier Prince Katsura chafed. On December 18, 1911, he announced that "for the sake of the peace of the Far East" Japan should intervene in China, and, on the twenty-third, Premier Yüan was informed by Minister Ijuin that his government would not grant recognition to a Chinese republic.^{77a} Meanwhile, Japanese forces in Manchuria were augmented, while the Yokohama Specie Bank began—but not with the premier—negotiations of a loan to the Manchus for military purposes. Great Britain, however, protested against intervention by its ally in any form, and two proposed loans were blocked. A vitriolic press campaign waged in Japan in 1916 against the government and people of England, during a critical period in the first world war,^{77b} and the negotiation in the same year of a secret Russo-Japanese alliance were among the indirect results of London's actions at this time.

The Ta Ch'ing dynasty passed into an eclipse with the abdication on February 12, 1912, of the boy emperor, Hsüan-t'ung, and the election, three days later, of Yüan Shih-k'ai to the provisional presidency of the Chinese republic. Unable to prevent the fall of the Manchus, a change in the form of China's government, and the accession to power of its old adversary, Yüan, Tokyo suggested to several of the powers "that the principle of joint action . . . be extended to the recognition of any new government [in China] . . . in order to secure guaranties more satisfactory than could be obtained otherwise." Such guaranties were to secure the integrity of "the rights, privileges and immunities of foreigners" in China and "formal engagements regarding the foreign indebtedness" of the country. For its part Washington expressed agreement in principle with the application of the policy of concerted action to recognition of the republic, "as far as this course will entail no delay," but postponed consideration of the problem of guaranties until it should be "more explicitly informed as to the nature and terms . . . proposed."⁷⁸

Informing the American government of St. Petersburg's assent to Tokyo's proposal, Russian Ambassador Bakhméteff called attention (March 8) to the "fact that Russia holds in North Manchuria, Mongolia and Western China special interests and rights founded on her treaties and conventions with China." And he added: "While approving the idea of a joint action of the powers as far as it bears on the defense of their general interests in China, the Imperial Government must reserve to itself, in respect to Russia's rights and special interests in the said regions, the right to take such protective measures as may be forced upon it by necessity." Four days later, American Ambassador Guild in Russia informed

^{77a} R. H. Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936* (Tokyo, 1936), pp. 332-34.

^{77b} F. Coleman, *The Far East Unveiled* (Boston, New York, n.d.), Chaps. V and XXXVIII.

⁷⁸ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 68-69.

his government that the "Minister for Foreign Affairs frankly states that Russia does not wish to see a strong military power in China," and that if Russia should "join the four powers already interested in emergency loans to China," it would be with the proviso that "her interests, notably in railways available in war, shall be strictly conserved in Manchuria, Mongolia and Western China. . . ." On the following day the ambassador added that, while appearing "to be acting in good faith with the other powers," Russia was "protecting her consulates in Mongolia with troops and increasing the consulates," and that "every possible influence will be used to prevent creation of another strong military power on Russia's borders, or the construction of railroads that could be used against Russia in war."

Not through the channel of the Japanese embassy but through German Ambassador Bernstorff was Washington informed that Japan, also, was making "a reservation with regard to her claims in Mongolia." This was confirmed by the Japanese ambassador in the course of a conversation with Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson on May 16, the explanation being given that "in view of Russia's reservation of rights . . . the Japanese Government had felt that silence might be misconstrued and that therefore Japan must make reservation as to Eastern Inner Mongolia (bordering on southern Manchuria) in which quarter Japan was naturally interested."

To which the acting secretary replied

that this [American] Government . . . with regard to both Japanese and Russian reservations . . . had been quite willing to acquiesce, on the understanding of course, that the rights and interests referred to were those covered by treaty or convention.⁷⁰

THE FIRST CONSORTIUM

In the meantime, to strengthen his personal position and to enable his embryonic government to function, Yüan Shih-k'ai was seeking means here and there, by devious methods, to fill his all but empty treasury. He was not alone in realizing that bankruptcy of the late imperial government, with its inability to obtain foreign loans for military and administrative purposes, rather than the size and fighting ability of the revolutionary armies or the genius of revolutionary leaders, civilian and military, accounted immediately for the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Prior to the Hsüan-t'ung abdication, the powers, except Japan, maintained a policy of strict neutrality, refusing funds to either side. Japanese financiers proposed granting a loan to the new Republic hypothecated upon the properties of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. Control of

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 78-79

this concern would have permitted Japan to supervise the rivers and coasts of China and would greatly have weakened the position of British and other Western interests in those areas. To prevent the consummation of the Japanese loan, the embargo on foreign loans was raised by the four-power consortium, composed of British, American, French and German financiers, at the instance of the British.⁸⁰

In seeking funds from foreign sources, President Yüan and his premier, T'ang Shao-yi, attempted to circumvent the monopolistic aims of the consortium—which demanded that it alone should lend funds to China for governmental expenditure—by following the ancient policy of their countrymen in seeking to sow dissension among the “barbarians” and in playing off one against another. On February 27, 1912, T'ang discussed with the representatives of the consortium in Peking the possibility of floating a Reorganization Loan of a suggested £60,000,000 which should be secured upon the salt gabelle—salt being a Chinese government monopoly. The representatives of the consortium in accepting T'ang's suggestion, with respect to the gabelle, ultimately demanded reorganization of the latter under foreign supervision and a similar supervision for the expenditure of the sums to be lent. These demands, while strict in the extreme and repugnant to the Chinese, officials and nonofficials alike, were in essence calculated to protect the interests of China itself as well as those of alien investors.⁸¹

Simultaneously with his request for aid from the four-power consortium, T'ang expressed approval of the admission of Russian and Japanese participating groups. Although the new members of the six-power group had no funds to lend abroad and were bent upon political, commercial, and territorial expansion in China, the safeguarding of their “special interest” in the areas earlier mentioned, and the prevention of China's becoming an independent and strong nation, the countries they represented were allied with France and Great Britain, respectively, and the latter—possibly from motives of self-interest as much as of friendship—insisted upon their inclusion. Within or without the consortium, it was possible for either the Russians or the Japanese to block the aims of its original members as had been demonstrated in connection with the negotiations for the Chinchow-Aigun railway. Partnership in the consortium offered a degree less of danger—as was to be shown in the following summer when a compromise in the articles of agreement of the six groups was adopted by which technical recognition of the special positions claimed by Russia and Japan with respect to parts of the Chinese empire was avoided.

⁸⁰ Overlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 236–40.

⁸¹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 112–41 *passim*; H. Croly, *op. cit.*, pp. 442–52; W. Straight, “China's Loan Negotiations” in *Recent Developments in China*, *Clark University Addresses*, November, 1912, edited by G. H. Blakeslee (New York, 1913), pp. 119–61.

Before this issue was settled, difficulties had been encountered by the Peking representatives of the four-power groups. On February 28, 1912, at the request of T'ang, the sum of taels 2,000,000 was advanced for emergency needs; on March 7, an additional sum of taels 1,100,000 was lent. Consequent upon these loans the representatives of the consortium addressed a letter to President Yüan, on March 9, stipulating the conditions attached. Among these were the declarations:

That the banks hold a firm option for the provision of further monthly requirements of the Chinese Government for the months of March, April, May, June and possibly July and August, which the undersigned four groups have already been requested to finance . . . [and] That, in consideration of the assistance rendered by the groups to China in the present emergency and of their services in supporting her credit on the foreign markets, the Chinese Government assures to the groups, provided that their terms are equally advantageous with those otherwise obtainable, the firm option of undertaking the comprehensive loan for general reorganization purposes already proposed to them. . . .⁸²

These the president confirmed by letter on the same day.

Nevertheless, five days later Yüan approved an agreement, negotiations for which had been begun on February 18, with a rival European group (the so-called Belgian, or Anglo-Belgian, syndicate, which included English, French, Belgian, and Russian financial interests) for a loan of £1,000,000, at a rate lower than the four-power group was willing to take and redeemable in twelve months, to be followed by another bringing the total to £10,000,000. A promise of preferential rights with respect to future loans ("until an aggregate amount of ten million pounds sterling shall have been floated") was contained in the articles of agreement similar to, and in breach of, that just made with the four-power group. It is notable that the syndicate negotiating this loan was the one which represented Russia when the latter became a member of the sextuple group in June; also that the security offered for the loan was the property and revenues of the Peking-Kalgan railroad. This line ended at the pass through which Russia for years had planned to construct a railway connecting the Trans-Siberian with Peking by way of Mongolia.

Learning of these developments, the representatives of the four-power group protested vigorously and suspended the loans. In an attempt to bring about internationalization of loans as a substitute for indiscriminate borrowing by China on a competitive basis, and to prevent reckless expenditures which threatened national bankruptcy with foreign intervention as a possible consequence, the British foreign office declared that until the major loan for reorganization contemplated by Peking had been negotiated

⁸² *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, p. 120; *China Year Book*, 1913, p. 350; Overlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-41.

with the four-power group it would grant support to no other bankers, and, on March 25, the ministers of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany protested formally to President Yüan against the "Belgian" loan. The outcome was the cancellation of this loan and the renewal of negotiations with the four-power group.⁸³

Demands for reorganization and foreign supervision of the salt gabelle were met by strenuous opposition. Again the Chinese turned to rival groups, but to no avail. They were forced by diplomatic pressure to renew negotiations with the six-power consortium.⁸⁴

At meetings in London on December 13-14, 1912, of the representatives of the six financial groups a draft agreement for a reorganization loan to China of £25,000,000 was considered. On February 4, following, Peking finally agreed to the terms of the consortium and announced the appointment of a Dane as associate inspector-general of the salt gabelle, a German as director of the bureau of foreign loans, and an Italian as adviser to the bureau of audit. Followed, thereupon, during the next two months, a series of arguments, essentially political, among the interested European powers with respect to the foreign personnel to be employed. Russia, suspected of a twofold desire to strengthen its influence in Mongolia and to wreck the consortium before funds could be advanced to Peking, insisted "that Russian subjects should be included in the number of foreigners who will have to serve the Chinese Republic. . . ." ⁸⁵

The ending of the Taft (Republican) régime with the inauguration of the Wilson (Democratic) administration on March 4, 1913, brought about a reorientation of thought and action along many lines. Responding to a request from the American members of the consortium that the new government indicate its desire as to their future conduct, the president, on March 18, issued to the press "a declaration of the policy of the United States with regard to China." In this were embodied the following statements:

We are informed that at the request of the last administration a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the Government of China (approximately \$125,000,000). Our Government wished American bankers to participate along with the bankers of other nations, because it desired that the goodwill of the United States toward China should be exhibited in this practical way, that American capital should have access to that great country, and that the United States should be in a position to share with the other powers any political responsibilities that might be associated with the develop-

⁸³ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 117-19, 122-26; Overlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-46.

⁸⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1912, pp. 130-59; *ibid.*, 1913, pp. 143-45; [British] *Accounts and Papers* (73), CXCI, 1912-13, China, No. 2 (1912), *Correspondence Respecting Chinese Loan Negotiations*—in particular Nos. 1, 7, 15, 17, 19, 29-37; Overlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-56.

⁸⁵ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1913, pp. 145, 151, 156, 158-59, 162-64.

ment of the foreign relations of China in connection with her industrial and commercial enterprises. The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan. . . . The administration has declined to make such a request, because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of that great oriental State, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes . . . to secure the loan, but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our Government implied . . . is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests. . . .⁸⁶

For four years, through the channels mainly of "dollar diplomacy," the Taft administration had tried hard—with indifferent success—to keep open the doors of equal opportunity in intra- and extramural China. Withdrawal of American bankers, far from affecting the terms of the now quintuple group, temporarily rendered less arduous the struggles of Europeans and Japanese for confirmation of previously claimed, or for further, concessions in China and its outlying dependencies. Cognizant of the fact that the Chinese minister of finance had obtained loans from other organizations while negotiating with the consortium and in defiance of vigorous protests by parliamentarians, as yet not organized, the representatives of the quintuple group signed an agreement, dated April 26, 1913, to lend the Chinese government £25,000,000 at five per cent "for general reorganization and administrative purposes. . . ." The loan was "secured in respect to both principal and interest by a charge upon the entire revenues of the Salt Administration of China subject to previous loans and obligation. . . ." The government engaged "to take immediate steps for the reorganization with the assistance of foreigners of the system of collection of the salt revenues . . .," including the appointment of a "foreign [British] Associate Chief Inspector (*Hui Pan*), who [should] constitute the chief authority for the superintendence of the issue of licenses and the compilation of reports and returns of revenues," and one

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 170–71, 174–75; see also Croly, *op. cit.*, pp. 452–54. For additional discussion see F. V. Field, *American Participation in the China Consortiums* (Chicago, 1931), pp. 93 ff.

Chinese and one foreign district inspector in each salt-producing district. In addition a German Deputy Inspector General of the salt gabelle was appointed. The government also engaged "at once to put into effective operation on Accounts and Audit Department." To the latter were appointed a Russian and a French adviser while over the Bureau of Foreign Loans was placed a German director. Thus the plums were freely distributed.⁸⁷

In the critical fourteen years before the First World War, most of the major political and diplomatic tensions of the future can be discerned, at least in brief outline. Russia's defeat by Japan in 1904-05 was the signal which released the aggressive impulses of the island empire, and which notified the world that a dynamic Oriental nation would henceforward be an increasingly powerful force in determining the future of the areas in and surrounding the Pacific ocean. Of mounting importance also was the growth in wealth and influence of the United States as a great Pacific power. With its most advanced outpost in the Philippines, the American Republic concerned itself at this period with expansion in the Pacific and Caribbean basins, while simultaneously steering a relatively conservative course in regard to the political control of chaotic China.

Having supported the Japanese against Russia, the Roosevelt administration was forced to recognize its inability to prevent Japan from closing the Open Door in Korea and from expanding in Manchuria. Because its major concern was to secure America's new position in the Pacific and in Latin America, the Roosevelt government reluctantly permitted the Japanese to enhance their power on the Asiatic mainland in return for guarantees of America's Pacific possessions. The Taft administration, on the other hand, having become aware of the potential power in America's new wealth, sought to protect equality of economic opportunity in China by financial and diplomatic co-operation with the other Western nations holding great economic stakes in eastern Asia. Irrespective, however, of the relative merits in these divergent policies, it should be emphasized that both Roosevelt and Taft became increasingly concerned about containing the monopolistic powers in Asia. In collaboration with Great Britain, Japan's formal ally, the United States sought by diplomatic means to halt the individual and joint efforts of Japan and Russia to expand at the expense of China in revolution.

⁸⁷ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, No. 1913/5, pp. 1007-38; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1913, pp. 179-91 (p. 191 contains an estimate in Japanese yen of the foreign loans to China as of October 15, 1913); E. T. Williams, *A Short History of China* (New York, London, 1928), pp. 477-81; W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, II, chap. XXXIX; Overlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 257 ff.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE FAR EAST

JAPAN'S DECLARATION OF WAR

In September, 1914, following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, President Yüan Shih-k'ai remarked to the American minister, "Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China." Contemporaneously another high official, Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan, observed, "Here are the beginnings of another Manchuria. Aggressive Japan in Shantung is different from any European tenant."¹ As early as August 3, China requested the United States to obtain from the European belligerents assurances that they would not carry their struggle into Chinese territories or waters—a request which the American government acted upon without success.² The republic, while proclaiming its neutrality by presidential mandate, also undertook to negotiate with Germany the immediate return of Kiaochow. Not, however, by China, or by the Western powers, was the question of maintaining peace in eastern Asia to be decided—but by Japan. In Tokyo the cabinet had been closely watching developments in Europe; a feeling prevailed that at last the time had come to destroy Teutonic influence in eastern Asia and avenge that part of the insult suffered at the hands of Germany in connection with the tripartite intervention of 1895.

Great Britain entered upon war with Germany on the night of August 4; ensuing upon a meeting of the Japanese cabinet on the morning of that day the foreign office had already issued a statement intimating that Nippon would take action based on the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. For some time previously, London and Tokyo had been exchanging views; coincidentally there was great activity on the part of the Nipponese war and navy departments, the foreign office, and the cabinet. On the afternoon of August 7, the British ambassador presented a memorandum asking Japanese co-operation in the destruction of "German ships in Chinese waters. . . ." It was observed in the document: "This, of course, means an act of war against Germany, but this is, in our opinion, unavoidable." At a cabinet meeting that night Foreign Minister Baron

¹ P. S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (Garden City and Toronto, 1922), p. 129.

² *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, pp. 162, 163, 165, 167. For Presidential Mandate, August 6, 1914, proclaiming Neutrality, see MacMurray, *Treaties, etc.*, Vol. II, No. 1917/7, p. 1365.

Kato personally advocated his country's participation in the war, not as a matter of treaty obligation but as a voluntary mark of friendship for England, and for other reasons which were implied in his determination that the limits suggested by London should not be accepted. Although opinion as to the desirability of Japanese participation in hostilities was not unanimous, the cabinet by August 8 had decided upon war. On the same day Japanese war vessels made their appearance off Shantung.³ Informed of Tokyo's decision, and requested to approve an unrestricted declaration of war, the British government, through its ambassador, asked (August 9) for both postponement of the declaration and limitation of activities; a similar request was made by Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Inouye. Baron Kato thereupon telegraphed to London stating that entrance of Japan into the war would not injure British trade, that Japan harbored no territorial ambitions, that the emperor had already been informed of the decision of the government, that there was a general demand for revenge upon Germany, and that postponement of action would create domestic difficulties. Nevertheless, London formally requested (August 11) a reconsideration of the matter of taking action under the alliance. The Nipponese foreign minister repeated his arguments. Exchanges were carried on in Tokyo and between the two capitals, Tokyo standing firm and London giving way with respect to the declaration of war (August 13) but still asking that action be limited to Chinese waters. Kato refused to agree, on the grounds that limitation would not be consonant with the waging of war, that German warships must be pursued wherever they might go, and that Nipponese commerce must be protected throughout the Pacific.

Defeated in its effort to impose limits in the Japanese declaration of war, the British government, yet hoping, apparently, to prevent intervention by its ally in the German islands of the Pacific, did not change its attitude with respect to its earlier requests.⁴ Acting unilaterally three days later, it issued to the press a declaration which was forwarded to Secretary Bryan on the eighteenth:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having been in communication with each other are of opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far East contemplated by

³ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁴ Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Garden City, New York, 1935), pp. 168-73; R. H. Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936: A Short History* (Tokyo, 1936), pp. 309-14; G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London, 1926), XI, 256 (No. 436), 292 (No. 534), 298 (No. 549), 305 (No. 571), 327-28 (No. 637), 329 (No. 641); E. T. Williams, *China Yesterday and Today*, 4th ed. (New York, 1929), pp. 583-84; P. S. Reinsch, *op. cit.*, chap. XI; T. E. LaFargue, *China and the World War* (Stanford University Press, 1937), chap. I; R. Young, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *The Contemporary Review*, CXX, 15.

the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially in view the independence and integrity of China as provided for in that agreement.

It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lanes in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent of eastern Asia.⁵

Great Britain's "understanding" of the "action of Japan" did not prevent the appearance, in October, of a Japanese squadron in the German Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands, with subsequent claim to permanent control of them. Excuse in part for this action could be found in the activities of German war vessels in the area, and in the occupation, less than a month earlier, of the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas and other German insular possessions by an Australian force. Contemporaneously the Nipponese press opined that the sphere and efficacy of the alliance with England would be increased; that the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity would apply to the South Sea so that the latter area would no longer be a closed preserve for Europeans and Americans; that Japan would henceforward have a vantage point against American naval bases in Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines; and that Jaluit might be used as a "starting point" for "predestined" Japanese expansion in the southern seas.⁶

The lease of 1898 by which China gave Kiaochow over to Germany contained the stipulation that "Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiao-chau Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiao-chau and to cede to Germany a more suitable place."⁷ Before implementation of this provision could be negotiated, Japan intervened. On August 15, after having administered a rebuke to Peking for requesting the good offices of the United States before approaching its near neighbor,⁸ Tokyo dispatched an ultimatum to Berlin. This advised the German government:

(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

⁵ *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, p. 171.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 191; also H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), pp. 573, 591.

⁷ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, I, 114.

⁸ *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, p. 169.

The Imperial Japanese Government announced that in the event of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice . . . , they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.⁹

Informing Secretary Bryan of Kato's comments on the ultimatum, Ambassador Guthrie wrote that Japan "would not seek any territorial aggrandizement or selfish advantage in China and would carefully respect all neutral interests."¹⁰ Premier Count Okuma, President of the Peace Society of Japan, reiterated his country's object as being

to eliminate from the Continent of China the root of the German influence, . . . Japan's warlike operations will not, therefore, extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defense of her own legitimate interests, accordingly, the Imperial Government have no hesitation in announcing to the world that the Imperial Government will take no such action as to give any third Power any cause of anxiety or uneasiness regarding the safety of their territories and possessions.¹¹

The premier's reference to "any third Power" was, apparently, not considered to include China, the "third Power" most vitally concerned in the maintenance by Japan of "peace in eastern Asia." On August 20, the American *chargé d'affaires* in Peking, J. V. A. MacMurray, reported to Washington:

Liang, Minister of Communications, advises the Legation in strict confidence that the note in which Japanese Legation communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the ultimatum to Germany stated that the matter is one that does not concern the Chinese Government which was advised to remain absolutely passive in regard to it; and it announced to the Chinese Government that if any internal disturbances should arise in China, Japan and Great Britain would undertake to suppress them. In reply to informal inquiries as to the possibility of Germany's retroceding Kiaochow directly to China, British Minister informed the Chinese that his Government could not now recognize such a transfer. In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Japan and apparently acquiesced in by Great Britain, the Chinese Government dares take no official action. . . .

The *chargé* added that Minister Liang, regarding "the occupation of Tsingtao by Japan as a menace to the independence of China," had sug-

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 206-11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.

¹¹ Quoted by, and from, Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 173. For Premier Count Okuma's cabled message "To the American People," dated Tokyo, August 24, 1914, see *The Independent* (New York), Vol. LXXIX, No. 3429 (August 31, 1914), p. 291.

gested that "the immediate retrocession of the leased territory . . . might be accomplished by the American Government approaching Great Britain and Germany with a proposal that, in order to avert hostilities, the German rights in Kiaochow might be ceded to the United States for immediate transfer to China. . . ." To which Secretary Bryan replied: ". . . Inform Minister Liang that the Department regrets its inability to comply with his request. . . . The Department feels sure that such a course would do more to provoke than to avert war"¹²—war between whom, the secretary did not specify.

To an unofficial inquiry addressed, August 11, to Berlin by the American state department with reference to circumscribing war in the extreme east, a reply reached Washington on the fourteenth which was forwarded to Tokyo on the following day. Germany declared that it did "not seek war with Japan," and that it was ready to enter into agreement with England and Japan for maintenance of peace in "all lands and seas between parallels London 90 east and all Pacific to Cape Horn," or, if this zone were too large, within "smaller limits."¹³ Tokyo made no response, nor did Berlin to the ultimatum sent on the day on which its offer to maintain peace in the east was delivered in Japan; accordingly, on August 23, the latter declared war upon Germany.

Replying to Tokyo's notification statement of its ultimatum to Berlin, Secretary Bryan observed from Washington, four days prior to Nippon's declaration of war upon Germany, that the American government noted

with satisfaction that Japan, in demanding the surrender by Germany of, . . . Kiaochow, does so with the purpose of restoring that territory to China, and that Japan is seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China . . . but is acting in strict pursuance of the alliance with Great Britain. . . . Should disturbances in the interior of China seem to the Japanese Government to require measures to be taken by Japan or other powers to restore order, the Imperial Japanese Government will no doubt desire to consult with the American Government before deciding upon a course of action.¹⁴

The American ambassador in Tokyo was requested to notify Peking of the contents of this message which, for a moment, inspired hope on the part of Chinese officials—ever ready, as earlier indicated, to play one "barbarian" against another and to place responsibility for solution of Celestial problems of self-defense upon alien shoulders—that Japan might yet be restrained by the American government from taking aggressive action in Shantung.

¹² *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, pp. 173-74.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-70; see also LaFargue, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15, and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 15. For Japan's declaration of war against Germany, August 23, 1914, see MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, No. 1914/9, p. 1153.

¹⁴ *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, p. 172.

How delusory was such anticipation was indicated in a dispatch sent in early November by Acting Secretary of State Lansing to Minister Reinsch in Peking.¹⁵ Reinsch was instructed to let the Chinese Foreign Office know that:

The United States desires China to feel that American friendship is sincere and to be assured that this Government will be glad to exert any influence, *which it possesses*, to further, *by peaceful methods*, the welfare of the Chinese people, but the Department realizes that *it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties*.¹⁶

As in the days of Caleb Cushing and later, the attitude of the United States was benevolent rather than beneficent: a fact more clearly comprehended by the men of Yamato than by the sons of Han.

The ensuing campaign in Shantung was ruthlessly waged by Nippon in complete disregard of China's neutrality, a precedent for this having been established in part by the Germans in Shantung. The Japanese, however, were not so delicate. While the Germans were expecting a frontal attack by sea, the Japanese had determined upon an attack from the rear overland without regard for the fact that in so doing they would have to cross Chinese territory. Landing of forces and seizure of railway and telegraph lines outside the leased area aroused the indignation of China and the world. Great Britain alone condoned Japan's acts and co-operated in the occupation of Tsingtao. The British, however, refused to infringe upon the neutrality of China. The investing forces served under the supreme command of General Kamio who gained the historic and "double distinction of being the first of his race to command Europeans in battle, and to command them in a struggle against other Europeans."¹⁷ Analysts of racial or color conflicts, and searchers for the ironical in history, may some day conclude that the command by a Japanese of British troops fighting their German cousins in eastern Asia was of even greater significance than the introduction by the French of African troops to combat the Teutonic hereditary enemies of the former at the western extremity of the Eurasiatic continent. Upon the fall of Tsingtao, on November 7,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190; also pp. 186-89.

¹⁶ Italicized by the authors.

¹⁷ Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 576; also *U. S. For. Rels. Supplement*, 1914, pp. 191-201; J. Jones, *The Fall of Tsingtao, With a Study of Japan's Ambitions in China* (Boston and New York, 1915), chap. III ff.; Akagi, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-16; LaFargue, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20; Y. Ichihashi, *The Washington Conference and After* (Stanford University, 1928), pp. 269-70; T. F. Millard, *Our Eastern Question* (New York, 1916), chaps. V-VII; M. T. Z. Tyau, *The Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations Between China and Other States* (Shanghai, 1917), pp. 74-86; H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), VI, 371-72. For Germany's protest to China against the landing of Japanese troops at Lungkow and China's reply thereto, see MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1367-68.

1914, the British contingent was withdrawn, the Japanese being left in exclusive control of the German leased territory.¹⁸

Against violation of its neutrality China protested in vain; nevertheless, pointing out, on September 3, that there existed in Shantung "an extraordinary situation analogous to the Russo-Japanese acts of hostility in Liaotung Peninsula in the year of 1904," Peking announced that "so far as concerning Lungkow, Laichow and places adjacent to Kiaochow Bay within the narrowest possible limits absolutely necessary for military operations of the belligerent troops, our Government will not be wholly responsible as a neutral state. . . ." ¹⁹

On January 7, 1915, exactly two months after the capitulation of Kiaochow, the war zone was canceled by China. On the same day the Japanese government, describing this act as "improper, arbitrary, betraying, in fact, want of confidence in international good faith and regardless of friendly relations," declared "we cannot acquiesce therein under any circumstance," and added that it "would not permit the movement and actions of [its] troops within a necessary period to be affected or restricted by such act of cancellation." One week later, the government of China replied to Minister Hioki that the step of delimiting a war zone had been

taken with a view to maintaining international friendship on the one hand, and meeting the necessity of the international situation on the other. We made that special declaration because we considered it necessary, and not because we had any agreement to that effect with the belligerent States. As our declaration was an independent act, so now we cancel it in an equally independent way—there being no necessity at all to secure the concurrence of any party. . . .²⁰

Following an "independent way," the Chinese walked into a trap set by their neighbors in the course of the latter's indefatigable pursuit of "the preservation of peace in the Far East."

As early as January 31, 1910, seven months prior to the formal annexation of Korea, the matter of "extending the lease of the entire Manchuria Railway zone" had constituted the subject of an interpellation in the Japanese Diet. Almost three years later, immediately prior to leaving London to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs in the third Katsura government, Ambassador Baron Kato ²¹ held two personal conferences (January 3 and 10, 1913) with Sir Edward Grey. In the course of the first, the ambassador explained to the British foreign secretary the desire of

¹⁸ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1159.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1154, 1367.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1158-59.

²¹ In his youth Baron Kato had been employed by the Mitsubishi and was brother-in-law to Baron Iwasaki, head of that house. Cf. H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics* (New York, London, 1932), p. 216. LaFargue, *op. cit.*, includes materials from the untranslated biography of Kato by Masunori Ito.

Japan to extend, possibly to perpetuity, the (originally Russian) lease of the Kwantung territory in the Liaotung peninsula which was due to expire in 1923. At the second meeting, Baron Kato expressed the hope that the South Manchuria Railway leases for the Dairen-Changchun and Mukden-Antung lines which would expire in 1928 and 1931, respectively, might also be extended—stating that the Open-Door principle would continue in effect. Speaking unofficially, Grey reportedly gave his assurance that he comprehended the situation and remarked that, as the matter concerned only China and Japan, other powers should not interfere. The opinion of the then Minister to Peking, Baron Ijuin, that the time had not come for such negotiations, and the resignation of the Katsura government in the following month, contributed to the postponement for two years of the negotiations necessary to carry the Kato plans into effect.²²

In addition to both general and specific tendencies toward Nipponese expansion, clearly perceptible throughout the post-restoration period, several developments had occurred during recent years, in connection with China, which contributed to the Kato policy. Among these were problems related to (1) railway construction in southern Manchuria (1907–10); (2) activities of the international consortium; (3) fear that the Chinese government might obtain control of the Hanyehping Company (China's largest iron and steel works) and oust Japanese interests therefrom; (4) asserted fear that with American financial aid, a naval base might be established in Fukien; (5) growing influence of Great Britain in Tibet and of Russia in Mongolia, and, finally, the old, old policy of the Chinese to divide and rule by playing off one "barbarian" against another—manifested during a generation of increasing Japanese encroachment upon the empire—by "befriending the Far and antagonizing the Near." In the words of a Japanese analyst of his country's foreign relations, "The opportunity for which Baron Kato was waiting came, in his opinion, with the World War."²³ Five days after the fall of Kiaochow, Kato ordered Minister Hioki to Tokyo where, on December 3, he placed in the hands of the latter Twenty-One Demands to be made upon China at an opportune moment. With the cancellation by Peking of the war zone on January 7, 1915, such a moment had arrived and, on the night of the eighteenth, Minister Hioki presented the Kato demands to President Yüan, personally, instead of using the foreign office, the regular channel for diplomatic communications.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

The significance of these demands can be comprehended only in the light of previous developments in Korea and of subsequent eventualities

²² Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–87; Akagi, *op. cit.*, pp. 335–36; LaFargue, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50.

²³ Akagi, *op. cit.*, p. 338, also p. 337.

in intra- and extra-mural China. Had they been accepted in their entirety the Chinese Republic would shortly have become a Japanese protectorate.²⁴

The demands were in five groups. Group I, in four articles, related to Shantung. In it were demanded (1) that China should agree to any arrangement which Japan might make with Germany respecting the disposition of the rights of the latter in Shantung; (2) that China should not in that province, "and along its coast," cede or lease "*to a third Power*"²⁵ under any pretext" any territory whatsoever; (3) that China should permit Japan to build a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway"; (4) that China should open "by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports," the places "to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement."

Group II, in seven articles, applied to "South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" in which it was fallaciously declared that "the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan. . . ." In this were demanded (1) that the leases for Port Arthur and Dalny, the South Manchuria Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway should be "extended to the period of 99 years"; (2) (3) that, in the two areas under consideration, Japanese should "have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming," and "be free to reside and travel . . . and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever"; (4) that Japanese should be granted "the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria," which mines should "be decided upon jointly"; (5) that "(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia [and] (b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of [the areas mentioned] as security," the consent of the Japanese Government should "be first obtained . . ."; (6) that, in these areas, the same government should "first be consulted" if "political, financial or military advisors or instructors" were to be employed; (7) that "the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway [should] be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement."

Group III, in two articles, related to the Hanyehping Company with its iron furnaces and rolling mills at Hanyang and its iron and coal mines at Tayeh and Pinghsiang, respectively, these being situated near Hankow in the heart of China. Japan demanded the transformation of the Hanyeh-

²⁴ Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

²⁵ Italicized by the authors.

ping Company into a "joint concern of the two nations," with China promising not to "dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company," or of causing it to "dispose freely of the same," or of permitting "mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company . . . without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company. . . ." Moreover, should it be "desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company [should] first be obtained."

Group IV, "with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China," required the latter "not to cede or lease *to a third Power*²⁶ any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China."

Group V, described as "wishes,"²⁷ was an omnibus group relating to (1) employment by China of "influential Japanese as advisors in political, financial and military affairs"; (2) grant by China of the right to "Japanese hospitals, churches [or missions] and schools in the interior of China" to own land; (3) agreement by China that "the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese . . ."; (4) purchase by China from Japan of "a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government)" or the establishment in China of "a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal"; also, China should employ "Japanese technical experts" and purchase "Japanese material"; (5) grant by China to Japan of the right to construct "a railway connecting Wuchang [Hupeh] with Kiukiang [Kiangsi] and Nanchang [Kiangsi], another line between Nanchang and Hangchow [Chekiang], and another between Nanchang and Chaochow [that is, Swatow, Kwangtung]"; (6) prior consultation of Japan should China need foreign capital "to work mines, build railways and construct harbour-works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien . . ."; (7) agreement by China that Japanese should have "the right of missionary propaganda [or, of propagating Buddhism] in China."²⁸

²⁶ Italicized by the authors

²⁷ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 159.

²⁸ H. F. MacNair (ed.), *Readings*, pp. 768-70; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1231-34; W. R. Wheeler, *China and the World War* (New York, 1919), chap. I and appendices 1, 2; La-Fargue, *op. cit.*, chap. III; Akagi, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-50; B. L. Putnam Weale, *The Fight for the Republic in China* (New York, 1917), chaps. VI, and VII; Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-94; F. Coleman, *The Far East Unveiled* (Boston and New York, n.d.), chaps. XI, XII; Temperley, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-74; K. S. Latourette, *China, The United States And the War*. World Peace Foundation, League of Nations, II (Boston, 1919), 167-226. For "Japan's Purpose Toward China A Message [dated April 3, 1915] To The American People From Count Okuma, Premier of Japan" for the purpose of dispelling suspicion concerning Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1915 see *The Independent* (New York), 82, No. 3462 (April 12, 1915), 55. For references to Group V, article 7, *cf. U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 118 (File No.

The comments of Count Hayashi in 1895 on national morality²⁹ were echoed now, twenty years later, by Minister Hioki when he observed: "The present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop, the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves."³⁰ The jewels coveted by China's neighbor were the most valuable in the shop: Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung, Hupeh and Fukien, with their vast mineral and timber wealth; with less direct but growing control, through railway construction, of Kiangsi, Chekiang and Kwangtung and probably (through Shantung and Inner Mongolia) of Shansi and Honan. With acceptance of Japanese advisers, and joint Sino-Japanese police administration, what might not be immediately brought under Nipponese control could ultimately be—and in no long time.

Contemporaneously with the presentation of Nippon's "demands" and "wishes," and the negotiation of the ensuing treaties, plans for the restoration in China of an imperial form of government with Yüan Shih-k'ai as emperor were coming to a head.³¹ On the occasion of his interview with the would-be emperor on the night of January 18, 1915, Minister Hioki is reported to have stated that

Chinese revolutionists are in close touch and intimate relations with numerous irresponsible Japanese some of whom have great influence and whose policy is for strong measures. Our Government has not been influenced by this policy, but if your Government does not quickly agree to these stipulations, it will be impossible to prevent some of our irresponsible people from inciting the Chinese revolutionists to create trouble in China.³²

To the twenty-one formal "stipulations," which were presented on paper watermarked with machine guns and dreadnoughts, a final one—secrecy—was added by the Japanese minister.³³ No attempt was made, however, by the Chinese government, to prevent news of the demands from reaching the legation quarter and newspaper correspondents. On January 22, 1915, Minister Reinsch "learned the astonishing nature of the Japanese proposals."³⁴ Within a week they were being discussed by the diplomatic corps and in the Chinese press. Nevertheless, on January 27, in both Tokyo and Washington it was declared "on the highest authority" that reports outlining negotiations in Peking were "absolutely without

793.94/276), 120, 138–39. For correspondence *re* the Twenty-One Demands as a whole, pp. 79–206.

²⁹ *Cf. supra*, p. 63.

³⁰ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

³¹ *Cf. infra*, pp. 243–44.

³² *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1915, p. 132. [Inclosure 1—Translation], see also p. 80 (File No. 793.94/211), and Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

³³ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 129, 131, 135.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

foundation," and for a fortnight the Anglo-American press refused to print reports of the demands.³⁵ At length, on February 8, Viscount Chinda, Japanese ambassador in Washington, handed to the Secretary of State an undated memorandum containing an incomplete list of the demands in Groups I–IV, the "wishes" in Group V being omitted *in toto*.³⁶ On the sixteenth the ambassador, in reply to oral inquiry, "expressed himself as certain that the memorandum included everything."³⁷ Three days later the Chinese minister in Washington handed to Secretary Bryan a complete list of the demands and on the following day the latter was informed by Minister Reinsch:

. . . As recently as yesterday Baron Kato informed Chinese Minister at Tokyo and on February 18 Japanese Minister informed the Foreign Office here that the Japanese Government was not satisfied with readiness of the Chinese Government to negotiate concerning the first four articles [Groups] but insisted upon negotiations in regard to the whole set of twenty-one demands presented on 18th ultimo including the more obnoxious ones segregated in article [Group] V.³⁸

On the twenty-first, the Japanese foreign minister explained to Ambassador Guthrie that Group V had been omitted in the statement handed to the latter (and to "the Ambassadors of England, France and Russia and to no one else"), on February 9, inasmuch as it contained not "demands" but "'requests' or wishes of which friendly consideration was" desired of China.³⁹ Two days later Minister Reinsch reported ". . . At the conference yesterday Japanese Minister continued to insist on full list of demands including Article [Group] V. When the Chinese refused steadfastly the Japanese Minister agreed to discussion in detail but insisting that Article [Group] V must be taken up in its turn. . . ." ⁴⁰ By March 8 Minister Reinsch disclosed that, although the Chinese had expressed themselves as "ready to grant extension of South Manchuria Railway lease to ninety-nine years and of the repurchase terms, as well as of the Antung-Mukden line to seventy-two years; also to make some concessions regarding rights of residence and landholding in this region," they were standing out for "withdrawal of the obnoxious demands in Group V," and the Japanese minister was threatening the use of "means outside of diplomacy" and suggesting the possibility that Nipponese "railway guards on the South Manchuria Railway . . . shortly to be relieved by forces [from Japan] . . . might thus find themselves free to take unexpected action." ⁴¹

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

³⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 83–84; also pp. 99–103.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 93–96.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97, and 84–85.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103–04.

Four days later the American minister informed Washington that Baron Kato was still pressing "the demands in Group V," and that Minister Hioki had recently informed China's foreign minister, Lou Tseng-tsiang, that the latter "must reckon on the fact that the Japanese fleet has already sailed under sealed orders, its destination and purposes being known only to the authorities at Tokyo." On the thirteenth he added, "The Chinese Government is informed that the second Japanese squadron has sailed with 30,000 men to be distributed in Manchuria, Tientsin, Shantung and Hankow."⁴²

The United States alone among the powers was in a position sufficiently detached to keep a watchful eye on the Sino-Japanese negotiations and to safeguard its interests—on paper. Great Britain, deeply involved in Europe, had been made aware in the early autumn of the preceding year how little importance ultimately was attached to its wishes by its far eastern ally. On January 22, British Ambassador Greene expressed to Baron Kato the hope that Tokyo would consult with London before taking action which might affect British rights in China and that no demands would be made in derogation of the latter's independence and territorial integrity. Baron Kato tried to reassure the ambassador and asked that England should not interfere in the negotiations.⁴³ On February 12, the British foreign secretary informed American Ambassador Page that "the British Government has made inquiries of Japan but so far has made no comment."⁴⁴ On March 8, however, Great Britain expressed her concern over the possible political complications which might result from the negotiations. Two days later, she warned against possible infringement upon the British railway interests in South China; and on April 28, she expressed the hope that Japan would avoid rupturing diplomatic relations with China and that, in case it was unavoidable, the whole procedure would not be out of harmony with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Again on May 4, she expressed her fear that, should the various items in Group V "cause disruption of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, public opinion in Great Britain would consider it as disregarding the spirit of the Alliance."⁴⁵ Finally, on May 6, Sir Edward Grey gave a memorandum to the Nipponese Ambassador containing the declaration that

His Majesty's Government are very much concerned at the prospect of a war between China and Japan. They feel this may imperil the independence and integrity of China which is one of the main objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴³ Akagi, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-47, but see also *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 81 (File No. 793.94/215), and Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁴⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 88.

⁴⁵ Akagi, *op. cit.*, p. 347; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-36.

On the understanding that the Japanese government had withdrawn Group V of the original demands "and left them for subsequent discussion and settlement" (which was not quite the case), Sir Edward Grey was reported on May 7—the day on which Japan issued its ultimatum to China—as having "expressed the hope today to the Chinese Minister that his Government would find itself able to accept them."⁴⁶

In the meantime, Washington had been manifesting increasing uneasiness at the course of Nipponese diplomacy. Expressing the "grave concern" felt by the American government at "certain of the suggestions which Japan has, in the present critical stage of the growth and development of the new Republic, considered it advisable to lay before the Chinese Government," and observing that while "on principle and under the treaties of 1844, 1858, 1868 and 1903 with China the United States has ground upon which to base objections to the Japanese 'demands' relative to Shantung, South Manchuria, and East Mongolia," Secretary Bryan, on March 13, nevertheless, made the important admission that "*the United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts,*"⁴⁷—an informal concession which was to be rendered formal two and a half years later.⁴⁸

The requirements of Japan to which the Bryan memorandum enunciated special exception, on the ground that "while not infringing the territorial integrity of the Republic [they were] clearly derogatory to the political independence and administrative entity of that country," were those

(1) forbidding the alienation or lease of any port, harbor or island on the coast of China, (2) requiring China to employ competent Japanese subjects as advisers for conducting administrative, financial and military affairs, (3) suggesting the joint policing of China, 'where it is deemed necessary,' and (4) relative to the purchase of arms. It is difficult for the United States, therefore, to reconcile these requests with the maintenance of the unimpaired sovereignty of China, which Japan, together with the United States and the Great Powers of Europe, has reaffirmed from time to time during the past decade and a half in formal declarations, treaties and exchanges of diplomatic notes. The United States, therefore, could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military or economic domination over China by a foreign Power. . . . This Government cannot too earnestly impress upon your Excellency's Government that the United States is not jealous of the prominence of Japan in the East or of the intimate coöperation of China and Japan *for their mutual benefit.*⁴⁹ Nor has the United States any

⁴⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 144–45.

⁴⁷ Italicized by the authors.

⁴⁸ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 594–625.

⁴⁹ Italicized by the authors.

intention of obstructing or embarrassing Japan, or of influencing China in opposition to Japan. On the contrary the policy of the United States, as set forth in this note, is directed to the maintenance of the independence, integrity and commercial freedom of China and the preservation of legitimate American rights and interests in that Republic.⁵⁰

Nippon's request that China should not "cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China" was stated (March 20) by Baron Kato to Ambassador Guthrie to have been caused by uneasiness at the memory of Secretary Hay's proposal, in December, 1900, to acquire for the United States navy a coaling station at Samsah Inlet, on the coast of Fukien north of Foochow, and that "this uneasiness had been recently revived by published reports that the Bethlehem Steel Company was negotiating with China a contract for that harbor's improvement."⁵¹

If Baron Kato was in truth worried over what Minister Hioki in Peking described as the pretensions of a "certain power" in Fukien, he had as little cause for his fears as certain members of the United States Congress, and parts of the American press, had had in 1912 over apparently equally unfounded reports that Japan was contemplating the establishment of a naval base in Mexico at Magdalena Bay on the coast of Lower California. Out of the earlier rumors had resulted, nevertheless, adoption by the Senate of the Lodge resolution:

That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for naval or military purposes.

By this measure the Senate, in so far as its power extended, had widened the scope of the Monroe Doctrine to include the states of Asia⁵²—a fact which, while he did not mention it, Baron Kato presumably had not forgotten in 1915.

Commenting upon the fears of the Japanese government "of a continuing desire upon the part of the United States to secure a concession on the coast of Fukien, whereas this Government had no such purpose or

⁵⁰ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 105-11.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-15; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-41; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1236-37.

⁵² Cf. A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine An Interpretation* (Boston, 1920), p. 235; R. G. Adams, *History of the Foreign Policy of the United States* (New York, 1924), p. 354; *Sen. Doc. No. 640*, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 38, pp. 1-3; E. Tupper and G. E. McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion* (New York, 1937), pp. 104-06; also *Chicago Sunday Tribune*, December 26, 1937, Part I, p. 3.

desire," Secretary Bryan authorized Ambassador Guthrie, on March 26, to inform Tokyo that

this Government will view without the slightest objection any arrangement which Japan may make with China looking toward the withholding of *any*⁵³ [not to a *Third*] concession to *any* foreign Power which contemplates the improvement of *any* harbor on the coast of Fukien or the establishment of a coaling station or naval base along said coast by *any* Foreign Power. . . . As Japan's desire to be consulted in regard to concessions granted to Fukien was based upon her wish to prevent the development of *any foreign influence* on the coast of Fukien we may assume that this fear being removed she will not feel it necessary to insist upon *any special advantage* in regard to the development of the interior of Fukien. . . .⁵⁴

The facts that the distinction drawn by Tokyo, in correspondence with the Western powers, between "demands" and "requests" or "wishes" was not patent in Peking, and that the suggestions of Secretary Bryan had not had the effect desired were made clear in Minister Reinsch's dispatches to the Department of State. On April 2 (1915), he cabled: ". . . I now learn that when that explanation [of distinction] was first reported in the newspapers the Secretary of Japanese Legation called especially at the Foreign Office to state in the Minister's name that his Government recognized no such distinction and particularly would insist upon Group V of the demands equally with the others."⁵⁵ Five days later, Minister Reinsch further reported:

At yesterday's meeting . . . Group V was again discussed and the demand concerning purchase of one-half of all war materials from Japan insisted upon. Fukien demand was taken up for the first time and urged by the Japanese Minister in a strikingly peremptory manner and at times with a show of excitement. He stated that apprehensions as to the intentions of a certain Power . . . compelled Japan to insist on a declaration that the Chinese would finance developments in Fukien herself [sic] and especially would not make any contract with nationals of another nation for the construction of harbors and dockyards. He declared that the certain Power was ready to accept this view.⁵⁶

From the same source two days later came information to Washington that "At yesterday's meeting residence in Manchuria was further discussed, China holding that taxes and police regulations should apply equally to Japan, Japanese residents and Chinese citizens, while the Japanese demanded the right to veto in these matters. Passing to Group V,

⁵³ Italics in all cases by the authors.

⁵⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 116-17.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119-22.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-139.

Japanese Minister presented a paper containing an additional demand in Fukien namely the concession of coal mines at Anki. . . .”—which document Foreign Minister Lou Tseng-tsiang had refused to accept. Contemporaneously, Ambassador Guthrie cabled news of Baron Kato's recent reference “to the fact that if Japan's demands for residential privileges were granted, the same privileges would inure to American citizens under our treaty.”⁵⁷

Consequent upon a deadlock, reached on April 17 and 19 over Group V and Group III, Article 2, a revised set of demands was presented on the twenty-sixth. The sweeping request for Nipponese control of mining interests in China was dropped and Group V was withdrawn—but with such provisions and qualifications as to leave its substance unaffected. Japan now promised that if China would agree to the revised demands Kiaochow would be returned at a “proper time under fair and reasonable conditions.”⁵⁸ These were that Tsingtao should

be an open port without a Chinese military station; that there be set aside a Japanese and an international settlement; and that the disposal of German public property . . . be settled by a subsequent conference between China and Japan. From the latter condition the Chinese surmise that the Japanese plan retaining the German forts and barracks as a part of the Japanese settlement. The return of Tsingtau upon such conditions and with Japan entrenched in the hinterland through ownership of railways and mines and through general industrial preference is not considered by the Chinese as an advantage of more than merely formal value.⁵⁹

Accordingly, Minister Lou replied on May 1 accepting part of the demands, rejecting others, renewing certain counter-demands for participation by China

in international conference for arrangement of altered status of Shantung, indemnification for losses consequent upon Tsingtau campaign and restoration of *status quo ante bellum*. . . . The Minister for Foreign Affairs also informed Japanese Minister that his Government, having gone to the utmost extent in a desire to prove its friendship for Japan by substantial concessions, would be compelled to place the whole situation before the Treaty Powers should Japan apply further pressure.⁶⁰

In the meantime, a Nipponese national election had been held (March 25) which had resulted in a sweeping victory for the Okuma government. Pressure also had been brought upon Baron Kato to resort to force; this

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁵⁸ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1234.

⁵⁹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 127.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 130–31.

had been followed by the construction, on the part of the invaders, of new entrenchments at Tsinan; the issue of orders to Japanese reservists in Mukden to repair to their stations; the sending of instructions to Japanese nationals in Hankow, Canton, Peking, and elsewhere to leave or, in the case of Mukden, concentrate in an area of safety; and the appearance off Chinwangtao of a cruiser and four destroyers. Nevertheless, certain influential statesmen, including Princes Yamagata and Matsukata of the *genrō*, were opposed to the dispatch of an ultimatum to Peking. Negotiations had now been dragging on for approximately three and a half months; public opinion in China was growing more and more exacerbated; England and the United States were becoming increasingly critical—and it was apparent that President Yüan was hopeful of Western intervention which once again might save his country from the too ardent friendship of its neighbor as had been the case in 1895. Under these conditions a conference of cabinet and *genrō* was held in the presence of Emperor Yoshihito on May 6 from which eventuated the imperial approval of an ultimatum.⁶¹

Informed on the same day of Minister Hioki's receipt of this document, the Chinese Government "in order to avert its presentation . . . offered further important concessions"⁶² which almost granted Tokyo everything asked for in the revised demands. Japan, however, was in no mood to equivocate. In the afternoon of May 7 the ultimatum was handed to Minister Lou. It called for categorical reply before 6 p.m. of May 9.⁶³ The Chinese answered affirmatively on the evening of the eighth with a formula indicating that the pending questions had been disposed of; the Japanese insisted that future negotiations of the demands in Group V should be specifically promised. The Chinese then gave a categorical assent to the ultimatum. "This shows," observed Paul Reinsch, "that it is by no means Japan's intention to give up the demands of Group V and that an early resumption of pressure on these demands may be expected."⁶⁴ Events of the next two decades were to vindicate the accuracy of the American minister's judgment.

With the unconscious humor of a hen admonishing ducklings not to go near water, Secretary Bryan on May 6—the day on which the all-highest functionaries of Japan were deciding to issue an ultimatum to China, while those of the latter were frenziedly offering to Nippon even more than it had demanded—⁶⁵ cabled to Tokyo and Peking "counselling

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 143; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 143; Akagi, *op. cit.*, pp. 341–44.

⁶² *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 144, 148–50.

⁶³ For English text of Japan's ultimatum, the explanatory note which accompanied it, and China's reply to the ultimatum, see MacMurray, *op. cit.*, II, 1235–36, or *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 194–96. For discussion of additional reasons *why* Japan issued the ultimatum see Akagi, *op. cit.*, p. 343, and Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–48.

⁶⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 145.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

patience and mutual forbearance"—counsel which Minister Reinsch received too late to pass on but upon which he later commented: "I should have found that its delivery would have seemed like whispering a gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door had been slammed to."⁶⁶ Five days later, Bryan, having learned of the presentation and acceptance of the ultimatum, dispatched identic notes to the governments concerned. In these are to be found the nucleus of the non-recognition doctrine of Secretary of State Stimson, enunciated almost seventeen years later (January 7, 1932). The note read:

. . . [The] Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government [and the Government] of China that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.⁶⁷

Simultaneously with the publication in Peking, on May 24, of the American note of the eleventh, there appeared "a telegram from Tokyo asserting 'on the highest authority' that the report of the existence of such a note was only another instance of machinations designed to cause political friction." In Tokyo the tone of the vernacular press was resentful.⁶⁸ While the Nipponese government made no comment, Minister Lou, receiving the note on May 13, stated to the American minister that "throughout the negotiations . . . it had been his endeavor to safeguard the treaty rights of other nations with which he conceived China's rights themselves were bound up."⁶⁹ During the same conversation Reinsch called the attention of the minister to the fact "that any rights of residence granted to the Japanese in Manchuria would, by operation of the most-favored-nation clause, accrue in like terms to all other nations having treaties with China. . . ." When the Chinese discussed this matter with a Japanese representative the latter stated "that the application of the most-favored-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*; see also Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

⁶⁷ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 146. For the history of the non-recognition doctrine see Robert Langer, *Seizure of Territory* (Princeton, 1947), chaps. VI and VII; for further discussion of American policy at this period see Arthur P. Kruse, "The Territorial Integrity and Administrative Entity of China as a Phase of the Far Eastern Policy of the United States, 1900-1921" (University of Chicago Ph.D. Dissertation, 1948), chap. IV.

⁶⁸ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 148. For summary of American press comment on the Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1915, see Tupper and McReynolds, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-17.

⁶⁹ In this observation is clearly implied a fact not always comprehended by the student of Chinese history: namely, that the principle involved in the most-favored-nation clause often works to the advantage of weak as well as to that of strong nations. In other words, this clause has on occasion protected China against exclusive and monopolistic claims advanced by individual powers.

nation treatment to the matter of residence in Manchuria would have to be worked out by China with the individual nations concerned.”⁷⁰

Unaffected either by the attitude of the Wilson administration or by bitter criticism within the imperial diet of the Okuma-Kato policy toward China,⁷¹ the Japanese government on May 25, 1915, imposed two treaties and thirteen exchanges of notes upon President Yüan’s government.⁷² The treaties related to Groups I and II, respectively, of the Demands. By signing that “Respecting The Province of Shantung,” with its accompanying Notes, China agreed: (1) “to give full assent” to any settlement concerning Shantung which might be reached by the German and Japanese governments (art. I); (2) “that as regards the railway to be built by China . . . from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan” (art. 2); (3) that “after consulting the Minister of Japan,” concerning choice and regulations therefor, China would “open . . . as soon as possible . . . places in . . . Shantung as Commercial Ports” (Note 2 and art. 3); (4) that “within the province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to *any foreign Power*”⁷³ under any pretext” (Note 1). In the Notes “Respecting The Restoration of The Leased Territory of Kiaochow Bay,” Japan promised to restore to China, “after the termination of the present war,” the territory under the conditions earlier mentioned (April 26), with the omission of reference to a Chinese military station in the area.

By the terms of the “Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,” and eight accompanying Notes, China agreed: (1) “that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years [that is, respectively to 1997, 2002, 2007]” (art. I and Note 1); (2) that in South Manchuria Japanese might lease (on terms not exceeding thirty years and with possibility of unconditional renewal) land “necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises” (art. 2 and Note 6), and “be free to reside and travel . . . and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever” (art. 3); (3) that “in the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission” (art. 4); (4) that “in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners . . . certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia” should be

⁷⁰ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, pp. 157–58, 125.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 197–204 or, preferably, MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, No. 1915/8, pp. 1216–30.

⁷³ Italicized by the authors.

opened "as Commercial Ports," such places to "be selected and the regulations therefor . . . drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself . . . after consulting the Minister of Japan" (art. 6 and Note 2); (5) that Japanese should "investigate and select [coal, iron, and gold] mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder [nine localities in Fengtien and southern Kirin provinces being listed] . . . and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or work the same" (Note 3); (6) that "funds [would be provided] for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required China may negotiate . . . with Japanese capitalists first; and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the security of the taxes in the above-mentioned places (excluding the salt and customs revenue which have already been pledged by the Chinese Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists first" (Note 4); (7) that "hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first" (Note 5); (8) that "a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement" should "speedily" be undertaken—in lieu of handing over to Nippon control of that railroad "for a term of 99 years," as had originally been demanded. The revision agreed upon occurred on October 12, 1917, China then agreeing to effect a loan from the South Manchuria Railway Company running over thirty years during which period the creditor company was to manage the railway.⁷⁴

According to article 5 of the treaty relating to Group II of the Demands, the "Japanese subjects [in South Manchuria] referred to in the preceding three articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China"; as regarded these, however, provision was made in Note 7 that "the Chinese authorities will come to an understanding with the Japanese Consul before their enforcement." Extraterritoriality was to continue in force, with the use of assessors, but "mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage." It is worthy of note that the treaty concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia contains no reference to "the fact," asserted in the original Demands, "that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan" in those areas. Owing to the circumstances under which the treaties and notes were signed, no significance is to be attached to the permissive, instead of explicitly mandatory, phraseology adopted in certain of the provisions to which China assented.

⁷⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, No. 1917/11, pp. 1390-94.

Group III of the Demands was disposed of by an "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping." In these it was agreed only (no reference being made to Article 2 of the original Group) that

If in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon co-operation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

The Demand contained in Group IV that the Chinese government should not "cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China" was not mentioned in the treaties or notes of May 25, President Yüan having, twelve days previously, issued a mandate declaring that: ". . . Hereafter no port, bay or island along the coast of China will be ceded or leased to *any foreign country*."⁷⁵ The ministries of war and marine and the officials on the sea-coast are hereby made responsible for the defence of the same so that the sovereignty of the nation may be consolidated."

The Demands in Group V (with the exception of article 6) having been reserved for "future negotiation," the only provision with reference to that Group was contained in an "Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fukien Question." Under date of "the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of Taisho"—May 25, 1915—Minister Hioki renewed his allegation that the Chinese government intended to permit *foreign nations* to build military establishments in Fukien province. In reply, Minister Lou emphatically denied that the Chinese government had any such intention.

The Sino-Japanese treaties of May 25, 1915, were to be "ratified by His Excellency, the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan," and the ratifications were exchanged on June 8 at Tokyo. They were, however, never confirmed by the parliament of China as required by the constitution. In consequence, from the moment of their implementation to the outbreak of World War II, they were claimed by the officials and people of China to be invalid and persistently constituted a major cause of friction between the two countries.

THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES

The year 1917 was, for the United States, significant in the Eastern as well as in the Western hemisphere. The announcement by Germany of an unrestricted submarine campaign resulted in the breaking of diplomatic

⁷⁵ Italicized by the authors.

relations between that country and the United States on February 3. On April 6, the United States declared war on Germany. Between these two dates a significant series of secret agreements, written and oral, was negotiated by Japan with Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy; the import of these agreements was that in exchange for their support at the Peace Conference of Japan's claims to the former German possessions in Shantung and the German Islands in the Pacific north of the equator (those to the south to go to the British), Japan would aid in bringing China into the war on the side of the Allies and would give additional—and badly needed—naval aid in the Mediterranean. Japan's intention to return Kiaochow to China, but to retain the German islands north of the equator, had been made known unofficially to Secretary Lansing in 1916; in the following year he was so informed by Viscount Ishii.⁷⁶

It appears that China had expressed willingness to enter the war in 1914 and in 1915 only to be rebuffed.⁷⁷ That Japan had no desire for China to enter the war had been made clear in November, 1915; the British, French, and Russian ambassadors had at that time requested the aid of Japan in persuading China to enter. To this Viscount Ishii, Foreign Minister, is reported to have replied that Japan must control China with care, and that "Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of a nation of four hundred million people." In April, 1919, the Viscount formally denied having made such a statement, adding however, that he had opposed China's entry into the war at that time on account of the domestic situation in China which would have been rendered more confused—to the embarrassment of Japan itself.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, Japan continued unhesitatingly to advance loans to the northern militarists and to Premier Tuan for equipment and recruitment. Having safeguarded her position in China and the Pacific by the secret agreements with the allies, Japan was determined to act as the leader of China in war preparation and participation. Irresponsible militarists were willing to mortgage practically anything, including assets which they did not control, in exchange for loans. Although a member of the international consortium, Japan was anxious to advance the necessary money.

⁷⁶ R. Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State* (Indianapolis and New York, 1935), pp. 291, 293; J. Spargo, *Russia as an American Problem* (New York and London, 1920). Appendix D, pp. 358–59; R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, New York, 1922), I, 59–62; II, 244.

⁷⁷ T. F. F. Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question* (New York, 1919), p. 97; Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 311; Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 285; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 123; Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁷⁸ W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (Baltimore, 1927), I, 383–84; Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 99; Baker, *op. cit.*, 62.

Between 1909 and the outbreak of the European war, Japan lent to China almost 50,000,000 yen; from the latter date to 1918 sums totaling an additional 391,340,000 yen were lent. In the single year 1918 loans amounting to 250,000,000 yen were made. Never had foreign money been scattered so lavishly in Peking.



Viscount Ishii Kikujiro. From *Diplomatic Commentaries* by K. Ishii, copyright 1936 by The Johns Hopkins Press

Diplomatic relations between China and Germany were broken on March 14, 1917; not until August 14 was war declared on the Central powers. During the intervening months the question of declaring war became involved in domestic politics and a change of administration in Peking.⁷⁹ This situation was distressing to the Wilson administration: the latter had invited China to break diplomatic relations; it had not asked for a declaration of war.⁸⁰ Hope for the restoration of tranquillity and

⁷⁹ See for details Wheeler, *op. cit.*, chaps. IV, V; also LaFargue, *op. cit.*, chap. IV.

⁸⁰ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 246, 286.

political co-ordination was expressed in a note of June 4 to the American minister as well as the opinion that the relations of China with Germany was a matter of "secondary consideration." It concluded:

. . . with the maintenance by China of one central, united and responsible Government the United States is deeply interested, and now expresses the very sincere hope that China in her own interest and in that of the world will immediately set aside her factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will work for the reestablishment of a coordinate government and the assumption of that place among the Powers of the world to which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in the midst of internal strife and discord.⁸¹

Here the United States was re-enunciating its age-old policy of encouragement to a far eastern state in the maintenance of its independence and integrity. The note had little effect in China although it was favorably received; to the Japanese press in that country and Japan, however, and to the Tokyo government it constituted a source of irritation being interpreted as an act of interference in China's domestic affairs.⁸²

Simultaneously with the dispatch of the note of June 4 communications were sent to Paris, London, and Tokyo, through the American embassies in those capitals, proposing "that an identic representation be made by the Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan to the Chinese Government," similar to that being made independently by Washington. None of them agreed.

On June 8, 1917, the Japanese vice-minister of foreign affairs orally expressed surprise at the step taken by the United States.⁸³ A week later Ambassador Sato handed Secretary Lansing a memorandum in which, while the "singleness of purpose" of the American government with respect to China was commended, it was declared with delightful irony that, "at this stage of the internal strife in China, it is seriously apprehended that any foreign influence brought to bear upon her is liable to create misgiving in the sensitive minds of one or the other of the opposing parties and to do more harm than good." The note concluded with the remarkable assertion:

Japan possesses paramount interests both political and economic in China and she would no doubt suffer more than any other country should the turn of events there present a grave aspect, but the Japanese Government holding to their avowed policy of non-interference in the essentially domestic affairs of China have scrupulously refrained from making any representation to the Chinese Government touching the

⁸¹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1917, pp. 48-49.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 62, 68-71.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

present crisis. They believe that in the absence of untoward development of the situation, this course would serve the best interests in China as well as of all the other Powers and they feel it due to frankness to confess that they do not find themselves justified in joining in the proposed representation to the Chinese Government.⁸⁴

On the same day (June 15), Ambassador Sato orally declared to Secretary Lansing "that Japan had special and close relations, political as well as economic with China and that this was recognized by Bryan when Secretary of State. Bryan had also stated that American activity in China was never political" and on behalf of his government requested "the American Government to confirm Mr. Bryan's statement and repeat his assurance of a friendly attitude towards Japan in respect to Chinese problems."⁸⁵

That the "inching along" diplomacy of Nippon with respect to China was essentially but a repetition of its earlier tactics in relation to Korea will be appreciated if the message telegraphed by Baron Komura to the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg on July 28, 1903, be borne in mind. Almost exactly seven years before annexing the Hermit Kingdom, and two years before it could substantiate its claims officially by incorporating them in the treaty of Portsmouth, Tokyo informed Russia that ". . . the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other powers."⁸⁶

It may be assumed that the analogy of Korea's case was not lost upon the American secretary of state. On July 6, 1917, the latter replied definitely and at length to Ambassador Sato. Stating that "the American Government is pleased to remove any doubts which may arise as to its purposes by reaffirming the statements made in the note of Secretary Bryan to Viscount Chinda, dated March 13, 1915,"⁸⁷ Lansing observed that that document had pointed out "in what respects the proposals [Twenty-One Demands] made by Japan to China in 1915 . . . were in derogation of the policy mentioned as well as of the understanding based upon the exchange of [the Root-Takahira] notes of November 30, 1908,"⁸⁸ and the treaty rights of the United States in China . . . , and that it had concluded with a reassertion of American policy as being "directed to the maintenance of the independence, integrity and commercial freedom of China and preservation of legitimate American rights and interests in that Republic." The secretary further observed:

I do not find that it [Mr. Bryan's note] anywhere went to the extent of stating or recognizing that Japan has special and close relations, polit-

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

⁸⁶ K. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Boston and New York, 1904), pp. 296-98; Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp. 522-29.

⁸⁷ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1915, p. 105.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1908, p. 510.

ical as well as economic, with China as a whole, as your excellency stated at our interview on June 15 last. Mr. Bryan merely said that the United States recognized that territorial contiguity created special relations between Japan and the districts of Shantung, Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia, but he did not admit that the United States might not in the future be justified in expressing its views in regard to Chino-Japanese relations involving even these districts. This view is borne out by the fact that Mr. Bryan felt justified in his communication of May 11, 1915,⁸⁹ in declining to recognize any agreement or understanding . . . between Japan and China impairing the treaty rights of the United States, the political or territorial integrity of China, or the international policy of the open door.

As the official memorandum which your excellency handed me on June 15 referred to Japan's interests both political and economic in China as 'paramount' . . . I feel that in this restatement of the attitude of the United States Government I ought to make it clear to your excellency that I had no intention in our conversation of June 15 to convey the impression that this Government recognized that Japan possessed in China a paramount interest. It was my intention to vary in no way the formal declaration of Mr. Bryan, and, as I recall my language, I did not employ the word 'paramount' but spoke of 'special' interest in the same sense in which the term was used in the note of March 13, 1915.⁹⁰

Among the great nations at war with the Central Powers the only one with which Japan had not recently negotiated an understanding was the United States. In August, 1917, therefore, Japan sent Viscount Ishii at the head of a mission the real object of which was the negotiation of a new understanding with the United States. This was accomplished by an exchange of notes between Secretary of State Lansing and the Viscount on November 2. The announced reason for the new understanding was the silencing of "mischievous reports." Prefacing a re-enunciation of the Open-Door policy was the statement:

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous."

The notes continued:

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 1915, p. 146.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1917, pp. 260-62.

geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The two governments then reiterated their devotion to the principle of "the so-called 'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China," and mutually declared their opposition "to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China."⁹¹ This agreement was the result of an attempt on the part of the United States (1) to return to the co-operative method of carrying out its policy in the Orient and (2) to block the aggressive policy of Japan.⁹²

The negotiation of the Lansing-Ishii notes was carried out with utmost secrecy: the American ambassador in Tokyo, the American minister in Peking, the Chinese minister in Washington, and members of the State Department other than the secretary himself knew nothing of the negotiations until their completion. Aside from the fact that if there were no change in the policies of either of the two countries it was not clear why it should be necessary so often to restate them, the outstanding aspect of the Lansing-Ishii Notes was the formal inclusion of the concession made by Secretary Bryan in 1915, and reaffirmed with interpretation by Secretary Lansing during the summer of 1917, with respect to "territorial contiguity"—now changed to "propinquity."

That the two governments held dissimilar views as to the meaning of the notes immediately became evident: the legations of the two governments in Peking issued divergent translations of the term "special interest"—that of the United States using a term denoting "special relation" that of Japan a term implying "special position" or "special influence." Minister Reinsch was authorized to inform the Peking government that the interests were economic, not political.⁹³

The effects of the agreement upon the position of the Japanese in Manchuria and Shantung soon became apparent. In the former, the attitude of certain Japanese toward Americans became such that on April 9, 1918, the United States consul-general at Mukden requested special in-

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1917, pp. 264-65; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, No. 1917/12, pp. 1394-97; Viscount K. Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries*, translated and edited by William R. Langdon (Baltimore, 1936), chap. VI.

⁹² Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 306; K. Hayashi, "Dr. Hayashi Defends Japan Against Lansing's 'War Memoirs,'" *Gaiko Jiho*, October 15, 1936, translated in S. Okamura, ed., *Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics*, Nos. 149-50 (Tokyo, October 15, 22, 1936); LaFargue, *op. cit.*, chap. V; Wheeler, *op. cit.*, chap. VI and Appendix III; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1917, pp. 266-68.

⁹³ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1917, pp. 269, 271-74; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, chap. XXVI; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, I, 363-68; Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-73.

structions, remarking: "I see no reason why the Japanese government should not be asked to instruct their detectives and other officials in such a way that their objectionable and insulting activities may at least be mitigated."⁹⁴ On October 1, 1917, an Imperial Government ordinance was promulgated in Tokyo by which civil administration in the former German area in Shantung, and, in addition, over the "railway zone"—ten miles on either side of the Shantung railway—was substituted for military administration. This appeared to imply permanent government and annexation by Japan. The State Department in Washington inquired of Japan, with evident disapproval, as to the reported change. It was informed that there was a misunderstanding of terms, that "civil" did not mean "domestic" administration, and another name for the new administration, the "Administrative Unit for Civil Affairs of the Military Government," was chosen. Nevertheless, foreign mission schools in Tsingtao were required to conform to the Japanese Department of Education's rules, and an unsuccessful attempt was made by Japanese authorities during the spring months of 1918 to take a census of American missionaries.⁹⁵ The prestige of the United States in the Far East was far from enhanced by exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes; study of the documents, nevertheless, makes clear the fact that, in negotiating them, the Wilson administration was attempting to weaken the effects upon China of the Twenty-One Demands and the ensuing treaties. The notes were finally canceled on April 14, 1923, consequent upon the signing of the Nine-Power treaty of Washington.

The continued interest of the Wilson administration in the welfare of China, and the safeguarding of American interests therein, was further manifested, in July, 1918, less than nine months after the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes. Decision having, apparently, been reached that negative morality, displayed by withdrawal from the Six-Power Group of bankers in 1913, was not sufficient for the protection of China, steps were now taken to form a new consortium which should prevent continued development of sphere-of-interest diplomacy in China.⁹⁶

The new consortium was established by an agreement of October 15, 1920, signed in New York City by the representatives of banking groups of the United States, England, France, and Japan. Its objects aside from the one earlier suggested were to procure "for the Chinese Government the capital necessary for a programme of economic reconstruction and improved communications," to aid thereby in bringing about stable government in China, and to prevent loans from other nondomestic sources

⁹⁴ Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

⁹⁵ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, pp. 92-93, 129-30, 214-22; *ibid.*, 1919, I, 288-89, 368-69, 386, 407; Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 600; Millard, *op. cit.*, chap. VIII; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 315, 333 ff., 352; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, I, 252-58; S. K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York and London, 1916), pp. 289-95.

⁹⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, pp. 169-99, particularly, p. 171.

which might endanger the hold of the country over its natural resources.⁹⁷ As far as loans to China were concerned the consortium proved a failure. From the viewpoints of discouraging sphere-of-interest diplomacy and preventing loans to decadent and evanescent governments in China it was, temporarily and to a considerable degree successful.



Landing of Japanese Occupation Forces in Vladivostok in 1918. Sovfoto

INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA, 1918–1920

While the United States and Japan were engaged in negotiating and interpreting the Lansing-Ishii notes another subject for correspondence and controversy arose, namely Siberia. In this vast area a crucial situation grew out of the Russian revolutions of March and November, 1917. Thereafter, and until August of the following year, rumors and plans alternated, or developed simultaneously, with respect to intervention in Siberia by one or more of the allied and associated powers. For divergent reasons England and France at one end of the Eurasiatic continent and Japan at the other favored such action, Japan hoping, and expressing the wish, that it might “act alone.” Revolution in Russia had brought about collapse of the eastern front; this the allies hoped to restore. Bolshevism and repudiation (February 8, 1918) of the tsarist government’s debts were repugnant alike to Britain and France which by some have been accused in this period of plotting the dismemberment of the Muscovite empire. Fears that Austrian and German prisoners of war in Siberia might be used in Russia on behalf of the Central Powers; arguments that quantities of military stores in or around Archangel, in European Russia. and Vladi-

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1919, pp. 420–504, particularly, pp. 454, 458, 471–73; *ibid.*, 1920, I, 497–605, particularly, pp. 555–56, 576–89.

vostok, in southeastern Siberia, needed to be guarded on behalf of the Russian people; and sympathy for an army of approximately fifty thousand Czechoslovaks who, having deserted from the armies of their hereditary foe, Austria, to co-operate with the Russians against the Central Powers, had found themselves stranded in the Ukraine as a result of the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) and had started across Siberia with the object of reaching the western front by way of the Pacific Ocean, the United States and the Atlantic—all of these, and yet other, factors played a role in bringing about intervention in European and Asiatic Russia in which the United States with great reluctance was finally persuaded to participate.⁹⁸

As early as the summer of 1917 an unofficial suggestion is reported to have been made in Europe that Japan might be invited by England and France to intervene in Siberia.⁹⁹ In November, Great Britain was reported to be preparing for intervention.¹⁰⁰ Approximately a fortnight after a Japanese warship had appeared at Vladivostok on December 30, without notice to the authorities, the British and American consuls officially expressed appreciation of Japan's action.¹⁰¹ Washington, mainly in the person of President Wilson, nevertheless, declined to give approval to any plan for intervention.¹⁰² In mid-January, 1918, a second Japanese warship, a British cruiser, and an American ship appeared at Vladivostok. Throughout the spring England, France, and Japan continued diplomatic and military preparations for intervention and simultaneously exerted pressure upon the Wilson administration.¹⁰³ An exchange of notes in

⁹⁸ *U. S. For. Rels*, 1918, Russia, II, *passim*, but particularly p. 85; Pauline Tompkins, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East* (New York, 1949), chap. IV; D. P. Barrows, "Japan As Our Ally in Siberia," *Asia*, XLIX (September, 1919), 927-31; F. L. Schuman, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917* (New York, 1928), pp. 73, 80-89, and chaps V, VI, VII; L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, n.d.), I, 96-7, 100-16, 132-39, 147-50, 182-87, 211-12, 221-29, 300-17, 373; T. F. Millard, *op. cit.*, chaps. XII, XIII; H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* (London, 1923), chaps. IV-X; C. G. F. Channing, *Siberia's Untouched Treasure* (New York and London, 1923), chaps. XI-XXX; J. Spargo, *Russia as an American Problem* (New York and London, 1920), chap. V; William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920* (New York, 1931).

⁹⁹ T. F. Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 285. Millard adds: "Apparently the press propaganda, which continued in a desultory way during the summer and autumn of 1917, had no definite official foundation until Japan gave it that by addressing a note to several of the Allied nations and to the United States, in December, 1917. I have seen what purports to be a copy, or rough draft, of that note." No reference to such a note is to be found in any volume of *U. S. For. Rels*. An inquiry addressed to the Department of State elicited (August 16, 1937) the following reply in part: "A careful search of the records of the Department reveals no communication from the Japanese Government to the Government of the United States in December, 1917 of the character which you describe."

¹⁰⁰ Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 81; Spargo, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 ff; Barrows, *loc. cit.*, pp. 928-29; see also, Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 57; and, *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰¹ Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁰² Cf., e.g., *inter alia*, *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, Russia, II, 29, 42, 45-46, 49, 67-69, 117, 140, 154, 160, 182.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 75-77, 81-82, 84-88, 97-99, 109-12, 128-29, 132-33, 135-37, 148-49, 162-63, 166-68, 170-72, 180, 202-3, 233, 241-46; also, Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 100-16; Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-84, 92-106; Graves, *op. cit.*, pp. vii ff.

March between China and Japan prepared the way for the signing in May of secret military and naval agreements which foreshadowed intervention in Asiatic Russia and bound China to the side of Japan.¹⁰⁴

In the United States, gradually, both governmental and public opinion slowly turned toward approval of the idea of intervention.¹⁰⁵ On July 9, following the seizure of Vladivostok from Soviet control by a Czechoslovak army (June 29), the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, including American Admiral Knight, issued a declaration in which was announced the taking of "the city and its vicinity" under the "temporary protection of the Allied powers. . . ." ¹⁰⁶ On July 6, after it had become clear that, with or without the cooperation of the United States, intervention was practically certain, President Wilson agreed to carefully limited American participation.¹⁰⁷ Over the date of the seventeenth he personally ¹⁰⁸ wrote an *aide-mémoire* which Secretary Lansing made known to the Allied Ambassadors in Washington.

President Wilson's friendship for Russia; his doubts of the value, and fears of the dangers, of intervention; and his determination to safeguard Russian interests to the best of his ability were frankly stated. Analysis of the Wilson aide-mémoire,¹⁰⁹ of the correspondence which followed, and of the actions of Major General William S. Graves, commander of the American forces which were sent to Siberia in August and September following, leads to the conclusion that the president, personally, was unalterably opposed to a military occupation of that area by any of the Allied powers and that he hoped American forces might in part serve as a brake upon the chariots of war which were being sent thither.

On the day on which the Allied ambassadors at Washington were informed of President Wilson's plans, Acting Secretary of State Polk informed Ambassador Morris in Tokyo that the government had "communicated through the Japanese Ambassador here a proposal to Japan that the United States and Japan each send a small contingent of 7000 men to assist the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia. . . . The Japanese will have the high command. . . ." ¹¹⁰

It has been stated on occasion that Japan agreed to the suggestion of the United States with respect to the number of troops to be sent to Siberia—and then dispatched approximately ten times as many. This is

¹⁰⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, pp. 91-92, 106-07, 222-26.

¹⁰⁵ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, Russia, II, 134-35, 144-45, 179, 181, 189, 208-09, 220-24, 267-70; also, Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-03.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 234, 235, 261-62, 270-71.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-46; see also, Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 133, 225.

¹⁰⁸ Graves, *op. cit.*, p. x.

¹⁰⁹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, Russia, II, 287-90.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 292. It may be remarked that Major-General Graves was apparently never informed that the Japanese were to "have the high command" and never recognized an authority over his troops higher than his own. This constituted one of the causes of friction between the Americans and the Allies in Siberia.

erroneous. It is true that Japan sent into, or to the frontiers of, Siberia, 72,000 troops; ¹¹¹ it is equally true that had its intentions coincided with those of the United States there would have been no need for such numbers; it is not correct, however, to say that Japan agreed to the numbers suggested at the outset by the Wilson administration. On July 24 Ambassador Ishii, in Washington, orally informed the Acting Secretary of State that

his Government for political reasons could not bind itself to limit the force to 7,000 as it would be said by the people of Japan, and particularly the opposition, that the limitation was being imposed because of lack of confidence in Japan and its motives. . . .¹¹²

During the same conference Ambassador Ishii read the declaration which Tokyo proposed to publish with respect to the sending of forces to Siberia. This document contained two particularly important statements. The first was a reference to the "special position of Japan" with reference to "the proposed mission." The second was the declaration that

They [the Japanese Government] further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated [i.e. 'to relieve pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces'] they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases whether political or military.¹¹³

The second statement became of interest in the light of later developments in Siberia. The first received the immediate attention of the American government. Viscount Ishii was informed on the following day (July 25) that the Department of State

. . . felt that in view of declaration in Lansing-Ishii agreement, and in view of the fact that they [the Japanese] would have supreme command and larger number of troops than all the other powers put together, this declaration [of "special position of Japan"] was unnecessary, and further than that, this assertion would be apt to create a misunderstanding in the minds of the Russian people and would be seized on by the Germans as having much greater significance than was intended.¹¹⁴

When, on August 2, the Tokyo government issued its statement regarding military action in Siberia the reference to the "special position of Japan" was omitted. On August 27, Viscount Ishii presented to Secretary Lansing a "rough statement prepared in all haste" announcing that, owing to the critical situation in Siberia, his government intended to send "anew

¹¹¹ Graves, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹¹² *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, II, 301-02.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 302, note; 324-25.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-07; see also, pp. 328-29.

about 10,000 troops to the Maritime Provinces" and "another detachment (probably one division)" to the Za-Baikal region.¹¹⁵ On the same day the secretary was informed, through the American consulate in Vladivostok, that 18,000 Japanese troops had already disembarked there; ¹¹⁶ that 6000 additional troops had been moved to the Manchurian frontier at Manchouli, and that the "Japanese [were] dominating everything possible . . ." and attempting to control all railway operation.¹¹⁷ In a manner reminiscent of the camel which followed its head into the tent, Japan had dispatched, by November, 72,400 men into Siberia and northern Manchuria of whom 44,700 were combatants. From Vladivostok the Japanese had advanced to Irkutsk. On November 20, following a protest on the sixteenth ¹¹⁸ by the Washington government, the new foreign minister in Tokyo, Count Uchida, "stated that the total number had now been reduced to 58,600 who were protecting 3,400 miles of railway, which he thought was not an excessive guard."¹¹⁹ Whether "excessive" or not the number was considerably greater than the combined forces of the Czechoslovaks, the Americans, the Chinese, the English and Canadians, the French and the Italians. By way of Manchuria, Korea, Vladivostok, and Nikolaievsk, streams of Nipponese troops poured into Siberia. On November 6, Ambassador Morris reported to Washington: "An examination of the map would indicate . . . the Japanese military occupation of every possible entrance into Siberia and Manchuria."¹²⁰ Ten days later Secretary Lansing, protesting Japanese actions in northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia, indicated that the possibility of complete withdrawal of Americans from the latter area was being contemplated.¹²¹

In Siberia itself extreme divergencies of policy and action arising between the officers and forces of the Allies and those of the United States brought about a long series of embarrassed, and at times extremely strained, relations which were only temporarily improved by the conclusion of the armistice in November.¹²² The government in Tokyo faced almost as great difficulties in attempting to control its military in Siberia during the years 1918-22 as it did elsewhere after 1931. Its extremist generals were determined to bring the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Man-

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-58.

¹¹⁶ On August 15, 1918, the number of American troops ordered to Vladivostok was announced as 251 officers, and 8763 men of whom 7398 were combatants.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 239.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 433-35.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 436. In the following March (1919), according to a statement by Sir Paul Vinogradoff (in an article on Admiral Kolchak in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 12th ed., XXXI, 683-84), "the foreign effectives in Siberia numbered over 118,000 men, as follows: Czechoslovaks, 55,000; Poles, 12,000; Serbians, 4,000; Rumanians, 4,000; Italians, 2,000; British, 1,600; French, 760; Japanese, 28,000; Americans, 7,500; Canadians, 4,000."

¹²⁰ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, Russia, II, 427; see, also, Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹²¹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1918, Russia, II, 435.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 462 ff.; also, *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1919, Russia, chap. II; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 481-503; Graves, *op. cit.*, chaps. III-X; Norton, *op. cit.*, chaps. VII-IX.

churia, and, if possible, all of Siberia east of Lake Baikal—with a minimum of northern Sakhalin and the Maritime Province—under the control of Japan. To fight Bolshevism as well as to prevent the evolution of a strong Russian government they aided the most reactionary and barbarous of the elements which rose to the top in the Russian Far East, such as the Cossack leaders Semenov, Kalmikov, and Ivanov-Rinov.¹²³

Whether considered ultimately from the viewpoints of England, France, Japan, or the United States little of good and much of harm was accomplished by intervention—or military missionizing—in Siberia. Finally, on January 9, 1920, arrangements having been completed by Great Britain and the United States for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks by way of Vladivostok, the Washington government, somewhat precipitately from the viewpoint of the Japanese, notified Tokyo through Ambassador Shidehara of its intention to withdraw from Siberia both its military forces and the group of American railway experts who had, since March 5, 1919, following obstruction from Japan for more than half a year preceding, been aiding the Inter-Allied Railway Commission in the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways.¹²⁴ Evacuation began at once and was completed on April 1. Contemporaneously French, British, Italian and Chinese troops were being withdrawn, the Canadian contingent having preceded them.

INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA, 1920–1922


The basic cause of the intervention's failure in European and Asiatic Russia was the inability of the powers to agree on objectives; this was evident before and throughout the period of foreign interference. Had harmony prevailed among the interveners and between them and the counterrevolutionary elements—who in turn were completely lacking in unity—it may be doubted that the Bolshevik government of Moscow would have survived. An important factor in its ultimate success was the invasion of the empire by foreigners who, themselves unable to agree in either aim or action, contributed to the achievement of Russian unity under the lead of the Bolsheviks.

Following a year of confusion and disintegration in Siberia, Admiral Kolchak, a White Russian, became titular Supreme Ruler of the empire on November 18, 1918—a week after the armistice. He received encour-

¹²³ Graves, *op. cit.*, *inter alia*, pp. 206, 251, 261, 263, 310, 341; also, Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91, 143; Barrows, *loc. cit.*, pp. 929–30; and *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1919, Russia, *passim*.

¹²⁴ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1920, III, 487–90; see also, *ibid.*, 1918, Russia, III, 239 ff.; *ibid.*, 1919, Russia, p. 256; Barrows, *loc. cit.*, p. 931; Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–42; Kruse, *op. cit.*, pp. 438–61. For the reaction of Britain and France to Japanese activities in Siberia see E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939* (London, 1948), First Series, Vol. II, pp. 774–75.

agement from the French, the English and one Czechoslovak general but not from the Czechoslovak forces as a whole. Having no intention to interfere in Russian politics, the American General, William S. Graves, remained consistently neutral. The Japanese, who were on the point of advancing to the Urals and who were ordered to stay at Chita and who, no matter how regardful of the "peace of the Far East," were not anxious to witness an immediate stabilization of Siberia, proceeded to encourage the pretensions of the Cossack leaders Semenov, Kalmikov, and Ivanov-Rinov who were nominally Kolchak's subordinates but actually his rivals.



A group of Allied Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines at Vladivostok, Russia. Sovfoto

The cruelty of these men contributed largely to the collapse of the Kolchak government which occurred in the latter part of 1919. Primarily interested in the peace conference, and doubtful of Kolchak's liberalism, the Western powers failed to grant full recognition to his government or to come to his aid in the face of increased pressure from Bolshevism east and west of the Urals. On February 7, 1920, when all non-Japanese forces in Siberia had either retired or were in process of so doing, and shortly after Semenov had announced himself as ruler of the country, Admiral Kolchak was executed at Irkutsk by the Bolsheviks.¹²⁵

These events were accompanied, or followed, by the establishment of anti-Semenov and anti-Japanese revolutionary governments in various parts of the country, including the Maritime province, and by the rise of poorly armed but vigorous bands of peasant revolutionists known as Partisans. The situation in Russia as a whole, taken in conjunction with the

¹²⁵ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1919, Russia, pp. 195-235; *ibid.*, 1920, III, 527-45; Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-93; Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20, 166-69; Sir Paul Vinogradoff, "Kolchak, Vladimir Vasilievich," *Ency. Brit.*, 12th ed., Vol. XXXI, 683-84.

withdrawal of Western troops from Siberia during the spring of 1920, caused considerable perturbation in the minds of Nippon's leaders both civilian and military. Disclaiming "political ambitions towards Russia," the Japanese government, on March 31, declared its inability to withdraw its forces immediately but stated that

As soon as the political conditions in the territories adjacent to our country settle down, as soon as the menace to Manchuria and Chosen has been removed, the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese residents assured and the freedom of communications guaranteed, we hereby reaffirm our pledge that the Empire will evacuate Siberia provided the Czecho-Slovaks have been completely withdrawn.¹²⁶

Immediately before sailing from Vladivostok on April 1, General Graves was informed "that something was planned by the Japanese" and that "the Japanese Military would act independently in Siberia."¹²⁷ On the following day six demands were made by the Japanese commander in Vladivostok upon the government of that area. Despite the agreement of the latter to these demands, the Japanese, late on the night of April 4, attacked and took over control of the city. As careful a prearrangement of plan was evidenced at this time with respect to the Maritime province as was demonstrated eleven and a half years later with respect to Manchuria: on the morning of the fifth, machine-gun massacres took place in the cities of Nikolsk and Habarovsk to the north; in each, several hundreds were killed and wounded.¹²⁸ An attempt on the part of the Nipponese diplomatic agent at Vladivostok to make it appear that his countrymen were representing the Allies in Siberia was met, in so far as the United States was concerned, by a curt denial from Washington.¹²⁹ Shortly before this the Russian provisional government at Vladivostok had been forced to sign an agreement with the Japanese by which the hold of the latter upon the Maritime province was greatly strengthened.

Sakhalin was next to receive attention from the Nipponese interveners; the occasion serving for this was known as the Nikolaievsk affair. On July 3, 1920, Ambassador Shidehara notified Secretary of State Colby of the intention of his government to "seize and occupy certain points in the province of Sakhalin . . . until a legal government shall have been established in Russia."¹³⁰ Action followed. Japanese forces captured Nikolaievsk in April, 1918. Their gunboats, plying up and down the Amur, fired upon villages and at times massacred the inhabitants. During the winter of 1919-20 Nikolaievsk was garrisoned by 640 Nipponese and a

¹²⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 505.

¹²⁷ Graves, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-27.

¹²⁸ Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-17; *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 506-10.

¹²⁹ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 512-13.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 516-17.

number of White Russian Guards. A brigand leader, Tripitzin, who falsely designated himself and his, perhaps, three thousand followers as Partisans, fought the invaders and their White Russian allies for some two months and, on February 29, 1920, received their surrender. Placed under parole, the Japanese were allowed to retain their arms. On March 12, at two o'clock in the morning, breaking their parole, they attacked Tripitzin's forces; 134 survived to be imprisoned. As Nipponese forces advanced to their relief, Tripitzin, on May 27, burned Nikolaievsk—including the jail with the imprisoned Japanese, their consul, and his family. Shortly afterward Tripitzin and more than a score of his brigand leaders were captured by actual Partisans and shot.¹³¹

Replying, on July 16, 1920, to Ambassador Shidehara's notification with reference to Trans-Baikalia, Vladivostok, Nikolaievsk, and Sakhalin, Secretary Colby expressed gratification at the announcement concerning the first, reserved judgment regarding the second, but with respect to the last two declared:

I must in frankness advise you that this Government, while deploring the excesses which appear to have been committed by irregular and out-law bands . . . nevertheless fails to see the relevancy of these tragic occurrences to the decision now announced. . . .

In view of the mutual understanding between Japan and the United States to the effect that their joint military action in Siberia two years ago was for the purpose of stabilizing a situation created by the disintegration of all lawful authority, and in view of subsequent coöperation between the two Governments on the basis of a recognition of the right of the Russian people to work out their national destiny, I should be lacking in candor if I were to conceal from you the concern with which this Government learns of a decision so entirely at variance with the trust which we jointly assumed and have sought to discharge in behalf of the distracted and oppressed people of Siberia. . . . In the friendly candor that marks the relations between our peoples, I am compelled to advise you that this Government cannot participate in the announced decision of your Government with regard to Sakhalien, nor can it recognize the occupation of said territory by a non-Russian authority. . . .¹³²

Again, as in the autumn of the preceding year, the threads of American-Japanese friendship became momentarily attenuated, and again Marquis Okuma became critical, reportedly pointing out with acerbity that although the United States might protest often its protests would be "only paper

¹³¹ Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-22; J. Mason, "The Chinese at Nikolaievsk," *Millard's Review of the Far East*, Vol. XIV, No. 6, 287 ff. and No. 7, 338 ff.

¹³² *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 517-19.

¹³³ Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

While Siberia west of Lake Baikal was going Red, and Nipponese military were fastening their control over Primorskaya preparatory to establishing themselves in northern Sakhalin, a transition "state" was coming into being at Verkhne-Udinsk in early April, 1920. With the cynical good will of Moscow an "independent-democratic" government was formed under the leadership, chiefly, of Alexander Krasnoschekov who, prior to the outbreak of the November revolution of 1917, had resided for several years in the United States. A sincere Communist—but no less a realist—Krasnoschekov believed that conditions in eastern Siberia were not auspicious for the immediate application of Marxian principles. Despite widespread opposition on the part of Nipponese military, his government, known as that of the Far Eastern Republic, gradually gained strength and, in November, following the flight of Semenov a few weeks earlier from Chita, established itself in that strategic railway center.¹³⁴

Encouraged by the growing opposition to its enemies, the government of the Far Eastern Republic protested, during the year 1921, to Tokyo, Washington, and the world against the actions of the Japanese. Protest to Washington was based on the asserted responsibility of the American government in having arranged for intervention.¹³⁵

Meanwhile, information received in the United States of the decision (announced on March 23, 1921) of the Japanese government to establish temporarily a system of civil administration in Russian Sakhalin and neighboring areas on the mainland, as well as of continued interference in Vladivostok by Japanese troops, led the American Department of State to issue, on May 31, a memorandum to the Japanese embassy in which was reviewed the relations between the two governments with respect to intervention in Siberia. It was stated that "in its view, continued occupation of strategic centers in Eastern Siberia . . . tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region."¹³⁶

Although assuring Tokyo that "the Government of the United States has no desire to impute to the Government of Japan motives or purposes other than those which have heretofore been so frankly avowed," the conviction was expressed that the course being followed by that government "brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time troops were sent to Siberia," and that, accordingly, "the Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the [former] can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights, or the political or terri-

¹³⁴ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1920, III, 545-60; Norton, *op. cit.*, chaps. XI-XV.

¹³⁵ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1921, II, 725, 736-41, 750-72, 717-19; Norton, *op. cit.*, chap. XIX.

¹³⁶ *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1921, II, 702-05.

torial integrity of Russia." The similarity of the policy enunciated at this time regarding the integrity of Russia to that earlier enunciated by the United States with respect to China is evident—as is the nonrecognition policy regarding potential Japanese claims in Russia to that laid down more than a decade later with respect to Manchuria.

To the American memorandum of May 31, Tokyo replied through its embassy in Washington on July 8. Admitting that the "military expedition to Siberia" was based "on a mutual understanding between Japan and the United States," the Japanese government politely pointed out that the order for American withdrawal from Siberia in the preceding year, "without any previous communication with Japan, and even without awaiting the complete departure of Czechoslovak troops," has resulted in a "serious dislocation in the disposition of Japanese troops to whom the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railways had been assigned under inter-Allied arrangements. . . ." Moreover, Tokyo stated, "The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question [*re* the Nikolaievsk incident] shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government." ¹³⁷

The day—July 8—on which Japan replied to the memorandum of May 31 was marked also by the address of an inquiry from Washington to Tokyo concerning the willingness of the latter to participate in a limitation of armament conference in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern problems should also be considered. This was followed on August 11 by a formal invitation to Japan to participate in such a conference, to be convened in Washington on November 11.

The practical necessity for Nippon to send a delegation to discuss limitation of armaments and far eastern problems in a conference of the powers moved the leaders of the country to attempt to solve as many as possible of these problems before the opening of that conference. To ensure permanence to settlements which Tokyo might reach with its neighbors before its delegates should meet those of the Western powers, the foreign office, in replying, on July 27, to the preliminary inquiry of the United States, suggested that "in order to ensure the success of the Conference" such questions as were "of sole concern to certain particular Powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts" should not be placed on the agenda but should be "scrupulously avoided." ¹³⁸

For the purpose of harmonizing relations, strained for months, between civil and military authorities, and to consider anew the policy to be pursued, a conference of high officials, representative of both groups, had already been called in Tokyo for mid-May. Before attending, the mili-

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 707–10.

¹³⁸ R. L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York and London, 1922), p. 240.

tary leaders conferred under the guidance of Minister of War, Tanaka, to decide upon conditions under which it would be possible for their forces to be withdrawn from the Maritime Province. The outcome of their decision was disclosed in the demands made by their colleagues in a conference with representatives of the Far Eastern Republic held at Dairen from the latter part of August, 1921—two and one-half months prior to the opening of the Washington Conference—to mid-April, 1922.¹³⁹

Ambassador Shidehara, on August 22, forwarded to Secretary Hughes a confidential memorandum stating that the Japanese government, in accord with overtures made by the Far Eastern Republic "looking to the establishment of the relations of amity and commerce," had "appointed a delegation to meet with the representatives of the Chita Government." The proposed negotiations were "in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive character."¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, from the outset, it was reported that Japan was demanding concessions: for example, the right to navigate the Amur.¹⁴¹ The Far Eastern Republic was not invited to send a delegation to the Washington Conference since the United States, although holding that Russian rights should be protected in the conference, had not granted recognition to the east Siberian government. The National Assembly of the latter, therefore, issued at Chita, on December 9, 1921, an Appeal To All Nations "against Japanese aggression in the Russian Far East" and "Japanese endeavors to strengthen and continue their intervention by falsehoods, deceits and atrocities." The interveners were accused of trying, at the Dairen conference, "to obtain the consent of the Far Eastern Republic that Japanese troops should remain in Siberia, that fortifications of Russian cities [should] be destroyed and that the Japanese should obtain all concessions in the territory along the Tartar Straights [sic!]."¹⁴² More specifically Washington was informed, on December 24, indirectly through the foreign minister at Chita, "that the Japanese at the conference at Dairen have become more insistent in their demands since the Washington Conference opened and that they now positively demand certain previously discussed concessions which heretofore they seemingly were willing to modify." The "most objectionable" of these were:

1. The port of Vladivostok must become purely commercial.
2. Recognition of the open-door policy. Commercial and industrial restrictions applicable to aliens must not be applied to Japanese who must in this respect be placed in a position no worse than that of citizens of the Far Eastern Republic. In addition the Japanese are

¹³⁹ Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-52.

¹⁴⁰ U. S. *For. Rels.*, 1921, II, 713-15.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 716.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, II, 717-19.

to have the right of coastwise trade and of navigation under their own flag on the Sungari and Amur Rivers. They likewise are to have the right to own land.

3. The Far Eastern Republic must not become communistic.
4. The Far Eastern Republic and Japan are each to recognize present rights of citizens or subjects no matter how acquired.
5. All present fortifications on the Pacific coast must be destroyed by the Far Eastern Republic, which must construct no new fortifications. To this demand a note is added allowing Japanese in Far Eastern Republic territory in a military capacity, but from the Russian text it is not clear whether this would apply only to individuals or to armed military units.¹⁴³

While no part of Russia was represented officially at the Washington Conference, a special trade delegation of the Far Eastern Republic was received informally (December 8, 1921) by the Russian division of the State Department. On this occasion a member of the delegation referred to attempts currently being made by the Japanese to negotiate a treaty which should include secret articles covering certain of the points mentioned above.¹⁴⁴

Neither of the conferences held contemporaneously at Dairen and Washington, in 1921–22, resulted in a solution of the Siberian-Japanese problems. The presence of an unofficial observer from Moscow at Dairen made apparent—what later was clearly demonstrated—that the Far Eastern Republic was but a mouthpiece for Soviet Russia. On account of the excessive demands, economic and military, of the Nipponese, and of their insistence that a commercial agreement should be signed prior to a military agreement, in which latter the date of withdrawal should be stated, the conference at Dairen broke up on April 16.¹⁴⁵

At Washington the Siberian issue was barely touched upon. In meetings of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, held on January 23 and 24, 1922, Baron Shidehara and Secretary Hughes reviewed the courses of developments in Siberia and referred to diplomatic correspondence between their governments relative thereto. Baron Shidehara again stated that the negotiations at Dairen were “in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature,” and, in conclusion, stated that it was “the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.”

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 719–20.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 750–52.

¹⁴⁵ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920–23 (Oxford, 1925), pp. 442–43.

Secretary Hughes, in replying to the Japanese spokesman, remarked: "These assurances are taken to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operation in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the maritime province." Referring "frankly" to the "divergence of views between the two Governments," the secretary concluded with the "hope that Japan [would] find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people." At the sixth plenary session of the conference (February 4) the Shidehara-Hughes statements were spread upon the records of that body.¹⁴⁶

In so far as Siberia was concerned, the advantages accruing from the Washington Conference consisted of the opportunity to air the problem before the powers, the clarification to the world of the American attitude, and the receipt of renewed, and now widely publicized, declarations from Japan of its intention both to withdraw from Siberia and to adhere to the principle of the Open Door in that area. Various problems resulting from intervention remained, nevertheless, unsolved.

A change of government in Tokyo took place in the following June by which Baron Kato was elevated to the premiership. Having been a delegate to the Washington Conference, and having observed the mounting popular opposition to further adventures of the military in Siberia, Kato issued orders for withdrawal from the Maritime Province. On July 1, Tokyo announced that evacuation would be completed at the end of four months. Nikolaievsk—but not northern Sakhalin—was later included in the order.

Another conference between representatives of Tokyo, Moscow, and Chita was held during September, 1922, at Changchun, Manchuria. The spokesman for Moscow aimed at a broad trade agreement with Japan including recognition for the U.S.S.R. To this the Japanese would not assent. Nor could the two parties agree with respect to (1) conditions for Japanese withdrawal from Sakhalin, (2) payment for fishing rights off Kamchatka and Okhotsk—which the Japanese had expanded to complete control during the period of confusion and for which they had ceased payment since the preceding April—and (3) disposition of supplies of arms and munitions at Vladivostok, valued at 250,000,000 yen, which had come under Nipponese control.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," *U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 126*, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 1921-1922, pp. 698-701, 703-06, 201-09, 853-62.

¹⁴⁷ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-45.

Despite collapse of the meeting at Changchun on September 25, retirement of the Japanese from Nikolaievsk and the Maritime Province took place as promised. Although the Nikolaievsk affair, with consequent occupation by Japan of northern Sakhalin, was a result of intervention by the Allied and Associated powers, it was held by Tokyo to constitute a separate issue not connected with the question of withdrawal from other parts of Siberia, and not until 1925 was the matter of Sakhalin settled.¹⁴⁸ In the meantime, on November 14, 1922, reunion of Siberia with European Russia had been brought about by the vote of the government of the Far Eastern Republic to dissolve itself. This having been carried out, Moscow was able to announce its rule of northern Eurasia from Poland to the Pacific.

¹⁴⁸ In the Russo-Japanese treaty of that year. See *infra*, p. 228

CHAPTER V

THE POST-WAR CONFERENCES

FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS AT PARIS

Shortly over two months after the armistice of 1918, the delegates of the Allied and Associated powers met in Paris to formulate treaties of peace. As one of the five chief powers, Japan was permitted five representatives at the conference, the three most important of whom were Marquis Saionji, a member of the *genrō*, Viscount Chinda, Ambassador to England, and Baron Makino, sometime minister of foreign affairs. China was allocated but two seats, and because of civil war it was no easy task to choose delegates and their entourages who would be satisfactory to the numerous political groups contending for power. The panel system of representation, however, allowed China to send more than two delegates so that at the first plenary session of the conference, Lou Tseng-tsiang and C. T. Wang (Wang Ching-t'ing), representing northern and southern China respectively, acted as China's official delegates; at the second session V. K. Wellington Koo (Ku Wei-chun) and Alfred S. K. Sze (Shih Chao-chi) represented disunited China. The fact that the Chinese delegation did not represent a united country did not prevent unanimity among the delegates themselves, but it did weaken their position at the conference.

The Fourteen Points laid down by President Wilson in 1918 seemed to hold special promise for China and the other areas of "colonialized" Asia. Particularly striking was Wilson's proposal for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at (Point I)" and his suggestion that in the adjustment of colonial claims there should be "strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is determined." At Paris, however, it soon became obvious that the major decisions were to be taken by President Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George, Orlando, and Clemenceau. It was in the consultations of the "Big Four," a completely Western group, that most of the outstanding issues between China and Japan were ultimately decided.

The Japanese delegation hoped to obtain recognition of their country's status as a great power and to gain from the Western powers a general acceptance of the unique relationship existing between China and Japan. In addition, the Nipponese sought to incorporate the principle of racial

equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations, to obtain the surrender to Japan of German's former holdings, rights, and privileges in Shantung, and to win control of the Pacific Islands north of the equator. China's objectives were less comprehensive. The delegates of the Republic sought to regain complete control over Shantung and to awaken the world to the imperialistic aims of Japan. China also *hoped* that in the spirit of President Wilson's "Fifth Point" all limitations upon her sovereignty might be relinquished.

The struggle between Chinese and Japanese delegates over the disposition of former German holdings in Shantung was especially protracted and severe. The United States alone among the great powers had not promised support to Japan in its claim. In fact, the existence of the secret agreements of 1917 between Japan and the Allied governments was not *officially* made known to President Wilson until after his arrival in France in January, 1919.¹ One of the Japanese delegates pointed out privately to Secretary Lansing that Japan would be forced to blame the United States if the Japanese did not receive Kiaochow, and made what the secretary called "an indirect threat of what would happen to the friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim was denied."² On April 21, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called on President Wilson and Secretary Lansing separately. The president suggested that the earlier proposal of the secretary of state should be accepted: to the effect that the German rights in China should be ceded to the Allied and Associated powers which should attempt a just disposition of them at a later date; that "it had been understood that Japan was to have a mandate for the islands in the North Pacific although he [the president] had made a reserve in the case of the island of Yap which he himself considered should be international"; and that all "spheres of influence in China" should be abrogated.³ Secretary Lansing "frankly told them [Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda] that they ought to prove the justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that [he] doubted their ability to do so."⁴ Japan's claims were supported by Great Britain, France, and Italy.

President Wilson, acting upon the age-old policy of the United States of discouraging exploitation of eastern Asia by the great powers among which, since 1905, Japan had been included, vigorously exerted himself in defense of the maintenance of the economic and political integrity of

¹ Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, 1922), I, chaps. II, III; *Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 166*, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 139-253, 517-18. See also A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), pp. 239-45; T. A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York, 1944), especially chap. XVIII.

² R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (Boston and New York, 1921), p. 253.

³ Baker, *op. cit.*, II, 247.

⁴ Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

attempts to implement them. Following the conclusion, on September 15, 1914, of the Bryan Peace Commission treaty with Great Britain, London was credibly reported to have informed Tokyo—without, however, officially informing Washington—that it considered this treaty as of the type envisaged by the 1911 agreement.⁸ Uneasiness nonetheless survived. A “Conference of the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India” met in London, June 21—August 5, 1921, for the purpose, *inter alia*, of discussing renewal, or abrogation, of the alliance. The desirability of Anglo-American and Anglo-Japanese friendship was considered as axiomatic. Nevertheless, the long duration of the alliance; the aid rendered by its Oriental ally to Britain—at a price—during the World War; the aggressiveness of Nipponese foreign policy, combined with extreme sensitivity of Nipponese statesmen to affronts, fancied or real; and the exposed position of the British in the Far East and the Pacific, particularly that of Australia and New Zealand, when contrasted with the failure of the United States government to ratify the Treaty of Versailles; its refusal to join the League of Nations; and its generally negative attitude toward adopting a policy of co-operation entailing responsibility in international affairs, had resulted, by the time the Imperial Conference opened, in the somewhat hesitant conclusion by all but one of its members that the alliance should be renewed—at least temporarily.

The one determined opponent to continuation of the agreement was the Prime Minister of Canada, Arthur Meighan. In the preceding February, in expressing opposition, he had advocated the calling of a conference on Pacific affairs in which not only the two allies but China and the United States should be invited to participate. The members of the London conference who most clearly demonstrated appreciation of the

⁸ A. L. P. Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Berkeley, Calif., 1923), pp. 58–62; C. F. Chang, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Baltimore, 1931), chaps. V, VII; R. L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York, London, 1922), pp. 115–34. Details are lacking of the negotiations which culminated in 1911 in the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1905, four years before the expiration of the latter. Those relating to article iv would be of particular value. O. Franke, a distinguished German historian, in *Die Grossmächte in Ostasien von 1894 bis 1914* (Hamburg, 1923), pp. 358–66, 408, suggests that, in exchange for Tokyo's concession with respect to the nonapplication of the alliance to the United States, Sir Edward Grey promised Baron Kato, ambassador to the Court of St. James, that Japan ultimately should succeed Germany in Kiaochow. Franke also opines that Russia's approval of this arrangement was obtained in the secret treaty of July 8, 1912. Whatever may have passed between Russia and Japan in the negotiations of the latter year, no such provision was incorporated in the treaty mentioned. The first suggestion is of equally doubtful merit.

With respect to the parts played by Sir Edward Grey and Marquis Komura, foreign minister of Japan, in reaching the solution of the problem of Anglo-Japanese-American relations embodied in Article iv of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1911, see Viscount Kikujirō Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries* (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 56–58; Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892–1916*, II, 104; R. H. Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542–1936* (Tokyo, 1936), pp. 306–09; A. Whitney Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 279–80.

fact, stated years earlier by Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay, that the center of world power in the twentieth century lies not in the Atlantic but in the Pacific, were Meighan and his vigorous critic and adversary, W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia. The latter, supported by his friend, Prime Minister W. F. Massey of New Zealand, was determined that the alliance should be renewed. From June 29 through July 1, the battle raged. Premier Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon being gradually won over by the arguments of the Canadian premier to the effect that changed conditions rendered the alliance no longer desirable, that it was in conflict with the spirit of the League of Nations, that it implied benevolent neutrality on the part of the empire toward the aggressive policies and actions of Japan and that, accordingly, both China and the United States looked upon its continuance with misgiving.⁹

Meanwhile, in Washington, a joint resolution proposed in Congress, in December, 1920, by Senator William E. Borah, that the United States should seek an agreement with Great Britain and Japan for the cutting in half of naval appropriations during the ensuing five years, in conjunction with negotiations conducted from London, was about to result indirectly in the calling of a conference which should deal with this subject.¹⁰ By the early summer of 1921, the relation of Pacific and far eastern problems to that of armaments was clear. Accordingly, as the outcome of interchanges of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, a modification of the original American plan was made by which a conference should be called for the consideration of both crucial topics. On July 10, while the imperial conference was yet involved in debate and indecision, a message was delivered to the British premier. The gist of this was made public in a formal statement published in London and New York on the following day. "The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries . . . Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject. . . ." It was added that, since the armament problem had "a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems," the president had suggested "that the powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned, and

⁹ J. B. Brebner, "Canada, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1935), pp. 45-58; also see C. N. Spinks, "The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *The Pacific Historical Review*, VI (1937), 321-40.

¹⁰ Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 76, n. 21.

China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems.”¹¹

The Gordian knot into which the Canadian and Australian prime ministers had tied the London conference was cut by the American government: “Lloyd George rushed to the House of Commons from the Imperial Conference with the news, and in his speech there could not resist the implication that the Imperial Conference, rather than President Harding or Secretary Hughes, had engineered the happy event.”¹² Thus it is clear that the origins of the Washington conference, like those of the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door, are to be traced to a co-ordination of the interests and ideologies of Great Britain and the United States.

On August 11, 1921, President Harding issued formal invitations to the above-mentioned governments “to participate in a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions [would] also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.”¹³ On the same day the government of China and, on October 4, those of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal were invited “to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, in connection with the Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament. . . .”¹⁴ Significantly, the conference was not to be held under the auspices of the League of Nations.

THE NAVAL QUESTION AT WASHINGTON

The conferees were in session from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922. They functioned through formal plenary sessions and two committees of the whole; of the latter, one, composed of representatives of the five principal powers, dealt with armaments; the other, representing all nine states, devoted itself to Pacific and far eastern affairs.

Among direct results of the conference were six treaties, a declaration accompanying the Four Power Pacific treaty, and twelve resolutions. Among indirect results were two treaties negotiated during, but outside, the sessions: (1) between China and Japan with respect to Shantung, signed February 4, 1922; and (2) between the United States and Japan, regarding the island of Yap and the other mandated islands north of the equator, signed one week later.

The six treaties mentioned were: (1) Between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, limiting naval armament; (2)

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77; *New York Times*, July 11, 1921, and *London Times*, July 11, 1921; see also Y. Ichihashi, *The Washington Conference and After* (Stanford University, 1928), chap. I.

¹² Brebner, *loc. cit.*, p. 57. See also Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-87.

¹³ *Conference on the Limitation of Armament. U. S. Sen. Doc. No. 126, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.*, pp. 17-18. (Cited hereafter as *Conference*.)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

between the same powers, in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare; (3) the Four Power Pacific treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean; (4) between the same four powers, supplementary to the Four Power Pacific treaty; (5) the Nine Power treaty relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China; (6) the Nine Power tariff treaty relating to China. With the exception of the Four Power Pacific treaty, these treaties were signed on February 6, 1922.

The Four Power Pacific treaty, in four short articles, prepared the way for the other agreements. By its terms the signatories agreed on December 13, 1921, to respect each other's "rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." Should, however, a controversy arise "out of any Pacific question . . . involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy . . . they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." In the event of a threat to their rights, "by the aggressive action of any other Power," it was agreed to "communicate with one another fully and frankly . . . to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." The treaty was to remain in force ten years from the time of its going into effect, and thereafter until any of the parties should "terminate it upon twelve months' notice." Upon deposit of ratifications of the treaty in Washington the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 was to terminate.¹⁵

The Declaration which accompanied the Four Power treaty provided that while the agreement should "apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean . . . the making of the Treaty [should] not be deemed to be an assent on the part of The United States of America to the mandates and [should] not preclude agreements between [that power] and the Mandatory Powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands." Thus provision was included for contemporaneous settlement of the Yap issue and for "reservations with respect to . . . the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator."¹⁶ By the same Declaration controversies which might arise between the four powers themselves were not to "embrace questions [e.g., "immigration and tariff matters"] which, according to principles of international law, lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers."¹⁷

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 890-91; Ichihashi, *op. cit.*, chap. X; Buell, *op. cit.*, chap. VI; A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 484-90; W. W. Willoughby, *China at the Conference: A Report* (Baltimore, 1922), pp. 347-48.

¹⁶ *Conference, loc. cit.*, p. 823.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 823, 892.

No sooner had the Four Power treaty been signed than the question was raised as to whether the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" included the islands of Japan proper: In the course of negotiations it had been understood that these were included. Inasmuch as this interpretation made it apparent that the United States, Britain, and France in signing the treaty had not only bound themselves not to declare war upon Japan but were, conceivably, bound, for the next decade, to render at least moral aid to that country in the contingency of an attack upon it by China or Soviet Russia, and since Japan had no more desire to adopt the role of a state protected by Western powers than these powers had to adopt the role of protector, the Nipponese delegation at once undertook negotiation of an instrument supplementary to the Four Power treaty. The additional agreement provided that the term "insular possessions and insular dominions," used in the Four Power treaty, should, "in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan."¹⁸

The Netherlands and Portugal, not having participated in the negotiations which culminated in the Four Power pact—despite the fact that they held insular possessions in the region affected—requested, and received, assurances of the intentions of the signatory powers to respect their rights "in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."¹⁹

On the opening day of the conference, immediately following his acceptance of the chairmanship of that body, Secretary of State Hughes declared that competition in naval programs constituted the core of the difficulty with respect to limitation of armament; that a solution could not be accomplished without "serious sacrifices"; and that "no one of the naval Powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone." Speaking for the delegation of the power economically best qualified to assume naval leadership of the world, if it so desired, he proceeded to submit a "concrete proposition for an agreement for the limitation of naval armament" based on four "general principles,"

- (1) That all capital ship building programs either actual or projected, should be abandoned: (2) That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of the older ships; (3) That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 892-93; Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-81; Ichihashi, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-24.

¹⁹ *U. S. Senate Document, No. 128, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.*, pp. 1-3: *Netherlands and Portuguese Insular Possessions in Region of Pacific Ocean*. "Copy of a Letter Addressed by Hon. Charles E. Hughes . . . to Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge . . . With Reference to The Notes Delivered by the United States Government to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands and to the Portuguese Government Relative to Respecting Their Rights in Relation to Their Insular Possessions in the Region of the Pacific Ocean." Consult also *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1922, I, 7-8; 21-23; 33-36.

- (4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.²⁰

Specifically, the American plan proposed was that a naval tonnage ratio of 5-5-3, or 10-10-6, be established for the capital ships in the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan; Italy and France subsequently agreed to a ratio of 1.75-1.75. During the prolonged negotiations which preceded the signing of the Five Power Naval treaty, the Nipponese delegates argued for a ratio of 10-10-7; finally, however, they gave way, upon obtaining assurance from the United States and Great Britain with respect to fortifications in the Pacific—in agreeing to which they themselves made concessions.

Although the United States had various sites in the Pacific capable of serving as naval bases or coaling stations for a large fleet, none in 1921 had been adequately fortified. As a proof of its friendship for Japan and Britain, and of its sincere desire for limitation of armament, the United States agreed to the maintenance of the *status quo* “with regard to fortifications and naval bases” in its insular possessions at the time held, or which might later be acquired, in the Pacific “except those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and the Hawaiian Islands. . . .” Great Britain similarly agreed with respect to “Hongkong and the insular possessions . . . east of the meridian of 110° east longitude [which excluded Singapore], except those adjacent to the coast of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and New Zealand. . . .” Japan similarly agreed with respect to “the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands [the fortifications of which latter group had recently been completed²¹], Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores. . . .” These limitations were contained in Article XIX of the Five Power Naval Treaty which was to remain in force until the end of 1936.

With respect to land armaments, aircraft, quantities of submarines and other auxiliary craft, no agreement was reached. In the Five Power treaty relating to the use of submarines and noxious gases, however, “the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers” was accepted as binding and the “use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties . . . ,” the signatory powers declared “their assent to such prohibition” and agreed “to be bound thereby as between themselves. . . .”²² This provision was to form the base, in

²⁰ Conference, *loc. cit.*, pp. 41-49.

²¹ Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 166-67.

²² Conference, *loc. cit.*, pp. 886-88.

part, of protests by both China and Japan during the period of hostilities after the autumn of 1937.

The Four Power Pacific and the Five Power Naval treaties, in addition to saving enormous expenditures upon armaments, and eliminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, resulted in the removal, for an indefinite period, of the likelihood of war between the United States and either Japan or Great Britain. They resulted also in making extremely unlikely intervention by naval forces of the United States and Great Britain in the western Pacific and the Far East. In these areas, hereafter, the influence of the English-speaking peoples was to become largely nonphysical, Nippon being left practically supreme. This was to be clearly indicated during the next few years in relations between the two outstanding states of eastern Asia.

THE NINE POWER PACT

China, "the stake for which the game of naval [and diplomatic] competition in the Pacific was being played,"²³ had, since the summer of 1917, been split, by civil war and the machinations of office seekers, into two main segments (and various minor ones) for the most part misruled from Peking and Canton. At the latter city, six months prior to the convening of the diplomats at Washington, Dr. Sun had been "elected" as "President of the Republic of China" following which he and his government had demanded representation in the conference, independent of that of Peking. To this Washington would not accede. The northern government, in keeping with the precedent established by the sending of a joint delegation to the peace conference at Paris, invited membership from Canton. This was declined. Accordingly, Peking, although at its wits ends for funds, sent its own delegation, while Dr. Sun announced that his government would not recognize decisions of the conference.

China's representatives had refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles with its transfer to Japan of the prewar German rights in Shantung. Peking had, moreover, declined all overtures from Tokyo for a direct settlement of the issues under dispute, while considerable sections of the Chinese people, without regard to political affiliation, had boycotted Japanese goods. The northern Chinese delegates to the Washington conference, hopeful of obtaining that justice which they—and others—felt had been denied at Paris, aimed broadly at the present removal, and prevention for the future, of all limitations upon their country's sovereignty. Specifically, they sought tariff autonomy, abrogation of the treaties and notes based upon the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, and restoration of Shantung. Their objectives were made manifest in the

²³ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

submission of ten general principles to the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions at its first session on November 16.²⁴ These were brought forward by S. K. Alfred Sze, head of the Chinese delegation and minister to the United States.

At the second meeting of the committee, three days later, Baron Kato, leader of the Japanese delegation, observed that "existing difficulties in China lie no less in her domestic situation than in her external relations." He declared that his country was "entirely uninfluenced by any policy of



Dr. Alfred Sze. Underwood & Underwood

territorial aggrandizement in any part of China"; that it adhered "without condition or reservation to the principle, 'the open door and equal opportunity' in China"; that it looked "to China in particular for the supply of raw materials essential to [its] industrial life and for foodstuffs as well. In the purchase of such materials . . . [it did] not claim any special rights or privileges, and [it] welcome [d] fair and honest competition with all nations." ²⁵

Aristide Briand, chief of the French delegation, questioned the meaning of the term "China" by remarking that "the principle of the territorial

²⁴ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 443-44.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

integrity of China . . . had significance only if a definition of the boundaries of China were first determined upon." With reference to this, Elihu Root of the American delegation stated his belief that "it was desirable to distinguish between China proper and the territories over which China exercised suzerainty"; he suggested taking China proper, for "if the committee had to deal with outlying districts at the same time, it would only lead to confusion; it would be possible to deal with the outlying districts later; it was impossible to do both at once; if it pleased the committee, he would be glad to present a resolution in regard to China proper." V. K. Wellington Koo, of the Chinese delegation, speaking to the question "What is China?" announced categorically that: "The territories of the Chinese Republic were defined in its Constitution."²⁶ The Chinese delegation could not discuss any question which might give the impression of attempting to modify the territorial boundaries of China. It was in the name of the Chinese Republic that he and his colleagues were participating in the discussion, and the territories of the Republic were to be considered as an entity. . . . [The] principle of administrative integrity should be confirmed for the Chinese Republic as one unit."²⁷ No further attempt was made to define, or change the definition of, "China."

By request of the committee, Elihu Root drafted, and, on November 21, submitted to that body, a resolution containing the fundamental principles upon which the work of the conference in relation to China should be based. As amended and adopted by the committee on that date, and by the fourth plenary session of the conference on December 10, the Root resolution read as follows:

It is the firm intention of the Powers attending this conference [other than China] . . .

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."²⁸

²⁶ In the constitutional compact of May 1, 1914, the territory of the Chinese Republic was declared to be "the same as that of the former Empire (chap. I, Article iii)." For complete text see Pan Wei-tung, *The Chinese Constitution. A Study of Forty Years of Constitution-making in China* (Washington, D. C., 1945), Appendix E, p. 170.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 448-52.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 454-60, 829; *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1922, I, 276-82.

The Root resolution, with minor changes (the chief being omission of the word "present" in point 4, and the inserting of the phrase "in China" after the word "conditions"), became Article I of the Treaty Between All Nine Powers Relating to Principles and Policies to Be Followed in Matters Concerning China.²⁹ In this manner "were reaffirmed the postulates of American policy which were no longer to be left to the exchanges of diplomatic notes, but were to receive the sanction of the most solemn undertaking of the Powers."³⁰

The other eight articles of the Nine Power treaty, with the exception of the last, which dealt with its ratification, had to do with specific provisions for the implementation of the principles enunciated in Article I. The contracting powers, including China, agreed "not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair" these principles. The same powers, other than China, agreed that they would

not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking, (a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China:

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

China, in turn, undertook "to be guided by the principles stated . . . in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries. . . ."

The powers agreed "not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory."

With respect to "the whole of the railways in China," that country agreed "not [to] exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of . . . nationality. . . ." The powers, "other than China," assumed "a corresponding obliga-

²⁹ *Conference, loc. cit.*, p. 895.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 829. Quoted from "Report of the American Delegation [Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oscar W. Underwood, Elihu Root] Submitted to the President, February 9, 1922."

tion in respect of any of the aforesaid railways [for example, the South Manchuria Railway] over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise."

The powers, other than China, likewise agreed "fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party," while the latter declared that when a neutral it would "observe the obligations of neutrality."

Whenever a situation might arise involving, in the opinion of any one of the powers, the "application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and [rendering] desirable discussion of such application," it was provided that there should be "full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned."³¹ Other powers having governments recognized by the signatories, and having treaty relations with China, were to be invited to adhere to the treaty.³²

By signing the Nine Power treaty, China, for the first time, became a party to the principle of the Open Door—twenty-two years after its formal enunciation by Secretary Hay. The document itself, which was believed by many Americans, and possibly by others, to have made the Open Door at long last a fact, was considered by the same optimists to constitute "a Magna Charta for China." Ideally advantageous to that state as such a "Charter" might, or might not, prove in the future to be—and it should be noted that the document, relating to the future rather than the past, contains no reference to the vested interests of the powers and their nationals in that country—there were numerous problems of the present distinctly material in nature. These had to do with tariff autonomy, extraterritoriality, leased territories, foreign post offices, radio stations, and armed forces within the boundaries of the republic.

CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR "SOVEREIGNTY"

In consonance with paragraph 2 of the Root resolution, adopted two days earlier by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions,

³¹ Be it noted, however, in connection with the convening of the Brussels Conference of 1937, that while the Four Power Pacific treaty contained provision for the calling, under specified conditions, of a conference of its signatories, no such stipulation was incorporated in the Nine Power treaty. The provision for "full and frank communication" did not render it mandatory upon any of the covenanting states to use an international conference as the channel for "communication." Cf., *infra*, chap. XV.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 895-96; also 135-37, 167-68, 613-17, 619-47, 829-30. Articles iii, iv, and v were based upon resolutions first adopted in the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions and later by the conference in plenary session. With respect to Articles iii, v, it may be added that another resolution was adopted providing for "a procedure for dealing with questions that [might] arise in connection with the execution of the provisions" of these Articles, to the effect that there should "be established in China a Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid Articles may be referred for investigation and report. . . ." No such Board was ever appointed. *Conference, loc. cit.*, p. 903.

Wellington Koo, on November 23, reviewed the history of his country's customs duties since 1842 pointing out that prior to that year, "China had enjoyed the full right of fixing her customs duties. But in that year and in the subsequent years, she had made treaties with Great Britain, France, and the United States, in which for the first time a limitation was imposed on this full right." He observed, subject to correction, that while Great Britain, France, and the United States now received 12, 15, and 35 per cent, respectively of their total revenues from tariff duties, China, "for nearly 100 years," had received but "a comparatively insignificant part" of its national revenues from that source; moreover, since 1918, its tariffs were "yielding only 3½ per cent." In the preceding sixteen years they had yielded "only 2½ per cent in comparison with the market value of the imports. . . ." In view of these facts, and the imperative need of his government for funds, Koo requested that tariff autonomy should be restored to China, and that "on and from January 1, 1922, the Chinese import tariff should be raised to 12½ per cent, a rate mentioned in the Chinese treaties with Great Britain, the United States, and Japan."³³

Here was an opportunity for the powers to give practical expression to the idealism expressed in the Root resolution; however, as a substitute for bread China was given hardtack. Without a considerable increase in its revenues it was impossible for the republic to establish "an effective and stable government," the lack of which constituted the ostensible reason for the failure of the powers to grant tariff autonomy. Had China's requests with respect to tariff and other financial restrictions been favorably considered it was estimated that an additional \$300,000,000 silver would have been provided annually; by the compromise agreed upon a potential, but by no means assured, \$46,167,000 (silver) annually was substituted. The means by which the government—in so far as a government existed in China at this time—might have begun internal rehabilitation were thus denied; continued negotiations for loans for military purposes from Japan, which had lent vast sums to China during the preceding dozen years and which alone evinced willingness to advance funds for such purposes, were encouraged,³⁴ and the powers were still enabled to unload their manufactures in the treaty ports at rates much lower than such goods paid on entering Japan and Western countries. This served to discourage development of Chinese manufactures in a way only less efficacious than those discovered by Nippon in the years from 1931 to 1937.

The Treaty Between the Nine Powers Relating to Chinese Customs Tariff provided *inter alia*: (1) for the appointment of a Revision Commission to meet at Shanghai for the purpose of putting into force an effec-

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 469-71, 594-98, 605-13, 762-74. See also Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-17.

³⁴ T. F. Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question* (New York, 1919), pp. 174-97; C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York, 1933), pp. 533-53; K. W. Shaw, *Democracy and Finance in China* (New York, 1926), p. 156.

tive five per cent tariff on imports into the country; (2) for the convening in China of a Special Conference "to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin" (internal transit duties), and the implementation of provisions contained in treaties with Great Britain (September 5, 1902), the United States (October 8, 1903), and Japan (October 8, 1903), with respect to the levying of surtaxes which, however, prior to the abolition of likin, might "not exceed 5 per centum *ad valorem*"; (3) for periodic revision of customs duties during an indefinite period; (4) for "effective equality of treatment and of opportunity for all the Contracting Powers" with respect to customs duties, and (5) for the carrying into effect of the "principle of uniformity in the rates of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China. . . ." ³⁵ The last provision was especially important inasmuch as Russia, in April, 1869, had succeeded in incorporating a provision in its revised convention with China relating to land trade, for the payment of "import duty at the rate of one-third less than that specified in the general Foreign Tariff" on goods brought in overland. To France (1886), to Great Britain (1894), and to Japan (1905), the same privilege had been extended.³⁶

No reference to tariff autonomy was made in the treaty, and it was not granted by the last of the powers to agree to it—Japan—until May, 1930. It may also be noted that, in connection with the discussions preliminary to the formulation of the treaty, the declaration was voluntarily made on behalf of the Chinese government that the latter had "no intention to effect any change which may disturb the present administration of the Chinese maritime customs." But it was made clear by Koo that this policy was not to be "invested with the character of permanency," inasmuch as the Chinese people felt increasingly "that more Chinese should be trained to assume the functions of the more responsible posts in the service"—no one of the forty-four commissioners of customs in 1922 being a native.³⁷

On November 25, two days after Koo's request for customs autonomy, Chief Justice Wang Chung-hui, and Alfred Sze, respectively, advocated action by the powers, in co-operation with China, looking toward the present improvement, and ultimate abolition, of the system of extraterritoriality in that country, and the immediate withdrawal of foreign post offices therefrom. With reference to the first, Wang argued that the extra-territorial system "is in derogation of China's sovereign rights, and is regarded by the Chinese people as a national humiliation"; that there is "a multiplicity of courts in one and the same locality, and the interrelation of such courts ha[s] given rise to a legal situation perplexing both to the

³⁵ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 897-901.

³⁶ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and Foreign States* (Shanghai, 1917), I, 155; A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

³⁷ *Conference, loc. cit.*, p. 774.

trained lawyer and to the layman"; that disadvantages "arise from the uncertainty of the law," the general rule being that the law applied is that of the defendant's nationality, "and so, in a commercial transaction between, say, X and Y of different nationalities, the rights and liabilities of the parties vary according as to whether" X or Y sues first; that when "causes of action, civil or criminal, arise in which foreigners are defendants, it is necessary . . . that they should be carried to the nearest consular court, which might be many miles away; and so it often happens that it is practically impossible to obtain the attendance of the necessary witnesses, or to produce other necessary evidence"; that "foreigners in China . . . claim immunity from local taxes and excises which the Chinese themselves are required to pay"; that until extraterritoriality should be "abolished or substantially modified" it would be "inexpedient for China to open her entire territory to foreign trade and commerce"—and, he might have added, residence; that the "evils of the existing system had been so obvious that Great Britain in 1902, Japan and the United States in 1903, and Sweden in 1908 agreed, subject to certain conditions, to relinquish their extraterritorial rights." He pointed out that in the period which had elapsed since those treaties were signed his country had made "great progress on the path of legal reform."

In the ensuing discussion, Balfour touched upon one of the main weaknesses in China's legal system which prevailed in 1844—and largely prevails to the present day—and which has militated against complete abolition of extraterritoriality. "Without professing to be an expert," Balfour understood that the difficulty lay, not so much in Chinese law itself, as in the administration of the law. "If those who had so ably reformed the laws should set themselves the task of reforming the courts and administration, an appreciable improvement might be expected." Perennial disorder, with superiority since 1912 of military to civil officials; paucity of scientifically trained and honest lawyers from whom to draw a nationwide judiciary; and, most important of all, the subordination of the judiciary to the executive branch of the government, which, on occasion, permits the most honest and competent of judges to be dictated to by the most venal and ignorant of generals: these largely account for the development, and maintenance in China for close to a century of the system of extraterritoriality.³⁸

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 475–80. For accounts of extraterritoriality, its origins and development, see *inter alia*: G. W. Keeton, *The Development of Extraterritoriality in China*, 2 vols. (London, New York, 1928); S. S. Liu, *Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline* (New York, 1925); H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1910–18), *passim*; H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), *passim*; H. F. MacNair, *Modern Chinese History: Selected Readings* (Shanghai, 1923), *passim*; W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (Baltimore, 1927), *passim*; A. M. Kotenev, *Shanghai—Its Mixed Court and Council* (Shanghai, 1925), *passim*. Wesley

The establishment and maintenance of post offices in China was a different matter. Extraterritoriality was imposed upon an existing system of law and custom for the protection of alien life and property; foreign agencies were introduced to fill a lacuna in China's postal services, only parts of which were under government control. A courier system linking provincial governments and garrisons with the capital, was maintained from early times through those of the Ch'ing; a Dispatch Office, connecting Peking with steamship lines at Shanghai, for the purpose of keeping the capital in touch with its representatives abroad, was established in 1876; commercial and family correspondence was carried for centuries through "Letter Hongs," or agencies, nongovernmental in origin and management. With the growth of foreign communities in the empire in the nineteenth century, and the expansion of steam communications, the need for a systematized mail service within the country and between China and the West became increasingly manifest. The imperial government offered no evidence of readiness to meet this requirement; accordingly, the Westerners met their own needs. Eight years before the treaty of Nanking was signed the English instituted an agency. Consequent upon the cession of Hongkong, in 1842, a post office was opened which shortly established branches in the treaty ports. France, Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States followed suit: by 1906 there were ten British, thirteen French, fourteen German, sixteen Japanese, five Russian, and one American (the last-mentioned in Shanghai) extraterritorialized post offices in the Manchu-Chinese empire.

In the years following the appointment of Robert Hart, a British subject, as inspector general of the Imperial Maritime Customs (1863), steps were taken at his instigation and that of Viceroy Li Hung-chang, and Gustav Detring (sometime commissioner of customs and oftentimes adviser to Viceroy Li), looking toward the institution of a national postal service. This was finally accomplished by imperial decree of March 20, 1896. Sir Robert Hart was then appointed to organize and head the new service, concurrently with that of the customs, becoming henceforth inspector general of customs and posts. On September 28, 1911, approximately four months before the death of Sir Robert Hart—but three years after he had left on furlough—the postal and customs services were divorced, the former being transferred to the ministry of posts and communications under a Chinese director-general and a French postmaster-general. The appointment of a French national, Théophile Piry, to the latter post, that of actual head of the service, was in accord with the agreement of April 9–10, 1898, by which China had leased Kwangchowwan to France for

ninety-nine years. This understanding, with respect to the postal service, is reported to have been made more explicit in October, 1902.³⁹

In substantiation of his request "that the powers assembled in the conference agree at once to abolish all postal services now maintained by them in China," Sze submitted a statement concerning the remarkable expansion, and efficiency of administration, of the Chinese postal service. Without referring to Japan, against the nationals of which numerous charges had been laid of drug smuggling into Shantung during the postwar period, Sze gently remarked that "in particular there was some smuggling of drugs through the parcel post. It had been agreed by all the powers that the smuggling of drugs should be stopped, and the withdrawal of the foreign post offices would greatly facilitate the attainment of that aim."⁴⁰

The appeal of Wang and Sze against extraterritoriality and foreign post offices, respectively, eventuated in the adoption by the conference of Resolutions 4 and 5. The first, including two "additional resolutions," provided for the appointment, within three months of the adjournment of the conference, of a commission, to be composed of representatives of the nine powers, which should "inquire into the present practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting . . . their findings of fact . . . and their recommendations . . . and to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality. . . ." The report and recommendations were to be submitted "within one year after the first meeting of the Commission," each of the powers thereupon being "free to accept or to reject all or any portion of the recommendation . . . but in no case [should] any of the said Powers make its acceptance of all or any portion of such recommendations either directly or indirectly dependent on the granting by China of any special concession, favor, benefit or immunity, whether political or economic."

Resolution 5, "Regarding Foreign Postal Agencies in China," recognized the "justice of the desire expressed by the Chinese Government to secure the abolition of foreign postal agencies in China, save or except in leased territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty. . . ." On the conditions that China should continue to maintain "an efficient . . . postal service," and that an assurance be given that China contemplated "no change in the present postal administration so far as the status of the foreign Co-Director General is concerned," the United States, Great

³⁹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1898/7, pp. 124-25; Morse, *op. cit.*, III, chap. III; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, II, 782-83, and chap. XXXIV.

⁴⁰ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 480-93; W. L. Godshall, *Tsingtau Under Three Flags* (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 194-96; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, I, 256.

Britain, France and Japan, the "four Powers having such postal agencies," agreed "to their abandonment . . . not later than January 1, 1923." In the meantime, the powers concerned undertook "to afford full facilities to the Chinese customs authorities to examine . . . all postal matter (excepting ordinary letters . . .)" for the purpose of ending smuggling through foreign postal channels.⁴¹

Less successful were the Chinese in their attempt to wreck the treaty structure raised by their eastern neighbors upon the foundation of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915—these, and the status of Manchuria, not having been listed on the agenda of the conference. That China was destined to wage a losing battle against Nippon in particular had been foreshadowed on November 21, in the reply of Root to Baron Kato, in the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, that the phrase "administrative integrity" in the Root resolution "certainly did not affect any privileges accorded by valid or effective grants; that, on the contrary, respect for the administrative integrity of a country required respect for the things that are done in the exercise of its full sovereignty by an independent State."⁴² Nevertheless, one week later, Sze, continuing the campaign opened by Koo, and joined by Wang and himself, for abolition of all limitations upon their country's sovereignty, instituted another attack upon one of the minor Western, but major Japanese, positions by proposing that the powers should agree not to "station troops or railway guards or establish and maintain police boxes, or erect or operate electrical communication installations, upon the soil of China"; and that such as then existed, "without China's express consent," should at once be withdrawn.⁴³ The outcome of this proposition was the adoption by the conference, on February 1, 1922, of two more resolutions: one relating to armed forces, and the other to radio stations, in China.

Resolution number 6 provided that "Whereas . . . The Powers have declared their intention to withdraw their armed forces now on duty in China without the authority of any treaty or agreement, whenever China shall assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China," a commission, composed of representatives of the nine powers, should conduct an inquiry and report to the governments concerned, whereupon each of the powers should be "deemed free to accept or reject all or any of the findings of fact or opinions expressed in the report but that in no case [should] any of the said Powers make its acceptance of all or any of the findings of fact or opinions either directly or indirectly dependent on the granting by China of any special concession, favor, benefit or immunity, whether political or economic."

⁴¹ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 903-05.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 455.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

Resolution number 7 stipulated ⁴⁴ (1) that foreign legation radio stations in China should send and receive government messages only, except in cases of interruption of "all other telegraphic communication"; (2) that all radio stations operated in Chinese territory by foreign governments, "under treaties or concessions of the Government of China," should operate under the terms of the agreements; (3) that "in case there be any radio station maintained in the territory of China by a foreign government or citizens or subjects thereof without the authority of the Chinese Government, such station . . . [should] be transferred to . . . China . . . upon fair and full compensation to the owners . . . as soon as the Chinese Ministry of Communications is prepared to operate the same effectively for the general public benefit"; (4) that "If any questions [should] arise as to the radio stations in leased territories, in the South Manchurian Railway Zone or in the French Concession at Shanghai, they [should] be regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese government and the Governments concerned" (—a provision which served largely to nullify any value which the resolution might have had); (5) that an attempt should be made to prevent interference by foreign radio stations in China with the wave lengths used by Chinese wireless stations.⁴⁵

On December 3, Wellington Koo led a charge upon a strategic position, held jointly by France, England, and especially Japan, namely, Leased Territories. On the grounds that these areas "greatly prejudiced China's territorial and administrative integrity, that they constituted virtually an *"imperium in imperio"* and hampered its national defense, that they had more than once involved China in hostilities such as the Russo-Japanese and the World Wars, and that they constituted *"points d'appui"* for developing spheres of interest to the detriment of the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China," Koo, in "the interest not only of China, but of all nations, and especially with a view to the peace of the Far East"—that desideratum so often touched upon by the leaders of Nippon—asked, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, "for the annulment and an early termination of these leases," promising "that the Chinese Government would be prepared to respect and safeguard the legitimately vested interests of the different powers within those territories."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 905-06, 499-513, 515-17, 519-37, 548-50, 552-58, also *The China Year Book*, 1936 (Shanghai), pp. 302-04, and *The Chinese Year Book*, 1935-36 (Shanghai), pp. 688-89.

⁴⁵ The short wave "beam" system of radio communications after 1924, discouraged further development in China of long wave communications. Proof of the value of the new system was demonstrated by the use made of it in the Nationalist campaigns of 1926-27. Plans for international short-wave telegraphy and telephony were carried into effect by the new government. In 1929 the ministry of communications took over the stations developed by the National Reconstruction Committee and, in December, 1930, an International Radio Station was opened at Chenju, on the outskirts of Shanghai. This communicated with San Francisco, Berlin, and Paris and, by 1934, with London and Tokyo.

For Japan, Hanihara stated with regard to the leased territories of Kiaochow, Port Arthur, and Dairen that, with respect to the first-named, his government had "already declared on several occasions that they would restore" it to China, and that conversations were then in process which it was hoped would result in "a happy solution of the problem." As to Japan's holding on the Kwantung peninsula, however, he bluntly observed:

the Japanese delegates desire to make it clear that Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights she has lawfully acquired and at no small sacrifice. The territory in question forms a part of Manchuria—a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan's territory more than anything else, she has vital interests in that which relates to her economic life and national safety. . . . In the leased territory of Kwantung Province there reside no less than 65,000 Japanese, and the commercial and industrial interests they have established there are of such importance and magnitude to Japan that they are regarded as an essential part of her economic life. It is believed that this attitude . . . is not against the principle of the resolution adopted on November 21.

Like Hanihara, Balfour divided the territories leased by his country into two classes: that of Kowloon, without which "Hongkong was perfectly indefensible and would be at the mercy of any enemy possessing modern artillery"; and Weihaiwei, the leasing of which, in 1898, "had been connected with resistance to the economic domination of China by any other powers" and "for the maintenance of the balance of power in the Far East with a view to the maintenance of the policy of the open door . . . as a check to the predatory action of Germany and Russia." Kowloon, it was made clear, Britain intended to hold indefinitely; Weihaiwei—which, according to the terms of its lease, should have been returned to China in 1905, when Russia was expelled from Port Arthur⁴⁶—would be surrendered as "part of a general arrangement intended to confirm the sovereignty of China and to give effect to the principle of the 'open door.'" This indefinite statement was supplemented by Balfour in an address before the fifth plenary session of the conference almost two months later (February 1, 1922), following announcement of the successful conclusion of Sino-Japanese conversations with respect to Shantung. On this occasion, Balfour, without setting a date, declared that "Great Britain proposes to hand back Weihaiwei to the country within whose frontier it lies."⁴⁷ While France, still awaiting the moment "to join in the collective restitution of territories leased to various powers in China,"

⁴⁶ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1898/14, p. 152: Preamble to the Convention for the lease of Weihaiwai—July 1, 1898.

⁴⁷ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 538-46, 139.

continued to August, 1945, to hold Kwangchowwan; Great Britain, on October 1, 1930, restored Weihaiwei to China a mere quarter of a century after the technical expiration of its lease.⁴⁸ In the course of the ceremonies incident to the rendition, a bowl of clear water was presented by the Chinese authorities to the retiring commissioner, Sir Reginald F. Johnston, in token of China's appreciation of the purity of the British administration of its Shantung leasehold.

Replying (December 7, 1921) to Hanihara's statement of the third, outlining Japan's position in Kwantung, Koo introduced a reference to the Twenty-One Demands without specifically mentioning them: "As to the leased territory of Kwantung Province . . . its original term will expire in 1925, and while an extension to 99 years was obtained by Japan in 1915 it was obtained in such circumstances that the dispute about its validity remains one of the most grave outstanding questions between China and Japan."

With respect to Manchuria, Koo described it as

an important part of Chinese territory. Not only does the national safety of China rely upon the safeguarding of [it] as an integral portion of the Chinese Republic, because these three eastern Provinces . . . have been the historic road of invasion into China throughout the past centuries, but also the security of the economic life of the Chinese people depends in a very vital measure upon the conservation and development with the surplus capital of the world of the natural and agricultural resources in Manchuria—a region where to-day an abundance of raw material and food supplies are already accessible to all nations, on fair terms and through the normal operation of the economic law of supply and demand. Moreover, Manchuria is an important outlet for the surplus population from the congested provinces in other parts of China. In view of the foregoing facts, it is clear that China has such truly vital interests in Manchuria that the interests of any foreign power therein, however important they may be in themselves, can not compare with them. The fact of close propinquity of Manchuria to Korea, if it justifies any claim to consideration, can be equitably appealed to only on the condition of reciprocity. As to the statement that assurance was given by the American, British, and French Governments at the time of the formation of the international consortium, that the vital interests of Japan in Manchuria shall be safeguarded, the Chinese delegation do not feel in a position, since China was not consulted at the time, to express an opinion as to the question of its accuracy. Should such assurance have been given, they could not, however, conceal their feeling that it can not be reconciled with the principle which was adopted by the conference on November 21 of respect for the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. . . .

⁴⁸ *The China Year Book*, 1931, pp. 55n., 64–66, 483–86.

To the contention of the Chinese delegation that their country should be granted additional opportunity to demonstrate its ability to rule Manchuria in a peaceful and orderly manner, Hanihara succinctly declared:

Japanese interests and Japanese security are matters of such importance that she [*sic*] can not afford to take obvious risks. By taking such chances as are suggested we should do no good either to China or to ourselves. We should not pander to a sentimental idea at the risk of creating grave international difficulties in a region which has already been the source of a life and death struggle on the part of Japan in a war which did more to preserve the integrity and independence of China than perhaps any other that has ever been fought.

Attached to Hanihara's statement were two appendices dealing with lawlessness in Manchuria and intramural China. These weakened China's case with reference both to the return of leased territories and the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality. Attacks by Chinese "bandits" within the South Manchuria Railway zone, beyond the Kwantung leased territory, during the period 1906-1920 were numbered at 1001. Attention was also directed to innumerable cases of banditry and military disorders occurring south of the Wall, a list being submitted of three outstanding cases which had taken place in eight provinces during the eleven months from October, 1920, to August, 1921.⁴⁹

RECONSIDERATION OF THE TREATIES OF 1915

Occasion for a frontal attack upon the treaties and exchanges of notes of May 25, 1915, stemming from the Twenty-One Demands of the preceding January 18, did not present itself at Washington until the session of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs of December 14. These headed "a list of restrictive stipulations from which China desires to be relieved." Commenting upon the Demands and the ensuing treaties and notes, Chief-Justice Wang stated that under

overwhelming pressure and with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East at a time when the powers were embroiled in the World War, China accepted reluctantly these demands with the exception of what is known as Group V, which was 'postponed for future negotiation,' hoping that a day would come when China could have the opportunity to bring them up for reconsideration and cancellation.

Summarizing the Treaty Respecting Shantung, and the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, with their accompanying exchanges of notes, Wang declared "that they vitally affected the very existence, independence, and integrity of China," and he added that, "in the

⁴⁹ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 551-58.

common interests of the powers as well as of China, and in conformity with the principles relating to China already adopted by the committee, the Chinese delegation urged that the said treaties and exchange of notes be reconsidered and canceled."

Hanihara immediately announced that if

there was a question of making the validity of the treaty or agreements of 1915 or the change or abrogation thereof the subject of discussion at this conference, he desired to announce that the Japanese delegation could not agree to such a course. He believed this question was one to be taken up between Japan and China, if it were to be taken up at all, and not at this conference.⁵⁰

This, he and his colleague, Baron Shidehara, succeeded in doing, without shedding undue luster upon the record of their country's recent dealings with China, and at the expense of having spread upon the minutes of the conference not alone the cogent protest of the latter but also a review of the correspondence between the United States government and those of Japan and China with respect to the treaties and exchanges of notes of 1915.

On February 2, 1922, Baron Shidehara summarized Tokyo's attitude with respect to the validity of the treaties under fire. Referring to China as "a free sovereign nation," which, "in the exercise of her own sovereign rights," had signed the treaties, he declared that although it was "evident that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance," nevertheless, "if it should once be recognized that 'rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.' " Somewhat naively, the genial Baron

pointed out that the term 'twenty-one demands,' often used to denote the treaties and notes of 1915, is inaccurate and grossly misleading. It may give rise to an erroneous impression that the whole original proposals of Japan had been pressed by Japan and accepted in toto by China. As a matter of fact, not only 'Group V,' but also several other matters contained in Japan's first proposals were eliminated entirely or modified considerably, in deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government, when the final formula was presented to China for acceptance.

The implication was plain that, far from exhibiting irritation at Japan's actions, China should manifest gratitude at having thus far been permitted to survive as a political entity. And the essential magnanimity of the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 583-87.

Nipponese attitude was rendered cumulatively apparent by Baron Shidehara's concluding announcements: (1) that his country was now "ready to throw open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organized, the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railway [*sic*] in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and, second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region . . ."; (2) that Japan had "no intention of insisting on her preferential right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in question concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria"; and (3) that Japan was "further ready to withdraw the reservation which she made, in . . . 1915, to the effect that Group V of the original proposals . . . would be postponed for future negotiations. . . . Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."⁵¹

On the following day (February 3), at the final session of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Justice Wang replied to Baron Shidehara. Taking note of Japan's concessions regarding loans, advisers, and Group V of the Twenty-one Demands, he expressed the regrets of his delegation "that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the treaties and notes of 1915." With respect to the "exceedingly dangerous precedent," which Baron Shidehara had held would be established by cancellation of the treaties, Wang declared

that a still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated, if, without rebuke or protest from other powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly, but in a military sense, weaker neighbor, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no *quid pro quo* was offered.

And Wang reminded the representatives of the powers present that

the Chinese Government, immediately after signing the agreements, published a formal statement protesting against the agreements which she [*sic*] had been compelled to sign, and disclaiming responsibility for consequent violations of treaty rights of other powers. . . .⁵²

China's final protest against these agreements having been presented to the committee, the chairman, Secretary of State Hughes, reviewed the "position of the Government of the United States as it had been set forth in

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 754-55, 192-94.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 776-78, 195-97.

identical notes addressed by that Government to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government on May 13, 1915." Having read this note, he added parenthetically with respect to the grants of leases, the stipulations about residence and travel in Manchuria, and the provisions about joint business undertakings that "the Government of the United States . . . will [also] claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most-favored-nation clauses in the treaties between the United States and China."⁵³

At the last, but one, plenary session (February 4, 1922) of the conference, the account of China's struggle to abrogate the 1915 treaties, that of Japan's success in blocking the attempt, and the review of American policy with respect to the subject, were embodied in the records of the conference. No reference was made, however, to China's failure, likewise, to obtain relief from the other "restrictive stipulations," including inter-power and nonalienation agreements,⁵⁴ and those related to spheres of influence and preferential or monopolistic rights, outlined by Justice Wang at the time the attack upon the Japanese treaties was made. With the exception of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the treaty structure erected by the other powers remained as unshaken as did the position of Nippon in Manchuria, and it was made clear that if salvation, through the restoration of complete sovereignty, were to be attained by China, it must be the result of Chinese exertion and not that of alien action, policy, or influence.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION AT WASHINGTON

Far outweighing at Washington in *popular* interest the problem of tariff autonomy and that of Manchuria was one of intrinsically less importance: the restoration of Shantung. Of this fact Tokyo's delegates were keenly aware and of it they made the best of use: relinquishing shadows, they retained substance. Less skillful as publicists than the Celestials, the Nipponese, in modern times, have often shown themselves more adroit in reaching their objectives. Not without reason have many of them been convinced that the sword is mightier than pen and parliament combined. In exchange for keeping their word—and something more—with respect to Shantung, they were left undisturbed in Manchuria. As earlier noted,

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 778–80, 197–99.

⁵⁴ 1. Franco-Japanese agreement (June 10, 1907)

2. Anglo-Japanese treaty (July 13, 1911)

3. Seven Russo-Japanese conventions, public and secret (two of July 30, 1907; two of July 4, 1910; one of July 8, 1912, and two of July 3, 1916)

4. Root-Takahira agreement (November 30, 1908)

5. Anglo-French agreement (January 15, 1896, Article IV)

6. Anglo-Russian agreement (April 28, 1899)

7. Anglo-German agreement (September 2, 1898)

8. Non-alienation agreements with reference to Hainan, the Yangtze Valley, Fukien, the Tonkin border, and the coast of China.

Peking had, since 1919, declined all invitations to negotiate with Tokyo for the restoration of that province; to have accepted would have been to admit, in accord with Nipponese policy, that the matters involved were of concern to the two governments only, and to have recognized the legality of the decisions thereto made at Paris. Despite the signing of agreements in September, 1918, relating to disposition of Japanese troops in Shantung; management of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway; construction of additional railways in Manchuria, Mongolia, Shantung, Chihli, and Kiangsu; and lending of additional sums to the Peking government by Japanese capitalists with the approval of Tokyo,⁵⁵ China continued to protest the validity of the agreements of 1915 and to hold that the declaration of war of August 12, 1917, had automatically canceled the German lease of Kiaochow.⁵⁶ The desire of the Chinese was to have the Shantung issues reviewed at Washington. Since, however, six of the nine powers there represented were bound by the Treaty of Versailles, this was impossible. Unless, however, a settlement should be reached, the conference would be generally considered, by the American public, to have failed in the main—and rightly so, inasmuch as the United States Senate would, almost undoubtedly, have prevented ratification of several of the treaties negotiated at Washington.

Finally, a compromise was found: Secretary Hughes and Mr. Balfour offered their "good offices" to bring about meetings of the Chinese and the Japanese delegates—at which these statesmen personally, or their respective representatives, should be present—and which should be held contemporaneously with, but outside, the sessions of the conference. Announcement of the solution was made by Baron Kato in the meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions on November 30. On this occasion Alfred Sze read a statement calling attention to the fact that he and his colleagues had "not solicited or asked for the meeting of the Chinese and Japanese delegations, as the Government and people of China [had] always hoped to be able to present this very important question to the consideration of the conference. . . ." Moreover, Sze reserved freedom for his government to "seek other methods of settlement in the unhappy event of inability to reach an agreement for a fair and just settlement."⁵⁷

The "conversations" were spun out over the next two months. Since Nippon had already promised to return the German leased territory of Kiaochow to China, no discussion of this matter was necessary. The

⁵⁵ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Nos. 1918/13, 1918/15, 1918/16, pp. 1445-46, 1448-52; also Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-66.

⁵⁶ *Conversations Between the Chinese and Japanese Representatives in Regard to the Shantung Question . . . Prepared by the Chinese Delegation* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), pp. 7-11. (Cited hereafter as *Conversations A.*)

⁵⁷ *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 526-27.

transfer, including all pertinent documents was to be made "as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than six months" after the coming into force of the treaty. Details of transfer relating to administration and public properties, and "other matters likewise requiring adjustment," were to be settled finally by a Joint Commission composed of three appointees, each, of the governments of China and Japan. The latter also renounced "all preferential rights with respect to foreign assistance in persons, capital and material stipulated in the Treaty of the 6th March, 1898, between China and Germany."⁵⁸

The topics most heatedly debated were those relating to public properties and the control of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railroad, connecting Tsingtao with the provincial capital in western Shantung.⁵⁹ On two occasions (December 20, and January 6), discussions became overheated, and so were suspended.⁶⁰ As a result of pressure, mainly American, exerted upon the delegations, a compromise was reached as the conference drew to a close. Japan agreed "to transfer to China the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, together with all other properties appurtenant thereto, including wharves, warehouses and other similar properties." China undertook to reimburse Japan to "the sum of 53,406,141 gold marks . . . or its equivalent, plus the amount which Japan . . . [had] actually expended for permanent improvements on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance for depreciation." For the appraisal and transfer of these properties a joint railway commission of three Chinese and three Japanese was to be appointed. Transfer was to take place "as soon as possible" and "not later than nine months from the date of the coming into force" of the treaty. Simultaneously with the transfer, China agreed to deliver "Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the railway."

Divers other matters connected with conflicting interests of the two nations in Shantung were settled with less difficulty. Japanese troops were to be removed from the railway as soon as Chinese forces should be ready to take over protection of the road, and the garrison was to be withdrawn from Tsingtao "not later than thirty days" from the date of transfer of the former German leased territory.⁶¹

With respect to the customs service, it was agreed that the "Custom-house of Tsingtao [should] be made an integral part of the Chinese Mari-

⁵⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1922, Vol. CXVI: Treaty Between China and Japan for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung—Signed at Washington, February 4, 1922, and Annex, pp. 676–83. Section I, p. 677, and Annex, Section I, p. 682. In addition to the authorities hereafter cited specifically the reader should consult, for details of points covered in the discussions of the Chinese and the Japanese delegates with respect to Shantung, reports of the "Conversations" cited in footnotes 56 and 64.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Treaty, Section II, p. 678, and Annex, Section II, p. 682.

⁶⁰ W. W. Willoughby, *China at the Conference*, *op. cit.*, pp. 309–26; Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 255–64; Ichihashi, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–88; Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 460–66.

⁶¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, Treaty, Section III, p. 678.

time Customs . . ." and that the "provisional Agreement of the 6th August, 1915 . . . relating to the re-opening of the office of the Chinese Maritime Customs at Tsingtao [should] cease to be effective upon the coming into force of the present Treaty."⁶² Following the British-Japanese capture of Tsingtao from the Germans in November, 1914, the port was closed to commerce until the following January 1, Nipponese steamers only being permitted entrance. Until August, 1915, the customs service was controlled by the Japanese garrison pending agreement by China to the application to Nippon of the principles enunciated in the Sino-German agreement of April 17, 1899.⁶³ Concession, on the part of the Japanese at Washington, to the abrogation of the agreement of August 6, above mentioned, followed agreement "that the Chinese delegation should recommend to its Government that Japanese traders should be permitted to communicate in the Japanese language with the customs administration at Tsingtao, and that the inspector general in the selection of a suitable staff at Tsingtao should give consideration, within the limits of its established service regulations, to the diverse needs of the trade at Tsingtao."⁶⁴ This promise was changed in the annex to the treaty, to a declaration that the Chinese government would "instruct" the inspector general to permit the use of the Japanese language and "to give consideration" to the other provision.⁶⁵

As regarded the form of government to be instituted in Tsingtao, China declined to be bound other than by an assurance given by its delegates, on December 9, that "in the management and maintenance of the public works in Tsingtao, such as roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, sanitary equipment, etc., handed over to the Chinese government by the Japanese government, the foreign community in Tsingtao shall have fair representation."⁶⁶ This promise was incorporated in the annex to the treaty. In the latter document the Japanese government promised not to "seek the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement, or of an international settlement, in . . . Kiaochow," while the government of China declared that that territory would "be opened to foreign trade, and that foreign nationals [would] be permitted freely to reside and to carry on commerce, industry and other lawful pursuits within such area"; furthermore, that "vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals . . . whether under the German régime or during the period of

⁶² *Ibid.*, Section IV, p. 679.

⁶³ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, No. 1899/2, pp. 189-91, and Vol. II, No. 1915/12, pp. 1246-47.

⁶⁴ *Conversations A*, p. 21, and *Conversations Between the Chinese and Japanese Representatives in Regard to the Shantung Question . . . Minutes Prepared by the Japanese Delegation* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 16-23 (cited hereafter as *Conversations B*); W. W. Willoughby, *China at the Conference*, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-03; W. L. Godshall, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-25.

⁶⁵ *Brit. and For. State Papers*, Annex, Section III, p. 683.

⁶⁶ *Conversations B*, p. 46; *Conversations A*, p. 25.

the Japanese administration [would] be respected," and that "All questions relating to the status or validity of such vested rights acquired by Japanese subjects or Japanese companies [should] be adjusted by the Joint Commission. . . ." ⁶⁷

The commission was likewise empowered to make arrangements with reference to mines, submarine cables, wireless stations, and the salt industry which Japanese subjects or companies had developed on the coast of Kiaochow Bay during the preceding seven years. The salt industry was to be purchased by China "for fair compensation," with the provision that "the exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt produced by such industry . . . is to be permitted on reasonable terms." ⁶⁸ The "mines of Tsechwan [coal], Fangtze [coal] and Chinlingchen [iron], for which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to Germany [were to] be handed over to a company . . . in which the amount of Japanese capital [should] not exceed that of Chinese capital." ⁶⁹ The "rights, title and privileges concerning the former German submarine cables between Tsingtao and Chefoo and between Tsingtao and Shanghai [were] vested in China, with the exception of those portions of the said two cables which [had] been utilized by the Government of Japan for the laying of a cable between Tsingtao and Sasebo. . . ." With respect to the "landing and operation at Tsingtao" of the last-mentioned cable, the commission was to adjust matters "subject to the terms of the existing contracts to which China is a party." ⁷⁰ Upon the removal of Japanese troops from Tsingtao and Tsinan, the Japanese wireless stations there maintained were to be surrendered to China "for fair compensation. . . ." ⁷¹

Concessions obtained by Japan, in September, 1918, for extending the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway line from Tsinan to Shunte, in Chihli, and from Kaomi to Hanchow, in Kiangsu, were surrendered "to the common activity of an international financial group," while the agreement made by China in the Shantung treaty of May 25, 1915, that "as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan," was supplanted by Japan's promise not to "claim that the option for financing the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway should be made open to the common activity of the International Financial Consortium, provided that the said railway is to be constructed with Chinese capital." ⁷²

⁶⁷ *Brit. and For. State Papers, op. cit., Treaty*, Section IV, p. 60.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Section IX, p. 681.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Section VII, p. 680.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Section X, p. 681.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Section XI, Article XXVII, pp. 681-82.

⁷² See footnote 56; also MacMurray, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, 1231, Note 1: Twenty-One Demands, Group I, Article iii, and Vol. II, No. 1915/8, Article ii, p. 1216; *Brit. and For. State Papers, op. cit.*, Annex, Section V, p. 683.

Settlement of the Shantung controversy was announced by Secretary Hughes at the fifth plenary session of the conference of February 1, 1922. Three days later the treaty and annex were signed.

Negotiations between the six commissioners appointed by the contracting parties were undertaken in Peking on June 26, 1922. During the next five months the commissioners and their aids carried their labors to completion. The Japanese civil administration of Kiaochow gave way on October 30 to Chinese control. On December 10 the port of Tsingtao was transferred. On the seventeenth the last Nipponese troops left Shantung—for a season.

The railway section of the commission formulated an agreement which, signed December 5, 1922, resulted in the transfer of the Kiaochow-Tsinan line to China on January 1, 1923. The valuation of this line with its appurtenances was fixed at 40,000,000 gold yen. Additional sums were agreed upon in payment by China for public properties including salt fields and mines; these were to be paid partly in cash and partly by the issue of treasury notes bearing six per cent interest and guaranteed by customs and salt revenues. Nippon was given the right to purchase from 100,000,000 to 350,000,000 catties (a catty is 1½ lbs. av.) of salt during a period of fifteen years—to 1937—after which a new agreement might be formed. The mines in the three districts previously mentioned were to be managed by a permanently exclusive Sino-Japanese company, the capitalization and additional investments of which were to be equally divided between the two groups of nationals concerned and which was to pay to Japan 5,000,000 gold yen, without interest, on the surrender by the latter to the company of the mines and appurtenant properties.

On the restoration by Nippon of the former German leased territory of Kiaochow that area was given the status of a voluntarily opened port under a Chinese governor. Inasmuch as foreign representation in the municipal council would almost certainly have resulted in the membership solely of Japanese, and the maintenance accordingly of a considerable degree of direct control by them, no provision was included for such representation—a condition which was eminently satisfactory to Western residents of Tsingtao and which did not unduly disturb the Japanese who still had open to them various channels through which their influence could be wielded.⁷³

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The Washington conference rested from its labors at 11:15 A.M. on February 6, 1922. Without attempting further to enumerate, or to enter

⁷³ Willoughby, *Foreign Rights*, *op. cit.*, I, chap. XI; Godshall, *op. cit.*, chaps. XI, XII and appendices xvii–xx; C. Chao, "The Shantung Negotiations" in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, VII, No. 1 (January, 1923), 80–100, and No. 2 (April, 1923), 48–54; *The China Year Book*, 1923, pp. 1156–95.

upon detailed analysis of, results attained by the conference, ponderable and imponderable, certain aspects may be summarized and evaluated. It is to be remembered that the objective of the diplomats at Washington was dual—that not only were they concerned with problems related specifically to the Pacific and the Far East but with the equally important question of armaments as well. With respect to the latter it may be remarked that the agreements emanating from Washington prevented an Anglo-American-Japanese naval race (with the saving in part of huge sums which would otherwise have been expended upon capital ships) and in the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Thereby were removed certain definite strains upon Anglo-American and Japanese-American friendship with consequent making infinitesimal, for several years, the likelihood of war between the three empires concerned. No longer was England to be, or to appear to be, the silent abettor to Nippon should the latter, contrary to its treaty obligations, continue a policy of aggression upon the Asiatic mainland. Unless development of aircraft should completely revolutionize warfare, Singapore remained for an undetermined period the only base from which an attack could be launched upon Japan and it was so distant from the latter as to be of defensive rather than offensive value. As long as the treaties should be observed, neither the United States nor Japan could successfully attack the other. Practically speaking, moral influence alone could be exerted by the Western powers in the western Pacific: Japan was left supreme. This meant that in so far as China was concerned its own efforts to develop self-defense and the honor and ultimate self-interests of its neighbor across the Eastern and Yellow seas, alone could protect it from maritime invasion. Approximately the same applied to Asiatic Russia.

The problems of the Far East studied at Washington centered around China and the rivalries and position of the great powers in its territory. The domestic situation of that country could scarcely have been worse than during the period in which the conference was held, nevertheless no new impositions were placed upon its government. A quarter of a century earlier the chancellories of most of the powers had acted confidently on the assumption that the "sick man of the Far East" could not survive—and he doubtless would not have survived if his self-appointed European heirs could but have agreed upon a division of his estate. They could not so agree and, perforce, had fallen back, after 1900, upon an uncertain degree of co-operation among themselves, and with the United States, to keep the invalid alive. Since the Western powers and Japan were in part—but in part only—responsible for Celestial weakness, and since it is pleasanter to blame another than oneself for one's mistakes and misfortunes, China, as on innumerable earlier occasions, continued to look abroad rather than homeward for aid in prevention of dissolution. Ten years of "republican"

misrule had rendered confusion worse confounded. During that period Europe in turn had done almost everything possible to ruin itself at home and overseas, while Japan had strengthened itself to supplant the West in the East and to adopt the role of heir to its ancient tutor. At the turn of the century China had had to be saved by the West—mainly in order that the West itself might be saved internecine struggle. Two decades later China had still to be saved, and Western interests therein to be maintained, lest the too rapid rise of a but recently contemptible Oriental state—which Europe had threatened to devour only half a century earlier—should upset the world balance of power and possibly threaten the *powerhood* of several of the Western nations. To lead in this work of combined altruism and selfishness, the United States, the least war-weakened of Western powers and the age-long protagonist of the Open Door, was best qualified inasmuch as an outstanding irony of Sino-American relations, during more than a century and a half, has been until recently the manner in which the American policy of enlightened self-interest, unlike the policies of Europe, has worked to the advantage of a China not sufficiently enlightened or powerful enough to pursue its own best interests. It was noticeable at Washington that, although the United States and Great Britain in particular rendered all the aid possible under the circumstances above described to protect China's integrity, and to encourage Japan to loosen its grip upon that unhappy country, the basic interests of both nations were safeguarded with the utmost care. The venerable policy of equality of economic opportunity was restated and—for the first time—legally defined, with, on the whole, the sincere, but assuredly not unselfish, good will of the Western powers, and with the official blessing of nonmilitarist Japan. China was offered one more opportunity to put its house in order, to save its own distracted inhabitants, and to play a part in world affairs as a modernized sovereign state. It remained to be seen how sincerely the Western powers and Japan would co-operate with each other, and with China, in the implementation of the new treaties; and how scrupulous, and competent, China on its part would be in carrying them into effect and in demonstrating its capacity for independence.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ For additional interpretations and evaluations of the Washington conference see "Report of the American Delegates Submitted to the President February 9, 1922" in *Conference, loc. cit.*, pp. 783–868; Buell, *op. cit.*, chaps. VIII–X; Ichihashi, *op. cit.*, chap. XXII; Willoughby, *China at the Conference, op. cit.*, chap. XXIV; Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–47; Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–32.

CHAPTER VI

A DECADE OF QUIET ACHIEVEMENT

SINO-RUSSIAN Rapprochement

The only power with important far eastern interests not represented at the Washington conference was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Because of the general distrust and suspicion felt toward the Moscow revolutionary regime, Russia was simply not invited to the Nine-Power conference. Indeed, even if the Soviet government had received an invitation, it is extremely unlikely that it would willingly have negotiated far eastern problems with three Western powers which had so recently sought to exterminate the Bolshevik regime, or with the Japanese who continued to maintain troops in eastern Siberia until the final months of 1923.

For China it was impossible to ignore the existence of the new regime in Russia. After 1917, the government at Peking was repeatedly put under pressure by the great powers to refrain from negotiating with the Bolsheviks.¹ Nevertheless, disappointment with the outcome of the peace conference, and particularly the decision of the Shantung question, tempted numerous Chinese political groups to break the international quarantine of the Bolshevik government. Geographical propinquity and points of contact and conflict, especially in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, finally forced China to realize that a new and dynamic movement had begun, and perhaps had to come to stay, in northern Eurasia.

Russia was also eager to have an ally—and perhaps a convert—in her struggle against the imperialist powers. Particularly antagonistic toward the foreign system of treaty ports and extraterritorial rights were the Kuomintang forces of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Having failed to receive either spiritual or material aid from the Western powers, the Cantonese leader sought the support of the Soviet Union in his expanding campaign against the other political hopefuls of China. Since China's part in the Siberian intervention had been relatively insignificant, the Moscow leaders could afford to gloss over Peking's original hostility in the hope of winning China's confidence, and perhaps eventually using China as the eastern base for the dissemination of Communist ideology.

While endeavoring to win China's co-operation, the Bolshevik government was simultaneously seeking to gain control over Outer Mongolia, an area over which China had long claimed suzerainty. Only the extreme

¹ See Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, 1930), II, 539.

confusion prevailing in China permitted Russia to carry out, with as great a degree of success as was attained, its mutually contradictory policy of courting China while it isolated Outer Mongolia from depending upon a Peking regime also trying desperately to restore Mongolia to its control.

As regarded Mongolia, the outbreak of revolution in Russia was as opportune for China as the Chinese Revolution of 1911 had been for Russia. The rulers in Peking were encouraged to formulate a threefold objective. They planned to prevent the entrance of Bolshevik doctrines into China through Mongolia. They desired to block Japan's extension of her power into Outer Mongolia. Finally, with their failure at Paris, they were increasingly anxious to show to an indignant country their ability to gain back territory which had apparently been lost permanently during the regime of the late president, Yüan.

Upon his appointment to the newly created post of defense commissioner, General Hsü Shu-tsêng in 1919 began the dispatch of troops to Outer Mongolia regardless of treaty stipulations. Within a few months the Chinese brigade at Urga numbered four thousand. Attempts of Cheng Yi, the Chinese resident at Urga, to persuade the Mongols to cancel their autonomy having failed, General Hsü proceeded thither in October to force the authorities to petition the Peking government for readmission of that territory to the sovereignty of China. On November 16, he received a petition from the Mongol ministers which he had himself dictated.² The petition was not signed by the Living Buddha, the Hutukhtu, nor was it approved by the semi-representative upper and lower houses. Six days later President Hsü Shih-ch'ang, in Peking, issued a mandate granting the petition which, he said, was "most sincerely expressed and displays the patriotism" of the Khan, the lamas, and princes. The system in force under the Manchus was declared to be restored, and an honorific title was bestowed upon the Hutukhtu. By a presidential mandate of December 1, the Chinese resident in Urga was supplanted by General Hsü as defense commissioner of the Northwestern Frontiers. This action was accompanied by the disbandment and disarmament of Mongol troops, and the opening of a branch at Urga of the Frontier Development Bank. Chinese economic influence, including currency, took the place of Russian, which had been paramount since 1915.³

Meanwhile, the weakening of Semenov's position by the withdrawal of the Japanese from the Transbaikalian Province was followed by the breaking away of Baron Ungern von Sternberg, one of his White generals, with a force of three thousand men. Ungern attacked the Far Eastern Republic, but was driven into Mongolia. In October, 1920, he and his augmented

² Text in *Millard's Review*, XI (December, 1919), 12.

³ For details see Ken Shen Weigh, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy* (Shanghai, 1928), pp. 190-93; also Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York, 1933), pp. 118-23.

bands of Russians, Buriats, Tartars, Tibetans, Mongols, Chinese, Japanese, and war prisoners of other nationalities, began a series of attacks upon Urga. The confusion prevailing in and around Urga gave a chance to General Hsü to let loose his troops upon the foreign residents of the city, including more than two thousand Russians, a great number of whom were treated with the utmost barbarity. The Chinese general next arrested and imprisoned several Mongol princes and even the Living Buddha. A shudder of horror passed through the Buddhist world at such impiety.⁴

During the first four days of February, 1921, Baron Ungern, with about two thousand men, made a second direct attack on Urga. The city fell, as did a majority of the Chinese garrison. The survivors fled to Kiakhta, where, in revenge, they slaughtered more than three hundred Russians. The capture of Urga was accompanied and followed by terrible scenes of massacre and pillage. Red Russians, Jews, and Chinese were put to death, and their property destroyed or confiscated. In May, the liberated Hutukhtu was again enthroned as sovereign of an independent Buddhist state. Ungern, whose authority had spread to the main centers of Outer Mongolia, became chief military adviser to the new sovereign.

At Kiakhta in Russian territory the Provisional Revolutionary Mongol People's Government had been proclaimed on March 13 by the Revolutionary Mongol People's Party which had been formed in Russia in 1918 as an arm of the Third, or Communist, International.⁵ Ungern attacked Kiakhta in June, to be defeated by an army composed of troops from Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic. Later in the summer, Ungern's troops revolted against him; he fled and was captured by a band of Mongols who bound him and left him on the steppe. He was found by Soviet soldiers who turned him over to their authorities. Ultimately, he was tried and executed at Novonikolaevsk.

Meanwhile, the Soviet troops pressed on to capture Urga in July. Many of those Russians in Mongolia who had survived the Chinese and White Russian regimes perished with the setting up of Red rule. Ceasing to be the head of an independent state, the Hutukhtu again contented himself with spiritual suzerainty, and, on July 6, the Revolutionary Mongol People's Government was set up.⁶ This government was in as close relationship with Moscow as was that of the Far Eastern Republic. A council of ministers ruled the country under the presidency of Comrade Bodo, sometime typist in the Russian consulate general at Urga.

⁴ For details about Baron Ungern see Fischer, *op. cit.*, II, 534-37; also Michel N. Pavlovsky, *Chinese-Russian Relations* (New York, 1949), pp. 76-89.

⁵ Purposes and activities outlined in "The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relations to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets," *International Conciliation*, No. 158 (January, 1921). Also consult Leon Trotsky, *The First Five Years of the Communist International* (New York, 1945).

⁶ Alfred L. P. Dennis, *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (New York, 1924), p. 322.

Soviet troops were maintained in Outer Mongolia until 1925. After this date Soviet instructors and specialists continued to find employment in the Mongol army. A treaty of peace and amity between the two countries, in which no reference was made to China, was signed at Moscow on November 5, 1921.⁷ Despite this treaty Moscow refused to loosen its grip upon the Urianhai territory in northern and western Mongolia. Instead it was organized as the Tannu-Tuva Republic which was brought into even closer relations with the Soviets—especially Siberia—than was the Mongolian Republic itself.

The Third Congress of the Mongol Peoples was held at Urga during the month of August, 1922. It was decided at this time that the policies of Outer Mongolia should be in keeping with those of the Russian Soviets. Chinese influence grew correspondingly weaker, and in the following December a number of Chinese were expelled from the country. In order to placate China proper and insure the policies of Moscow therein, the Soviet agreed in its treaty with China of May 31, 1924, that "Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China, and (Russia) respects China's sovereignty therein." To all intents and purposes, though not officially, Outer Mongolia became one of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics. In spite of numerous protests from China, and of equally numerous promises of unselfish policy and fair play on the part of Moscow, it was clear that another vast territory, for long a component part of the Chinese state system, had been united to a young and lusty socialist empire.

The conversion of Siberia and Outer Mongolia into satellites of Soviet Russia was but a primary move in a widely proclaimed Bolshevik scheme for a world revolution in which Asia was to be the "eastern front." From the end of 1917, when Chinese troops were sent to Harbin to protect the nationals and the interests of their country, the relations of Russia and China became of even more importance than they had been under the czars and the Manchus. Phases of the problem developed in Siberia, Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia, northern Manchuria, and China proper. Thousands of White Russians fled into Chinese territory and to Japan to escape the consequences of revolution. Japan and France were determined to block the Bolsheviks in the East and, for a time, were able to cause inconvenience to Soviet emissaries who came seeking recognition and the negotiation of new agreements.

As early as January, 1919, the Chinese Workingmen's Association in Moscow resolved that propagandists should be sent to China. In March an appeal was sent to Canton, and in July another was drafted for Peking. The latter appeal was not, however, relayed from Irkutsk until March, 1920. In the earlier appeal Dr. Sun Yat-sen was praised for his untiring

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

perseverance in marching "at the head of Chinese democracy against the northern Chinese and foreign imperialistic governments of oppression." The Northern government was described as "the puppet of foreign bankers," and the Chinese proletariat was invited to ally itself with the Russian.⁸ It was quickly realized by the Russian leaders that an appeal to the Chinese proletariat was not sufficient. Accordingly, other channels of approach were sought to supplement those used in the West. In July, 1919, after the humiliating decision at Paris in April, a manifesto from the Moscow government was addressed by Leo Karakhan, assistant commissar for foreign affairs in Soviet Russia, to "the ministers, civil governors, bureaus, and People of the Chinese Republic." The manifesto maintained that "all people, no matter whether their nations are great or small, no matter where they live, no matter at what time they may have lost their independence, should have their independence and self-government and not submit to being bound by other nations." Denouncing secret treaties, Moscow offered to negotiate with China on the following basis:

1. The territory seized by the former imperial Russian government to be returned to you.
2. The Russian government will restore to the sovereignty of China the Chinese Eastern Railway and the mines and forests appropriated by the former imperial Russian government, and it will not ask one cent therefor.⁹
3. This government will not accept the Boxer Indemnity payments.
4. The special privileges for Russian subjects established by the former imperial Russian government and China are null and void. All extraterritorial privileges are also canceled.
5. In addition to the matters noted above, all agreements made by the former Russian imperial government, acting independently or with Japan, or with the Entente powers, with the envoys of China, in which there are unfair points, will be null and void.¹⁰

For a time the Bolsheviks made slow progress in their appeal to a divided China, and it was not until after the fall of the Anfuites in the summer of 1920 that important developments took place.¹¹ In September, the Peking government ratified a commercial treaty negotiated by the representatives of the Tashkent Soviet and those appointed by the Chinese warlord of Sinkiang.¹² By this treaty Russia gained a new chan-

⁸ For details see *The 2nd Congress of the Communist International as Reported and Interpreted in the Official Newspapers of Soviet Russia* (Washington, 1920), *passim*.

⁹ It was this clause which caused difficulty in subsequent negotiations. It was included in the official Chinese but not in the official Russian text of the treaty. See Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 126, n. 44.

¹⁰ Translation of Chinese text in *China Year Book* (1924), pp. 860-61; translation of Russian text in *Problems of the Pacific* (1927), pp. 265-68.

¹¹ See *infra*, pp. 245-46.

¹² See Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

nel of intercourse with China proper through Turkestan. Commercial and diplomatic representatives were to be exchanged in Russian and Chinese Turkestan. The first step toward the abolition of extraterritoriality for Russians in China was taken by its relinquishment in Chinese Turkestan. Disregarding the St. Petersburg treaty of 1881 the Chinese had shortly before this begun the collection of customs duties on the Turkestan frontier.

With the recognition granted by Moscow in May, 1920, to the Far Eastern Republic, the latter also entered upon negotiations with Peking. Ignatius Yourin, a polished Russian connected with the old nobility, was placed at the head of a mission which reached Peking on August 21, less than a month after the overthrow of the Anfu group. This mission was received unofficially, despite the protests of the Japanese minister against intercourse between China and the Far Eastern Republic. A protest from the French minister had been withdrawn upon assurance being given that political affairs would not be discussed. Yourin entered at once upon the task of discrediting the czarist minister at Peking, Prince Koudachev, and his diplomatic and consular assistants, who were still recognized as the legitimate representatives of Russia. When the Allied ministers in Peking had agreed on November 30, 1917, that the payments of the Boxer Indemnity should be suspended for five years, it had also been agreed that there should be an exception in the case of Russia, only a small part of whose indemnity should be waived. The greater part was still to be paid and "kept in safe custody by the Russo-Asiatic Bank so as to be transferred to the future Russian Government formally recognized by China." Supported by these funds the czarist diplomatic and consular officials had maintained their position throughout the country. The first evidence of the weakening of their status was the suspension on August 1 of the indemnity payments, which left them without financial support. The success of the Yourin mission was demonstrated in part by the issue on September 23 of a presidential mandate suspending recognition of Prince Koudachev and the Russian consuls in China. The Russian consulates were, for the most part, taken over by the Chinese authorities. All Russian post offices were soon closed.¹³

Inasmuch as the treaties between Russia and China continued in force, the two to three hundred thousand Russian subjects in Chinese territory continued in theory to enjoy their extraterritorial status. In fact, this status was lost. Since the consular courts could no longer function, and the Russian concessions were taken over for administration by the Chinese authorities, the Russians were for all practical purposes placed in the position of nontreaty foreigners without extraterritorial rights of any kind. This resulted in the utmost confusion and the worst of abuses in Turkestan,

¹³ Consult Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-44.

Mongolia, northern Manchuria, and China proper. The Russian tribunal at Harbin was forcibly closed by the Chinese authorities, as were the offices of the Justices of the Peace and of Preliminary Investigation in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. The members of the Yourin mission felt occasional qualms when they contemplated the results of their new policy. In a note to the Peking government of February 2, 1921, reference was made to the terrible conditions prevailing in the Chinese courts of law in Harbin.¹⁴

Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Tashkent-Sinkiang agreement and the arrival of the Yourin mission in Peking in September, 1920, a Chinese mission under General Chang Si-ling reached Moscow. Its object was a survey of Russian conditions under the new regime. Lack of a stabilized government in Peking, the knowledge that Yourin aimed at spreading Bolshevik propaganda in China, and the absence of a satisfactory settlement in Outer Mongolia united to prevent Yourin from gaining recognition for the Far Eastern Republic. He retired to Chita in May, 1921, where he became minister of foreign affairs of the Republic.

Coincidentally with the secret signing of the Mongol-Russian treaty of November 5, 1921, Moscow sent another agent, Paikes, to represent its interest in northern China. Denying at first that a treaty had been negotiated between Russia and Outer Mongolia, he was shortly forced to admit it, and was visited with the wrath of Peking, which declared that "any treaty secretly concluded between the Soviet government and Mongolia will not be recognized by the Chinese government."¹⁵

Russia hereafter sent to the East Abram Adolf Joffe, a clever diplomat and a finished publicity agent. He reached Peking in August, 1922, shortly after a war between General Wu P'ei-fu and Marshal Chang Tso-lin. This conflict had resulted in the expulsion of Marshal Chang from China proper, the resignation of President Hsü, and the recall to the Presidency of Li Yüan-hung. Joffe's arrival also followed closely upon the rebuffs to Soviet Russia administered by the conferences of Genoa and the Hague. Having appealed in vain to Europe and America, the Soviets were ready to carry on with renewed vigor in Asia their war upon capitalism and imperialism. The old saying "scratch a Russian and find a Tatar" was personified in Joffe and his followers. Claiming that the Russians in reality are Asiatics, and should return to the Asiatic policy of their ancestors after having too long followed the Western road mistakenly laid out by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century, Joffe opened a journalistic and oratorical campaign in Peking which made a deep impression upon the university students and many of their instructors.

¹⁴ Text in *The China Year Book* (1921-22), pp. 638-44.

¹⁵ Text in Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-24.

However successful as a propagandist among the intelligentsia, Joffe was unable to carry out his plans as concerned the Peking government. In mid-January, 1923, he slipped away from Peking to Shanghai. Here Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been refugeeing in the French concession since his overturn in Canton during the preceding summer. Joffe now called on Dr. Sun, and, in the course of several interviews, went far toward bringing him into the Bolshevik camp. A joint statement, issued on January 26, showed that "the most cordial and friendly" relations existed between the two men. From this time Dr. Sun and one group of his followers swung more and more to the Left, but Sun exacted from Joffe the admission that Communism could not be introduced into China "because the conditions do not exist here. . . ." ¹⁶ The government of Hongkong having intimated to Joffe its inability to permit him to convalesce on that island, the Soviet envoy decided to accept the invitation of Viscount Goto Shimpei, the mayor of Tokyo, to try to recover his health in Japan. The Japanese statesman was a frank advocate of a policy of rapprochement between his country and Russia; with him, Joffe entered, early in May, into unofficial negotiations. Negotiations in Tokyo, however, were no more successful than those in Peking and Changchun, and Joffe shortly retired from the far eastern diplomatic scene.

All other envoys at Peking were ministers. For the post of Soviet ambassador was chosen Leo Karakhan who, as active commissar for foreign affairs, had drafted the seductive promises of 1919 and 1920. Karakhan reached Peking on September 2. To negotiate with him, C. T. Wang, former vice-speaker of the senate, and participant in the Paris conference, had been called from Shantung where he had been engaged in receiving from Japan the former German holdings. The Russian ambassador continued the campaign of disparagement of America and the European powers begun by Joffe. In Manchuria, he said: "If once again foreign hands will interfere in our mutual affairs, we must mercilessly cut off those hands." ¹⁷

Karakhan announced that, before formal negotiations could be undertaken, it would be necessary for China to accord recognition to the new government of Russia. This Peking was not ready to grant. Hereupon there began a new series of wrangling notes not unlike those which had preceded the departure of Joffe from Peking in the preceding January. Exactly what the Soviet had promised in 1919 and 1920 was again disputed. China still demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, while Russia continued to complain of White activities in Manchuria. The position of the Soviet envoy was strengthened by the recognition of Russia by Great Britain and Italy. China became less hesitant, and

¹⁶ Text in *China Year Book* (1924), p. 863.

¹⁷ Quoted by, and from, Fischer, *op. cit.*, II, 542.

finally, on March 14, 1924, a preliminary agreement was reached by Karakhan and Wang. Foreign Minister Koo disavowed the agreement on the ground that Wang had exceeded his authority in signing an agreement when he had been commissioned merely to negotiate. Karakhan in turn issued an ultimatum giving China three days in which to reconsider and approve the agreement. Minister Koo coldly refused to "recognize that the Soviet envoy had any right to impose a time limit upon the Chinese government."¹⁸

Instead of three days, two and a half months passed before the dispute was settled. Finally, on May 31 an agreement was signed.¹⁹ By it Russia relinquished extraterritoriality for her nationals and gave up her concessions at Hankow and Tientsin. The legation and the consulates throughout the country were restored, and all property of the Russian Orthodox Church was turned over to the Russian government to be held "in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property holding in the inland." Russia renounced her remaining share of the Boxer Indemnity which was to be administered "for the promotion of education among the Chinese people" by a commission of three, two to be appointed by China and one by Russia. The two governments jointly agreed not to "recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, etc., concluded between Russia since the czarist regime and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China." China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was specifically recognized and evacuation of Russian troops therefrom was to be arranged by a commission.

On one point only the Russians would not give way, even apparently, despite their offers of 1919 and 1920. From its inception in 1896 to the present, the Chinese Eastern Railway has constituted a bone of contention between the powers.²⁰ From mid-February, 1919, to the end of October, 1922, the railway had been under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Technical Board with headquarters at Harbin. One of the objects in creating this board was to prevent the Japanese from assuming the Russian, or perhaps both the Chinese and Russian, interests in the railway. Meanwhile, on October 2, 1920, the Chinese government had signed an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic Bank, a White Russian organization which claimed to be the only shareholder of the Chinese Eastern Railway. By the agreement of October 2, the Chinese government assumed trusteeship of the railway. A new board of ten directors, five White Russians and five Chinese, was established with a Chinese president and a Russian vice-president. The Technical Board continued to function. The situ-

¹⁸ *The China Year Book* (1924), pp. 864 ff.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 887-88.

²⁰ For the complete history of the railway see C. Walter Young, *International Relations of Manchuria* (Chicago, 1929), *passim*.

ation at the time of the Washington conference prevented any settlement, and the representatives of the powers contented themselves with passing two resolutions in keeping with the theory of trusteeship for Russian interests outlined by Secretary Hughes. The first stated that "the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest requires that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use." The second insisted upon the "responsibility of China for performance or non-performance of the obligations towards the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway."²¹

With the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Siberia in the autumn of 1922, the Technical Board at Harbin ceased its labors. During the spring months of 1924, as it became evident that China and Soviet Russia were on the point of reaching an agreement, France and the United States entered into correspondence with Peking in reference to the railway. France made clear to Peking the changed position of the Russo-Asiatic Bank—which change China refused to recognize. The United States appears only to have warned China against making any agreement concerning the railway which would be prejudicial to foreign interests.

Such was the situation when the Karakhan-Koo Agreement on General Principles, and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway were signed on May 31, 1924.²² Article ix of the former stated first that the railway is a "purely commercial enterprise"; China's "right of sovereignty" was recognized, as well as her right to redeem the railroad "with Chinese capital," which would preclude the possibility of purchase by foreign loans. Of significance, as events five years later were to demonstrate, were the provisions that the future of the railway was to be determined by the two governments "to the exclusion of any third party or parties," and the recognition and operation of the railway. The Agreement for the Provisional Management provided for a board of five Chinese and five Russian directors and a board of three Russian and two Chinese auditors.

While the political supremacy of China over the Chinese Eastern Railway had been recognized by Karakhan, the economic grip of Russia on that railway had been materially strengthened by the provision for a Russian manager. There remained only one obstacle as regarded the railway: Chang Tso-lin, the independent ruler of Manchuria and a staunch opponent of the Soviets, refused to recognize the agreements, and it was through his territories that the railway passed.

²¹ Cf. discussion in *ibid.*, pp. 216–19.

²² Translation of text in *American Journal of International Law, Supplement*, XIX (1925), pp. 55–63.

However, the Chihli-Fengtien struggle of 1924 strengthened the position of Ambassador Karakhan in arranging with Marshal Chang a *modus operandi* for the Chinese Eastern Railway. Assuming the role of protector of China as soon as the struggle began, Russia announced to the powers a "Hands off China!" policy, at the same time beginning quietly to mass her troops on the northern borders of Manchuria at Marshal Chang's rear. Chang agreed to negotiate the desired agreement, and the document was signed at Mukden on September 20.²³

In general the new agreement was similar to that signed in Peking the preceding May. There were, however, a few important differences. The period of eighty years specified in the agreement of 1896, after which the railway was to pass to the Chinese government free of charge, was now reduced to sixty years. The Peking agreement did not specifically provide for a revision of the 1896 agreement, but that of Mukden provided for such a provision within four months of the signing of the new agreement. The time within which a revision of the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway company should take place was now reduced by two months. No change was made in the management of the railway. By the Mukden agreement, another step had been taken by Russia in detaching Chinese dependencies in her southward push. It thus became clear that the China policy of the Union of Soviets, while broadened to include the use of China as a base for world revolution, was in other respects similar to that of czarist Russia, and that the price of friendship had not been lowered with the passing of years and the czarist regime.

Article ii of the Sino-Russian agreement of May 31, 1924, provided for the convening, within one month of signing the agreement, of a conference for the conclusion and carrying out of detailed arrangements regarding outstanding problems between the two nations. Ambassador Karakhan deferred the opening of this conference until the evening of August 26, 1925, and as he was leaving for Moscow on the following day, the ceremony was purely formal. The conference did not begin to function until December, 1925.

In the meantime notable events had taken place in northern Manchuria in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway as differences of opinion between the Chinese and the Russians became more marked. In May, 1925, Ivanov, the director-general of the railway, dismissed a large number of White Russian employees contrary to the wishes of Marshal Chang, and the Chinese president of the board of directors. Moreover, tension also developed in 1925 over Marshal Chang's demand that his troops who acted as railway guards should either be given free passage on the railway or should be carried on the credit of the Peking government. Ivanov, however ruled against the request and in January, 1926, disturbances broke

²³ *Ibid.*, Appendix G.

out over this issue in Harbin. In the confusion that followed Ivanov was arrested by Marshal Chang's military authorities. In Peking Karakhan quickly responded by protesting and issuing what amounted to an ultimatum. Ivanov was shortly released, but was removed from his position by the Chinese who appointed another Russian national in his place. The handling of the situation by the Russian ambassador convinced many Chinese once again of the similarities between the policies of Czarist and Soviet Russia.

Having succeeded so well in his continental diplomacy, it remained for Karakhan to try his skill upon the rulers of Japan. In that empire there was a desire for a settlement of the disputes with Russia which might open the way for economic penetration of northeastern Asia, where military and political exploitation had failed. Without this penetration Japanese industrialization could not go on. The success of the Russians in dealing with Peking, and especially with Mukden, rendered it desirable that Japan should not be disregarded. Marshal Chang Tso-lin must not be allowed to entangle himself with the Russians to Japan's loss. There were, moreover, two other factors connected with the *rapprochement* between Russia and Japan.²⁴ These were the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Washington conference, and the insensate method adopted by the American Congress in settling the vexed problem of Japanese immigration into the United States.

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1924

Unfortunately the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-1908 with respect to immigration did not remove all causes of friction connected with that issue between Japan and the United States. Along the Pacific coast of the latter country anti-Japanese feeling persisted. Several bills directed against Japanese were introduced into the California legislature. Despite warnings from the federal government, an Alien Land Act was passed in 1913; henceforth aliens ineligible to citizenship might no longer own land in California or lease it for longer than three years.²⁵ In December, 1920, the privileges of Japanese to lease lands, to act as guardians for their American-born children who might own lands, and to own shares in American-controlled land-owning companies were taken away.²⁶ In November, 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *Ozawa vs. the U. S.*,²⁷ decided that Japanese are ineligible to citizenship. During the

²⁴ For details of the treaty see *infra*, p. 228.

²⁵ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1913, pp. 625-53; also consult T. A. Bailey, "California, Japan, and the Alien Land Legislation of 1913," *Pacific Historical Review*, I (1932), 36-59.

²⁶ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1920, III, pp. 1-21; see, also, P. J. Treat, *The Far East* (New York and London, 1928), pp. 513-18; A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), especially chap. IX.

²⁷ 260 U. S. 178.

next two years the same court upheld the constitutionality of several laws passed by the legislatures of California and Washington which circumscribed the position of Orientals.

In 1923, sympathetic Americans sent to Japanese earthquake sufferers millions of dollars in funds and supplies; less than eight months later Congress pushed through the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, which annulled the Gentlemen's Agreement and, with the exception of certain privileged classes, denied the right of entry into the United States of persons not eligible for citizenship.²⁸ The placing of Japanese on the same footing as Koreans, Chinese, and other Asiatics, considered by certain sections of the American populace as "undesirable aliens," was a serious affront to a nation which had for a generation been striving for a special position in, and with reference to the rest of, Asia. It was not, however, a unique decision for the United States to take. Barriers against the Oriental immigrant existed in the countries of Latin America, and discrimination was not unknown in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

While the first draft of an immigration bill proposing exclusion was under consideration in the House of Representatives, both Secretary of State Hughes and Ambassador Hanihara argued against the abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The secretary addressed a letter (February 8, 1924) to the Chairman of the House Immigration Committee in which he stated that "to single out Japanese immigrants for exclusion" would "largely undo the work of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, which so greatly improved our relations with Japan"; he recommended placing the nationals of that country on the quota basis which would permit the entrance into the United States of less than 250 Nipponese per annum.²⁹

When it had become clear that the House favored exclusion of his country's nationals, instead of regulation by quota, Ambassador Hanihara wrote to Secretary Hughes, on April 10: "I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure containing that particular provision [abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement] would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between the two countries."³⁰ Hoping to persuade the Senate to block the proposal of the House with respect to exclusion legislation, the secretary forwarded a copy of the ambassador's note to that body. Irritation was immediately manifested therein at what one of its members termed the "veiled threat" of the Japanese ambassador. The

²⁸ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, XLIII, Part I, chap. 190, pp. 153-69. For a systematic, but colored presentation of the issues see Rodman W. Paul, *The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936).

²⁹ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 151.

³⁰ R. McElroy, "New Immigration Law over Japan's Protest," *Current History*, XX (July, 1924), 648-52; also, pp. 521-22, 703, 876-77, 881-82.

feeling was stimulated that the right of the government to deal with immigration as an exclusively domestic issue, without pressure from abroad, must be demonstrated—even if, in the words of one senator, it meant “a waste of twenty years of excellent diplomacy . . . a waste of the fortunate and happy results that followed the ratification of the Four-Power Treaty . . . and . . . throwing away the good relations, or a large part of them, that followed the prompt and friendly action of America after the Japanese earthquake last year.”³¹

It is noteworthy that no Japanese official in either his homeland or the United States questioned the right of the American government to handle the immigration problem as it saw fit: what was criticized at that time and later on both sides of the Pacific by Japanese and many Americans was the method by which a generally desirable objective was attained.

Fortiter in re Congress undoubtedly was; *suaviter in modo* it unquestionably was not. President Coolidge, on signing the bill, wrote: “If the Japanese exclusion provision stood alone I should disapprove it without hesitation. . . . But the bill is a comprehensive measure dealing with the whole subject of immigration and setting up the necessary administrative machinery. . . . I must therefore consider the bill as a whole. For this reason the bill is approved.” A Korean revolutionary leader, Dr. Syngman Rhee, however, exultingly declared: “The Japanese exclusion law seems . . . the inevitable result of the domineering and overbearing attitude of the Japanese toward all peoples. . . . We welcome the exclusion act, carrying with it the annulment of the gentlemen’s agreement. We are at last placed on a basis of equality with the Japanese.”³² In the following year Japan entered into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.

CHINA’S NEW NATIONALISM AND THE POWERS

While Russia and Japan were jockeying for position in eastern Asia and the Pacific, China was seeking once again to rehabilitate her faltering economy. As Wellington Koo had reminded the powers at Washington, the establishment of an “effective and stable government” in China was dependent to an important degree upon the Republic’s ability to meet its financial obligations by drawing whenever possible upon domestic, rather than foreign, sources of income. One of the first efforts designed to rehabilitate China’s financial position was the five-year suspension of payments on the Boxer indemnities which was granted by the powers from December 1, 1917.

In June, 1921, the *Banque Industrielle de Chine* had failed, weakening thereby more than the financial position of France in the East. In an

³¹ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1924, p. 153.

³² McElroy, *op. cit.*, pp. 648, 651.

attempt at rehabilitation, the French agreed in principle to the reconstruction of the bank by the diversion of Boxer funds for that purpose upon the resumption of indemnity payments in December, 1922. Subsequently arose a divergence of opinion between Paris and Peking known as the Gold-Franc Controversy.³³ This had to do with the desire of China to pay in francs, as she had done since 1905, in accordance with an agreement by which indemnity payments were to be paid in the currencies of the creditor nations—thereby guaranteeing the creditors against loss in exchange. In the years following the Great War the franc depreciated, to the advantage of China and other nations indebted to France. To avoid loss, the French government demanded an interpretation of the term “gold-franc” which, instead of merely distinguishing between the silver currency of China and the gold currency of France as formerly, should force China to pay in “gold” francs upon a prewar rate of exchange. Encouraged by Italy and Belgium, France insisted upon a favorable settlement with China as a condition of her ratification of the Nine-Power Washington treaties. The governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, for the sake of co-operation and to insure the coming into effect of the treaties, finally sided with France, but without enthusiasm. Public opinion in China strengthened the Peking foreign office so that it held out until April, 1925, when a compromise was reached. China met the demand of France as regarded gold payments, which were made, however, in gold dollars instead of francs. But payment of the indemnity started from December 1, 1924, instead of 1922. The *Banque Industrielle* was to be rehabilitated with the indemnity funds, any sums left over being used for cultural purposes.

In 1908 the American government, following a precedent established by itself in 1885, had authorized the remission to China of that part of the Boxer Indemnity due it in excess of claims for actual losses. This meant the return to China, upon China's payments to the government, of \$11,-961,121.76 gold. On May 21, 1924, Congress, by a joint resolution, authorized the remission to China of the balance of the indemnity due—\$6,127,552.90 gold—“in order further to develop the educational and other cultural activities of China.” The other powers who had received Boxer funds were also in process of providing means of restitution through the establishment of educational and philanthropic grants.

Despite such manifestations of “benevolence,” hostility toward the foreigner had been mounting in China since the Versailles conference. The anti-foreign movement got well underway by May 30, 1925 when labor difficulties in Shanghai were accompanied by violence. Led by the students and workers the Chinese rioters were vehement in their demands for abolition of the imperialistic exactions. From Shanghai the rioting spread to numerous of the seaport cities, but especially to Canton, the

³³ *The China Year Book* (1924), appendix; also Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-62.

home of the Kuomintang coalition. Accompanying the parades and demonstrations was the organization of an economic boycott directed mainly against the interests of the British and the Japanese. Merchants, students, and laborers joined their efforts to produce an organization of efficiency and driving power that was aided, especially in Canton, by the Kuomintang. On June 23, 1925, street fighting broke out at Shameen between Chinese demonstrators and the troops of Britain and France. Mutual recriminations followed and the Chinese undertook as a retaliatory gesture the economic blockade of Hongkong. For effectiveness the Hongkong boycott was unrivaled to that time.³⁴ Moreover, it remained in force for well over a year, until October, 1926.

In the midst of this turmoil, the Nine-Power treaties came into effect on August 5, 1925. Thirteen days later China issued invitations to the eight powers for the Special Customs Conference which had been provided for in Articles ii and iii of the tariff treaty of February, 1922. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Spain, having signified their adherence to the Nine-Power Customs treaty, were later invited to participate as adherent powers in the conference. In the meantime, a tariff revision commission had met in Shanghai in 1922 to revise the schedule of duties which had been fixed in 1918 by a similar commission. The object of the 1922 revision was to obtain an effective five per cent tariff. Pursuant to the announcement made at Washington by the Chinese delegates of their intention to bring up the matter of tariff autonomy on all appropriate future occasions, the invitations issued by China announced the inclusion of this subject for consideration at the conference.

The first and only plenary session of the conference opened in Peking on October 26, 1925, under the presidency of Foreign Minister Shen Jui-lin.³⁵ Much was hoped by the Chinese people from the holding of this conference. The government, on June 24, had forwarded notes to the powers requesting the revision of existing treaties.³⁶ In his speech welcoming the delegates to the conference, C. T. Wang demanded the removal of all tariff restrictions by January 1, 1929, and promised that China in its turn would abolish likin not later than the same date.

The powers reached a compromise with China by which, on November 14, it was agreed that the rates agreed upon at the Washington conference should be put into effect at once. Having early in the conference agreed "in principle" to grant tariff autonomy to China on January 1, 1929, the powers accepted it as a fact on November 19. Whether autonomy was to be contingent upon the abolition of likin by the same date was not made

³⁴ Cf. C. F. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 95-102.

³⁵ Details in Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-81. Also consult Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1947), chap. VI; and Stanley F. Wright, *China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy* (Shanghai, 1938), chap. VI.

³⁶ See *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1925, pp. 761-63.

clear. The claim of the Chinese was that the two agreements were not contingent the one upon the other, and this ultimately prevailed. Following the plenary session, the conference did its work through subcommittees. The disintegration of the government in April, 1926, and the withdrawal from Peking of all but two of China's representatives, precluded a second plenary session, which might have officially confirmed the actions taken by the subcommittees. The result was that the representatives of the powers were forced, through no fault of their own, to withdraw without completing their work. The conference adjourned *sine die* on July 3, 1926.

While the Special Tariff Conference was still in session, the Commission on Extraterritoriality provided for by the Washington treaties convened in January, 1926, at Peking. The representatives of twelve treaty powers met with the representatives of the northern Chinese government to examine, as they were delegated so to do by the Washington conference, the structure and operation of justice in China and to formulate recommendations for its reform. Such was believed to be a necessary step in the preparation of China for the kind of justice that the treaty powers were willing to accept as a prerequisite to the abolition of extraterritoriality. Because of its determination not to accept meekly the decisions of the foreign "imperialists," the Kuomintang government at Canton refused to co-operate with the Commission or to abide by its decisions or recommendations. Nevertheless, after numerous secret sessions and several tours of investigation into courts and prisons in the northern provinces (the Kuomintang not permitting such investigations in the areas under its control), the Commission formulated a detailed report which was published at the beginning of 1927.

The Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China included a comprehensive survey of the practice of extraterritoriality, a discussion of the laws and the judicial system of China, and an evaluation of the administration of justice in China. In addition, the final section of the *Report* outlined a series of "Recommendations" which "when reasonably complied with the several Powers would be warranted in relinquishing their respective rights of extraterritoriality." Although straightforward and sympathetic in its diagnosis of China's ailments, the *Report* proposed a program of legal and judicial reform so comprehensive as to be almost impossible of achievement within a reasonably short time. Moreover, the *Report* emphasized the chaotic character of Chinese politics and the instability of the Peking regime as factors especially deterring the achievement of full sovereignty. Looking upon the Chinese scene as mainly a struggle for political control by a series of irresponsible and fractious warlords, the commissioners, perhaps understandably, failed to perceive the fundamental economic and social revolution that was taking place in

China. Because of this blindspot in their thought, neither the commissioners nor their governments were able at this time to appraise fully the problems of China or to aid materially in the re-establishment of political stability.

NANKING AND "RIGHTS RECOVERY"

. Beginning in 1927, it was the studied determination of Chiang Kai-shek and the new Kuomintang governments, if at all possible, to rid China of the "unequal treaties." Internal strife, however, temporarily retarded the struggle to raise China to the position of a fully sovereign state, as the powers contemplated military intervention. Shortly before the Nationalist campaign of 1928 against Peking, negotiations were inaugurated by Nanking with Great Britain and the United States for the settlement of the "Nanking incident" of 1927. This was the occasion when the Nationalists entered the capital on the Yangtze and carried out a premeditated, organized, and controlled attack upon foreigners in the city. The first settlement to be reached was that with the American government, which had consistently displayed a more lenient attitude toward the Nationalists than the other interested powers in China. It was concluded by an official exchange of notes on March 30, 1928.³⁷ While declaring that the events under discussion had been brought about by Communists prior to the establishment of the Nanking government, the Chinese minister accepted full responsibility and expressed profound regret, stating that the troops involved had been disbanded and that the individual participants would be punished. For the personal injuries and the property damage sustained by Americans, official and nonofficial, Nanking promised compensation in full and proposed the appointment of a joint commission to verify damages and assess compensation. Similar settlements were reached with the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain (August 9), France (October 16), Italy (October 18), and Japan (May 2, 1929).

Contemporaneously with the working-out of this settlement, the Nanking government was attacking the major problem of "rights recovery" which was bound up with the treaties and engagements entered into by China between 1842 and 1918. Stated specifically, Nationalist China's object was to rid herself of tariff control, extraterritoriality, inland and coastal navigation by foreign ships, foreign settlements, concessions and leased territories, and the stationing of foreign troops on her soil. In essence there was nothing new in this policy. The desire of China to rid herself of the obnoxious treaty provisions had been recognized in the British and the American treaties of 1902 and 1903, respectively. The pleas of Peking made at Paris in 1919 and at Washington in 1921-22 were

³⁷ Text of notes in *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1928, II, 331-33.

mainly reiterations of earlier ones. What was new was the determination to push the issue to a speedy conclusion by propaganda, diplomacy, and force.

The stimulus to speed and violence was mainly Russian, although the war of 1914–1918 and postwar conditions contributed no little to the program. The Sino-German agreement of May 20, 1921, was the first to be negotiated by China in recent times on a basis of approximate equality. This was followed by the preliminary agreement with Russia of May 31, 1924, and the treaty of commerce with Austria of October 19, 1925. These treaties and agreements were, of course, negotiated by the Peking government, which also undertook to revise or abrogate existing treaties with Spain, Belgium, Japan, Portugal, and France. During the last weeks of its existence it succeeded in signing treaties on an equalitarian basis with Poland (May 19, 1928) and Greece (May 26, 1928). With the fall of Peking, the Nationalist government continued the work begun by the Northern government.

During the latter half of the year 1928, twelve treaties³⁸ were signed between representatives of China and those of twelve other states, including those states that possessed major far eastern interests. The signing by the American minister of the first treaty (July 25) was construed by his government as constituting *de jure* recognition of the new government of China. On the day that the British treaty was signed (December 20), the British minister, Sir Miles Lampson, presented his credentials to General Chiang Kai-shek as President of the National Government of China, thus according British recognition.

These treaties deal in the main with the question of China's tariff autonomy, which was now recognized by all the powers save Japan. All contained guarantees of mutual nondiscriminatory tariff treatment and the most-favored-nation clause with respect to the nationals of the contracting parties. Five of them—the Portuguese, Dutch, British, Swedish, and French—construed the clause to apply to goods as well as to persons. In the British and French treaties, China promised to abolish *likin* and other inland taxes "as soon as possible." Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain agreed that their nationals should pay taxes to China as soon as other treaty nationals paid the same. By article ii of the treaties with these five powers it was agreed that their respective nationals should be subject to the "laws and jurisdiction of the law courts" in the territory of the other. By Annex I to the last four of the five treaties, it was stipulated that the article should become operative on January 1, 1930; before this date detailed arrangements were to be made by the Chinese government with the other governments for assuming jurisdiction


³⁸ Text of all twelve treaties in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *op. cit.*, *passim*. For details of the American negotiations see Borg, *op. cit.*, chap. XVIII.

over foreign nationals. Failing such arrangement by that date, the assumption of jurisdiction by China was to be postponed to a date to be fixed by China after the latter had "come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such a date shall be applicable to all such Powers." The Belgian treaty included an exchange of notes by which a similar understanding was reached, except that it allowed China to assume jurisdiction over Belgian subjects "as soon as the majority of the Powers now possessing extraterritorial privileges in China shall have agreed to relinquish them."

In exchange for the provisional concessions contained in the annexes to the five treaties, China promised that, in addition to her modern codes already in force, by January 1, 1930, her civil and commercial codes should have been promulgated, and that foreign nationals not enjoying extraterritoriality and other special privileges should have the right to reside, trade, and own property in the interior subject to China's legal limitations and regulations. The agreement with respect to property-owning by aliens in the interior was immediately subjected to bitter criticism by many Chinese.

With respect to the tariff, although China put into effect a new schedule of duties on February 1, 1929, ranging from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to $27\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, she was not fully autonomous, since Japan had not signed a treaty. The negotiations of China with Japan were more intricate and prolonged than those with any other power owing mainly to the following factors: Japan's geographical proximity to China, her industrialization during the last half-century with consequent dependence to a considerable degree upon China for raw materials and markets for her finished products, her strategic position in Manchuria, and the disagreements with respect to a China policy among her political leaders. From June, 1924, to April, 1927, Baron Shidehara was foreign minister in the Kato and Wakatsuki cabinets; his policy toward China was friendly. From the latter date to July 2, 1929, Baron Tanaka was concurrently premier and foreign minister; his policy was a "positive" one considerably less sympathetic than that of Baron Shidehara. With the fall of the Tanaka government, Baron Shidehara returned to the foreign office to continue his earlier policy.

On October 20, 1926, Peking notified Japan of its desire for a fundamental revision of the treaties of 1896 and 1903 and the Protocol of 1896. While taking exception to the proposal for a fundamental revision, Tokyo agreed to negotiate. This the two governments began in January, 1927, and continued until Peking fell to the Nationalists in 1928. On July 19 of the latter year, Nanking notified Japan of the expiration of the treaty of 1896, and announced that Japanese subjects would be dealt with under *ad interim* regulations promulgated eleven days earlier for the governance of nationals of countries whose treaties with China had expired prior to



Railroad Map of Northeastern Asia, 1929

the negotiation of new ones. These regulations provided *inter alia* for the bringing of such nations under Chinese jurisdiction and the payment by them of Chinese taxes and customs duties. Japan denied that the treaty had expired, declared China's attempt to control her subjects an "outrageous act," and threatened to take suitable action if an attempt to enforce the regulations should be made. Nanking did not change its official attitude, but did not attempt to act upon it. Negotiations between the two countries were delayed by the anti-foreign incidents of 1927-28, as well as by Japan's desire to avoid having her trade with China injured by high tariff rates.

The signing on July 25, 1928, of the Sino-American tariff treaty, at a time when China and Japan had reached an impasse, strengthened China's position. Europe followed the lead of the United States, and the Japanese were angered. Not until January 30, 1929—two days before the proposed putting into effect of the new tariff—did Japan notify China of her decision to recognize the tariff. On the following July 2, with the fall of the Tanaka ministry and the formation of the Hamaguchi cabinet, Baron Shidehara renewed negotiations with China.

Finally, on March 12, 1930, C. T. Wang and A. Shigemitsu, Japanese *chargé d'affaires*, concluded a tariff agreement which was signed at Nanking on May 6 and went into effect ten days later.³⁰ By this agreement and its four accompanying annexes, Japan granted full recognition of China's tariff autonomy, but safeguarded for a period of three years her trade with China by a provision for reciprocal conventional duties covering her principal exports. Reduced rates for imports over the land frontiers of the two countries were to be abolished at the end of four months, after which the regular customs tariff of China was to go into effect. China agreed to abolish "as soon and as far as possible" all such taxes and charges as "*likin*, native customs duties, coast-trade duty and transit dues and other like charges," and stated that a mandate had been issued "ordering the abolition of *likin* as from the 10th of October, 1930"; this date was later changed to January 1, 1931. With reference to the "large number and amount of the unsecured and inadequately secured obligations of China due to Japanese creditors," China informed Japan that the government had "already commenced to set aside annually the sum of \$5,000,000 (silver) from the customs revenues for the purpose of consolidating the domestic and foreign obligations of China and that it intends to call a conference of the representatives of creditors on or before October 1 of this year, at which an adequate plan for consolidation will be presented and discussed with a view to devising means (including an increase of the sum above-mentioned) for effectuating the consolidation in question."

³⁰ Text in *The China Year Book* (1931), p. 471; details in Wright, *op. cit.*, chap. VII.

This made it clear that despite objections of the Kuomintang to the vast sums lent to the Northern militarists in earlier years, the Nationalist government had been forced to meet Japan's demands and take measures for repayment. The contracting parties to the agreement declared that the stipulations contained therein should be "incorporated in, and form part of, a treaty of commerce and navigation to be negotiated and concluded as soon as possible" between them. With the conclusion of this agreement with Japan, followed on November 18, by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty with the Netherlands regulating tariff relations, China had won the struggle for tariff autonomy. She had perforce made concessions of a temporary nature with respect to the duties to be collected, but in theory and practice she was autonomous.

From the beginning of the Nationalist government the Chinese had vindicated their right to change the Inspector General of the Customs at will. In January, 1927, Sir Francis Aglen was given a year's leave with the understanding that he would not return. The cause of this action was his refusal, on the grounds of illegality, to obey the Peking government's order to collect the two and one-half and five per cent Washington surtaxes in the face of protest on the part of the diplomatic corps. Another Englishman, Mr. A. H. F. Edwardes, was appointed Acting Inspector General. In October, 1928, Nanking appointed Mr. Edwardes Officiating Inspector General—a post which he resigned at the end of the year. On January 10, 1929, F. W. Maze (later Sir Frederick), an Englishman, was appointed to the substantive position.

The provisions concerning extraterritoriality made in the treaties with Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had no immediate practical effect, but did give moral support to China in her struggle by narrowing the scope of the campaign and placing the onus of maintaining the system on the shoulders of the four great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. To the governments of the first three of these powers, Nanking dispatched identic notes on April 27, 1929.⁴⁰ After referring to the unification of the country and the progress made in modernization, the desire was expressed that the restrictions on Chinese jurisdictional sovereignty should be "removed at the earliest possible date." Similar notes were sent to the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil.

The United States, Great Britain, and France replied on August 10. The American note was sympathetic in tone. It reviewed the origin and system of maintenance of extraterritoriality in China, pointed out that the recommendations of the commission on extraterritoriality of 1926 had not

⁴⁰ *The China Year Book* (1929–30), pp. 904–05. For further explanatory details see Wesley Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), chaps. VII, VIII, and IX.

been carried out and while expressing appreciation of the improvements being brought about in China, remarked:

To exchange an assured and tried system of administration of justice, under which it is acknowledged that life and property have been protected and commerce has grown and prospered, for uncertainties in the absence of an adequate body of law and of an experienced and independent judiciary would be fraught with danger in both of the foregoing respects.⁴¹

The reply of Great Britain contained the statement that:

. . . the Western legal principles should be understood and be found acceptable by the people at large no less than by their rulers, and the courts which administer these laws should be free from interference and dictation at the hands not only of military chiefs but of groups and associations who either set up arbitrary and illegal tribunals of their own or attempt to use legal courts for the furtherance of political objects rather than for the administration of equal justice between Chinese and Chinese, and between Chinese and foreigners.⁴²

France replied that the carrying out of the recommendations of the commission of 1926 was prerequisite to her renunciation of the system—particularly with reference to protection of the judiciary from outside interference.⁴³

Early in September, 1929, Nanking replied to the powers that conditions had changed since the drawing-up of the report of the Extraterritoriality Commission, pointed out that the system had been given up in Turkey, and that in China there was need for replacing the old system by "one in harmony with the actual state of things." Contemporaneously the problem was attacked by C. C. Wu, China's chief delegate to the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations; he asked that a committee be appointed to decide on a method for applying Article XIX of the League Covenant which deals with the right of the Assembly to advise reconsideration by the members of the League of treaties "which have become inapplicable." On account of the embarrassment this might cause, Wu was persuaded to withdraw his request.

On December 28, the National government issued a mandate⁴⁴ in which it was declared "that on and after the first day of the first month of the nineteenth year of the Republic (January 1, 1930), all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the Central and Local Governments of China." Two days later,

⁴¹ *The China Year Book* (1929-30), pp. 905-07.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 908-10.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 910.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 487.

Minister Wang issued an explanatory statement to the effect that the government was "prepared to consider and discuss within a reasonable time any representations made with reference to the plan now under preparation in Nanking." To the declaration and statement of the Nanking government, Great Britain replied that it was "willing to agree that January 1, 1930, should be treated as the date from which the process of the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality should be regarded as having commenced in principle." To this formula both Tokyo and Washington adhered. Meanwhile negotiations between China on the one hand and Great Britain, France, and the United States on the other continued until September, 1931, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria forced the participants to turn their attention to these more immediate issues.⁴⁵

THE TRIANGULAR STRUGGLE IN MANCHURIA

The failure of the Japanese to carry their racial equality clause at Paris and to obtain redress for the American Immigration Act of 1924, and their desire to share in the economic exploitation of northeastern Asia account for Tokyo's willingness in 1925 to enter formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Concluded at Peking, the Russo-Japanese convention established consular relations. Moreover, Russia agreed that the Treaty of Portsmouth, upon which the position of Japan in Manchuria was based, should remain in force. Reciprocal rights of travel, residence, commerce, and navigation were also provided for. In addition, the two countries concluded two protocols by which Japan agreed to restore northern Sakhalin to full Russian sovereignty and in return "Japanese concerns recommended by the Government of Japan" were granted the right of exploiting the oil and coal resources of northern Sakhalin. The Japanese were also permitted to continue fishing in Russian waters in the Far East.⁴⁶

After the First World War, the question of Manchuria had not loomed large again in the politics of northeastern Asia until 1926.⁴⁷ As far as Japan and Russia were concerned, the Treaty of Portsmouth had established a convenient, even if temporary, compromise of their conflicting aims and interests in China's Three Eastern Provinces. Under the leadership of the Nanking government, however, China after 1927 began to take the initiative in the construction of railways in Manchuria. This departure from past policy was accompanied by extensive Japanese loans to the new government for railway building of the kind which would aid materially Japan's effort to divert as much traffic as possible to Dairen and the South Manchuria Railway. This policy brought both China and

⁴⁵ For later developments see *infra*, chap. IX.

⁴⁶ Additional data in Fischer, *op. cit.*, II, 555-60.

⁴⁷ See particularly the data papers of Shuhsi Hsu and Masamichi Royama, in *Problems of the Pacific, 1929* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 466-593.

Japan into direct conflict with the Soviet Union and its cherished ambition of making the Chinese Eastern Railway the main agency of economic exploitation in northern Manchuria. The Soviets and Japan were able until 1933 to settle their differences through diplomatic channels. Russo-Chinese conflicts in 1927–1929 were not so easily reconciled.

Following a course of action begun in 1925 when he seized the Russians' river fleet and closed the Sungari River to their navigation, Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1926 closed the Chinese Eastern Railway land offices and school department. In the following year, Chang demanded that half the Chinese Eastern revenues should be placed in Chinese banks. An additional cause of ill feeling on the part of the Chinese was the policy pursued by Russia after 1924 of blocking the functioning of the joint board of ten directors of the Chinese Eastern by causing the absence of the five Russian members, thereby preventing a quorum and permitting the actual control of the railway by the Russian manager who took orders only, and directly, from Moscow.

During the summer of 1928, shortly after the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, another incident occurred which further strained the relations between Manchuria and the Soviets. This was the attempt made by a group of Outer Mongolian raiders—"Young Mongols"—to cut off Barga from Manchurian control. This area, on the northwestern frontier, had in 1912 declared its independence of China. On November 6, 1915, China and Russia had agreed that it should be autonomous under the nominal sovereignty of China; actually this meant Russian control. Since 1920, Barga had been under Manchurian control, whereas Outer Mongolia, of which it had been a part, had fallen under Soviet influence. Although communications over the Chinese Eastern Railway were temporarily broken, the movement appeared to collapse with the refusal of the Buriat Prince of the district to give it his support, and Manchurian soldiers dispersed the raiders. The question was reopened in the following year when, on the fall of Hailar to the Russians, the "Young Mongols" again attempted to bring about an autonomous rule for Barga and entered into negotiations with Mukden for recognition of their autonomy.⁴⁸

While the strain between the Soviets and the Chinese rulers of Manchuria was becoming increasingly tense, China, south of the Great Wall, had been taking measures to rid herself of Russian influence and ideology. By the spring of 1929, following the adherence of Chang Hsüeh-liang to Nanking, the Nationalist government was ready to apply north of the Wall its policy of recovering what it conceived to be its rights and breaking the grip of Moscow on the Chinese Eastern Railway and northern Manchuria, presumably as a first step in a general effort to recover foreign rights and concessions. As earlier at various points in China proper, so

⁴⁸ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, 1930, p. 368.

at Harbin, Tsitsihar, Manchouli, and Suifenhö, Chinese police raided the Russian consulates on May 27.

At the Harbin consulate more than eighty Soviet subjects were allegedly discovered holding a meeting; forty of these were arrested and accused of having gathered from various points in northern Manchuria and Siberia to plot revolutionary action through dissemination of propaganda and by destruction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Various incriminating documents were declared to have been seized by the police.⁴⁹ Four days later, Moscow protested, and declared the diplomatic immunities of Chinese representatives in Russia to be withdrawn until China should render redress. On June 2, two Soviet consular officials and a director of the Chinese Eastern Railway were arrested at Manchouli as they were leaving for Russia. China's next steps, on July 10–11, were the seizure of the Chinese Eastern telephone and telegraph system, the closing of Russian official and nonofficial organizations in Harbin and the Chinese Eastern zone, the taking-over of the administration of the railway, and the arrest of more than two hundred Russian employees of the road. Of these, sixty were deported, including the manager and the assistant manager of the railway. The Chinese President and Director General of the railway justified these actions on the charge that the Russians had violated the "no-propaganda" provisions in both agreements of 1924.

To the charges made by Mukden and Nanking, Moscow replied, on July 13, that the Chinese had likewise broken both the 1924 agreements and that they had failed to avail themselves of opportunities offered by Moscow for a settlement of the outstanding points of dispute. Three demands were now made: (1) the immediate convening of a conference to settle disputes relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway; (2) the canceling of arbitrary orders regarding the railway; (3) the release of the arrested and a cessation of persecution of Soviet citizens and institutions. Three days were given for an answer, failing which the Soviet government would be compelled to resort to other measures.⁵⁰ Nanking replied on the 16th, denying Moscow's charges, defending Chinese actions, and requesting the release from arrest and detention of some one thousand Chinese merchants in Russian territory and the granting to them of adequate protection and facilities for trade. Following such action, China would be ready at an "appropriate time to take similar measures towards the arrested Soviet agents and the closed office buildings," and order an investigation of the Harbin case preparatory to an amicable settlement.⁵¹ This answer Mos-

⁴⁹ The account here given is the official Chinese version related in *The China Year Book 1929–30*, pp. 1217–22. For the contrary viewpoint see Fischer, *op. cit.*, II, 796. For documents "uncovered" by the Chinese see pamphlet of the Far Eastern Information Bureau, *Documents with Reference to the Sino-Russian Dispute* (Nanking, 1929). Cf. *infra*, pp. 255–58.

⁵⁰ Further details in *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1929, II, 201–06.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 209–10.

cow considered unsatisfactory and announced its determination to (1) recall from China its diplomatic, consular, commercial, and railway representatives and employees; (2) suspend railway communications with China; and (3) order all Chinese diplomatic and consular representatives to leave the territories of the Soviet government.⁵² Three days later, China withdrew her representatives from Russia, and the tenuous relations existing between the two countries since the end of 1927 were formally broken. The German government, at the request of the disputants, took over the interests of each in the territory of the other. Several attempts on the part of the German government during the next four months to use its good offices in the dispute failed.

Meanwhile, two other series of actions were taking place: The one military, on the borders of Manchuria: the other diplomatic, in the capitals of the powers. From August 13 until well into December, a state of military activity existed differing from war mainly in the lack of a formal declaration. On occasion White Russian raiders invaded Soviet territories. After repeated protests, Soviet troops were dispatched on November 17, under the supreme command of General Vassily Blücher, to compel the submission of the Chinese. The Chinese combatants were more numerous—some sixty thousand being in the western zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway—but were badly armed and poorly disciplined. Consequently, the limited objectives of the Soviet action were promptly achieved.

There were numerous reasons why the governments of nations other than those immediately concerned should be interested in the Manchurian struggle.⁵³ The practical compression of the earth which has resulted from the development of speedy means of communication and transportation had rendered any dispute between nations a matter of universal concern. This was clearly demonstrated by the course of the terrible struggle begun in Europe in 1914. One result of this had been the trusteeship of the Chinese Eastern Railway exercised by the Allied and Associated powers from 1919 to 1922. The closing in 1929 of the only rail route between Europe and the Far East was a matter of immediate concern. The leading powers, especially the United States, were interested in the continued functioning of the Open Door, and four of them were bound by the treaty of Washington of December 13, 1921, to "communicate with one another fully and frankly" if the rights of any of them in connection with "any Pacific question" shall be threatened. Japan had particular reason for watching developments in Manchuria with care. While she could not be expected to regret the weakening of Russian power in Chinese

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

⁵³ Further details in Young, *op. cit.*, pp. xix-xxx; also consult Vera A. Micheles, "Russia and China in Manchuria," *Foreign Policy Information Service*, Vol. V, No. 11 (August, 1929), pp. 193-202.

territory, if that should be the outcome, she had no intention of allowing it to be materially strengthened—or of having China attack her position in Manchuria, if the latter were successful in the attack on the Russian position in that area. Finally, there was the question of the application of the international treaty for the Renunciation of War, commonly known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact. This had been signed at Paris in August, 1928, and was to go into effect on July 24, 1929. The Sino-Russian dispute offered the first opportunity to test the value of that instrument. Both China and Russia had signed the pact. China, moreover, was a member of the League of Nations, but the Soviet Union was neither a member of the League nor bound by the Washington agreement.

On July 18, 1929, two days before Nanking broke its relations with Moscow, and three and a half weeks before military hostilities began, the governments of the four powers doubly linked by the Washington treaty of December, 1921, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, took the Sino-Russian dispute under advisement. On the initiative of the American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, he and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, reminded China and Russia, respectively, of the war-renunciation agreement.⁵⁴ Both parties to the dispute agreed to uphold the treaty, and not to resort to hostilities unless attacked. Throughout the crisis, however, Russia stood firm on the declarations in both the agreements of 1924 with China that “the future of the C. E. R. shall be determined by the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. to the exclusion of any third party or parties.” At first, although anxious to win the sympathy of the powers, China took somewhat the same attitude; but when it became evident that Manchuria could not withstand Russian pressure she became as anxious as she had been in earlier periods of stress to profit from the divergent interests of the powers. This she was unable to do owing to the neutral position taken by them on account largely of the methods used by her in attempting a solution of her problems at this time, and during the preceding few years. An appeal by Nanking to the powers, on November 26, for intervention against Russia proved fruitless, although a protest was made in collective diplomatic representation to the Soviets, led by Secretary Stimson, on December 2.

With the fall of Lahasusu on October 14, Manchouli and Dalainor on November 17, of Hailar ten days later, and the disarming of some 8000 to 10,000 Chinese troops, Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, the *de facto* ruler of Manchuria, was ready to agree on November 26 to Russia's demand for a restoration of the *status quo ante*, although Nanking's approval was lacking. Although negotiations between the Soviet Union and Mukden were already underway, Nanking suggested to Moscow, through the German

⁵⁴ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1929, pp. 223–26. For Stimson's suggestions of conciliation see *ibid.*, pp. 242–44.

embassy in that capital, that both governments should remove their troops thirty miles from the Manchurian boundary, and that the settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question should be left to arbitration. This Moscow refused. Simultaneously, Nanking contemplated an appeal to the League of Nations, but was discouraged by London on the basis of Russia's nonmembership in the League. In the meantime, Manchuria and Russia were approaching agreement. After a preliminary meeting (December 1-3) of representatives at Nikolsk-Ussuriski, a protocol was signed at Khabarovsk on December 22.

While these negotiations were in process, a second invocation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact was taking place. On receipt of the news of the Russian successful advances into Manchuria of November 17-27, Secretary Stimson consulted with the representatives at Washington of Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany and Italy. The American government then approached China directly and Russia indirectly by way of Paris, again reminding them of their duties in the light of their relationship to the Pact of 1928. Individual representations were made also by thirteen of the fifty-five other signatories of the pact including Italy, France, and Great Britain—but not Germany and Japan. Germany's earlier actions had brought no favorable results, and she was the agent for the disputants. Japan held aloof throughout, partly, it may be, to signify her unique position in the Far East and her oft-times intimated desire to take the lead in diplomatic actions in that area, and, partly, because she believed there was little danger of an actual outbreak of war, for which she knew China was unprepared, and believed that interference by third parties would be met by rebuff—in which assumption she was correct.

The reply of Russia to the United States constituted a snub reminiscent of that administered to Secretary Knox at the time of his neutralization scheme for Manchuria in 1909-10. After declaring that Russia's actions were "counter-measures" which had been compelled "in the interests of defense, protection of the frontier and the peaceful population," and were "in no wise violations of any obligations of the Paris pact," the Soviet government declared that the United States had "addressed its declaration at a moment when the Soviet and Mukden governments already had agreed to several conditions and were proceeding with direct negotiations. . . . In view of this fact the above declaration cannot but be considered unjustifiable pressure on the negotiations, and cannot therefore be taken as a friendly act." Giving vent to its irritation at the failure of the United States to grant it recognition, the Soviet government concluded that it could not "forbear expressing amazement that the Government of the United States, which by its own will has no official relations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel." ⁵⁵

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 404-06.

In addition to the irritation of Moscow over the matter of nonrecognition, there was the question of the financial interests of the United States and Japan in the Chinese Eastern Railway during the years 1919-22 and that of French interest in the reorganized Russo-Asiatic Bank, sixty per cent of the shares of which were declared in 1929 to be French-owned. Russia had no intention of recognizing non-Russian and non-Chinese interests in the road. It does not appear, however, that the American government in 1929 was motivated by interests of such a nature. Rather is it apparent that the policies and actions of Secretary Stimson were based on the eagerness of Washington to put into force the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Had the pact been completely ignored at the moment of its going into effect, an even more serious blow at its prestige would have been struck.

The bilateral Khabarovsk Protocol provided for a restoration of the situation, based on the provisional agreements of 1924, which had prevailed in Manchuria prior to the outbreak of difficulties. The consulates and commercial houses of both countries were to be reopened; nationals detained by both parties were to be released; armed units of White Russians were to be disarmed and their leaders deported; Soviet executives and employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway were to be restored, and a conference to be held in Moscow in January, 1930, was to settle all causes of dispute and to restore diplomatic relations between China and the Soviets. By this agreement it was clear that Russia had again won a victory over China and that the latter had once more been humiliated by its northern neighbor. The manager and the assistant manager who had controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway prior to the break were only formally restored to office and were immediately supplanted by new appointees from Moscow, but the Chinese president of the railway was also succeeded by Moh Teh-hui.

Moh was shortly ordered by Nanking to represent his country at the conference in Moscow which did not open until October, 1930—a postponement reminiscent of that which took place after the signing of the provisional agreements of 1924. In the negotiations it shortly developed that while the Chinese representative aimed at a settlement of the railway dispute, on which matter only he was empowered to speak, Moscow wished first to discuss restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviets and China, and only then to approach the other questions outstanding between the two countries. At the end of December, Moh returned to China. After conferences at Nanking stretching over several weeks, he started in March, 1931, on the return trip to Moscow. The readiness of Nanking to consider diplomatic and commercial problems, including that of navigation of the Sungari River, was announced by Moh before his departure. Contemporaneously, it was charged by the Chinese that approximately a quarter of a million Soviet troops were concentrated in eastern Siberia

and on the borders of Manchuria; that the Russians had seized control of considerable areas of Chinese territory on the frontier of the Manchurian provinces; and that they were expanding their influence in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). While doubtless having some basis in fact, no proof was given of the accuracy of any of these charges. The completion in 1930 of the Turk-Sib Railroad, which roughly parallels the western border of Sinkiang, meanwhile strengthened Soviet influence in the New Dominion.

The Sino-Soviet imbroglio of 1929 resulted in the loss of many millions of dollars to the participants and had portentous results for the future of Manchuria, since it established, in part, the precedents for the Mukden "incident" of 1931. That China should have resorted to aggression in an attempt to solve the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway is to be explained by the peculiar relation of the Soviets to the rest of the world. Having been encouraged by the Russians to take direct action for the settlement of her foreign and domestic problems, China turned on her to test the efficacy of their method only to find one of them—General Blücher—in command against her. This general was as competent in defending his government's interests against Nationalist China as he had been in aiding the nationalists three years earlier to attack the interests of the "imperialist" governments in China. In addition, the support which China expected in the West failed to materialize. The outcome made it additionally clear that Soviet policy was in part similar to that of the czars, and that Russia was even more determined than in the nineteenth century to participate in the domination of Asia. It also constituted a setback to Nationalist China in her attempt to remove all forms of foreign control by unilateral action and force. Most significantly, it provided an example to the Japanese of Soviet success in northern Manchuria. If the Moscow government, virtually an international pariah, had been unopposed by the Western powers, what was to prevent respectable Japan from undertaking similar action in the Three Eastern Provinces?

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

Officially the aim of the nations with reference to the Pacific as well as the Far East, after the Washington conference, was in general to maintain the *status quo*. This meant the maintenance of the position and the rights of each in the eastern hemisphere. The method of carrying out this policy by the signatories of the Washington treaties was officially one of co-operation. With occasional exceptions, this method was acted upon to 1931.

In keeping with this object, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, on the initiative of the British government, held a naval

conference in London from January 21 to April 22, 1930. This followed the failure of an attempt made at Geneva in 1927 by the three powers first named to extend the application of certain of the provisions of the Five-Power Naval treaty of Washington; it followed also, ironically enough, the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war. The object of the London Naval Conference was a double one: to reconsider the provisions of 1922 concerning battleships and aircraft carriers, and to apply the agreement of limitation to all type of craft for naval combat.

The London Naval Limitation Conference opened under inauspicious circumstances. France and Italy were at loggerheads particularly with respect to equality in lighter craft. Under Mussolini's leadership, Italy demanded mathematical equality with France. Meanwhile Paris reiterated its earlier stand that security through political agreements must precede effective disarmament. Neither Britain nor the United States was willing to commit itself to the support of France, since political agreements were not the chief objectives of the great maritime nations. Their main concern was, by reduction of naval armaments, to relieve the strain of naval building upon their depression-stricken economies. Therefore, after lengthy negotiations, it was decided that Great Britain, the United States, and Japan should conclude naval agreements relative to light craft without including France and Italy in the deliberations.

Each of the three major powers appeared at London with a set of proposals. While insisting upon parity with the United States, and while acquiring equality in the Mediterranean with the combined Italian and French fleets, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald urged the stabilization of all naval armaments. Secretary of State Stimson and the American delegation aimed at drastic reductions, but without altering the ratios worked out at the Washington conference. The Japanese delegation under the leadership of former (Minseito) Premier Wakatsuki Reijiro had instructions to press for "three fundamental claims." While working for a general reduction of armaments, the Japanese were to insist upon a seventy per cent ratio (10:7) with respect to the United States in 10,000-ton cruisers and in auxiliary craft, to fight against the British project of eliminating submarines, and to demand parity in underseas craft.

In company with Wakatsuki, the Japanese were represented at London by Baron Matsudaira Tsuneo, ambassador at the Court of St. James, and by Admiral Takarabe, a powerful representative of the Satsuma naval clique. Although Takarabe apparently possessed the confidence of a working majority in responsible naval circles, he had also to contend with a fiery and determined minority of aggressive younger naval officers. Cleavages within Japan's naval clique, therefore, left the representatives of the Foreign Office in a position of leadership at London. Unlike the naval groups, the Japanese civilians were eager to assure the success of the

negotiations even at the expense of making minor concessions. Prosperity through peace, trade, and compromise was the goal of Minseito statesmanship in 1930.⁵⁶

The formula which finally won acceptance was worked out through a series of informal conferences between Baron Matsudaira and Senator David A. Reed of the American delegation. Without consulting the technical staff of Nipponese naval experts present at the conference, Tokyo's



Some of the Delegates to the London Naval Conference. Left to right: Secretary of Navy Charles F. Adams; A. V. Alexander, first lord of the British Admiralty; Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, Head of the American Delegation; Arthur Henderson, British Minister of Foreign Affairs; Charles Dawes, American Ambassador to Great Britain; Senator Joseph T. Robinson, of Arkansas; and Dwight Morrow, U. S. Ambassador to Mexico. European Picture Service

civilian emissaries accepted the Washington proposal of a 10:6 ratio in heavy cruisers. Rather than assume responsibility for breaking up the conference, Admiral Takarabe also subscribed to the sixty per cent arrangement. The Japanese government was sharply divided as to whether it should accept modification of its three fundamental claims. Only after

⁵⁶ For the Japanese side consult the excellent discussion of the 1930 conference in chap. XXV of Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (New York, 1935); for the American viewpoint, treaty texts, and pertinent figures regarding relative naval strength see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1930, I, 1-131; for the fullest account of the Conference proceedings see E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (London, 1946), Second Series, Vol. I (1930). For an evaluation of the documentary materials see Conyers Read, "Recent United States and British Government Publication on the London Naval Conference of 1930," *American Historical Review*, LIV (1949), 307-14.

serious and bitter debate did Premier Hamaguchi decide against the navy and forward instructions to accept the Reed-Matsudaira conclusions. The bitterest opponent of the London arrangements was Admiral Kato Kanji, Chief of the Naval Staff. In his efforts to halt ratification of the London treaty Kato appealed to the *tennō*, the constitution, and the Seiyukai. His insistence that the civilian government had neither the right nor the power to determine policies affecting national defense brought into vivid relief the struggle for control going on between the civilian and the military branches of the government.

As ratified, the Naval Limitations Treaty of 1930 embodied far more than the compromise ratio with respect to heavy cruisers. The life of the Washington treaty was extended through 1936. This meant that the "holiday" in the building of capital ships was prolonged for five years, and that the scrapping of three outmoded British capital ships, three American, and one Japanese should take place. In light cruisers the Japanese received a ratio higher than the sixty per cent ratio in heavy cruisers established by the Reed-Matsudaira compromise. In destroyers Japan was permitted more than seventy per cent, and in submarines was granted parity. A far more serious precedent, however, than the arrangements affecting tonnage relationships among the maritime powers was the inclusion of the "escalator" clause which was designed to permit Britain (or any other interested power) to increase its tonnage in case France or Italy should launch a naval-building program. Under such circumstances, the other signatories would also be permitted to make appropriate increases.

No one of the leading powers obtained exactly what it desired at London; especially was this the case with Japan. Nevertheless, the agreements reached indicated a considerable degree of mutual confidence and the probability that the relations of the maritime powers of the Pacific would, at least until 1936, be peaceable in nature.

RECAPITULATION

To 1931, the course of far eastern politics followed rather closely, but at a leisurely pace, the pattern cut at the Washington conference. Japan's position as the leading power in the western Pacific limited her expansion after the withdrawal from Siberia to economic penetration of the continental and insular areas of eastern Asia. In the period of Baron Tanaka's premiership (April, 1927-July, 1929), Japan's policy of "friendship" toward China reverted temporarily to the methods of force and arrogance which had characterized Nippon's policy during the First World War.

Having the unparalleled advantage of hindsight, it is relatively simple to characterize the first postwar decade in Japan as a period of rehabilitation, watchful waiting, and preparation for new efforts at territorial aggrandizement in the thirties. It is most difficult also to accept at face value the assurances of such statesmen as Baron Shidehara that Japan was sincerely concerned in aiding China to solve its own difficulties, in establishing a stable government, and in gradually winning freedom from the "unequal treaties."

Although Japan co-operated in the implementation of the Washington treaties, her participation in the various conferences and agreements was often reluctant, and frequently her delegates were hesitant to follow their agreements to logical conclusions because of the rising sentiment in Japan against the inferior naval status and against the perpetuation of a *status quo* that had been mainly the creation of Great Britain and the United States. The American Immigration Act of 1924 was considered a significantly unfriendly gesture by the power which had most strenuously objected to the Twenty-One Demands, and which had been successful in winning abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Great Britain was only slightly less irritating than the American colossus, for the British were by far Japan's most important competitor for the markets of China and southeastern Asia.

Antipathy toward the Anglo-Saxon powers was responsible to an important degree for the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1925. However, *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union was shortlived. By the end of the twenties, the difficulties between Russia and China over the Chinese Eastern Railway aroused in Japan a fear that Russia was about to embark upon an expansionist policy in Manchuria. Of equal ominousness was the rapid unification and nationalization of China. The growth in strength and influence of either or both of these great, but hitherto unorganized states, appeared from Tokyo to threaten Japan's economic stake in Asia, and the area considered vital to plans for future territorial expansion.

Triumph of the Kuomintang forces in southern and northern China appeared to be the materialization of Dr. Sun's first principle of nationalism. China's new and belligerent nationalism thereafter poised a challenge, not only to Japan and Russia, but to the Western powers as well. The British, in particular, having the largest foreign economic stake in China, were subject and vulnerable to attacks from irate Chinese groups. Until 1927, the conservative attitude of the London government toward China played an important part in the growth of anti-British sentiment. Of equal seriousness was the arrogant attitude frequently taken by many

British subjects in China, and by the oft-times critical, unsympathetic and reactionary tone adopted by influential sections of the British press in eastern Asia. After the establishment of a responsible government at Nanking, official British circles at least, followed a more conciliatory policy toward China. Despite widespread skepticism about the sincerity of the new British attitude, the rendition of British concessions at Hankow, Kuikiang, Chinkiang, and Amoy, and the restoration of Weihaiwei during the years 1927-30 constituted ample proof of the practicability of the British turn of heart or change of mind. The skeptical, however, continued to consider the British policy as one of expediency and profits rather than one of genuine idealism.

The American Government was faced in the East by three possibilities: co-operation with the powers, or withdrawal from the scene altogether, or development of its own policy with readiness ultimately to defend or carry out this policy by resort to diplomacy and force. It generally chose co-operation. It took the lead in organizing the new international consortium in China; also in demanding settlements for attacks upon foreign properties, as a result of which it took part in the discussion of a plan for policing Chinese railways. It participated also in the prevention by the powers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's proposed seizure of the customs funds at Canton. Finally it joined with the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan in the sending of identic notes after the Nanking outrage of March 24, 1927. But by refusing to join with the powers in the use of force in the interior for the backing of these demands, it prevented co-operative action. By independently negotiating the tariff treaty with China in 1928, and granting recognition to the Nanking government, it set a precedent which other powers followed. It was evident, therefore, that the choice between co-operation and independent action was based on the exigencies of the occasion.

For being at once too active and not active enough, the American government was criticized at home and abroad. If American business interests inclined to coolness for certain of China's nationalist aspirations and tended to demand and support drastic action to force China to meet her international obligations, the Coolidge administration and considerable numbers of American missionaries contributed to the development of a national spirit in China and aided the movement for "rights recovery" in every legitimate way. Of the great powers whom the Chinese Nationalists and their Russian advisers denounced as "imperialistic" in the years 1925-1927, America alone had no territories which had been conquered or leased from China, and enjoyed no spheres of interest or influence. Extraterritoriality, however, the United States enjoyed in company with

several other states—a sufficient answer, when considered in the light of her consistent demands for most-favored-nation treatment of her nationals, to the charge sometimes made that American policy is mainly based on altruism and sentiment. The notable differences between the American policy in the East and those of the other powers was based primarily on the fact that American interests and policies were generally consonant with those of the Eastern nations, while those of Europe—and, in later times, Japan—were not.

CHAPTER VII

CHINA IN REVOLUTION

OVERTHROW OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY

China as a whole, or in part, has often been ruled by aliens. For more than three thousand years, prior to 1912, it was administered by some thirty-five dynasties which at times paralleled or overlapped each other. Some were long-lived; others were ephemeral. One of the formulas of Chinese history is that of the rise and fall of ruling houses. In the early years of a dynasty there is strength and virility; order evolves from chaos. Follows a period of sound rule, statesmanship, and prosperity. Gradually the rulers become effete, but for a time the state machine runs on stored-up energy. Then comes confusion resulting from moral disintegration of officialdom and cataclysms of nature, such as floods and droughts, followed by pestilence and widespread poverty, recrudescence of banditry, and civil war. The mandate of heaven is withdrawn;¹ the dynasty falls. After a term of anarchy, long or short, a new dynasty rises to consolidate its power. The cycle is complete.

The formula indicated is exemplified by the rise and fall of the Manchu, or Ch'ing, dynasty (1644–1912). The Manchus were aliens who, with the aid of Chinese, conquered China and, with the aid of Chinese, ruled it. Like previous invaders of the Middle Kingdom, the Manchus were absorbed culturally by their victims. Before they followed the way of all flesh, however, they produced two of the greatest rulers ever to occupy the throne of any country, namely, the K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung emperors.

By the end of the eighteenth century, after an administration of approximately one hundred fifty years, the great age of Manchu rule had ended. The nineteenth century was devoted, by the Ch'ing rulers and their Chinese colleagues, chiefly to an attempt to maintain the *status quo* in the face of numerous plots and rebellions which had for their object overthrow of the dynasty and expulsion of the aliens. The middle years of the century—1850–1865—witnessed the rise and suppression of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed the tragedy of the Boxer Rebellion. This started in part as an anti-dynastic movement, but by the skill of the Manchu-Chinese official hierarchy it was turned into a movement to “cherish the dynasty; exterminate the foreigners.”

¹ See, for example, H. F. MacNair, *The Real Struggle between China and Japan: An Analysis of Conflicting Ideologies* (Chicago, 1938), *passim*.

The course and outcome of the Boxer Rebellion, in which the Japanese fought shoulder to shoulder with the forces of the West, spelled doom to the Ch'ing dynasty. The passage of time, moreover, demonstrated clearly to thoughtful men that the confusion certain to follow the breakup of a dynasty was to be more complicated than ever before by the accretion of unprecedented factors. These had to do with the rivalries and interference in China of the Western nations; modern political, social, and religious ideology; and the rapid rise to influence of an Oriental state—Japan. The latter was to play an increasingly important part in Chinese as well as in world affairs since its leaders had been able and willing to modernize the defense forces and introduce mechanization of industry.

Under the Ch'ing dynasty China failed to strengthen itself sufficiently to ward off foreign aggression; in consequence there ensued increasing interference in domestic affairs. Between 1902 and 1911 sporadic attempts were made to reform the country: a decree ordering the assimilation of Manchus and Chinese was issued; preparations were made to send Manchus abroad for study; the old system of examinations was abolished in 1905 and pursuit of modern knowledge was mildly encouraged; finally, the introduction of constitutional government within a few years was promised. Faced by loss of prestige on the part of the dynasty and growing radicalism in the central and southern provinces, the Tz'u-hsi Empress Dowager, made a desperate attempt to prevent another debacle. Unfortunately for the Manchus, she died in November, 1908, leaving the throne to a three-year-old child, Pu Yi (P'u-i), later the emperor of Manchoukuo.

Less than three years afterward occurred the outbreak of revolution. The result was not alone the overthrow of the Manchus but the attempt to set up a republican form of government, a form alien to the political experience of the Chinese people.

During more than fifteen years before the outbreak of the revolt of 1911—in China and Indo-China, in Malaysia, in Japan, in Hawaii, in the United States, and in Europe—Sun Yat-sen had been plotting the overthrow of the Manchus and the setting up of a republic. In December of that year Sun was elected "President of the Provisional Government of the United Provinces of China"; from London he hurried thither to assume office. Before he could arrive, it had been agreed that he should shortly retire in favor of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the conservative strong man of North China.

Yüan had played a part in the Boxer Rebellion which had brought him to the favorable attention of the governments of Western states, but which had caused trouble for him in China itself. On the death of the Empress Dowager he had been appointed Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent; he had, however, shortly fallen from power and had been recalled only

when it became clear that the revolutionists in the central provinces were getting out of control. The degree of his loyalty to the imperial house is a matter for debate; for several months at least he appeared to work to retain the Manchus upon the throne. Finally he gave way and the abdication of the child-emperor took place. It was then agreed that Sun Yat-sen should retire in favor of Yüan Shih-k'ai. In these two personalities are to be found opponents who were the main figures on the stage of China until the death of Yüan in the summer of 1916. Although both are now dead, the conditions, the theories, and the ideas for which they stood constitute one of the sets of causes for struggle to the present day.

On February 15, 1912, three days after the abdication, Yüan was elected Provisional President of the Republic. This ended the first phase of the republican revolution; the second quickly began. Dr. Sun shortly lost any possible illusions with reference to Yüan's republican and democratic principles. In the summer of 1913 Sun and his revolutionary party, the Kuomintang (National People's Party), involved themselves in a rebellion against the president in Peking. This was crushed with little difficulty and several of the Kuomintang leaders were proscribed as traitors, although the party itself escaped indictment and continued to work vigorously for the appointment of a responsible ministry. On November 4, 1913, less than a month after his election by parliament as substantive executive, Yüan expelled the Kuomintang from that body, which then lacked a quorum and two months later was dissolved. Despite protests and plots, Yüan remained in control. An attempt, however, in 1915, to establish a constitutional monarchy and enthrone himself ended in failure and the President died in June of the following year.

WARLORDISM IN NORTHERN CHINA

The death of Yüan, taken in conjunction with the economic and political conditions which prevailed in China at that time, let loose diverse forces. The dictator's disloyalty to the republican ideal as demonstrated by his attempt to make himself emperor; the wasting of public funds either raised in China or borrowed abroad; the growth of the power and the numbers of provincial military governors (*tuchiäns*, *tupäns*, *tutuhs*) and their satellites: the determination of Dr. Sun and his followers to rule south China—and the north if possible—and to establish a real republic and new social institutions—all these united to render confusion worse confounded. As to the wisdom of attempting to change suddenly the form of government—as distinct from ending the pseudo-rule of an effete dynasty—volumes might be written. In addition to problems of essentially domestic nature were those of foreign relations, some new, others of old standing.

Overthrow of the Manchus resulted in disorder greater than any which had hitherto followed the fall of a dynasty.² In the old days the country had been left largely to itself. When the mandate of heaven had been withdrawn from a ruling house, another dynasty had brought order out of chaos and the people had pursued the daily round, breaking but little with their past. In 1912, when the Manchus were expelled from the throne, the situation differed. The impact of the modern upon the ancient Middle Kingdom had already been far-reaching in its effects. The development of communications and transportation had brought the remainder of the world close to China. The empire was no longer a largely isolated and self-sustained entity; what was of importance to it now was of interest to the rest of the inhabited universe. A domestic upheaval was of international significance. As if this were not sufficient, there was the additional factor of a new form of government, that of a republic, insisted upon by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers. These two factors, in conjunction with a third, namely, the rise of Japan as a great power, serve largely to explain why the situation in China during the twentieth century has been unprecedentedly confused.

On the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, General Li Yüan-hung succeeded to the presidency. He reassembled parliament and appointed as premier a Northern militarist, General Tuan Ch'i-jui. A believer in the republic, the new President had considerable respect for parliament; in this he differed from his militaristic premier, who considered himself the source of power and had small use for parliamentarians and their methods of rule, vocal and venal. Struggles shortly followed between President Li, Premier Tuan (backed by a group of northern military governors), and parliament; furthermore between Peking and the provinces; as well as between north and south China. In other words, cleavage ensued in every quarter. The causes of these struggles were mainly domestic, but into them entered the question of China's breaking relations with Germany—which the American government, in February, 1917, had invited it to do—and later of declaring war upon Germany—which the American government had not invited China to do.

After a succession of difficulties President Li resigned, and another general, Vice-President Fêng Kuo-chang, took over the acting presidency on August 1, 1917. This he was supposed to hold for the unexpired term of Yüan Shih-k'ai, or until October, 1918. Fêng and Tuan, however, belonged to rival cliques of the Northern militarists and co-operated no more successfully than had Li and Tuan. To prevent the election of Fêng as

² Consult especially for further details on warlordism H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution* (Chicago, 1931), and the same author's essay in the book which he also edited, *China* (Berkeley, 1946), pp. 127-44; cf. Arthur N. Holcombe, *The Chinese Revolution* (Cambridge, 1930). See P. H. B. Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East* (London, 1937), Part II.

substantive president, Tuan convened (August, 1918), a packed body known as the "Tuchüns' Parliament," which elected Hsü Shih-ch'ang, sometime viceroy of Manchuria and friend of the late President Yüan.

During Hsü's administration (September, 1918–June, 1922) there were three outstanding politico-military combinations in the north: the Anfu³ Club, led by Premier Tuan; the Fengtien clique, headed by Chang Tso-lin, ruler of Manchuria; and the Chihli group, controlled by Ts'ao Kun, tuchün of the metropolitan province of Chihli, and his chief supporter, General Wu P'ei-fu. Not called upon to protect himself from his enemies, President Hsü gave no evidence of ability to save himself from his friends. During the summer of 1920 the Fengtien and Chihli factions determined to overthrow the Anfuites. This was accomplished mainly by the army and strategy of Wu P'ei-fu. The immediate outcome was the retirement from public life of Premier Tuan—who now solaced himself by the study of Buddhist philosophy in Tientsin—and the establishment of a Chihli-Fengtien government. Over this Chang Tso-lin gradually gained control, himself twice going to Peking in 1921. On the second occasion he forced a change of cabinets which resulted in smoothing out difficulties for Japan in the "conversations," regarding the restoration of Shantung to China then being held between the Chinese and the Japanese delegations at the Washington conference.⁴

In the division of spoils by Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin, following the overthrow of the devotees of Peace and Joy, General Wu P'ei-fu had been all but ignored; this irked him, as did the establishment by Chang Tso-lin of a cabinet which too soon and too generously dispensed pardon to the Anfu leaders who were popularly held to have done everything possible to sell their country to their neighbors across the eastern seas. Accordingly there was little love lost between him and Chang. By early 1922, Chang Tso-lin had decided to eliminate Wu, and war between the two generals broke out in April. To his aid, Wu called from Shensi General Fêng Yü-hsiang, whose star had been gradually revealing itself as one of the first magnitude. Chang Tso-lin was now forced to take refuge in Manchuria, the independence of which he shortly declared. Thus was created a precedent which, less than a decade later, was to be cited and followed by the Japanese in the Three Eastern Provinces.

Robbed of Chang's support and that of others of his friends, and not recognized by the South, President Hsü, at the suggestion of Wu P'ei-fu, resigned office early in June, 1922. Retiring to Tientsin, he too pursued Buddhist studies. Li Yüan-hung, who, for almost five years, had been living in that haven of retired, resigned, or ousted officials, was now per-

³ An (Peace); Fu (Joy), also An (from Anhwei province, home of certain military men) and Fu (from Fukien province whence certain of the "navy" men hailed).

⁴ See *supra*, pp. 194–96.

sued against his will to reassume the burdens of the presidency. Wu P'ei-fu hoped that the restoration of Li might bring unity to the country by winning the support of the southern provinces. The parliament which he had been forced to dissolve in 1917, was reconvened by Li on August 1, 1922.

Meanwhile, the warlord of Chihli, Marshal Ts'ao Kun, another of the late President Yüan's friends, found it more and more difficult to restrain the stirrings of political ambition in his martial breast. His adherents were able shortly to bring about strained relations between President Li and Generals Wu and Fêng. As a result, the president fled from Peking to Tientsin on June 13, 1923—one year and two days after his resumption of office. Ts'ao's men assumed control of the Northern capital until their master could purchase from parliament (for \$15,000,000 silver, it was reported) an election to the presidency. This office Ts'ao assumed on October 10, 1923.

The expulsion in 1922 of Chang Tso-lin from intramural China did not end the quarrel between him and Wu P'ei-fu. The latter, while keeping an eye on Chang, set to work to unify the country by relying on force rather than diplomacy. By the summer of 1924, Wu was military overlord of most of China with the exception of the three southernmost provinces—Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yünnan—and of Chekiang, over which Tuchün Lu Yung-hsiang, an ally of Chang Tso-lin and the sole survivor of the Anfu clique, still remained in control. In August, 1924, war broke out between Tuchün Lu of Chekiang and Tuchün Ch'i Hsieh-yüan of Kiangsu, the latter an ally of Wu P'ei-fu. In the following month, the super-Tuchüns Wu and Chang renewed their struggle directly in the north, while their respective allies fought around Shanghai. In both battle areas, the most conspicuous characteristics displayed were disloyalty and treachery. By them, mainly, Lu was forced to flee from Chekiang to Manchuria; Chang's Fengtien troops passed through the Great Wall to threaten Peking; and Wu P'ei-fu was overthrown as a result of Fêng Yü-hsiang's defection. This forced Wu to flee southward by sea. Be it remarked to his credit that he took refuge neither in Japan nor in a treaty port under foreign protection but in central China.

Dispatched by Wu to stop Chang's army at Jehol (Chengtch) northeast of Peking, Fêng Yü-hsiang suddenly returned late in October to seize the capital. He imprisoned President Ts'ao, scattered the parliamentarians, and, disregarding the abdication agreement of 1912, shortly afterward forced the Manchu emperor from his palace in the Forbidden City. One of the peculiar arrangements connected with the abdication of the emperor had been the agreement providing *inter alia* that the imperial family should continue temporarily to reside in a designated portion of the Forbidden City, and that the title of emperor should be retained for life

by the head of the house, the Hsüan-t'ung emperor, now generally referred to as Pu Yi. Accordingly, for more than twelve years, 1912-1924, the young emperor, still retaining his title and keeping his court, resided in the northern section of the old palace city. When Fêng Yu-hsiang, with force and contumely, expelled him from his palace he resided for a short time in his father's residence but shortly fled to the Japanese legation in the foreign administered and protected legation quarter, this being the safest place in the capital. Later he took refuge in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, having to the present day never relinquished the title guaranteed by the agreements between the Chinese Revolutionists and the Manchu imperial family. Later on, the titular ruler of Manchoukuo was, accordingly, still legally the Ch'ing Emperor of China. His Majesty remained in Tientsin until the Japanese invited him to leave for Manchuria in November, 1931.⁵

Having seized the capital, Fêng proceeded, with the aid of Chang Tso-lin, to restore Marshal Tuan to power as Provisional Chief Executive. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was invited to go north from Canton to confer with Fêng, Chang, and Tuan over the reorganization of the government. The southern leader arrived in Peking on December 31, 1924. Too ill to participate in further plans, he died there in the following March.

Analysis of the political changes in North China from the death of Yüan in 1916 to that of Sun in 1925 leads to the conclusion that the successors of the first substantive president, Yüan, were rather more than less *fainéant* rulers. Often they were able to force obedience to their orders hardly beyond the walls of Peking itself and, on occasion, not even within them. Nevertheless, the fiction that he who held Peking was the *de jure* ruler of China, was maintained by the powers to 1927 and all attempts on the part of the government at Canton to gain formal recognition ended in failure. A survival of this type of thought is to be observed in the fact that most of the diplomats accredited to the government of China continued for a number of years to reside in their respective legations or embassies in the old imperial metropolis, although after 1928 Nanking was officially the capital of the country.

Nor is the whole story of warlordism related by describing the rise and eclipse of individual *tuchüns*. More fundamental perhaps is the realization that China was *in revolution*, in a fundamental upheaval that had begun in the nineteenth century with peasant rebellion against landlordism and the alien dynasty. With the overthrow of the traditional form of government, and the failure of the new Western governmental system to provide stability and livelihood, the central authority lost its hold upon the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Thereafter, the effort of the indi-

⁵ For a full discussion of the topics here touched upon, cf. Sir Reginald Johnston's *Twilight in the Forbidden City* (London, 1934).

vidual warlord to organize a strong provincial base, and from it to extend his power throughout the land until a new dynasty should come into being, became the order of the day. Moreover, the inability of those who had overturned the Manchus to settle upon common aims was indicative of the deep cleavages that split the Chinese into unreceptive and uncompromising economic and social groups. Even though Western observers have frequently been quite unaware of it, warlordism was more of a symptom than a cause of China's chaos and disorder.

RISE OF THE KUOMINTANG

Turning now to a consideration of political changes and trends in south China, it may be remarked that when President Yüan unseated the Kuomintang members of parliament in the autumn of 1913, many of them repaired to Canton. After the death of the dictator in 1916, parliament, as previously mentioned, was reconvened by President Li. The Kuomintang immediately renewed its struggles; for this and other reasons, that potentially influential body accomplished nothing constructive. Then came its dissolution in June, 1917, and again the party parliamentarians took refuge in Canton.

The Kuomintang now definitely broke with the northern government. In January, 1918, a Southern Constitutionalist Government was established in Canton headed by a directorate of seven members, including Dr. Sun. The new government received the lip-service adherence of a considerable part of China south of the Yangtze and of Szechwan. It may be noted, however, that this province from 1911 to 1934—when it swung, perforce, into the orbit of Nanking—remained for all practical purposes an independent entity. In it during the period mentioned, raged one civil war after another.

Although China became a participant in the First World War in 1917, it remained primarily at war with itself despite the overt activities of Japan. Nevertheless, when the time came to appoint delegates to the peace congress the rival governments did agree, with some difficulty, upon representatives who spoke on behalf of their respective governments for China as a whole. But while the Chinese at Paris presented a united front, the fact that they had not been sent by a united country greatly weakened their position. The result was bitter disappointment to the Chinese people and their sympathizers, who felt that the truth of K'ang Yu-wei's dictum of 1917, "there is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of weak nations," had been demonstrated.

In those stirring times, the position of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang was ineffective. Attempts made in February, June, and September, 1919, to heal the breach between Peking and Canton by the conference method


failed. On neither side of the Yangtze could unity be maintained; in the south as well as in the north, there were rival factions. At Canton, Dr. Sun was alternately in and out of office; when he was out he generally took refuge in his home in the French Concession at Shanghai. This was the case in the autumn of 1919, after a defeat by the Kwangsi military party, and again, after a split in the Kuomintang itself, in April, 1920. In Shanghai the Student Movement was most active and influential, and there, to the benefit of both, during 1919-20 its forces and those of Dr. Sun gradually became allies. Dr. Sun's aims and political philosophy were now discussed by the students with renewed zeal and expounded to the people. The Kuomintang derived strength from its new supporters and, re-organized, became increasingly nationalistic. It vigorously opposed the militarists with their belief in provincial autonomy, based on feudal ideas and methods of government, and denounced many of the policies and actions of the powers and their nationals with respect to China.

In the autumn of 1920, Dr. Sun's faction in the Kuomintang was again in control of Canton and thither he returned in November. Regardless of his devotion to constitutionalism and to peaceful reform, the leader of the Kuomintang accepted an election, in April, 1921, as "President of the Chinese Republic"; this was accomplished by a minority group of the old 1913 parliamentarians, whose terms however elastic could scarcely have been stretched over so extended a period. There were but 222 votes cast, of which 213 were for Dr. Sun; inasmuch, moreover, as a legal quorum of parliament had been 580 and three-fourths of these must have voted for the successful candidate, it is clear that his election was doubly lacking in validity. Nevertheless, it served its purpose, and the distinguished revolutionary was enabled again to raise his standard in the South.

In the summer of 1922, however, Dr. Sun was again ousted and returned as usual to his residence in Shanghai. The Kuomintang leader had made various attempts to obtain help from Canada, England, Hong-kong, the United States, Germany, Japan, and Soviet Russia. From the last-mentioned, only, had he been able to obtain satisfaction. Since early 1919, appeals to China and offers of assistance had been coming in from Russia, from the Bolsheviks themselves and from Chinese in that country. An appeal sent to Canton in March of that year praised Dr. Sun for his perseverance in marching "at the head of Chinese democracy against the Northern Chinese and foreign imperialistic governments of oppression." The government in the north was described as "the puppet of foreign bankers." The disappointment of China at Versailles in 1919 was followed by sweeping and flattering offers from Moscow to return what had been taken from China by "the former Imperial Russian Government." These were followed by several special missions as already described.

If not entirely deaf to the siren singers, both north and south China

were extremely watchful. Until 1924, little progress was made by Moscow in the north; but in December, 1922, Abram Adolf Joffe went from Peking to Shanghai where he conferred with Dr. Sun. After several conversations, the two issued a statement on January 26, 1923, in which they declared that while both agreed that "the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do



Sun Yat-sen. *From China Revolutionized*, by J. S. Thompson, copyright 1913, used by special permission of the publishers, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.

not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism," nevertheless "most cordial and friendly" relations existed between them.

In February, 1923, Dr. Sun was able to return again to Canton to head a South China Government. To that city, in the following autumn, repaired Michael Borodin, not officially but actually to serve as adviser to Dr. Sun and the Kuomintang on behalf of Soviet Russia. Party reorganization was now undertaken, the model chosen being the Communist

Party of Russia. Lines were drawn tighter and re-registration was required. The result was that many earlier members dropped out and authority became centralized in the hands of Dr. Sun, his personal followers and advisers. At the First Party Congress held in January, 1924, it was agreed that Communists, who had been growing in numbers during the past five years, might be admitted, with the provisos that they were to accept Kuomintang principles and that the party did not accept Communist principles.

The entrance of the Communists into the Kuomintang greatly enhanced their power; contrary to plan it was not they who were changed in principle but the Kuomintang. Many of the older members of the party would have nothing to do with the new organization, as its complexion changed from yellow to red. In September, 1924, Sun Fo, the only son of the southern leader, withdrew with his followers from the party as then administered; later he returned to the fold. Meanwhile, the struggle for control of Kwangtung continued. Dr. Sun was forced to depend upon mercenaries from Yünnan, Kwangsi, and Hunan, who conducted themselves as conquerors rather than as fellow-countrymen of the Cantonese. To maintain himself and pay his troops, Dr. Sun, the devotee of liberty, fostered what many declared to be an arbitrary and tyrannical government which mulcted the province of enormous sums.

Great dissatisfaction developed among merchants in particular. With the aid of their volunteer corps in various towns throughout the province, they determined to overturn the Kuomintang government. In mid-October, 1924, Dr. Sun crushed the merchants' volunteer corps; many lives were lost and a considerable part of Canton was destroyed. Shortly after this event, which discredited him amongst powerful elements in Kwangtung, and following the overthrow of Wu P'ei-fu, came the invitation to Dr. Sun to confer in the north with Generals Fêng Yü-hsiang, Chang Tso-lin, and Tuan Ch'i-jui on governmental reorganization.

Not the least ironic aspect of Sun Yat-sen's career was his death, on March 12, 1925, in Peking—base of the power and conservatism against which he had struggled throughout his adult life. He died calling on his followers to fight on for the solution of China's problems along the lines he had, during the preceding quarter of a century, laid down by word of mouth and pen. In death, the Kuomintang leader was infinitely more powerful than he had ever been in life. Although a believer in Christianity, his apotheosis began at once; in effect a religious movement was inaugurated. For this his *San-min-chu-i* or Three Principles of the People—Nationalism, Sovereignty or Democracy, and the People's Livelihood, that is, economic equality for the people—served as the main foundation.⁶

⁶ A brief, but comprehensive, statement of Sun Yat-sen's doctrines is contained in Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang K'ai-shek* (Boston, 1941), pp. 239-54. A more de-

In his writings and speeches, Dr. Sun had proclaimed China's need for the spirit of nationalism. Like Chiang Kai-shek at a later date, the father of the Chinese Republic stressed the importance of "ancient virtues" and China's unique role in the history of the world. Moreover, his naïve hopefulness about the ease of introducing democratic institutions in a country whose traditions were not founded upon Christianity, the Bill of Rights, and constitutional guarantees are almost beyond comprehension today. Nevertheless, his vigorous style and dogmatic certainty lent his speeches and writings something of that flavor peculiar to the effusions of leaders of men. Finally, his concern with the economic welfare of the masses set him apart from his Western-educated contemporaries. Although his plans for bringing about People's Livelihood appear impractical in the light of events that have transpired since 1925, he did focus the attention of China's leaders upon the economic problems vital to the solution of China's political and international problems.

NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS

Agreeing upon the sanctity of their late leader, Dr. Sun's followers were agreed upon little else. Immediately there began a struggle for succession to headship of the party. From this developed control by two men who jointly played an all but dictatorial role for approximately two years. The dominance of one continued to the end of 1948. The sometime colleagues were Michael Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek. The latter, a native of Chekiang, born in 1886, had been graduated from Tokyo military Staff College, had served for a time as a secretary to Dr. Sun and later as his chief of staff. As such in 1923 he had been sent to Moscow to study the Soviet military system and to continue negotiations on behalf of the party leader. In opposition to the more radical groups there and elsewhere, there was, in Peking, a conservative, definitely anti-Communist section of the party known as the Western Hills Group. In Canton, the Central Executive Committee of the party was controlled by a radical, pro-Russian, and more or less pro-Communist group known as the Elder Statesmen. Among these were Liao Chung-kai, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei, adherents of Dr. Sun and the Kuomintang of many years' standing. Liao, the radical labor-peasant leader of Kwangtung, had continued in Japan the discussions with Joffe begun at Shanghai by Dr. Sun in 1922-23. He had been largely responsible in the completion of arrangements for co-operation between Communist Russia and Canton. But for his assassination in August, five months after Sun's death, the Kuomintang-Communist *entente* would, in all likelihood, have had a

tailed work by the same author is entitled *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I* (Baltimore, 1937).

wholly different outcome—considering the facts that he was second only to Dr. Sun in influence and was most ardent in support of the pro-Russian programme. As for Wang, of the Left, and Hu, somewhat less radical, each aspired to the mantle of the late party leader. Personal rivalries between them, coming into the open in 1925, were to be maintained regardless of the state of party or country and to the detriment of both until Hu's death in May, 1936. Generally opposed to the extremists were Sun Fo, the late leader's son, and his followers, designated by some the Prince Faction.

On May 23, 1925, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang passed a resolution announcing its inability to co-operate with the northerners in the reorganization of the country, and calling for co-operation between the party and Soviet Russia. The Nanking Road Shootings in Shanghai on May 30, 1925, the Shameen affair at Canton on June 23, and other brushes between nationals of the treaty powers and Chinese students and laborers, strengthened the position of the radical Left wing of the Kuomintang in Canton and elsewhere.⁷

In June, 1924, at the insistence of Liao and Joffe, a military academy had been established by Dr. Sun at Whampoa, near Canton. Russian military experts aided greatly in the organization and the management of this institution, which had for its aim the education of officers for a national army. As head of this school Chiang Kai-shek first distinguished himself as a national figure. On the assassination of Liao, he stepped from the presidency of the military academy, with the glamour which had surrounded him there, to the control of the South China movement—under the tutelage of Borodin.⁸

By January, 1926, a split had taken place between Chiang and Borodin; the latter left Canton in the following month to visit Fêng Yü-hsiang in the north. In March, Chiang conducted an anti-Communist purge of the government. Early in May, however, Borodin returned with means—namely support for the northern expedition—to win back Chiang temporarily, whereupon Chiang's anti-Communist aides were expelled from power. As during the period of his headship of the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang displayed remarkable agility in running with the Communist hare while hunting with the anti-Communist hounds.⁹

After bringing Kwangtung under his control, Chiang succeeded in

⁷ For details on these incidents see H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), pp. 722–23.

⁸ Biographical data about Chiang may be obtained in H. K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman* (2 vols.; Shanghai, 1931); the authorized and official life. See also, Robert Berkov, *Strong Man of China* (Boston, 1938), and Sven Hedin, *Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China* (New York, 1940).

⁹ On Russian co-operation consult Louis R. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, 1930), II, 539–47; also R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917–31* (New York, 1933), pp. 160–71.

winning Kwangsi. Next a part of Hunan was obtained by union with T'ang Shêng-chih, a militarist who rebelled against the governor of the province. By June, 1926, Chiang was able to send troops into Hunan to the aid of T'ang, the combined forces shortly moving into Hupeh. On September 6, Hankow fell to the Nationalists, as the Southerners were now called. Next to fall were Hanyang and Wuchang, the latter after a thirty-eight day siege. In November and December, Kiangsi and Fukien respectively went over to the Southerners. In January, 1927, Chekiang, General Chiang's native province, joined the winning side; in March Kiangsu, with the rich emporium of Shanghai, was captured. By the end of that month intramural China—except Shantung and Chihli—was under either Nationalist control or that of generals who claimed adherence to the Nationalists.

But what appeared for a moment to be the dawn of victory for national unification, the application of Sun Yat-sen's principles, and the making of China into a modern state qualified to take its place in the family of nations, proved to be a false dawn. The marriage of convenience between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang served mainly to show the incompatibility of their temperaments. The establishment of Nationalist power in Wuhan (Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang) had been followed in December, 1926, by the transfer of the Kuomintang government from Canton to Hankow, the controlling group being under the dictation of Borodin and the Communists. At Nanchang, in Kiangsi, where he was ensconced, Chiang Kai-shek, viewing with jealousy and alarm developments at Hankow, worked vainly for a transfer of the government to his base of power. By the following March, 1927—approximately a year after Chiang had ousted the Communists from Canton—the personal rivalries and political differences between Borodin and Chiang and their respective henchman came to a head. The Hankow Communists and Kuomintang radicals declared the deposition of Chiang as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist armies. It was mainly as a result of this split, and in an attempt to discredit Chiang, that on March 24, 1927, outrages upon the foreign community of Nanking were perpetrated by an advance guard under the control of a Communist general from Hunan.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Chiang shortly established his own government at Nanking; thereupon mutual recriminations between Nanking and Hankow became the order of the day.

In April, 1927, a raid upon the Russian Embassy in Peking, directed by Chang Tso-lin, now in control of the northern capital, uncovered documentary evidence of the studied part being played in Chinese domestic and foreign relations by the Soviet Government. In June, additional evi-

¹⁰ Cf. Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, pp. 737 f.

dence was presented at Hankow to Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei indicating that Borodin, adviser of the Nationalist government, was, by order of the Third International at Moscow, planning the overturn of the Kuomintang. Consequently, in July, a number of Russian and Chinese Communists were forced to leave for Russia by the overland route through northwestern China and Mongolia. Among these were: Borodin; Eugene Chen, the fiery foreign minister of the Wuhan government and born a British subject; and General Blücher (Galens), who had been chief military adviser and strategist in the Nationalist move to the Yangtze Valley. Madame Sun Yat-sen also shortly withdrew to Moscow.

As a means of healing the breach between the radical Wuhan, the more moderate Nanking, and the almost conservative Western Hills groups of the Kuomintang, General Chiang Kai-shek resigned his offices and retired to private life on August 12, 1927. Shortly afterward he went to Japan. His absence, however, did not have the desired effect; accordingly he returned to China early in November. On December 1, he married Miss Soong, a sister of Madame Sun, of Madame H. H. Kung, and of T. V. Soong. This alliance enhanced Chiang's position and that of what has come to be known in China as the "Soong Dynasty." In less than ten days after his marriage he was requested to become generalissimo of the Nationalists—a request to which he was pleased shortly to accede.

A Communist coup in Canton on December 11, accompanied by the setting up of a "Red" government, was followed three days later by the fall of the city to a general who supported Nanking. Then occurred a wholesale purging of Canton of Russian and communistic influence, accompanied by the arrest and severe treatment of the Russian consul-general and the execution without trial of the Russian vice-consul with a number of other Russians suspected of communism. Though formal relations had not been entered into, Nanking on December 15 made a gesture of severing its nonexistent diplomatic ties with Moscow. Shortly afterward, Wang Ching-wei, the radical opponent of Chiang Kai-shek and the stormy petrel of the Kuomintang, withdrew from China.

The years immediately after 1927 constituted for the Communists a period of revaluation and reappraisal of their program for China. Divorced from the Kuomintang and driven underground by their efforts to seize power in the cities they failed to rouse the urban workers to class action. Continued failures resulted in the overthrow of Ch'en Tu-hsiu as secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Thereafter, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Ho Lung became the dominant figures as the Communists concentrated their attention upon the rural population, the founding of Soviets, and the organization of the Red Army. Although not so immediately a threat to the Kuomintang, the new line of organizing Communism in one country (by analogy with contemporary events in Soviet

Russia) laid the foundations for the widespread popularity of Communism two decades later.

Meanwhile, attempts by the Nationalists, during the summer of 1927, to seize Peking and control the country north of the Yangtze failed. This was owing to their own divisions and to the dispatch of troops to Shantung by Japan in May and June. With the reorganization of the Nanking government in February, 1928, preparations were undertaken for another attempt in collaboration with Fêng and Yen. The latter dispatched troops along the Peking-Hankow railway, while Chiang advanced by way of the Tientsin-Pukow line to the east. Again Japan intervened in Shantung, from Tsingtao to Tsinan, for the purpose of taking, as officially declared, "adequate self-defense measures in case peace and order in districts where Japanese are residing is disturbed. . . ." The result was a serious clash between the Japanese and the Nanking troops at Tsinan in May. This prevented Chiang from reaching Peking. Yen and Fêng, however, continued their advance, and on June 8, the Shansi troops were in the old capital. In less than a fortnight the Peking-Tientsin area had been brought under control by the allies of the Nationalists, and Nanking had changed the name of Peking, meaning Northern Capital, to Peiping—Northern Peace—a name which it retained until the autumn of 1937, when, following a succession of Japanese victories in northern intramural China, the old name was restored for the war period. Chang Tso-lin, having withdrawn from Peking for Manchuria, on the night of June 2–3, was mysteriously assassinated by a bomb explosion which wrecked his train as it was entering Mukden on June 4.

THE "CONSTITUTIONAL" REGIME

October 10, 1928, the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of revolution in Wuchang, was celebrated by the inauguration in Nanking of the National Government of the Republic of China. Six days earlier an Organic Law had been instituted by the party. This law (revised in December, 1931, and again in December, 1932) and the *Yüeh Fa*, or Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period, of June 1, 1932, constituted the basic instruments of the Nanking government to December 25, 1947. Distinctly and frankly a party government—that of the Kuomintang—the party and the government being inextricably interlocked by committees and councils, as in the case of Soviet Russia. In this, as in other channels, the influence of Borodin and his Russian colleagues was felt long after they had withdrawn from China.

Sun Yat-sen had outlined the development of a government for the country passing through three stages, *viz.*: Revolution, or the Military Phase; Tutelage, or the Disciplinary Phase; and finally that of the Con-

stitution, when the government shall be handed over to the "People" by the Kuomintang. The ceremonies of October, 1928, were considered to mark the end of the first phase and the opening of the second; the latter, it was announced, would continue to the year 1935. Subsequent events have caused expressions of doubt from time to time as to whether the first phase has yet ended.

The organization of the Kuomintang is based upon the party constitution as adopted at the first congress held at Canton in January, 1924, and later amended. The supreme organ of the party is, in theory, the National Congress, which was, again in theory, elected by local units until, at the third congress in March, 1929, the party constitution was amended. By this action authority was granted to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee¹¹ to issue regulations "concerning the organization of the Convention [that is, party congress], the election of delegates, and the apportionment of representation. . . ." The congress may, in fact practically must, be "packed" owing to lack of electoral machinery and to the amendment mentioned. It is supposed to meet biennially, or oftener, and must be convened at least every three years. Its duties are simple; they consist of expressing approval of reports submitted by the government, amending the party constitution, enunciating new aims for the government, and electing the all-important Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees of the party. From these two committees the Kuomintang government for practical purposes receives its mandate.¹²

When neither the central committees nor the congress are in session, the repository of power is the Standing Committee (nine members) of the C. E. C. The nine members of the Standing Committee of the C. E. C. constitute in reality an oligarchy against whose will there is no appeal.

There was no Bill of Rights in the Organic Law promulgated in October, 1928, and if there had been it would not have affected the C. E. C., since that group is above the law itself. This accounts in part for numerous arbitrary acts from time to time characterizing the Nanking Government. The incorporation of a section (2) entitled "Rights and Duties of the People" in the *Yüeh Fa*, or Provisional Constitution promulgated in 1931, did not affect the position of the C. E. C.—nor did it add materially to the safety of those who come into conflict with the ruling party.

The National Government was, as previously stated, the creature of the Kuomintang. As constituted in 1928, under the Organic Law, it was composed of a President of the National Government—not a president of China; a State Council, with a membership of from twelve to sixteen—later increased "from twenty-four to thirty-six"—under the chairmanship of the president of the government; and five *Yüan*, or Boards, namely,

¹¹ Hereafter referred to as C. E. C.

¹² Cf. *China Year Book*, 1933, p. 239.

Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control. From these Boards, outlined by Dr. Sun,¹³ derives the term Five-Power Government. The *Yüan* were in practice the highest administrative organs in their respective spheres. They were mutually co-ordinate and independent but their policies and deeds were subject to approval by the party C. E. C. to which committee each was responsible.¹⁴

The Executive *Yüan* decided on bills, budgets, amnesties, and declarations of war and negotiations for peace to be submitted to the Legislative *Yüan*; also upon the appointment and dismissal of administrative and judicial officials of the three highest ranks; upon matters beyond the competence of the Ministries and Commissions, and other matters upon which "according to law or in the opinion of the President of the Executive *Yüan*, should be decided at the meetings of the said *Yüan*."¹⁵ The President of the Executive *Yüan*, after the reorganization of the government in 1931–32, became the actual executive of the government—though not necessarily the most powerful individual in the government. He occupied a position approximately parallel to a prime minister in a parliamentary system.

The Legislative *Yüan*, composed of from forty-nine to ninety-nine members serving two-year terms, dealt mainly with matters submitted to it by the Executive *Yüan* but also with those submitted by the other three *Yüan* within their respective competences.

The Judicial *Yüan* consisted of the Supreme Court—the president of which was the president of the *Yüan*—the Administrative Court, and the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Functionaries, presided over by the vice-president of the *Yüan*.

The Examination *Yüan* exercised, "according to law, the powers of examination and the determination of qualifications for public service."¹⁶ It consisted of the Examinations Commission and the Ministry of Personnel which later was organized, like the ministries under the Executive *Yüan*, with a minister and a political and an administrative vice-minister.¹⁷

The Control *Yüan*, comprising twenty-nine to forty-nine members, was "the highest supervisory organ of the National Government."¹⁸ It exercised powers of impeachment and auditing, the former through its total membership, the latter through a Ministry consisting of a minister, two vice-ministers, deputies, secretariat, auditors, assistant auditors, and inspectors.

¹³ Cf. *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary* (London, no date), Appendix II, p. 239. For details see Paul M. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang K'ai-shek* (Boston, 1941), especially chap. II.

¹⁴ Cf. *China Year Book*, 1934, p. 460.

¹⁵ Article 24, Section IV, Revised Organic Law (December 29, 1931, and December 27, 1932).

¹⁶ Revised Organic Law, *op. cit.*, Article 42, Section VII.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 44, Section VII.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 46, Section VIII.

Several subordinate agencies were set up as entities independent of the five *Yüan*. Outstanding among these before 1937 were the highest military organs, which were four in number. Less powerful than the military organs, but possibly of more significance ultimately, were four other organs of the government, namely, (1) the Academia Sinica with its nine scientific research institutes in the fields of chemistry, physics, astronomy, meteorology, geology, history, philology, psychology and the social sciences; (2) the National Reconstruction Commission, and (3) the National Economic Council which two organs, with the aid of technical experts delegated by the League of Nations, accomplished remarkable results in engineering (including highway construction, flood prevention and relief, water power, and electrical industry) and in the fields of public health, rural reconstruction, mass education, and rehabilitation of the silk industry;¹⁹ (4) the Comptroller-General's office, or Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, which had for its aims the scientific collecting, budgeting, and public reporting of the country's finances. This department was under the direct supervision of the president of the national government. Like the National Economic Council, it owed its inception mainly to T. V. Soong, the ablest of the ministers of finance produced under the Kuomintang republic.

Under the control of the National Government—in theory, but not in fact—were the twenty-eight provinces plus Mongolia and Tibet.²⁰ The provinces included the old eighteen south of the wall; the former Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria; the former Special Administrative Areas of Jehol, Suiyüan, and Chahar; the former dominions of Chinghai and Sinkiang; a portion of Kansu now organized as the province of Ninghsia; and Hsikang, formerly called the Western Marches of Szechuan.

A provincial government legally, but not always in practice, was composed of a group of from seven to nine Administrative Members appointed from Nanking, one of them being designated chairman of the provincial government. The provinces were subdivided into *hsien*, or districts, totaling 1943, each administered by a magistrate, district council and several bureaus. The magistrate, during the period of political tutelage, was examined and recommended by the provincial government and appointed by the National Government. Ideally, the smaller units of local government had elected chairmen.

In the years since the institution in 1928 of the National Government numerous changes in personnel and in detail of organization were necessarily made. With one conspicuous exception, however, the frame of government and its functioning have remained essentially as then out-

¹⁹ *China Year Book*, 1934, p. 461.

²⁰ Cf. Article 1, Section 1, Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period, and Article 4, Part I, of Proposed Constitution of China.

lined. The exception to be noted has to do with the executive power of the presidents of the National Government and the Executive *Yüan*; it is integrally connected with the perennial struggle between civilian and military elements for control of the country as well as the personal rivalries of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and his opponents.

When the National Government was inaugurated on October 10, 1928, Chiang was chairman of the C. E. C. and its standing committee. He was, as might be expected, chosen president of the new government, which office included the chairmanship of the State Council. Co-operating with the latter at this time, although unmentioned in the Organic Law, were the Central Military and the Central Research councils. Of the former Marshal Chiang was also chairman. An indirect result of hostilities with Japan, which synchronized with continued intra-governmental struggles, were the revisions, in 1931 and 1932, of the Organic Law of 1928 in attempts to limit the power of Marshal Chiang and curb tendencies toward consolidation of a dictatorship. As hitherto, the president of the government was to be "selected and appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang," but henceforward he was definitely to "hold office for two years" with the possibility of reappointment—and "have no actual political responsibility" and "not hold any concurrent Government post." Article 9 of the original Organic Law, quoted above, was repealed by omission and substitution; accordingly the post of president of government, however honorable, was rendered innocuous from the point of view of a dictatorship. Though not stated in the revised law, it was agreed in the Central Executive and the Central Supervisory Committee in December, 1931, that a candidate for the post should be a man of recognized probity and integrity of the minimum age of sixty years. The latter qualification, if not the former, precluded the possibility of an election of Marshal Chiang (born in 1886) to the presidency. Contemporaneously, as mentioned above, the executive power of the government was concentrated in the presidency of the Executive *Yüan* to which office Chiang's longtime rival, Wang Ching-wei, was appointed.

In connection with these changes, two facts should be borne in mind: first, political power, in so far as it is concentrated, lay not in the government but in the Standing Committee of the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang—of which Marshal Chiang and Wang Ching-wei, continued to be members; second, there was little to indicate that the civilian and the military elements in China had struck an equilibrium. He who controlled the armies of the party and the government possessed at least nine points of the law and need worry but little over the title under which he ruled.

CONTINUATION OF INTERNAL STRIFE

From the taking of Peking by the Nationalist allies in June, 1928, until March of the following year, there was, from a military point of view, peace in China; nevertheless, internal political strife between the central government and five regional areas went on almost uninterruptedly, as was also the case between conflicting forces in the government itself. In Manchuria, Chang Hsüeh-liang succeeded his father, Chang Tso-lin, as ruler of the Three Eastern Provinces. In December, 1928, the young marshal, having two months earlier been appointed a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government, raised the Nationalist flag in Mukden, thus recognizing Nanking as his superior and thereby causing umbrage to Japan which was to have important results. The chief significance of the reunion of Manchuria with intramural China was that, theoretically at least, Nanking became the director of Manchuria's foreign relations. In Shansi and Chihli, Yen Hsi-shan the "model" ruler, was in control of the "model province." Over Kansu, Shensi, and Honan, Fêng Yü-hsiang ruled with little or no supervision from Nanking. In the Wuhan area, including the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, Li Tsung-jen, whose attitude in 1927 had contributed to the temporary retirement of Chiang Kai-shek, was in control. Kwangsi and Kwangtung were more or less under the control of Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sun), who at times was an adherent of Chiang and Nanking.

Regionalism, provincialism, jealousy, and suspicion were too strong to permit disbandment, unity, and centralization to be brought about. In March, 1929, the Kwangsi faction of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang defied Nanking from the Wuhan area. With the aid of Colonel Max Bauer, sometime chief of staff to General Ludendorff but now military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, the latter was able, early in April, temporarily to crush the rebellion and seize Hankow. An attempt by the Kwangsiites to gain control of Kwangtung, following their expulsion from Wuhan, failed; thereafter they retired to their native province to be heard from again from time to time.

During the summer and fall of 1929, while China was at odds with Russia over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the revolts of the Kwangsiites and Fêng Yu-hsiang continued to plague the government at Nanking. Time after time Nanking's punitive armies were called upon to quell revolt. Wang Ching-wei and the Left Wing Reorganizationists repeatedly encouraged and aided the revolting warlords in their frenzied effort to prevent the ascendancy of Chiang Kai-shek. A truce between the warring groups was not again arranged until the end of November, 1929, and even then China was ready for neither peace nor unity. In December, Wang Ching-wei was solemnly expelled from membership in

the Kuomintang and the government was able to finish the year with an uncertain degree of equanimity.

How uncertain was this degree became manifest early in 1930. During the rebellion of Fêng and the Northwestern generals in October and November preceding, Yen Hsi-shan—after apparently allying himself with the rebels—had “graciously” accepted an appointment by Nanking to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the National forces. The value to the government of its new Deputy Commander became clear when he and Fêng formed an alliance. In February, Yen telegraphed to Chiang advising the latter to retire from office and accompany him abroad. Ensued then a somewhat lengthy correspondence between the Nanking authorities and Yen which gave each group a chance to explain its apparent motives, appeal to public opinion, and collect its forces for renewal of war. This began on March 18 with the seizure by Yen’s Shansi forces of control of Peiping and the advance of allied forces in northern Kiangsu. On April 1 the Shansi Marshal assumed office as commander-in-chief of the armies of the northern coalition numbering about 400,000 men. Those of Nanking, approximating 250,000 faced not only the northern armies but those of the Kwangsi leaders and Chang Fa-k’uei in Hunan. The war lasted for six months (*ca.* March 18–September 18), being terminated by the military successes of Nanking in conjunction with the fateful intervention of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang from Manchuria.

Contemporaneously with the outbreak of fighting, Marshal Yen advocated a union government of the northern leaders and those of the Left Wing Reorganizationists; he himself would direct political affairs while Wang Ching-wei should head the Kuomintang. The latter, as a Cantonese patriot, despite his willingness to bless any and all opponents of Chiang Kai-shek, hesitated to throw in his lot personally with the northerners. By midsummer, however, he overcame his scruples and, late in July, appeared in Peiping. Here he announced certain of his reasons for opposition to the Nanking section of the Kuomintang: his desire for the early assembling of a people’s conference based on free election of delegates; the encouragement of the people to exercise their rights of citizenship during the political-tutelage stage, including participation in local self-government; and the right of the people freely to organize political parties in opposition to the Kuomintang. A government of the ends against the middle, known as that of the Enlarged Conference, was formally instituted in Peiping on September 1, 1930.

From the inception of the northern rebellion the leaders on both sides had appealed to Chang Hsüeh-liang, the Manchurian marshal, for support. The northerners elected him to membership in their State Council. Nanking appointed him Deputy Commander-in-Chief of its forces. As if sensing a turning point in his career, the young marshal hesitated for

months; it was late in August before he intimated his final decision not to ally himself with a group which included his father's enemies but none the less to intervene in the struggle. In the meantime affairs, which had earlier favored the northerners, turned against them and in less than a fortnight after formally instituting a new government, Marshal Yen announced his retirement. Four days later—September 18—Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang by circular telegram commanded the cessation of hostilities and permitted those of his troops who had been held in leash at Shanhaikwan to advance on Peiping. On the twenty-second the old northern capital passed under Manchurian control as did Tientsin on the thirtieth. The collapse of the Enlarged Conference government in Peiping was quickly followed by that of its military campaign. On October 13 President Chiang was able to announce the victorious conclusion of the most sanguinary domestic struggle in the history of republican China to that time.

The northern leaders scattered. Wang Ching-wei again sought refuge in Europe whence he was to return in the following spring again to trouble, but finally to become a collaborator with, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek. Marshal Fêng shortly retired to the mountains of southern Shansi where he resided until the autumn of 1931. Following the split among the Nanking-Canton leaders, and Marshal Chiang's temporary retirement from state affairs in December of that year, Fêng reappeared in the role of peacemaker and was reinstated to membership in the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. In January, 1932, he became a State Councillor in the reorganized national government and later a standing member of the National Military Council. Once more, at least, in connection with the renewed invasion of the Japanese in North China in 1933, he was to constitute an alarm from without. Marshal Yen, having ceased to be head of the Enlarged Conference which had died a-borning, decided the time was ripe to put into effect plans earlier announced for foreign travel. He took refuge for a time in Dairen, later traveled in Japan, and returned to his province in September, 1931, contemporaneously with the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria.²¹ Pardoned, by Nanking, he again became a member of the C. E. C., and State Councillor of the national government, and he continued to rule Shansi over the destinies of which he had presided with constructive and, in general, peaceful success since 1912.

THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION (*Yüeh Fa*)

The intervention of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, with the concomitant ending of the Yen-Fêng revolt, was followed by the definite casting-in of

²¹ *North China Herald*, Vol. 181 (October 6, 1931), p. 6.

his lot with Nanking. He assumed office as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of China's national forces on October 9, 1930. In mid-November he participated in person in the Fourth Plenary Session of the Third Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Nanking.

Immediately prior to the opening of the session, President Chiang outlined to the nation five objectives of his government. These were the extirpation of communism and banditry; the rehabilitation of national finances, including the enforcement of budgetary, accounting, and auditing systems with publicity of all accounts, national and local; the development of an honest and effective administration with demarcation of officials' powers and the removal of inefficient and corrupt office holders; the economic development of the country with the aid of foreign capital, particularly for the expansion of communications, agriculture, water conservancy, mining, and other basic industries; and, finally, the enforcement of the district autonomy system.

Among the resolutions adopted at the November, 1930, session of the C. E. C. were those for (1) a reorganization of the machinery of the central government, including measures for the reform and discipline of officials through the implementing of the control *Yüan* with powers to impeach officials and audit accounts; (2) a revision of the Organic Law of 1928 looking in part toward the strengthening of the executive; (3) the outlining of the future activities of Kuomintang members and organs; (4) the reorganization of the national army—with direct control by the Commander-in-Chief; and (5) the convocation of a People's Convention on May 5, 1931.

Of these resolutions the last was of greatest immediate significance. In the first place, it reflected the spirit, and one of the chief aims, of Wang Ching-wei in participating in the Enlarged Conference government at Peiping of the preceding summer. He had vigorously advocated the calling of a People's Convention as well as the Convocation of the third national party congress. Wang in person might be in exile but his spirit hovered over Nanking. Out of the resolution to call the convention logically ensued the decision to draft a provisional constitution. Dr. Sun had also advocated the adoption of an instrument of government for the second stage of the revolution, the disciplinary period of tutelage, which should precede the adoption of the permanent constitution of the third and final period of constitutional reconstruction.

The decision to promulgate a provisional constitution was reached on February 28, 1931; it brought to a climax differences between the two outstanding leaders of the Kuomintang in office, Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min. President of the Legislative *Yüan*, and second only in importance to Chiang, Hu was suspected by some to be desirous of outshining the party leader. He had criticized the government for expenditures con-

nected with the recent campaign in the north and, independently, had advocated a loan from the American government of one million ounces of silver for the stabilization of finances and economic reconstruction—a proposal to which T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, objected. Critical of Chiang's dictatorial powers, which he feared would be strengthened and rendered permanent by a People's Convention, Hu now seized upon an implied wish of the late Dr. Sun, to the effect that the establishment of local self-government should precede the promulgation of a provisional constitution. As a result of his attempts to obstruct the wishes of Chiang and the latter's supporters, Hu's resignation from office was accepted by the Standing Committee of the C. E. C. on March 2, 1931. To prevent his withdrawal from Nanking, potentially dangerous to that government, Hu was detained in the capital "to avoid," as Marshal Chiang announced, "misunderstanding as well as to disarm his critics." The latter added: "Comrade Hu has a long record in our Party, which is the hard-earned result of several decades of strenuous struggle. . . . We really loathe to see such a long record as Comrade Hu's wrecked in a single day. Therefore, both for the sake of the public and his own interest, we are anxious to devise measures to preserve him [from ruin]." ²²

Hu Han-min was not alone, however, in being disgruntled and in harboring suspicions of Chiang Kai-shek. He had friends in Nanking, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi who were quick to seize the opportunity to embarrass the too powerful commander-in-chief. The Kwangsi faction and Chang Fa-k'uei's "Ironsides" had kept up guerilla warfare in the south despite the collapse, in the preceding autumn, of their northern allies of the Peiping Enlarged Conference. In October, 1930, Chiang had despatched a Kwangsi general, Ma Shao-chun, from Nanking to effect by diplomacy a settlement with the southerners. Ma's mission produced no permanent results.

Meanwhile so unstable had become the position of Chiang's henchman in Kwangtung, General Ch'en Ming-ch'u, chairman of the provincial government, that on April 26, 1931, he withdrew to Hongkong and thence to Japan. General Chen Chi-tang, who in January had gone north to confer with Chiang, now announced the independence of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Fukien, and Hunan and called upon Chiang either to resign his offices or fight to retain them. Other Cantonese leaders joined in impeaching Chiang while those of Kwangsi hastened to make clear that their feelings, so often wounded by the Nanking generalissimo, remained in a state of exacerbation. Their dislike of Chiang being temporarily stronger than their mutual distrust, the guiding stars of the two

²² *China Year Book*, 1931-32, p. 530. See also the discussion in Pan Wei-tung, *The Chinese Constitution. A Study of Forty Years of Constitution Making in China* (Washington, 1945), especially chap. III.

provinces drew together. Early in May, State Councillor Sun Fo, Vice-President of the Examination *Yüan* and Minister of Railways, and Wang Ch'ung-hui, President of the Judicial *Yüan*, retired from Nanking to Shanghai whence the former, with Eugene Chen, shortly proceeded to Hongkong to meet Wang Ching-wei (who had recently returned from Europe) and the aged T'ang Shao-yi, prominent Elder Statesman of early republican fame. By the end of May a "National Government" had been established in Canton under the direction of Wang Ching-wei, T'ang Shao-yi, Sun Fo, and Eugene Chen. Thus the perennial rivalries of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei continued to manifest themselves through rival governments—each claiming legitimacy through Sun Yat-sen.

In the meantime, Nanking, with a modicum of serenity, completed its plans for, and held, a National People's Convention which, according to its critics, was packed, there being no machinery for free elections. The *Yüeh Fa*, or Provisional Constitution, upon which Hu Han-min had animadverted, was presented to the convention. A committee, consisting of Chiang Kai-shek and ten others, had been appointed on March 2, 1931, by the Standing Committee of the C. E. C.—simultaneously with its acceptance of Hu Han-min's resignation. The body of 475 delegates, out of a total of 530, representing every province but Kwangtung, sat from May 5 to May 17. It formally adopted the constitution in its final form of a preamble, eight chapters and eighty-nine articles.

The preamble declared the intention of the national government to reconstruct the Republic of China on the basis of the Three Principles of the People and the Constitution of Five Powers, which were declared to form the underlying principle of the revolution. The chapter headings are: I. General Principles, among which are the declarations that the territory of the republic consists of "the various provinces and Mongolia and Tibet" and that the "Republic of China shall be a unified republic forever"; II. Rights and Duties of the People, consisting of axiomatic provisions for civil rights to be enforced, or waived, "in accordance with law"; III. Essentials of Political Tutelage, during which period the political policies shall be carried out in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Outline of National Reconstruction"; IV. People's Livelihood, comprising broad but definite plans for the economic development of the country and its inhabitants; V. Education of the Citizens, based on Dr. Sun's *Three Principles of the People*, by government supervision of all public and private educational institutions, free education for all children of school age, encouragement for education of overseas Chinese, and government patronage for research in science and the arts; VI. Division of Power between the Central and Local governments, with restrictions upon the latter to encourage the strengthening of the former; VII. Organization of the Governments, central and local, with continuation of the Five Power

or *Yüan* (that is, Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control) government controlled by the Kuomintang; the C. E. C. to select and appoint the President of the National Government (*not* a president of China) and the State Councillors; the heads of the *Yüan*, ministries and commissions to be "appointed or dismissed in accordance with law by the National Government at the instance of the President of the National Government"; provincial governments to be directed by the national government until "a province reaches the period of Constitutionalism [when] the [Provincial] Assembly of People's Delegates may elect a Provincial Governor"; VIII. Annex, providing for (1) the nullification of all laws in conflict with the Provisional Constitution, (2) the power of interpretation to be exercised by the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang, (3) the drafting of a permanent constitution by the Legislative *Yüan* "on the basis of the 'Outline of National Reconstruction' as well as the achievements during the political tutelage and constitutional periods"; and (4) that "when a majority of the provinces in the country reach the period of Constitutionalism—that is, when district autonomy has been completely instituted throughout each of such provinces—then the National Government shall immediately summon a National People's Congress to decide upon the adoption and promulgation of the Permanent Constitution." The Provisional Constitution was promulgated on June 1, 1931 and remained in force until December 25, 1947.

In addition to enacting the *Yüeh Fa*, the National People's Convention adopted, on behalf of the nation, "the entire body of the bequeathed teachings of the late Party Leader of the Kuomintang of China."²³ This was the first time that the Chinese as a people—in contrast to the members of the ruling party—were held officially to have expressed approval of Dr. Sun's teachings as a national creed. A corollary of this was the resolution declaring the abolition of all unequal treaties and the issue of a manifesto announcing to the world that the people would no longer recognize such and calling upon the government "in conformity with Dr. Sun's testamentary injunction [to] achieve, with the least possible delay, China's equality and independence in the family of nations." The manifesto included also a condemnation of Communism, a "new foreign menace," and enjoined upon the people "to stand together as one man in supporting the Government in carrying out its anti-Communist campaign."²⁴

To add to the confusion of rebels in the north, rebels in the south, and Communists in the heart of the country, the worst flood in the history of China occurred during the summer of 1931. Phenomenally heavy rains caused the Yangtze River and its tributaries—in normal times controlled in part by thousands of miles of dykes—to overflow. An area about 900

²³ *China Year Book*, 1931–32, p. 533.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

miles in length averaging forty miles in width was turned into a lake besides which an additional 8000 square miles were flooded. "It is estimated from the best population figures obtainable that 23,500,000 persons [were] directly affected. . . ." ²⁵ Of these many thousands were drowned and vast numbers suffered illness or death from disease; starvation reaped its toll not alone from immediate lack of food but from the tardy recession of the waters which prevented the tilling of the land even when seed was available.



Three Soong Sisters. Left to right: Madame H. H. Kung, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Wide World Photo

All attempts on the part of Nanking to heal the breach with the south had ended in failure; nothing less than the retirement of Chiang would mollify the southerners. Early in August, 1931, contemporary with the collapse of Shih Yu-san's rebellion, Kwangsi troops invaded Hunan and Marshal Chiang ordered the mobilization of his forces to fight the Kwangsi-Kwangtung Clique. While the Yangtze was still in flood and civil war on a grand scale appeared to be the only solution of the Nanking-Canton imbroglio the world was alarmed by the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria between China and Japan.

²⁵ G. G. Stroebe, Chief Survey Engineer, Yangtze River Commission and National Flood Relief Commission, *China Year Book* (1932), p. 387.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA IN JAPAN

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Unlike China, Japan, in the first generation of the twentieth century, quickly adjusted itself to the Western impact. After the Restoration of 1868, the feudal and decentralized political organization of Japan was gradually replaced by a more modern and centralized government under the leadership of the Meiji *tennō*. Through a civil bureaucracy reminiscent of pre-shogunal government, the Western clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa dominated the Meiji political regime. Under internal and foreign pressure, the samurai of the Western clans developed provisional institutions to lead Japan through the transitional era between feudalism and constitutionalism. Abolition of the traditional clans, elimination of the old system of law and justice, creation of a new nobility, establishment of new governmental councils and agencies were contrived by the clansmen in the name of the "divinely descended" emperor. Loyalty of all groups to the "line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal" made easier the dissipation of the strong feudal forces opposing the new order, and made simpler the organization of a centralized state.¹

The economic and social transformation of nineteenth-century Japan was accompanied by demands for more modern political institutions. The Charter Oath of 1869 had promised that "learning shall be sought for throughout the world." As early as 1870, Ito Hirobumi, a Choshu samurai, visited Washington to study the American constitution. Ito believed, however, that the American document would not fit Japan's traditions or requirements. Later he studied seriously the Prussian constitution and derived therefrom numerous features ultimately incorporated in the Japanese document of 1889. The Charter Oath had also promised that "all measures shall be decided by impartial discussion." During the seventies, therefore, when the ferment for parliamentary institutions reached a high pitch, political factions made their appearance. As a result of this increasing agitation, the Meiji emperor promised in 1881 to establish a parliament by 1890. The proclamation also included reference to

¹ For careful and detailed discussions of the Restoration and preconstitutional period, see J. H. Gubbins, *Making of Modern Japan* (New York, 1922); W. W. McLaren, *Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era* (New York, 1916); and the excellent study by E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940).

"limitations upon the Imperial prerogative" which was taken to mean imperial agreement to the promulgation of a constitution.

In 1884, Ito and his colleagues began to write Japan's constitution. Two years later the first draft was completed. After undergoing the tests of discussion and debate, the draft document finally won general approval from the official hierarchy. Upon submitting the constitution to the Privy Council for ratification, Ito supplied extensive *Commentaries* to explain and amplify its more controversial points.² After deliberating for eight months, the draft was ratified by the Privy Council and on February 11, 1889, it was proclaimed the law of the land without further reference to anyone. In other words, the constitution was generally considered a free gift from a benevolent emperor, and not a document emanating from the people.

The Japanese constitution provided for a government which was a compromise between old and new.³ Although an Imperial Diet was created, the methods of election and its limited powers prevented the Diet from being a truly representative body. Actually, the Japanese Diet, like its Prussian prototype, was a bicameral deliberative assembly opened, closed, and prorogued by the emperor. The upper chamber, called the House of Peers, included six classes of members ranging from princes of the blood to representatives of those subjects paying three hundred yen or more each year in direct taxes. The lower chamber, called the House of Representatives, was elected by the people. The suffrage, however, was limited by sex (exclusively male suffrage) and by tax qualifications. Even the comparatively liberal election law of 1925 denied suffrage to women, to persons without a specific residence, and to recipients of charity. The legislative powers of the Diet were delegated to it by "the Emperor [who] exercises the legislative power" with its consent. Even though the Diet's most important function was approval of the annual budget, the financial independence of the government was protected by a provision reading that "when the Imperial Diet has not voted on the budget, or when the budget has not been brought into actual existence, the government shall carry out the budget of the preceding year"—a device inherited directly from the political tactics of Bismarck.

The powers of the executive were carefully safeguarded in other ways from interference by the representatives of the people. The cabinet,

² Ito Hirobumi, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*, 2nd ed. trans. by Ito Myoji (Tokyo, 1906).

³ There are numerous thorough accounts of Japan's constitutional history. See especially H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics* (New York, 1931); and T. Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (New York, 1935), Part I. R. K. Reischauer, *Japan. Government and Politics* (New York, 1938). Consult also the articles by Kenneth W. Colegrove, "Parliamentary Government in Japan," *The American Political Science Review*, XXI (1927), 835-52; "The Japanese Privy Council," *ibid.*, XXV (1931), 589-614, 881-905; "The Japanese Emperor," *ibid.*, XXVI (1932), 642-59, 828-45; "The Japanese Cabinet," *ibid.*, XXX (1936), 903-23; "The Japanese Constitution," *ibid.*, XXXI (1937), 1027-49.

which had preceded the parliament in existence by several years, was not directly responsible to either house of the Diet. The premier in practice was responsible to the emperor alone for specific, as well as for general, cabinet policies. All ministers, except those holding defense portfolios, were completely under the control of the premier. Provision was made that the defense ministers should have direct access to the emperor, and should therefore be beyond the control of the premier in military and naval decisions of grave importance. Nor could a cabinet be formed without the sanction of the General Staff. Such practices also rather clearly reflected the Prussian influence.

Although Ito Hirobumi in the *Commentaries* held that complete sovereignty was part of the imperial prerogative, certain constitutional theorists led by Professor Minobe later argued that the emperor ought to be merely an organ of the state with the final authority reposing in the state.⁴ The Charter Oath itself had certainly suggested a more democratic government than the constitution brought into existence. Conflict over interpretation of the constitution was one of the starting points in the struggle between the strong conservative group and their much weaker, liberal opponents. Although the constitution established surface unity, the political life of the next forty years was disturbed by perpetual struggle.

Even before 1889, bitter conflict had been in progress between the advocates of modern parliamentary and party government and the Satsuma-Choshu bureaucrats, who wielded autocratic power from the shadowy precincts of the throne. The convocation of the Diet in 1890 did not end the struggle, it merely provided new opportunities for expression. Until 1898 the power of the Choshu and Satsuma men was maintained without interruption, the premiers being appointed alternately from these two clans. Party government was thereafter attempted for the first time under the leadership of Okuma and Itagaki, neither of whom belonged to the two great clans. Inability to divide the spoils peacefully and interminable factional strife brought about the fall of Okuma's cabinet after only four months in office. Actually, the coalition movement (*Kenseito*) which Okuma headed was not designed primarily, as was sometimes alleged, to foster the growth of responsible government. Party politicians were mainly concerned with capturing the offices and powers of the bureaucrats. After their initial failure, it was not until twenty years later that the parties again had control of the cabinet.

After the fall of Okuma, the government was controlled until 1918 by the bureaucracy and the *genrō* with the intermittent aid of the parties. The *genrō* was an extraconstitutional body composed of elderly clan lead-

⁴ For an interesting exposition of Minobe's point of view see Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12. Also consult K. W. Colegrove, "The Treaty-Making Power in Japan," *American Journal of International Law*, XXV (1931), 276-97.

ers who had increasingly assumed important powers in the government from the days of the imperial restoration to the death of Prince Saionji, the last of their number, in 1940. As personal advisers to the emperor, and as makers and destroyers of cabinets, their authority for two generations was responsible for maintaining bureaucratic government. Paralleling the struggle between the Satsuma-Choshu bureaucrats and the proponents of party government, serious strife divided the advocates of civil administration from the militarists. After 1898, the outstanding protagonists in this conflict were, ironically enough, two great Choshu clansmen, the princes Ito and Yamagata. In his last years Ito became a reluctant convert to party participation for the more effective functioning of government. Yamagata was unequivocally opposed to alliance with the parties and was an ardent proponent of expansion by military means. He was strongly in favor of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese War of ten years later. Ito, who opposed the annexation of Korea, was assassinated in 1909 by a misled Korean patriot. The great constitutionalist's mantle fell on the shoulders of his former protégé, the aristocratic statesman, Marquis (later Prince) Saionji. For slightly over a decade (1904-14), Saionji led the Seiyukai as successor to Ito, the founder of the party. Thereafter, Saionji was exalted to the position of an elder statesman. In this capacity he acted during his last years as the emperor's adviser.

Owing mainly to their successful conduct of the wars with China and Russia, and to the spectacular territorial gains in the Pacific and on the mainland of Asia, the bureaucrats and the militarists were able to control Nipponese destinies until 1918. During the years from 1901 to 1913, General Katsura Taro, a clan rival of Yamagata, organized three cabinets and acted as premier for a total of nine years. Katsura's occasional alternate was Saionji, who held office on two occasions for a total of approximately three years. Actually, Saionji was unable in either of his two ministries to bring about complete party control. The most he could do was to include a few party men in his cabinets. Although the Seiyukai generally had control of the House of Representatives, the cabinet failed to respond during these years to the insistent demands for truly representative and democratic institutions.

During the summer of 1912, the Meiji emperor died and two years later Japan became involved in the World War. Thereafter, the liberal trend was temporarily halted. Although Marquis Okuma, a reputed liberal,⁵ was premier in 1914, his government demanded immediate and unqualified acceptance of the war budget and other government measures necessary to War. Okuma's cabinet was also responsible for the Twenty-One De-

⁵ A contemporary evaluation of Okuma is included in Stanley K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York, 1916), pp. 171-92.

mands upon China in May, 1915. Seventeen months later (October, 1916), even though he apparently possessed strong popular support, Okuma resigned at the suggestion of the *genrō* and the House of Peers. *Genrō* Yamagata chose as his successor an able militarist and sympathetic bureaucrat in the person of Marshal Terauchi Suki. As had his predecessors, Terauchi used his supporters in the lower house as convenient aides for cultivating public opinion.

Among the parties supporting the Terauchi regime the Seiyukai was most important. In 1918, however, when Terauchi decided that Japan should participate in the general Allied expedition and should also dispatch an independent force to Siberia, the Seiyukai, led by Hara Takashi, opposed committing Japanese troops and money to an enterprise that had few deep-seated purposes and numerous unpredictable complications. Meanwhile, the Terauchi regime was plagued by serious internal economic problems. High prices and shortages created by war resulted in serious rice riots in several major cities. Repression was the only answer offered by Terauchi. In September, 1918, the three remaining *genrō* (Yamagata, Matsukata, and Saionji) at the suggestion of Saionji called Hara to office as the first commoner to lead the Japanese state.

Although Hara had systematically organized the first party government to rule Japan in the twentieth century, he was in no sense of the word a liberal or responsible official. His ideas of responsible government, like those of the party he led, were vague and ill-defined. His success in politics was probably to be traced to his winning personality and his complete lack of political scruples. Corruption, bribery, and the spoils system characterized his regime. During these years, the peace conference at Versailles, the Siberian expedition, the second Four-Power Consortium, and the projected Washington conference brought the Japanese into closer political and economic relationships with their wartime allies. Foreign trade had also become important to war-expanded Japanese industry. Therefore, the clan leaders in the Seiyukai, as well as in official positions, were gradually forced into the background as businessmen became more directly concerned in government. Hara's command of postwar Japan was ended abruptly by his assassination on November 21, 1921, by a young "patriot" who was naïvely trying thereby to rid the government of corruption.

After Hara's death, the Seiyukai was unable to produce a successor of comparable stature. In partial response to the complex naval problems of 1922-24, the *genrō* suggested the successive appointments of Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, a Japanese representative at the Washington conference and Admiral Yamamoto Gombei. Until the summer of 1924, the parties, therefore, had only incidental representation in the cabinets. Upon the recommendation of *Genrō* Saionji, the last surviving member of

the extraconstitutional advisory body, Viscount Kato Takakira was then called to office. A member of the Kenseikai (Constitutional Party) Kato ruled through a coalition until January, 1926.

Beginning with Kato's rule, Japan experienced its longest period of party government. The new regime, however, inherited the after effects of the earthquake of 1923, and the bitterness occasioned by the American Immigration Act of 1924. Although seriously disturbed by these untoward events, the Kato government enacted the Manhood Suffrage Bill in 1925. By this measure property qualifications for suffrage were eliminated. The electorate was thereby increased from around three million to twelve and one-half million Japanese *males*.

Although passage of the suffrage bill broadened the governing base of Japan, it must not be assumed that the Kato government or the political parties were ardent advocates of democracy.⁶ The Seiyukai and other parties were still dominated by aristocratic clansmen. Gradually, however, the older samurai were being displaced by leaders of business. The Kenseikai, which had been organized by Kato in 1915, was supported by funds from the Mitsubishi interests.⁷ Indeed, the Kato governments of 1924-25 were referred to ironically as the "Mitsubishi regime." In 1927, when the Minseito was organized to succeed the Kenseikai and a portion of the Seiyuhonto, the new party inherited Mitsubishi backing. Meanwhile, the Seiyukai was consistently supported by the vast Mitsui interests.⁸ Moreover, Saionji's brother was the head of the Sumitomo firm which was expanding rapidly in the twenties. Financial support was necessary to political success, it being virtually impossible for normal election bribery to function without vast sums from the *Zaibatsu* (wealthy financial families) for the contesting candidates and parties.

After 1925, widespread fear of the growing labor movement and the nascent labor and radical parties prompted the great capitalistic interests to pour money even more freely into the established parties.⁹ The general election of 1928 witnessed four new proletarian parties making their initial political effort after the inauguration of manhood suffrage.¹⁰ Although poor men voted for the first time in Japanese history, strict police surveillance of campaigns and balloting made vigorous protests a practical im-

⁶ One of the most interesting objections to universal manhood suffrage in Japan was the fear that it would undermine the familial basis of society by placing too much emphasis upon individual participation in politics. See Soyeshima Michimaza, "Japan, the Far East, and the United States," in *Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem* (Chicago, 1925), p. 19.

⁷ Kato married the sister of the head of the Mitsubishi firm (see Quigley, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17).

⁸ See T. Tachibana, "Influence of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Japanese Political and Economic Life," *China Weekly Review*, April 14 and 21, 1934.

⁹ See K. W. Colegrove, "Labor Parties in Japan," *The American Political Science Review*, XXIII (1929), 329-63; also Quigley, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-51.

¹⁰ See K. W. Colegrove, "The Japanese General Election of 1928," *The American Political Science Review*, XXII (1928), 401-06.

possibility. The Seiyukai government, under the leadership of the notorious Baron Tanaka, interfered extensively in the election. Following the usual custom, the "prefectures were stuffed" with Seiyukai men. Suzuki Kisaburo, the Home Minister, raided the headquarters of opposition parties, broke up Minseito and other meetings, and ruthlessly suppressed the system of corruption and bribery used by the government's oppo-



Emperor Hirohito in 1926 in the coronation robes of his ancestors.
Underwood & Underwood

nents—while maintaining the government's own system intact. Despite Seiyukai's strength in the rural areas, the Minseito drew enough support from nonproletarian industrial groups to defeat the government. Although the Minseito was supposed to serve the cause of popular government by opposing clan and military interests, its victory was not warmly welcomed by laboring groups. The proletarians condemned both old-line parties as pawns of the great capitalist families.

The appearance of labor and socialist parties after 1925 had the effect of forcing the older parties to outline more definite objectives. Business

depression and the growing power of the Kuomintang in China were the two basic problems of the late twenties. Under the leadership of Hamaguchi Yuko, the victorious Minseito held office from July, 1929, to December, 1931. Like the Hoover regime in the United States, the Minseito advocated a policy of domestic retrenchment. Hope for better trade inspired the Minseito to pursue a conciliatory policy toward Kuomintang China. In other spheres of foreign policy, the Hamaguchi government also displayed a surprisingly mild attitude. It actually co-operated in the London Naval Treaty of 1930 which was the logical follow-up to Tanaka's participation in the ill-fated Kellogg-Briand effort to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. Peace at home and abroad, it was held, served the best interests of trade and industry.

Meanwhile, the Seiyukai, as the group removed from power, advocated a more "positive" policy at home to deal with economic difficulties, and abroad to cope with the more assertive and independent Nationalist government of China. Objections to "bourgeois supremacy" came mainly from the old clan and military aristocracy as well as from the all but forgotten agricultural population. Close ties had long existed between the farm families and the rank and file of the armed services, for approximately seventy per cent of the army came originally from the farms.¹¹ By comparison with both groups, the city dwellers lived in comparative ease and security. The party government was viewed in 1931 as the puppet of the eight or ten wealthiest families in Japan. The proletarian parties also were disgusted at the unblushing corruption that appeared in civil affairs with the advent of party governments.

Badly wounded by a "patriot" assassin, Premier Hamaguchi did not recover sufficient strength to continue in office, and his retirement from politics in May, 1931, seriously weakened the Minseito. Although he was succeeded by Wakatsuki who followed the same general policies, the Minseito was faced by increasingly ominous opposition. Military and naval leaders, still angry over Japan's agreement to the London Naval treaty, were determined to tighten their political hold on the government. Retrenchment measures had also hampered the military's desire for expansion of the armed forces. During September, 1931, the military acted in Manchuria without the foreknowledge of the Minseito government. Three months later, the military in co-operation with the Seiyukai forced Wakatsuki out of office in favor of Inukai Takishi, a protégé of Baron Tanaka.

Although Inukai pursued a "firm policy" with regard to China, he was not completely the pawn of the militarists. His main financial support still came from the great commercial firms, especially those of the Mitsui. Most aggravating to army circles was Inukai's failure to suppress liberal

¹¹ B. Omura, "Fascism Lures Japan," *Current History*, XXXIX (1934), p. 678.

and labor criticism of events occurring in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Parliamentary and party government were roundly criticized for retarding the execution of Japan's continental policy. Direct action was advocated by military hotbloods and by the war office itself. On March 5, 1932, Baron Dan, general director of Mitsui interests, was murdered by a young reactionary. During the Diet sessions of the same month, General Araki hinted that the militarists themselves might be forced to take action to alleviate social problems.² "Fascism" made its first great bid for control on May 15, 1932, when direct military action resulted in the assassination of Inukai and abortive attacks upon strategic power stations, the Metropolitan Police Board, the Bank of Japan, and several other important institutions. Order was quickly restored, but the "incident of May 15" marked the end of the trend toward democratic and liberal institutions.

Although responsible government of the British and American type was never within sight in Japan, the enlarged popular vote (post 1925) brought with it more widespread interest and participation in government. Although "constitutionalism" was generally used by leaders and minorities as a word of reproach to the party or group in power, party struggles, even for selfish purposes, resulted in progress for liberal institutions. Nevertheless, the Japanese political system in all of its branches continued to be dominated by the executive authority. Even cabinets drawn from the parties would act independently upon taking office. Furthermore, political loyalty was mainly to party leaders rather than to party programs or ideals. Multiplicity of parties and frequent shifts of individuals from one party to another also illustrate the opportunism and individualism characterizing party rule.


Association with commercial and industrial interests was necessary to the major parties for political success. The resultant corruption, however, aroused intense disgust among the elements working for honest and democratic institutions. Military and "fascist" groups used it as an effective point of departure for attack upon the theory and structure of parliamentary government. Radical elements, such as the labor parties, the socialists, and the communists, felt unable to compromise with or work within parties so completely dominated by the country's wealthiest families. Many people from every stratum of society welcomed the downfall of the parties and the return to what they thought of as a more beneficent aristocratic, military, and paternalistic regime.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

During the long centuries of closure, Japan had been almost completely dependent upon native material resources and creative ingenuity. After

¹² Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

1868, however, contact with Western social and economic institutions had a revolutionary effect upon traditional methods of production and distribution. Before the outbreak of the First World War, the foundations of a modern economic structure were laid, and new institutions, adapted from Western models, had gradually come into existence. Rapid economic transformation had also enabled Japan to wage successful wars against China and Russia and to begin organization of a territorial and economic empire.



Baron Shidehara. Wide World Photo

Japan's predominance in eastern Asia was further aided by the studied efforts of the Island Empire to convert from an essentially agricultural country to a great industrial and trading nation. As the only state in the Far East to achieve such industrialization, Japan soon came into competition, first in eastern Asia and then in other world markets, with the commercial nations of the West. Quick transformation of its economy and its sudden rise to economic importance had telling effects upon the country's internal social structure and upon its position as a world power.¹³

¹³ On the economy of the Meiji Restoration see Norman, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-66.

While Japan's population increased rapidly during the era of industrialization, new lines of agriculture were almost impossible to develop. This was particularly serious since one-half the population continued to work at farming and fishing. The productive agricultural area—fifteen per cent of the country's land—had already been cultivated by highly intensive methods for several centuries.¹⁴ Even before the nineteenth century, Nippon had been troubled by the problem of adjusting a small productive area to the demands of a comparatively dense population. Despite these difficulties, agriculture was able to provide the nation with adequate supplies of food. By concentrating upon cultivation of rice which "yields a higher quantity of calories per unit of area than any other cereal,"¹⁵ and by growing in most parts of the country at least two cereal crops each year, the Japanese have been able to provide themselves with the most essential component in their diet. Quantities of seafood are also easily obtainable from the surrounding seas, and game can be hunted in the forests and nonarable areas. Grazing, however, is practically undeveloped as a food-producing occupation, because most uncultivated areas are covered with a growth of bamboo grass or trees. Since the forests act as an aid in preventing erosion while producing fuel and lumber, they have normally been zealously protected from denudation whether for grazing or other purposes. Consequently, agriculture is in the predicament of not being able to develop grazing, but is forced to cultivate intensively a land where the arable soil is but a small part of the total area.

Although intensive cultivation has been successful in maintaining the food supply, agriculture was not able to expand enough to provide the empire with surplus products for export.¹⁶ Growth of cocoons for silk was the only large-scale type of farm production that had no direct connection with the food supply. Cotton and wool were grown in small quantities in a few areas, but the mulberry trees on which the cocoons of silk worms feed can be cultivated on land where cotton will not grow. In addition, agriculturists have concentrated on small-scale farming and have generally been unable or reluctant to change their practices. Lacking surplus commodities for export, the economic planners of the country have generally stressed, therefore, the vital need for development of industrial and commercial enterprises as the only hope for raising the nation's level of living.

During the first World War, Japanese industry and commerce expanded rapidly. Japan's outlay, however, in material and human resources was exceedingly small in comparison with the expenditures of its

¹⁴ See E. F. Penrose, "Characteristics of Japanese Agriculture," in E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchoukuo* (New York, 1940), p. 117.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁶ Consult H. G. Moulton and Junichi Ko, *Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal* (Washington, 1931), pp. 330-32.

Western allies. New industries were called upon to produce military supplies, and Japanese ships were hired for transporting men and materials to many parts of the world. Meanwhile, Japanese commercial establishments gained footholds in the neutral and allied markets of Asia, Africa, and South America at the expense of Western concerns. As a result of the wartime market, Japan until 1919 was able to show a favorable balance of payments and was consistently increasing its backlog of credits in foreign banks. An outcome of increased exports was the elevation of Japan from the status of a debtor to a creditor nation for the first time in its recent history.¹⁷

Economic expansion for industrial, commercial, and farming groups did not bring substantial increases in real income for the majority of the people. Although work was regular and wages higher than before the war, prices preceded wages into an inflationary spiral. During the war years, "the rate of increase in wages was about twenty-six per cent less than the price of commodities."¹⁸ By 1918, "prosperous" Japan was having urban food riots, for the price of rice had risen to a peak of one hundred and seventy per cent more than it had been a year before.¹⁹ In a belated effort to control rice consumption and distribution more equitably, the government inaugurated a partial system of price control. In 1919, however, the failure of the bureaucracy to check inflation brought an end to wartime prosperity and was a reason for Hara's ascent to power.

Although the landowners and peasants were receiving extraordinarily high prices for their rice, they also were not prosperous. Their real income suffered from the inflated prices of other commodities, such as clothes and shoes, and from a disproportionate and excessive tax burden. Before 1931, the agricultural population paid a higher percentage of their income for national taxes than people living in the cities. In addition, they were also required to pay relatively higher local taxes.²⁰ The encouragement originally needed to aid industrial development was thus vividly reflected in the continuation of tax preference to industry and urban citizens. Difficulties of making ends meet on the farms forced rural youths either to enlist in the armed services or to seek employment in the cities. Those who benefited mainly from the inflationary boom were the great economic families with resources varied enough to profit at the expense of small owners, "white-collar" workers, and laborers.²¹

¹⁷ See especially Margaret S. Gordon, "Japan's Balance of International Payments, 1904-31," appendix to E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 865-78. Also G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867-1937* (London, 1946), pp. 92-93.

¹⁸ Kobayashi Ushiaburo, *The Basic Industries and Social History of Japan, 1914-1918* (New Haven, 1930), p. 267.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

²⁰ See Moulton and Ko, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-41.

²¹ See chap. XI of A. Morgan Young, *Japan in Recent Times, 1912-1926* (New York, 1929).

Recovery from the postwar decline which began in 1920 was slow and uneven. Meanwhile, the country's economic structure had begun to suffer from the problems which normally afflict highly industrialized nations. During the war, the first serious efforts had been made to organize labor unions and to regulate working conditions in the factories. Inflation and subsequent unemployment occasioned unrest until after the Washington conference. The earthquake of 1923, disastrous as it was, resulted in additional employment and renewed prosperity for those fortunate enough to survive. Subsidized rebuilding and public works helped relieve the unemployment situation. At the same time, nevertheless, the government was forced to use its backlog of accumulated foreign credit to finance the purchase of imports necessary to the post-earthquake rehabilitation program.

Whether in form of subsidies for rehabilitation or in terms of restrictions upon individual enterprises, "there had been a greater degree of state ownership of industry and closer relations between the government and private enterprise . . . [in Japan] than has been the case in any other country during the same era."²² Early in Japan's industrial history few individuals had enough capital to venture it in expanding and modernizing the established industries. Practically no Japanese had sufficient accumulated capital to speculate in an enterprise for which there was no native tradition and no available, skilled personnel. At the outset, therefore, the government assumed the initiative in opening mining, textile, transportation, and communication enterprises. Since the government had been almost completely free of debt in the late years of the nineteenth century, government subsidies and long-term credits were easily obtained by private concerns. Although the government usually tried as soon as possible to sell government-owned enterprises to private firms, its experience in business, and the subsidies accepted by private businesses, established a tradition and a wedge for extension of government control in times of difficulty.

In the post-earthquake years Japanese industry, commerce, and credit continued to expand as the result of the boom in building and public works. Meanwhile, passage of the suffrage measure of 1925 made possible the organization of labor and radical parties. In an attempt thereafter to check the growth of "subversive" parties the government enacted a Peace Preservation Law by which members of societies dedicated to overturning the political and economic order were subject to fine and imprisonment. In 1926, a Labor Disputes Arbitration Act required that conflicts in enterprises directly affecting the public welfare should be subject to compulsory arbitration. Consequently, when the serious banking crisis of 1927 caused grave economic repercussions throughout Japan, the government

²² Moulton and Ko, *op. cit.*, p. 312

already had in its possession sufficient power to suppress criticism and to check active strike measures. Although the unions had increased their power, they did not possess a definite legal status and hence did not enjoy the protection of the law.

Bank failures in 1927 heralded the onset of general economic depression in Japan. Thereafter, the government with the active support and collaboration of the great financial families began to rationalize the economy of the nation. Revisions of the general tariff law in 1926 had the effect of virtually establishing free trade relationships between Japan and its colonies, while imposing careful restrictions upon foreign commodities in competition with the products of Japanese industry. Raw materials and certain types of industrial equipment, however, were admitted duty free. The government also sought to bolster the wavering economy by bounties and subsidies.²³

Politically, the initial result of depression was a gradual loss of prestige and power by the Seiyukai and the expansion of the Minseito under Hamaguchi. Upon acceding to power in 1929, the Minseito inaugurated a strict policy of domestic retrenchment accompanied by a conciliatory policy toward Japan's prospective customers. In an effort to win the confidence of the major economic powers of the West, the Minseito government removed the embargo on the export of gold and attempted simultaneously to establish the yen at its prewar parity with the pound and the dollar.²⁴ Although designed to promote good trade relations, the currency manipulations of the Minseito served only to make the deflation more critical. Farm losses, as well as urban unemployment, also caused widespread social unrest. Retrenchment measures of the Minseito aroused the more jingoistic elements among the militarists to demand the end of private enterprise and the further extension of government controls. Japan's adherence to the London Naval Treaty also inspired military opposition. With the fall of the Minseito cabinet in December, 1931, the Seiyukai government of Inukai reimposed the embargo on gold exports and by other measures started the country down the torturous road of ever-increasing government control.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM

Important to most of Japan's actions in the twentieth century has been the problem of a rapidly increasing population. Contrary to widespread belief in America and Europe, "there is no basis whatever for the view that the Japanese people are, or ever have been, abnormally fertile or fecund as compared with Western peoples."²⁵ As a matter of record,

²³ Consult *ibid.*, pp. 321-36.

²⁴ See M. S. Gordon, *op. cit.*, appendix to Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 900.

²⁵ E. F. Penrose, *Population Theories and Their Application with Special Reference to Japan* (Stanford, Calif., 1934), p. 100.

Japan's population had been stabilized at around thirty millions for several decades before the Meiji Restoration. Thereafter, Nippon began to industrialize and to have a rate of population growth similar to that experienced by the Western industrial nations in the nineteenth century. Although the precise relationships between population growth and rise in the level of living have never been defined with exactitude, it is possible to illustrate with facts and figures the existence of a striking correlation between rapid industrial development and a sharp rise in population.

In the sixty years after 1872, Japan's population doubled. Since industrialization implied the concentration of larger numbers of people in the cities and in the vicinity of factories, it was not long before sanitary conditions were improved, hospitals were organized, and more doctors were available. Such improvements resulted in the decline of the death rate, and particularly in the decrease of infant mortality. The combination of a fairly constant birth rate and a decreasing death rate resulted, of course, in an increased population and in new and numerous social problems. Until 1911, however, the British population was still increasing proportionally more rapidly than the Japanese. Since 1911, the reverse has been true.²⁶

Although no comprehensive census was available for Japan until 1920, local registration records of births, deaths, and marriages provide fairly accurate indications as to the first effects of industrial growth upon population.²⁷ Improvement in the level of living and the accompanying decline of the death rate, however, are but the first social repercussions of city living and a factory-dominated economy. Even before 1920, it was fairly obvious that the Japanese birth rate had also begun to decline. Since 1920, the rate of reproduction has definitely decreased for mothers of all ages as the level of living has consistently improved. The decreasing death rate, however, particularly with respect to infants, temporarily prevented a decline in population increase.²⁸ Meanwhile, the average age of the Japanese is becoming greater, and it appears that in the future "the rate of increase of the population will fall much more sharply than it has done up to now,"²⁹ even though Japan will continue for a long time to have a population problem. Already, France has begun to feel the effects of declining reproduction rates upon its total population. Other Western nations, such as Britain, Germany, and the United States, may also expect a more immediate population decline than less industrialized nations such as Japan.

²⁶ Consult E. B. Schumpeter, "The Population of the Japanese Empire," in Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²⁷ For an excellent evaluation of Japanese vital statistics see *ibid.*, pp. 45-48.

²⁸ See E. F. Penrose, "Mortality, Reproduction, and the Rate of Increase of the Population Since 1920," in Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 104-06.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Should Japan's future development conform to the experience of the Western nations, its problems of population pressure will probably be relieved, but in no wise eliminated, in the normal course of events. Population, however, cannot be considered apart from economic problems, social customs, and religious traditions. During the time when the declining birth rate is overtaking the declining death rate to bring about a population decrease, agitation for immediate relief from population pressure was bound to become intense. In relation to arable land, no nation in the world after 1918 had a density of population equal to that of the Japanese homeland. Through intensive cultivation of the land and extensive fishing, the nation's food supply was nevertheless remarkably adequate. Agriculture, however, was unable to provide enough work and opportunities for the rapidly increasing population, and food after a time also had to be imported. Although still the most important single enterprise in Japan, agriculture provided support in 1920 for only about one-half the country's total population; whereas in 1873 it had supported more than seventy-five per cent.³⁰ Although industry and commerce became the mainstays of economic expansion during the first four decades of the twentieth century, unemployment and lack of opportunity cast their sinister reflections over Japanese life in the years between the two World Wars. Fluctuations of the business cycle also contributed to the intense agitation for more living space, increased emigration, later marriages, and education for birth control.

Until about 1914 the problem of population pressure was of slight importance in Japan.³¹ Rapid industrial expansion gave employment to a growing proportion of the increasing population. Paternalism of employers prevented abrupt dismissals and the traditional practice of family responsibility made easier the short periods of unemployment between changing jobs. After the rice riots of 1918, agitation over population pressure began to loom large in Japan's domestic and foreign policy. At home, industrial expansion with government help was considered the most hopeful method of providing a livelihood for the population. The government also viewed with benevolent neutrality at times, and with suspicion at other times, the birth-control agitation of feminists like Baroness Ishimoto.³² Neither of these methods, however, gave immediate relief to unemployment on the farms or in the towns.

Although Japanese had been emigrating to other parts of the world ever since the Restoration, the problem was of relatively slight significance until the period between the two World Wars. Before 1908, emigration was

³⁰ See Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, in Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 63. For further details see W. R. Crocker, *The Japanese Population Problem* (London, 1931), pp. 102-07, and A. Andradés, *La Population du Japon* (Bruxelles, 1931) pp. 34-50.

³¹ See the excellent study of unemployment in Moulton and Ko, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-69.

³² Consult interview in *New York Times*, November 8, 1932.

generally directed toward the United States, Canada, and the islands of the Pacific. With the conclusion of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" (1908), many Japanese began to settle in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. Before 1931, emigration to Manchuria and China was never enough to relieve population pressure in the slightest degree.³³ In general, the Japanese refused to compete with the farmers and traders of continental Asia, who were normally satisfied with a lower plane of living. On the contrary, emigration to areas where a higher level of living prevailed appealed to the discontented farmer, laborer, or intellectual. Japanese emigration, however, has been exceedingly slight by comparison with the amount of popular agitation it has caused in other areas, and the international problems it has occasioned from time to time. Certainly, emigration at no time in Japan's history has been sufficient by itself to relieve the pressure of population in the home islands.³⁴

Since neither industrial expansion nor emigration, alone or combined, could absorb Japan's surplus population, the tendency was resumed in the twenties for the government to aid in the development of overseas markets necessary to an expanded industry, and in gaining access to, and favorable treatment in, desirable colonizing areas. After the American Exclusion Act of 1924, emigration became more than ever a problem directly concerning the Japanese government. Although total exclusion from the United States was a sharp blow at Japanese pride, the government took no active measures until depression and unemployment had created an acute problem. Believing that orderly commerce had failed to supply the nation with its needs, the attack on Manchuria in 1931 was heralded by many Japanese as the first positive effort of the government to provide easy access to raw materials, better markets for industrial products, and a vast area favorable to colonization.³⁵

SOCIAL CHANGES AND UNREST

Industrialization and attendant economic changes continued to affect old class lines of Japanese society while bringing new social groupings into existence. Before the Restoration, class divisions had been firmly fixed along ancient and feudal lines. At the apex of the social pyramid were the ancient court nobility (*kuge*), and the feudal lords (*daimyo*) and their retainers (*samurai*). The rest of the people in old Japan were farmers,

³³ See Anon., "Immigration of Japanese Farmers into Manchuria," *Contemporary Manchuria*, II (March, 1938), 57.

³⁴ See Ichihashi Yamato, "International Migration of the Japanese," in W. F. Willcox (ed.), *International Migrations* (New York, 1931), pp. 617-24; also A. E. Hindmarsh, *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), p. 101; Hugh Byas, "Japan's Population Problem," *Asiatic Review*, XXIX (1933), 662-67; and Uyeda Teijiro, "Japan's Population Problem," *Living Age*, CCCXLVII (1934), 116.

³⁵ See Freda Utey, "Population and Conquest," *Pacific Affairs*, X (1937), 16-29; also E. F. Penrose, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-36.

artisans, or merchants. During the late nineteenth century, certain feudal clans and lords with members of the old civilian aristocracy of Kyoto began to dominate the government. Because of outside opposition, these governing groups were soon forced to broaden the base of government by co-operating with, and including, nonnoble elements. Very quickly, thereafter, a professional governing class materialized. With the rapid expansion of economic life, industrial magnates and merchant princes soon formed themselves also into a new and powerful economic class. During the twenties, the wealthy families came to have an increasingly significant influence within the government and in the governing class. Although class lines were never again as arbitrary as in Tokugawa times, a wide gulf continued to separate the governing and wealthy classes from the small manufacturers, shopkeepers, petty landowners, and peasants who made up the mass of the population.³⁶

Until World War I, the lower classes continued to exist without serious protest at low levels of living.³⁷ It was possible through the family system to distribute fairly equitably a minimum amount of cheap clothing and economical foods, such as fish, rice, and vegetables. War inflation and postwar depression, however, aroused farmers, laborers, and intellectuals to organize groups for sustenance and groups for protest. Co-operatives in various fields, and political agitation through Socialist and Communist organizations, made a marked impression upon rural and urban life. In the period between 1918 and the occurrence of the Manchurian "incident" of 1931, the struggle for economic and social preponderance became acute.

At the turn of the century, the co-operative movement had been launched by Viscount Shinagawa and Count Hirata. Using German societies as models, these and other leaders by 1905 had organized credit, purchase, sales, and production co-operatives. Although mutual loan associations to finance productive enterprises had existed even in Tokugawa times, it was in the field of rural credit that the co-operatives made their greatest contribution.³⁸ Deposits were accepted by local co-operative credit associations from participating individuals as well as from others having money to invest. Loans were extended on easy terms to farmers who had to buy seeds, fertilizers, or other essentials. By 1923, the co-operative credit groups had expanded into most rural areas and were able thereafter to establish a central bank, or chest, to which the local units contributed the capital. Subsidies and other forms of government encouragement also enabled credit groups to become a vital link in Japan's over-all credit system. Furthermore, the central bank of the

³⁶ Consult in particular G. C. Allen, *Japan the Hungry Guest* (London, 1938), p. 65; also for an example of local change in class lines see J. F. Embree, *Suye Mura* (Chicago, 1939), p. 158.

³⁷ Cf. Moulton and Ko, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-81.

³⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 186-91.

credit groups possessed the legal right to borrow from commercial banking houses in times of financial distress.

The growth of purchaser's co-operatives follows roughly the history recounted for credit unions. By 1924, a National Federation of Purchase Societies had been organized as a central wholesale association. Money borrowed by the farmers from the credit associations was often used to buy seeds and fertilizer from the local purchase unit. Local groups also built and maintained co-operative granaries for keeping rice and other cereals from one season to the next. Great stimulus was given to the rural co-operative system by the organization in 1921 of Kagawa Tozohiko's peasant union. This Christian group hoped to encourage rural education, to expand rural industrial co-operatives, to organize credit more efficiently, to improve rural housing and sanitary conditions, to urge scientific agriculture, and to introduce an effective system of crop insurance.³⁹ Although Kagawa's organization stressed the plight of the peasants, the majority of the co-operatives were run by, and for the benefit of, the small landlords and the more important peasant proprietors. In general, small landowners and tenant-farmers received only incidental or secondary benefits from the rural co-operatives.⁴⁰ Unlike co-operative movements in other countries, those in Japan displayed little interest in the moral aspects of co-operation, but were acutely aware of possible economic gains.

Because of close government supervision and their essentially rural character, Japanese co-operatives were never intimately associated with the labor and radical movements. In the decade prior to 1914, the Socialists, such as Abe Isoo and Katayama Sen, voiced the radical protest against the growing power of Japanese capitalists. Until 1910, the early Socialists experienced alternate attacks of enthusiasm and apathy. During the war against Russia, the Japanese Socialists were in violent opposition to the capitalist war with the result that the government interfered actively to break up their movement. Socialism in Japan thereafter became mainly theoretical.⁴¹

In 1912, leadership of the labor movement was taken over by Suzuki Bunji, founder of the Laborer's Friendly Society (Yusikai). During the inflationary years at the end of the war period, this organization began to expand rapidly. In 1920, the Yusikai was converted into a General Federation of Labor modeled on the American Federation of Labor. Although certain individuals and groups in the General Federation were regularly examined by government agents as subversive or dangerous agitators, the

³⁹ See G. M. Fisher, "The Coöperative Movement in Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, XI (1938), 478-91.

⁴⁰ Consult G. C. Allen, "Economic Policy: State Intervention in Industrial Organization," in E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 769-70.

⁴¹ On the early Socialist movement see Katayama Sen, *The Labor Movement in Japan* (Chicago, 1918).

organization itself succeeded in evading direct opprobrium by adopting a consistently more and more conservative program.

The interwar years witnessed the introduction of Communism into Japan. The example of the Soviet experiment and the strides made by the Third International in China helped to stimulate activity among Japanese Marxists. In 1921 a Nipponese branch of the Comintern was organized. In the following year Katayama Sen was asked to preside over a Comintern Congress in Moscow.⁴² Thereafter, the police began to ferret out the leaders of the Japanese party. After suffering dissolution, the Japanese party was revived in 1925. Its reappearance gave the government an opportunity to impose the Peace Preservation Law, and to restrict other radical activities. Although repression of the party followed the issuance of the law, it reappeared in 1927, and began in that depression-stricken year to make more converts than ever before. Trained organizers were sent from China to strategic centers in an effort to establish local concentrations of Communist sentiment. In the hope of ending Marxist activity, the government revised the Peace Preservation Law in 1928 to provide the death penalty for persons founding an organization which sought alteration of the constitution or which threatened private property. Those who consciously joined such an organization were made subject to "jail sentences." Actually, very few Japanese were ever able to renounce their love of ancient traditions, their reverence for the *tennō*, and their interest in spiritual matters in favor of the stark materialism and internationalism of Communist theory.

Although socialism enjoyed little public favor in Japan, the societies of the extreme right were quite popular. Even during the "liberal twenties," the ultra-patriotic societies played an important role in the formation of public opinion. At the end of the First World War patriotic groups organized during the war continued their flag-waving and jingoistic activities. Opposed to international political co-operation, international capital, and international labor, the patriot societies stressed the unique virtues of "the Japanese spirit" and worked against the adoption of Western political, social, and economic practices. Japanese youth groups were also concerned in their teachings to instill deep reverence for "the fundamental character of the Japanese state." Moreover, the armed services were hotbeds of nationalistic and reactionary fervor even in the apparently serene decade before the Manchurian incident. The principles of "*Hakko Ichin*" (making the world into one family) and "*Kodo*" (the "imperial way") were spoken of freely as basic precepts, and were used to prepare Japan mentally for territorial expansion.⁴³

⁴² See the interesting article by H. Vere Redman, "Sen Katayama," *Contemporary Japan*, II (1934), 677; also H. Byas, "Red Crop in Japan," *Asia*, XXXII (1932), 88-90.

⁴³ Kenneth Colegrove, *Militarism in Japan* (Boston, 1936), pp. 27-32.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION

Although the *changes* in Japanese life after 1868 have been emphasized, it is important to realize that rapid industrialization and foreign influences failed to eliminate numerous traditional customs and institutions. The family system was not replaced by either the individualism or the collectivism which characterizes European society. Japanese still think and act in a communal fashion. Newlyweds for the most part still live in the bridegroom's household. Families still assume a relatively high degree of responsibility for members who are ill, unemployed, or in other bad straits. Although it may have been needed before, a state organized relief law was not absolutely required until 1929. Likewise, social protests were not serious or well organized until the period of World War I. In the family, in social relationships, and in religion Japan has perhaps retained more of its ancient and feudal character than in any other phases of its life—although, as earlier indicated, these are by no means lacking in the economic and political spheres.

Basic to appreciation of Japanese morals and customs is an understanding of Shinto, the "Way of the Gods."⁴⁴ From its origins as a primitive explanation of creation, the religion of the gods (*kami*) has pervaded Nippon's literature, customs, and world outlook. According to its doctrines, the Japanese islands and their inhabitants are the handiwork of the Sky-Father (*Izanagi*) and the Earth-Mother (*Izanami*). The *tennōs* of Japan are asserted to be the direct lineal descendants of the Sun-Goddess (*Amaterasu-o-mi-kami*) and were until quite recently, and undoubtedly by many still are, thought to possess divine attributes. To a marked degree the people are also directly related to the *kami*, since Shintoism is not something they elect to believe, but something with which they are endowed by being born into the land of the *kami*. Although most religious sects possess a theogonic myth, Shinto is unique in its insistence upon the sacredness of Nippon, the Japanese people, and the imperial family.

During the Meiji Restoration, the founding fathers of "modern" Japan deliberately set out to revitalize the Shinto tradition, and thereby to provide solid, emotional backing to their reinstatement of the *tennō* in his traditional prerogatives. Government and religion were both considered subject to the will of the divine emperor. State Shinto was organized to make emphatic the identification of the state with the nation's religious traditions.⁴⁵ To counteract the enervating effects of Western thought, State Shinto consistently urged strict obedience to Nipponese customs and gods. Defense of the gods and the traditional virtues against the under-

⁴⁴ Consult especially D. C. Holtom's *The National Faith of Japan* (New York, 1938).

⁴⁵ See D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago, 1943), pp. 1-27.

mining influence of modern thought resulted in the growth of a highly emotional and irrational nationalism. As applied to international affairs, Shinto aroused in the Japanese a consciousness of their sacred mission to extend their peerless rule and their perfect institutions to less fortunate parts of the world.

Throughout the nation individuals worshipped the innumerable members of the Shinto pantheon at thousands of shrines and sacred places. Although State Shinto was certainly an important part of everyday life, the individual usually required more positive religious affirmations and moral admonitions than he could get from merely worshipping the *kami*. Therefore, in addition to the State Shinto beliefs, many also observed Buddhist rituals, or belonged to *Tenrikyo* or some other branch of Secular Shinto. Once the state became aware of the lack of religious quality in sponsored Shinto, the priests were instructed to inject ethical and religious teachings into their ceremonies of obeisance before the *kami*. By meeting the individual's religious needs the government checked the growth of "undesirable" Shinto and Christian sects. In the post-Restoration period, for instance, Christianity has been unable at any time to claim more than one million members.⁴⁶

State Shinto was basic to the educational system that came into existence after 1868. In 1890, the imperial rescript on education was issued and read as follows:

Know Ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our Subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interest; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye be not only Our good and faithful subjects but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible in all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to

⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 95-123.

lay it to heart in all reverence in common with you, Our subjects, that we may attain to the same virtue.

Thereafter, the necessity of teaching national traditions and of inculcating the spirit of *kami* worship was emphasized at all educational levels.⁴⁷ After 1872, school attendance had been compulsory for all between the ages of six and fourteen. During the early years, therefore, the children were taught Japanese language and history, arithmetic, geography, science, drawing, singing, gymnastics, and moral lessons. Elementary readers and textbooks were published under the supervision of the extremely powerful Ministry of Education, and included serious accounts of Japan's mythological origins. Even private and missionary schools were required to teach Shinto myths as history or run the risk of losing their certification as acceptable schools.

During the twenties, about fifty per cent of Nipponese male adolescents elected secondary or technical education in spite of the fact that it was not free. In addition to their regular academic program, the youths in the middle schools were given light rifles and brass-buttoned uniforms. They had learned during their elementary years to march and drill. Under the instruction of regular army officers, they advanced during their early teens to the place where they could execute the manual of arms and handle weapons of war. Among their instructors in academic subjects were many retired or inactive army men, who taught "morals" with an Imperial "M", and who conducted periodic excursions to near-by military shrines. The most rigorous followers of Shinto were usually the most militant elements in the nation.

At all levels, including the universities, education was designed to benefit and glorify the state rather than the individual. As a rule, emphasis was upon the acquisition of practical skills, such as languages, law, medicine, agriculture, and engineering. The humanities and the social sciences were viewed with suspicion as possible sources of "dangerous thoughts." Theoretical science was encouraged because of its possible practical results. Even in science, however, the critical spirit was deplored when it ran contrary to what were held to be the immutable lines of Japanese policy.

CORNERSTONES OF EMPIRE

Even before World War I, Japan had begun to build an Asiatic empire at the expense of China. In 1881, the latter state recognized the impossibility of preventing its island neighbor from extending control over the Liu-ch'iu archipelago, to the south of Kyushu. From the Liu-ch'iu (Ryukiu) islands the Nipponese were able more fully to appreciate the

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

strategic value of the large island of Formosa at the southern extremity of the chain. Formosa had been annexed as part of the Manchu-Chinese empire as late as the reign of the K'ang Hsi emperor, following the expulsion in 1661 of Dutch forces of occupation. Several times during the nineteenth century the Japanese had taken arbitrary action in Formosa. The shaky control of the Manchu-Chinese government was eliminated completely after China's defeat in 1894-95. By the Treaty of Shimone-seki, Formosa (henceforward called Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands, located between China and southern Formosa, were surrendered to Japan.

Japan's gradual expansion into the islands of the south brought the forces of the Rising Sun within a short distance of the Chinese port of Amoy and the province of Fukien. After its cession, Formosa was gradually—but never completely—pacified, and converted into the southern outpost of Nippon's empire. At the outset, the Japanese were forced to invest large sums of money in public works, railways, highways, harbors, and military installations. Difficulties with the aborigines, and differences in economic pursuits, made Japanese colonization of Formosa a slow and unprofitable process. Forest products, opium, salt, and rice were the islands' main export commodities. With a few exceptions, the Japanese monopolized every phase of Formosa's exports and imports. Although the islands became more nearly self-supporting as time went on, their strategic and military importance gave the Japanese their only real excuse for retaining control over dependencies which were obviously poor economic investments.

The second cornerstone in Japan's imperial structure was laid when Korea (Chōsen to the Japanese) was annexed in 1910. After protesting for centuries that Korea was aimed by nature and human malevolence as a dagger at the heart of their country, the Japanese were able in the twentieth century to turn the dagger in the opposite direction. In the period 1910-31, Korea was prepared as a base for further continental expansion. Korean customs, institutions, and economic life were altered to fit Japanese blueprints for empire-building. It was hoped by more or less benevolent assimilation to win the conservative and wealthy Koreans to the support of the Nipponese regime. When "friendly societies" and empty promises failed to reconcile the articulate Korean populace, the children of the *kami* showed no hesitation in using repressive and brutal methods to force the process of assimilation.

Upon annexation, the Korean emperor was demoted to the rank of prince—a precedent for handling royalty which the Japanese had established in the case of the king of the Liu-ch'iu islands in 1881. The head of the Korean administration was a Governor-General appointed by, and responsible to, the Japanese government. Governors, and other important officials were usually named by the Governor-General, who called upon

his own countrymen to fill a majority of the important posts. The governor's general advisory council was made up entirely of trustworthy Koreans—but it was rarely consulted. In general, the council advised only on matters of tradition or public opinion, for it was particularly difficult for the Japanese to determine public reactions to their regime since no political parties or organizations were permitted to function.

Until 1919, Korea was governed by military force and martial law. Thereafter, an attempt was made to modernize the peninsula and its people. Public works, industrial expansion, afforestation and reforestation of cutover areas, railway, and road building were undertaken by the government. The Korean economy was altered and expanded to fit the requirements of the stepmother country. Foreign business people and missionaries found it increasingly difficult to carry on their work under the Japanese administration. Korean efforts to attain independence continued during the twenties with an uncertain degree of encouragement from foreigners inside and outside of the country. Civil rights were almost nonexistent, and the Korean rank and file continued to experience a low level of living. The "material progress" sponsored by the Japanese regime was mainly for strategic and military purposes, and incidentally for the benefit of the native people. After 1931, the importance of a pacified and productive Korea to the Manchurian adventure and to later continental conquests became apparent even to many who had earlier viewed the annexation of Korea with a complacency born of the feeling that inevitably certain backward areas must come under the control of more civilized peoples.⁴⁸

Thus, Japan to 1931 experienced a degree of economic prosperity and political stability uncommon to the lands of eastern Asia. Encouraged by a constantly rising level of living, extension of the franchise to most Japanese males, and gradual establishment of favorable trade relations, the sons of Nippon in the early years of the twentieth century envisaged for themselves an even brighter future. Of all the Oriental nations, Nippon alone had been able to establish a stable constitutional regime, an industrialized economy, an army powerful enough to demand universal respect, and the cornerstones of an empire which would soon outstrip in size and wealth the overseas possessions of most of the great Western powers.

⁴⁸ For an interesting, but rambling, discussion of Korean history see chap. III of A. J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944). Additional features of Korean history are discussed in chapter XVII.

PART III

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE FAR EAST, 1931-1945

CHAPTER IX

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS, 1931-1933

BACKGROUND

The first battles in the Second World War were fought in remote Manchuria.¹ Japan's determination to seize one of the most strategically located and economically valuable areas of continental Asia aroused widespread anxiety in 1931 among the nations mainly responsible for the treaty structure and the creation of the League of Nations. Coming so close upon the Sino-Soviet embroilment over the Chinese Eastern Railway, hope ran high for a time that the agencies of international control would be sufficiently aroused and would therefore act with dispatch and decision in conciliating the aggrieved parties in the new dispute. Disappointment soon followed, however, as it became increasingly apparent that Japan was acting without regard to her commitments, and that the great nations of the world were unwilling to take any stand in this issue which could possibly involve them in war in the Far East. Shaken by the whirlwind of Japanese expansion, the structure of peace was thereafter buffeted mercilessly until the horrors of aggression and war were ultimately visited upon most of the civilized world.

Manchuria has periodically been the center of intense political, social, and economic tensions, and the subject of frequent diplomatic and military conflicts. Perhaps its history—recent as well as early—can best be related by discussing its crucial international position, and by describing the movements of peoples toward the great central plain through which wind the Sungari, Nonni, and Liao River valleys. Strategically, Manchuria commands the great expanses of northern China and central Asia, combining “natural wealth with natural protection against external attack and propinquity to the object of acquisition [China].”² Time after time people originating in Manchuria have conquered or participated in the conquests of China.

Although Manchuria was an integral part of the Manchu-Chinese Empire for almost three centuries, its natural wealth was never systematically exploited until after the Japanese occupation. In an area almost twice

¹ Modern Chinese dislike this non-Chinese term, since it seems to imply that Manchuria is something apart from China proper. There is in Chinese, however, no simple name which refers specifically to what Westerners call Manchuria. Several terms, like “Eastern Three Provinces,” refer roughly to this area. For a discussion of this point see Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York, 1935), pp. 7-8.

² Shuhsi Hsü, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem* (Shanghai, 1932), p. 13.

the size of Texas there are vast tracts of timber, extensive veins of coal, and a moderate supply of iron ore. The great plain area is particularly suitable for agriculture; and like the American Middle West, it is noted mainly for its grain and soybean crops. These vast economic potentialities have made Manchuria an attractive prize.³ But it was not until comparatively recently that Chinese farmers were permitted by the Ch'ing dynasts, and later were forced by economic pressure and domestic unrest south of the Wall, to adventure in large numbers north of the great Wall. In the years 1923-30 some 5,700,000 Chinese went into Manchuria, about one-half of them settling there permanently. After 1930, tensions between China and Japan forced a decline in the rate of Chinese immigration, and during 1932 around 84,000 more Chinese left Manchuria than entered.⁴

Large-scale emigration of Koreans to Manchuria began after Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1910. After the first decade of the twentieth century, the Nipponese government also encouraged mass emigration from the Japanese homeland. By this means Tokyo hoped to relieve the acute population pressure in the islands and at the same time raise a barrier against the threat of Russian expansion in the future. Through various commercial concessions obtained from China and through establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Company (August 1, 1906), the Japanese attempted to transplant and to maintain their nationals in Manchuria. Despite their efficient propaganda campaign only 233,320 Japanese had been located in Manchuria by 1931.

In and after 1895 Tsarist Russia inaugurated a Manchurian policy of "peaceful penetration." The concessions obtained, however, were restricted mostly to those of an economic character. Few Russians settled in Manchuria before 1917. After the Russian Revolution, numerous Tsarists (or White Russians) sought refuge in Manchurian cities, especially in Harbin.⁵ Many of these, however, have since moved on to more populous and prosperous areas. Although the Soviets have shown considerable interest in Manchuria, the Russians prior to 1945 were largely pre-occupied elsewhere. In the twenties, the Soviets were vitally concerned about the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway and many Communist agents worked in Manchuria. At no time was there anything resembling a mass emigration from Soviet Russia.

In the years prior to 1931 the Chinese and the so-called "natives" (mostly Mongols and Sinicised Manchus) constituted the majority of Manchuria's population. The historical association of the area with China tended to enhance the feeling of community of interests with that

³ For a more detailed discussion of natural resources consult *The Manchuria Year Book*, 1932-33.

⁴ Data on immigration are given in the various *Reports on Progress in Manchuria* compiled by the South Manchuria Railway Company.

⁵ See Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

country. Complete supremacy of Chinese civilization in Manchuria, however, has been delimited by a variety of factors. Once the emigrating Chinese were safely established beyond the Great Wall they often tended to substitute regional attachment for cultural or national feelings.⁶ In addition, Chinese predominance has been challenged, and Chinese customs have been influenced in Manchuria by the ideas and policies of Japan and Russia. Even though Manchuria is pre-eminently Chinese in civilization it must also be realized that there exists a decided regional feeling, and that material progressiveness has gone further than in most areas of China south of the Wall.

By alternate conflict and co-operation, Russia and Japan prior to 1931 built up and consolidated powerful interests in Manchuria while continuing with the rest of the world to recognize officially the sovereignty of China over the area. Although the Chinese wedge was by far the most powerful in numbers and local influence, the materialistic aggressiveness of the Japanese and Soviet governments and nationals gradually forced the Chinese to relinquish the initiative,⁷ and thereafter they acted more and more frequently as a buffer between the economic interests of Japan and Russia. During the years after the First World War, a long series of friction-producing events occurred particularly between the Chinese and the Japanese. Many of these were never settled owing to the recalcitrance exhibited by one or the other of the parties.

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES

Within Japan itself there existed deep-seated social and economic ills which were coming to have more and more influence upon political and diplomatic events.^{8, 9} In the island empire's partial transformation from a feudal state to a modern industrialized nation, the farming element was severely depressed. Recurrent agricultural crises culminated in the autumn of 1930 in disastrous famine conditions about which the liberal-business Minseito government did nothing fundamental. Agitation developed within army and navy circles, since the majority of men in the armed services came originally from the agricultural districts. Fanatical secret societies and patriotic organizations demanded removal of the civilian chiefs of government and a stronger policy at home and abroad. Minseito officeholders, such as Wakatsuki Reijiro (Premier) and Baron Shidehara Kijuro (Foreign Office), were moderate representatives of industrial and commercial interests. Shidehara's policy toward China had been concili-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷ Consult *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

⁸ Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (New York, 1935), pp. 340-41; also Hugh Borton, *Japan Since 1931: Its Political and Social Developments* (New York, 1940), pp. 13-35.

⁹ See *supra*, pp. 286-88.

atory with the aim of creating better commercial relations between the two nations. Minseito co-operation with the general disarmament trend in world politics, participation in the London naval treaties of 1930, and the intention to enter into the arms conference scheduled at Geneva for 1932 aroused fear in army and navy groups that disarmament might be hailed favorably in depression-stricken Japan.

Without question Japan's interests in Manchuria had been increasing since 1905. Her arrangements with China dated back to the Peking treaty of 1905 by which China agreed to the arrangement made at Portsmouth with regard to southern Manchuria. Thereafter Japan had extended her control to every facet of life in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway Company had efficiently and profitably administered the railway zone. In the "Demands" of 1915 Japan had sought to obtain an extension of the Kwantung lease, insisted upon rights of travel, residence, and enterprise for her citizens (Japanese and Koreans alike) in China's northeastern provinces, and stipulated the right of "advising" the government of Manchuria. Japan had also asked for a preferential position with regard to railway and other loans in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Although the Chinese had never accepted the "Demands" (or so they asserted), the Japanese with the aid and protection of the Kwantung army, the railway guards from the zone area, and numerous consular police went ahead with their plans for Manchuria without regard to the increased animosity with which their activities were being viewed in intramural China.

Meanwhile, the Japanese military groups were fondly talking about Japan's "special position" with respect to Manchuria.¹⁰ Although Tokyo never defined exactly what was meant by this term, it consistently insisted upon the recognition of this intangible in relations with the continent. Viscount Ishii Kikujiro in his *Memoirs*, emphatically declares that Japan's "special interests" are not the product of international negotiations, but are somehow based upon the geographical and historical relationships between Japan and the continent.¹¹ As with many other political attitudes, it was not possible to understand the Japanese viewpoint toward Manchuria by reference to treaties alone, since it was conditioned by patriotic sentiments, economic considerations, and a fervent religious belief in political destiny. In general, the Japanese looked upon Man-

¹⁰ For an interesting sidelight on this controversial issue see Chih Meng, *China Speaks on the Conflict between China and Japan* (New York, 1932), p. 18. The Japanese viewpoint is most adequately expressed in the writings of Professor Royama Masemichi. For a good summary of Royama's attitude see Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-40, n. 8.

¹¹ Quoted in Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 338. The *Lytton Report* remarks that "it is only natural that the Japanese use of this expression in diplomatic language should be obscure and that other States should have found it difficult, if not impossible, to recognize it by international instruments."

churia in their "lifeline policy" as a first barrier of defense with respect to China and Russia, as a possible field for the sale of Japan's new industrial products, as a source of raw materials, and as a gate of entry to the Asiatic mainland.¹²

The eyes of China's nationalists were also focused upon Manchuria during the decade before the "Mukden Incident." The Peking government referred repeatedly in its diplomatic dispatches to the desperate need of intramural China for closer economic and political ties with the north-eastern provinces. Japan's efforts to establish "special relations" with Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia aroused strong protests from the newly conscious nationalists of China. To a degree Chang Tso-lin's evil reputation as a "traitor" has been due to the deep resentment felt by his colleagues south of the Wall for his negotiations with the Japanese. Recent information from the Japanese "war trials" confirms, however, what many had long suspected—that the "Marshal of Manchuria" resisted temptation staunchly when the Japanese sought to buy him out, and that his son followed in his footsteps.

It is also relatively clear now that the Japanese militarists were sorely agitated by the extension of the "rights recovery" movement to Manchuria. In the years just after the Washington Conference, the Chinese sought by obstructionism and numerous devices to make life as uncomfortable as possible for the Japanese in Manchuria. Contrary to the Peking declaration that accompanied the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1905, the Chinese in 1925 began to construct rail lines paralleling the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway. Thereafter a deal of ink was spilled in legalistic bickering over the meaning of the declaration with regard to "parallel lines." Moreover, the Chinese refused whenever possible to borrow money for railway construction from the Japanese. Three lines were built in Manchuria to 1929 that were financed exclusively with Chinese capital, and others were undertaken. The Chinese also irritated the Japanese considerably by opening the ports of Yinkow and Hulutao as competition for Dairen. Chinese railway construction was also designed to connect the interior with the two new ports on either side of the Gulf of Pechili. China's "revolutionary diplomacy," as the Japanese called it, was directed at the nullification through unilateral abrogation of what the Japanese believed were their "treaty rights" in Manchuria. To 1931 the Japanese received a share of sympathy from the other national groups who had also suffered from the anti-foreignism of China's new nationalism.

In 1929 the aggressive Chinese policy was blunted in the conflict with

¹² See Viscount Ishii, "The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XI (January 1933), 224; also C. Walter Young, *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria* (Baltimore, 1931), *passim*.

Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway.¹³ The threat of direct action by the Soviet government, which was not even theoretically bound by the Washington treaties, made it apparent that Chinese problems might still be settled by the use or the threat of force. In fact, the Kuomintang Chinese and Bolshevik Russian governments did not engage in diplomatic relations again until 1932. Even though the Japanese were committed to the Washington treaties and hence to a policy of nonintervention in Chinese affairs, the Japanese military was gravely concerned, but perhaps a bit jubilant, over the precedent of direct action, and animosity toward Nanking established by the Soviets. The absence of machinery to enforce obedience to international agreements, the movement toward disarmament, and the general apathy toward action in a place so remote from the center of the world-stage gave the Japanese additional opportunities to advance their position in Manchuria and to increase their stake in China.

Europe was also going through a series of political and economic crises in 1931. During the first three months of that year, diplomatic tension in western Europe was at a high pitch over the negotiations between Germany and Austria for a customs' union. To the despair of France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, this tariff *Anschluss* was announced on March 21, 1931. The subsequent crisis over German-Austrian collaboration caused a withdrawal of foreign capital from central Europe which threatened to destroy the German and Austrian financial structures. Germany was unable to obtain loans from France and had to turn to Great Britain and ultimately to the United States. On June 20, 1931, President Hoover extended a helping hand by his proposal of a year's moratorium of debts. In the interdependent economic world of the twentieth century it was not possible for any of the countries to escape unscathed from the ensuing financial panic. Because of the numerous drains on England's financial resources that country on September 18, 1931, went off the gold standard. The U.S.S.R. alone was occupied mainly with internal problems such as those attending the first Five-Year plan.

The situation within China and Manchuria was also chaotic. The most sanguinary of China's innumerable civil wars was being waged by a northern coalition headed by Generals Yen Hsi-shan and Fêng Yü-hsiang against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking government. The rise and fall of political fortunes in China south of the Wall attracted the interest of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, military overlord of Manchuria. By his participation in the wars and political activities around Peiping, it appeared to outsiders that Chang was not primarily interested in his possessions to

¹³ For a detailed account consult Harold S. Quigley and George H. Blakeslee, *The Far East: An International Survey* (Boston, 1938), pp. 16-31; C. Walter Young, *The International Relations of Manchuria* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 216-35; also *supra*, pp. 228-35.

the northeast where matters were coming to a climax and where his absence weakened his personal hold as well as that of Nanking.

In the spring of 1931 near the little Manchurian village of Wanpaoshan, eighteen miles north of Changchun, disputes arose over land-leases between interested Chinese and Koreans who were under Japanese "protection." As a result of this, on July 1, 1931, riots broke out in Korea which were given prominent display in Japanese and Korean newspapers, and anti-Japanese boycotts were revived in China. Simultaneously, anti-Chinese riots and boycotts were apparently staged with deliberation in Korea. Meanwhile, a more critical incident was causing great difficulty in western Manchuria. Captain Nakamura Shintaro of the Japanese army, traveling in disguise as a civilian agricultural expert, was killed by Chinese soldiers. The Chinese charged that he was carrying narcotics and a military map when detained. In attempting to escape from the Chinese, he and several companions were killed.¹⁴ Missions of investigation were later sent by both the Japanese and the Chinese, and on the afternoon of September 18, 1931, the Chinese formally accepted responsibility for the murders.

During September, it had also become increasingly clear that the long series of incidents and traditional rivalries had brought about a crisis in Manchuria.¹⁵ The Japanese press declared repeatedly that the army had decided that the "solution ought to be by force." Settlement of all pending issues by force was openly advocated by such responsible Japanese officials as Colonel Doihara Kenji. In a public statement during August, General Minami, minister of war, and high officers of the army had denounced vigorously the "irresponsible third parties attempting to discredit the military." The time for sword-rattling and military action was propitiously chosen from the international, the Japanese, the Chinese, and the local point of view. When action began on September 18, the Japanese were relatively certain that they would meet only nominal opposition.

THE "MUKDEN INCIDENT"

The "incident" of September 18, 1931, was nothing but the percussion cap which set off the more general explosion.¹⁶ From the available evi-

¹⁴ Details in *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 1-10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3, especially for memorandum of a conversation between Dr. John C. Ferguson, adviser of the Executive Yüan of the Chinese National Government, with Nelson T. Johnson, American Minister to China. See also the official warning sent to the major League members and the United States by Nanking on September 12 about the possibilities with regard to Japanese "drastic action" in Manchuria and Mongolia (*ibid.*, pp. 5-7, 7-9).

¹⁶ Details of the "plotting" are in the *Judgment. International Military Tribunal for the Far East* (no place, November 1, 1948), Part B, chap. IV, pp. 90-96. "Okawa [Shumail, with Hashimoto [Kingaro], and his Cherry Society, instigated the Mukden Incident. The Army General Staff approved the scheme, which was commended to them by Colonel Doihara [Kenji]. Doihara and Colonel Itagaki [Seishiro], both members of the Kwantung Army Staff, each played important parts in the planning and in the execution of the attack. . . . War Minister Minami [Jiro], though he took the Army's part, and favored the Army's

dence it appears that this was not an incident created by the Tokyo government; rather it was the action of a military group which hoped to discredit the Minseito government and to arouse national fervor for a strong policy under army direction. Between 10:00 and 10:30 P.M. a bomb allegedly exploded on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway a few miles north of Mukden. Japanese troops immediately went into action against Chinese soldiers stationed in near-by barracks. At 11:46 P.M., according to the Nipponese account, the Japanese Special Service Station in Mukden learned the news by telegraph. Before the night was over, the Japanese army had occupied the capital of Mukden, and other important cities in the vicinity. The war department in Tokyo did not receive word of these activities until 2:00 A.M. on September 19.

Whatever the truth may be about the details of the incident, the actions which remain of paramount importance are those taken by the Japanese army after the incident. In no sense of the word can the Japanese movements of September 18 and the days following be considered legitimate measures of self-defense.¹⁷ In a meeting of the Japanese cabinet of September 19 it was solemnly decreed that Japan should pursue "a policy of non-aggravation."¹⁸ As a result of the conflict within Japan between the Minseito group and the army, the operations in Manchuria proceeded apace without cabinet authorization, and contrary to Wakatsuki's express instructions. The Premier said:

Day after day expansion continued; and I had various conferences with War Minister Minami. I was shown maps daily on which Minami would show by a line a boundary which the Army would not go beyond, and almost daily this boundary was ignored and further expansion reported, but always with assurances that this was the final move.¹⁹

Because of this dualism in government, it was impossible for Baron Shidehara and the Foreign Office to reassure the powers about actions over which the civilian government could exercise no ultimate control.

While Japanese forces were carefully occupying strategic centers in Manchuria, their country's representative at Geneva, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, submitted formal notice to the League of Nations of Japan's action in

scheme for the conquest of Manchuria, was disposed to pay some deference to the views of the Cabinet and the Emperor" (p. 92). For further information see *ibid.*, Part B, chap. V, pp. 533-61. For details regarding the incident itself see Ben Dorfman, "The 'Manchurian Incident' of 1931," *Harpers Monthly Magazine*, CLXIX (1934), 449-62.

¹⁷ This was the conclusion given in chap. IV of the *Report of the Commission of Enquiry* (Lytton Commission). For an excellent summary of this document see *International Conciliation. Documents for the Year 1933* (New York, 1933), pp. 58-87. See also *Judgment . . .*, I, 94.

¹⁸ See Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

¹⁹ As quoted in *Judgment . . .*, Part B, chap. V, p. 561. For the American viewpoint on the cabinet's difficulties see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 38.

Manchuria.²⁰ Two days later, Dr. Alfred S. K. Sze, China's representative to Geneva, presented a letter to the Council asking for League action under the terms of Article eleven of the Covenant.²¹ China's appeal was aimed at bringing the issue to a quick end, to restore the *status quo ante*, and to ascertain the nature and amounts of the reparations China believed were due.²² Although Nanking might have issued an appeal under any of several articles in the Covenant, Dr. Sze and his aides decided to appeal under Article eleven since it was known that the Council preferred to operate under this article and precedents favorable to China's contentions therefore existed, and that this article more than any other permitted the League unqualified competence.

At the meeting of the Council on September 22, Yoshizawa asserted that the Manchurian affair was a purely local one and that a quick conclusion could best be won by direct negotiations between the participants.²³ The Japanese representative also emphasized that public opinion in his homeland would be excited by a League investigation. Dr. Sze bluntly retorted:

How can we enter into diplomatic negotiations with Japan when a large portion of our territory is under military occupation by that country, and further, when that very country has resorted to means other than diplomatic negotiations. I do not think that any self-respecting State can agree to open diplomatic negotiations for the solution of a situation so long as a considerable portion of its territory is under forcible military occupation by the party which requests a diplomatic settlement.²⁴

Even at this early date in the negotiations, China persistently requested that a commission of inquiry be sent to Manchuria to ascertain the facts of the situation. The Chinese also insisted that all Japanese troops be withdrawn to the Kwantung area before proceeding with negotiations. In answer to these stipulations, the Japanese argued that it was necessary to keep troops in certain areas to protect the lives and interests of the

²⁰ Notice was not given, however, until it was requested of Yoshizawa by Alexandre Lerroux, president of the Council. See W. W. Willoughby, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore, 1935), p. 30.

²¹ Article eleven begins as follows: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe-guard the peace of nations. . . ." Sara R. Smith, *The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-32. A Tragedy in International Relations* (New York, 1948) points out (p. 29 and *passim*) that China's case was also referred at the same time to the United States with the request that Washington should "take such steps as will insure the preservation of the peace in the Far East. . . ." Apparently no written reply to the Chinese request was ever dispatched by the American government.

²² See League of Nations, *Official Journal, Minutes of the Sixty-Fifth Session of the Council*, 12th year, No. 12, p. 2266.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2267.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2268.

Japanese in Manchuria. Yoshizawa also assured the League during September that Japan was slowly withdrawing troops from Manchuria proper, and he further asserted that "the Japanese Government has no territorial design on Manchuria."²⁵

While Japanese and Chinese representatives were engaged in diplomatic byplay at Geneva, the Japanese military continued active in Manchuria. Changchun was occupied shortly after Mukden on September 18-19. Two days later the Japanese moved into Kirin, another provincial capital. By these operations the most important cities in south-central Manchuria came into the hands of the Japanese without serious military struggle. The Chinese troops in Manchuria, who were numerically far superior to the Japanese, put up only token resistance in line with the proclamation issued at Nanking "to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders."²⁶ Although the Japanese promised to withdraw part of their forces from Manchuria, outrages continued and culminated on October 8 in the bombing of Chinchow, the temporary seat of Chinese government in Manchuria. During September and October, it became evident that the dualistic character of Japan's government permitted the army a free hand in Manchuria while the civilian government performed diplomatic contortions in vain attempts to reassure the world of Japan's intentions.

Although the United States was not a member of the League, the Sino-Japanese dispute was of direct concern to the Washington government, the United States being a member of the family of nations and a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Pact of Paris. Throughout the negotiations at Geneva, the American government was advised of all developments, and American official opinion was solicited regularly. At the outset of the discussions, Secretary of State Stimson was sounded out by the League Council concerning the dispatch of a commission of investigation to Manchuria. Stimson, however, would not at first sanction American participation in such a project *over and against the objection of Japan*, since he professed to see a distinction between Oriental and Occidental methods of arbitration. In the face of both Chinese and Japanese custom *re* use of "middle-man" mediators, he contended that the Oriental tradition was that of direct negotiation! He also feared that public resentment in Japan toward an international commission would make further difficulties for Minister Shidehara and the Japanese liberals.²⁷ Instead of following the Council's proposal, the United States instructed Lawrence Salisbury, a secretary at the embassy in Tokyo, and American Consul-General Hanson

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2290.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2282.

²⁷ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 47-49 and *passim*. See also R. M. Cooper, *American Consultation in World Affairs* (New York, 1934), chap. V. Cf. also Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

at Harbin, to investigate the situation in Manchuria and to report their findings directly to the State Department.²⁸

During October, Prentiss Gilbert, United States Consul at Geneva, was appointed American auditor at the League Council. On October 5, he transmitted a note to the Council which assured the League that his government would "endeavor to reinforce League action."²⁹ On October 13 the Council reconvened and the Japanese representative shortly thereafter voiced objections on constitutional grounds "to an American representative being invited to participate in Council discussions."³⁰ Such constitutional grounds did exist, but the Japanese were mainly concerned about closer cooperation between the United States and the League because of the more precise tack which Secretary Stimson was beginning to follow.³¹ Although the American representative sat in the Council, he participated only infrequently, for he was not authorized to speak except in discussion of the applicability of the Paris Pact to the controversy. After reminding the conflicting powers of article ii of the Pact of Paris, the Council optimistically adjourned on October 24 with a resolution (agreed to by all except Japan) calling upon Japan "to begin immediately" the withdrawal of its troops to the railway zone and recommending to the two governments concerned that they make arrangements for direct negotiations. Japan refused to sanction the resolution, because, as the Japanese representative contended, it did not "lay down the conditions which it [Japan] regards as essential for effectively safeguarding the lives and property of its nationals."³²

During October and November, 1931, Japanese occupation and penetration of Manchuria continued.³³ There were, however, no large-scale military activities again until November 4 when the Nonni River bridge "incident" took place in Heilungkiang province. As a direct result of this action, Japanese troops occupied the important city of Tsitsihar around November 19. By this thrust three hundred miles north of Mukden,

²⁸ Cf. *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 85, 90-92; also *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 10-11; Henry L. Stimson, *The Far Eastern Crisis* (New York, 1936), pp. 43-46; also Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

²⁹ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 117.

³⁰ League of Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 2330-31; also see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 199.

³¹ Stimson's attitude during the early days of negotiations is reflected in the following quotation: "In one of my early reports to my colleagues in the Cabinet on October 9th, I find from my diary that I had voiced the apprehension that these modern treaties initiated by Western nations . . . might not be taken very seriously in the Orient. But, as I then pointed out to my colleagues these treaties existed; for better or for worse they represented the earnest hopes of our part of the world" (Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 56). Consult also Stimson's conversations with Debuchi Katsuji, Japanese Ambassador to Washington, in which Stimson asserted, "that in accepting the invitation of the League of Nations I had had very largely in mind avoiding the appearance of a personal issue between Japan and America . . ." (*U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 26-27). Full analysis of Gilbert's role in Smith, *op. cit.*, chap. IV.

³² League of Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 2356.

³³ See especially the report of Hanson and Salisbury of October 22 (*U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 288-91, 315-28).

Japan gained control of the northernmost city of importance in Manchuria, and concentrated forces in the vicinity of the Soviet-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, several peculiar "incidents" between Japanese and Chinese took place in Tientsin on November 8 and 26 which considerably influenced the situation between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria. During this period, the Japanese also seized the salt revenues of Manchuria and began the organization of local puppet regimes, such as the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden.³⁴

In the period (October 24–November 16) during which the Council was adjourned for further study of the Manchurian question, military activities in Manchuria were the subject of a number of communications. Proposals and counterproposals emanated from Tokyo, while dispatches from Nanking regularly accused the Japanese of extending their aggressive activities. On October 24, the signatories of the Pact of Paris, including the United States, had addressed identical telegrams to both interested parties communicating to them the resolution adopted by the Council calling upon Japan to withdraw its troops to the railway zone and calling upon China to assume responsibility for Japanese lives and property in Manchuria. The Japanese policy of temporizing brought two further appeals from Briand, the President of the Council, reminding the contesting powers that they should "take all necessary steps to avoid aggravating the situation." These fervent appeals went unheeded by the Japanese military while the diplomatic corps continued diligently to find legal excuses for the events transpiring in Manchuria.³⁵

STIMSON'S DOCTRINE OF NONRECOGNITION

After three weeks adjournment, the League Council reconvened on November 16. The group which assembled in Paris at the Salle de l'Horloge of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was presided over by Aristide Briand. Sir John Simon had been sent to represent Great Britain and the United States government had dispatched American Ambassador to Great Britain, Charles G. Dawes, to act as an unofficial liaison officer. Dawes made his headquarters at the Ritz Hotel and from this vantage point interviewed the representatives of the League Powers. At the express instructions of Stimson at no time did Dawes sit with the Council and he but rarely crossed the Seine to visit the French Foreign Office.³⁶

In his opening address to the Council Briand pointed out that the numerous documents exchanged during the recess period had made plain that Japan was insistent upon scrupulous observation by China of *all* treaties

³⁴ Consult for details, Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–52; also *infra*, pp. 322–26.

³⁵ Consult the documents in League of Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 2513–28.

³⁶ See Charles G. Dawes, *Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain* (New York, 1939), pp. 410–32, for a short summary of the author's work and his impressions of the Council meeting at Paris. For criticisms of Dawes' role see Smith, *op. cit.*, chap. VI.

undertaken by the government.³⁷ China was willing to abide by its international obligations except for the unilateral agreements forced upon it in 1915 in the form of the "Twenty-One Demands." It was the validity of these agreements which the Chinese questioned and which the Japanese insisted upon as essential to good relationships.



Henry L. Stimson. Wide World Photo

During the remaining days of November, the Japanese continued to extend their operations in Manchuria. On November 21, Yoshizawa proposed, on behalf of his government, that "the League of Nations should send a Commission of Enquiry to the spot."³⁸ Although Japan had earlier objected to such a proposal, it is probable that willingness to co-operate at this time was inspired by the hope of winning additional time to enlarge and reinforce the hold upon Manchuria. Apparently, the Nipponese also aroused hopes among the diplomats, for Dr. Sze in a memorandum of November 22 seriously warned that

³⁷ This was one of the five basic points made by Japan in its declaration of October 26 (League of Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 2514).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2365.

enquiry, without *at the same time* providing for immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of Japanese forces . . . becomes a mere device to condone and perpetuate for a more or less definite period the unjustifiable occupation of China's territory by an aggressor who had already virtually attained his unlawful objective while these discussions have been going on.³⁹

Stimson and his advisers were wary of pressing the Japanese too closely for they felt that the national temper of Japan was too sensitive to tolerate what might be considered "outside interference." The Minseito government in power appeared to represent the most conciliatory elements in Japanese officialdom. Instead of producing a peaceful solution, the diplomats in Washington feared, quite correctly it now appears, that pressure would simply force the resignation of Shidehara and his colleagues. Nevertheless, the American government continued in November to oppose uncompromisingly Japan's effort to extort by force a ratification from China of the disputed treaties and a compromise solution of the other outstanding and unsettled issues. By November 18, Stimson's patience was all but exhausted. He wrote to Dawes in Paris that Japan's attitude:

is tending to force me toward concluding that a settlement which this Government can accept in the light of the treaties of peace is, after all, getting to be increasingly hopeless and that the only recourse left may be for everyone to close the negotiations, to make public the whole damning case against Japan, and to rest upon the reaction of public opinion which in the United States would be overwhelmingly against Japan.⁴⁰

At no time, however, did Stimson consider seriously the possibility of going to war against Japan. Moreover, he had no sympathy with the efforts of Dr. Sze "to get all the nations of the world in war with Japan."⁴¹

While the Council continued to discuss the details necessary to the dispatch of a commission of inquiry, the *Tokyo Asahi* and other Japanese newspapers published an extra edition on November 27 to announce that a new drive toward Chinchow, Chang Hsüeh-liang's headquarters city, was under way.⁴² Secretary Stimson told a press conference in Washington that he found difficulty in understanding the report about the advance of General Honjo's army toward Chinchow, for three days before he had an assurance that "the Premier, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and he [Shidehara] are agreed that towards Chinchow there shall be no hostile operations, and orders have been issued to that effect."⁴³ Almost at once,

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2529.

⁴⁰ *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1931, III, 478.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 496-97.

⁴² Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 367, n. 113.

⁴³ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 50-51, as reported by Ambassador W. Cameron Forbes.

the Japanese press under army inspiration, and perhaps with the connivance of Shiratori, the foreign office spokesman, reacted violently to Stimson's public statement and accused Shidehara of revealing military secrets.⁴⁴ On the following day Secretary Stimson sent to Japan the text of his statement to the press and categorically denied all other stories emanating from Tokyo.⁴⁵ Protests and warnings were also addressed to Tokyo by London and the League. For the first time since September, the powers had acted collectively and with surprising results. The rapidity and forthrightness of collective action, and the wish of the Japanese foreign office to keep the negotiations at Paris on an even keel, probably forced the Japanese military to suspend temporarily their actions against Chinchow. This loss of prestige for the military occasioned further widespread agitation in Japan against the foreign policy of Baron Shidehara and the Minseito government.

On December 10, the resolution of the Japanese representative requesting the dispatch of a commission of inquiry was carried at Paris, and on the following day at Tokyo the Minseito government resigned. Two days later the Seiyukai formed a cabinet under Inukai Ki with Yoshizawa as Foreign Minister and Lieutenant-General Araki Sadao as Minister of War. At home, terroristic measures against Japanese moderates became the order of the day. In foreign affairs, the Inukai government was forthrightly aggressive, even though determined, like its predecessor, to attempt to control the army. On December 22, Ambassador Forbes nevertheless wrote to Secretary Stimson that "active preparations are continuing for further operations in Manchuria where a free hand seems to have been given to the military."⁴⁶ Other sources and news dispatches also reported increased Japanese activity in Manchuria for the purpose of driving the Chinese south of the wall. Two days after Christmas the Japanese foreign office notified the world that "bandit subjugation" in the area about Chinchow was about to be resumed.⁴⁷

Repeatedly during December, Stimson had warned that Japanese advance toward Chinchow could be regarded as nothing less than "pure aggression."⁴⁸ Since November, Stimson had repeatedly taken the initiative away from the League in the Manchurian affair. His remonstrances to Tokyo had been couched in terms extremely frank for the language of

⁴⁴ On November 28, Baron Shidehara informed Secretary Stimson that he was "being subjected to most acrimonious and bitter attacks from his army (*ibid.*, pp. 51-52)."

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65. *Judgment . . .*, I, 96-97, for Inukai's efforts to control the army and to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek.

⁴⁷ A complete record of claims and counterclaims made by the Japanese and Chinese between December 16, 1931 and January 25, 1932, is contained in the League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 13th year, No. 2 (February, 1932), pp. 283-305.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

diplomacy.⁴⁹ By December, he was determined to make evident the extreme displeasure of the American government by a drastic measure short of war. On December 29, Minister Nelson T. Johnson in China reported that Marshal Chang had ordered withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Manchuria, and on January 3, 1932, the Japanese occupied Chinchow. Johnson also requested the American government to act positively as soon as possible. On the following day Stimson received permission from President Hoover to strike out into the troubled waters of diplomacy without League support. Uncompromisingly opposed to economic sanctions being imposed upon Japan, Hoover permitted his energetic Secretary of State to issue an official statement which clearly enunciated a moral sanction similar to that issued by Bryan in 1915.⁵⁰ After conversations with the French and British ambassadors in Washington, Stimson dispatched identic notes to Nanking and Tokyo stating that the United States:

. . . cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.⁵¹

During the next two months, the United States remained the only proponent of nonrecognition. In spite of the belief of the American Secretary of State that Britain, France, and the United States had a common interest in the maintenance of China's integrity, the British made plain through their Foreign Office, and by editorials in the semi-official *Times* of London, that they did not consider the American note of January 7 necessary inasmuch as Japan had already pledged respect for the Open Door.⁵² Non-

⁴⁹ For an interesting attack on Stimson's policy see A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), pp. 417-27.

⁵⁰ The difference lay in the fact that Bryan's statement related only to China. See discussions of Stimson's relations with Hoover in Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, *The Hoover Policies* (New York, 1937), p. 603; also William S. Myers, *The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933* (New York, 1940), pp. 154-69.

⁵¹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 76. See also the discussion of this note in Quincy Wright, "The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932," *American Journal of International Law*, XXVI (1932), 342-48. Also consult for a general history of the nonrecognition idea, Robert Langer, *Seizure of Territory. The Stimson Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and Diplomatic Practice* (Princeton, 1947), especially chap. X. For criticism of Stimson's delay in taking forthright action see Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-37.

⁵² See Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-03. Consult also the interesting acknowledgment published in the *Times* (November 30, 1938) by Sir John Pratt of the Foreign Office in which he termed the British communiqué "a slip" and a "real obstacle in Anglo-American relations." See Sir John W. Pratt, *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943), pp. 275-76.

recognition was also viewed by the British as of slight importance after its failure in 1915, and certainly inconsistent with Britain's traditional international policies. A double-edged and sarcastic Japanese reply of January 16⁵³ was framed after it became evident that neither Britain, France, nor the League intended to follow immediately the trail of nonrecognition which Stimson had blazed.⁵⁴

The leading European powers were determined to await the results of the neutral investigation. On January 14, the commission was named to include the Earl of Lytton (British) as chairman, Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti (Italian), General Henri Claudel (French), Major-General Frank R. McCoy (American), and Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German). The assessors later named were Yoshida Isaburo for Japan and Dr. Wellington Koo for China. After two meetings at Geneva, the European appointees set forth for Manchuria via America, Japan, and China. They reached Tokyo on February 29. It was unfortunate, in Secretary Stimson's words, "that this first great test of the strength of the collective structure . . ." should have come to a head in an issue between other races on the opposite side of the world,⁵⁵ and that the far eastern powers had to be investigated by a completely Western committee.

THE SHANGHAI "WAR"

Meanwhile, the situation in the Far East was taking a decided turn for the worse. As if deriving impetus from Stimson's doctrine of nonrecognition, the Japanese in January, 1932, extended their activities on the Asiatic continent to Shanghai, China's most important port, and to the Yangtze Valley. Although the fundamental reasons for this new outbreak are relatively obscure, it is obvious that Japanese business interests had been suffering great financial and prestige losses in part because of China's boycott of Japanese goods. The Japanese themselves argued that the attack on Shanghai was designed to protect their nationals from reprisals by the outraged Chinese. Although "protection" was probably a reason, the Japanese may also have hoped to shift attention away from "independence activities" in occupied Manchuria, or perhaps they felt that further military action would demoralize the Chinese Nationalist government completely. It may also in part have been the result of agitation by the Japanese navy for a role in empire-building to rival the army's activities in Manchuria.

⁵³ The Japanese saw fit in this note to remark that "it might be the subject of an academic doubt whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily voids the ends secured," *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 77.

⁵⁴ *The North China Herald*, owned and operated by British interests in China, deplored the lack of government strength in China and expressed marked sympathy with Japan's position *vis-à-vis* Manchuria. H. G. W. Woodhead's articles and editorials in the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* were also understanding of Japan's "positive policy."

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

In China the utmost confusion prevailed. Since the preceding April the Cantonese group had been trying vigorously to bring about the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking government. During the summer and autumn, as mentioned earlier, one of the most devastating floods in the history of China had occurred. Throughout the early winter thousands of students rampaged against the government, seeking to compel a union of the Cantonese and Nanking leaders to present a united front against Japan and to force a formal declaration of war. Commandeering free passage to the capital, at times by lying on the railway tracks to prevent the movement of trains, they went to Nanking by the thousands. On September 28, they severely beat Minister of Foreign Affairs, C. T. Wang, and in December all but destroyed the ministry offices in repeated attacks. They also attacked the Central Party headquarters and a newspaper plant, doing heavy damage and severely wounding two prominent members of the government.

The boycott against Japan was also conducted with unmitigated zeal and severity. Quantities of goods were seized, shops were picketed, native dealers in Japanese goods were terrorized, imprisoned, or fined; users of such articles were likewise threatened and punished. The Kuomintang openly encouraged boycotting and anti-Japanese demonstrations. Insulting references to the Japanese emperor were made vocally and in the press. Japanese shipping on the Yangtze River was halted. Attacks on Japanese nationals protected by international agreements also became frequent during January, and the crack Nineteenth Route Army was concentrated by Nanking for the protection of the city.

Hostilities at Shanghai were preceded and accompanied by the usual diplomatic byplay. Formal protests were lodged by Consul-General Murai Karamatsu to Mayor Wu T'ieh-ch'eng of Greater Shanghai. On January 20, Murai received instructions from Tokyo to deliver an ultimatum to Mayor Wu requiring a formal apology, the immediate arrest of persons responsible for attacks on Japanese citizens, payment of hospital bills, etc., and adequate control of the anti-Japanese movements or organizations. Although the terms were agreed to before the deadline, at midnight on January 28 Japanese bluejackets landed from the fleet in Shanghai harbor and attacked Chinese troops allegedly to bring law and order to the section of Greater Shanghai called Chapei.

The world was shocked and the commercial powers alarmed by the Japanese attack on the great metropolis and business center of the Yangtze Valley. On January 27, Ambassador Forbes in Tokyo delivered a message from Stimson to Yoshizawa which stated in substance that "the government of the United States cannot regard with indifference a situation in which apparently a foreign government has authorized the commander of its naval force at Shanghai to use force . . . to support demands made by

the local consular representatives. . . ."⁵⁶ In addition, Stimson warned the Japanese not to harm the important communication interests of the Radio Corporation of America at Chenju, seven miles from Shanghai.⁵⁷ On January 28, the British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, protested strongly regarding the actions at Shanghai, and the British Foreign Office asked American co-operation.⁵⁸ Thus Stimson received British aid on his firm policy once the vital Yangtze area was brought into the scene of military action. Like the British, the other European powers were shocked profoundly by this second aggressive Japanese move.

In Japan itself, there was much less enthusiasm for the Shanghai venture than there had been for the Mukden incident.⁵⁹ It was possible to argue about China's claim to Manchuria; China's sovereignty over Shanghai could not be questioned. Both governments requested the good offices of the United States in settling the Shanghai dispute, and China again appealed to the League of Nations. On January 29, Dr. W. W. Yen (Yen Hui-ch'ing), the new Chinese representative at Geneva, asked League action under articles x and xv of the Covenant in addition to the action already being taken under article xi. By this move the League was obliged to continue conciliation while considering adjudication of responsibility and the possibility of imposing sanctions. The Council at once recommended the formation of a special investigating commission at Shanghai consisting of neutral diplomatic and consular representatives. The American agents in Shanghai were instructed to co-operate with the League committee.⁶⁰

In answer to the Japanese protest that the Chapei incident was "entirely a matter of self-defense . . . in an effort to protect Japanese life and property,"⁶¹ the American Government immediately dispatched Admiral Taylor to Shanghai on the flagship "Houston" with destroyers and the 31st infantry regiment from Manila not as a "threat to anyone," but simply for "measures of precaution."⁶² Meanwhile, through their ambassadors to Tokyo the American and British governments lodged strong protests at the Foreign Office against Japanese use of the International Settlement as a base for military operations. Further reports were received on February 1 that Japanese gunboats on the Yangtze had begun without warning to fire on Nanking.

⁵⁶ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 162. For further details see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1932, III, 102-10.

⁵⁷ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 163.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁵⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 190; also Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-75.

⁶⁰ Cf. Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-18.

⁶¹ See report included in the Communiqués issued by the Japanese Consulate-General at Shanghai, *The Shanghai Incident* (Shanghai, 1932), Vol. I, No. I, 3 pp. Also in *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 167-68.

⁶² *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 168-69.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa had requested American good offices to "induce the Chinese not to bring up further reinforcements."⁶³ In answer, the powers forwarded five proposals for cessation of the conflict. The proposed terms called for an immediate armistice, no further mobilization, withdrawal from points of contact in Shanghai, establishment of neutral zones in the International Settlement, and "prompt advances . . . in negotiation to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Resolution of the League of Nations of December 10, without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers or participants."⁶⁴ The Chinese were quick to accept the proposals, but Yoshizawa objected to the fifth proposal, which would have committed Japan to deal with China contrary to the 1915 precedent of independent negotiation without neutral participants.⁶⁵

While the Japanese Cabinet considered the five proposals, events in Shanghai became increasingly serious. On February 3, Secretary Stimson in conversation with Ambassador Debuchi emphatically stated that Japanese attacks from the Settlement had to cease, "or otherwise we will all be involved in a great catastrophe."⁶⁶ On the same day, the American secretary cabled Ambassador Forbes: "You should inform the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States assumes that the Japanese armed forces are so thoroughly disciplined that their actions can be controlled. . . ."⁶⁷ Yoshizawa met the American, British, and French ambassadors on February 4 and presented a refusal to the proposal for cessation of hostilities, objecting most strongly to the second and the fifth proposals. He further informed the ambassadors that the Japanese would send infantry to Shanghai in addition to the marines already there. Two days later, Yoshizawa advised the interested ambassadors that Japan had drawn up a possible solution of the Shanghai affair agreed to by Japanese military, naval, and diplomatic officials.

The independent Japanese program contemplated immediate cessation of hostilities, creation of a neutral area policed by neutral forces, and continued occupation by Japanese forces of those areas outside the Settlement inhabited mainly by Japanese.⁶⁸ The ambassadors in Tokyo recommended that the neutrals in Shanghai should co-operate in attempting to make the Japanese formula workable, and on the same day Secretary Stimson advised American Consul-General Cunningham at Shanghai to co-operate. Stimson emphasized that "the proposal must be considered entirely as a proposal coming from Japan . . . [and is] in no way an

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

acceptance of the recent four-power proposal for a lasting settlement.”⁶⁹ On February 7, the Japanese government issued a statement reviewing the incident and advising the concerned neutrals that the new forces about to be landed at Shanghai were dispatched to give additional protection to Japanese nationals.⁷⁰ By February 10, the neutrals in Shanghai and in the State Department at Washington had given up hope of anything materializing from Japan’s independent proposals. On February 12, Secretary Stimson wrote Ambassador Forbes his conviction “that the Japanese military authorities at no time have considered any cessation of hostilities . . . but . . . have been determined to force a military decision.”⁷¹

Meanwhile, military maneuvering was proceeding ominously at Shanghai. The initial Japanese attacks had met with unexpectedly stiff resistance from China’s Nineteenth Route Army. On January 29, Japanese airplanes bombed and burned a large portion of the Chapei area. Thereafter the Japanese used the International Settlement as the base for their operations against the numerically superior Chinese forces. Evidently the Japanese naval group had had its prestige badly marred by its failure to dispose of the incident quickly. On February 15, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa announced to the interested ambassadors in Tokyo that Japan would have by the following day around 15,000 land troops and 3000 marines in the Shanghai area. He contended that the Nineteenth Route Army stationed from Chapei to Woosung numbered around 31,000. In order to stave off large-scale hostilities, the Japanese army delivered on February 18 an ultimatum to the Chinese forces requiring that the Chinese withdraw a distance of twenty kilometers from the International Settlement. Despite appeals and veiled threats by the neutral powers, the Japanese refused to remove their troops a similar distance and to create thereby a neutral zone. With the rejection of the Japanese ultimatum, hostilities were renewed on the morning of February 20.

British policy during this period had been more closely than ever coordinated with American diplomacy. The second report of the Consular Committee to the League had announced that “since February 3 a state of open war exists.”⁷² United States Minister to Switzerland, Hugh Wilson, was thereupon instructed to act as a liaison officer between the American government and the League. On February 9, Secretary Stimson invited British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, to a formal invocation against Japan of the Nine-Power Pact, which had not yet played a part in the diplomatic maneuvering. On February 11, Stimson telephoned to Simon and on the following day sent through Minister Wilson to Sir John a rough draft designed as a joint or concurrent statement by the interested signa-

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-88.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁷² See Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-29.

tories of the Nine-Power Treaty.⁷³ The main motive in the issuance of such a statement was "to clarify the thought and focus the moral support of the world upon the situation which had been taking place in Shanghai."⁷⁴ Stimson's draft, if accepted fully by the British, would have committed Great Britain to the doctrine of nonrecognition.⁷⁵ Simon, however, adhered firmly to the policy of reserving judgment until the League of



Sir John Simon. Wide World Photo

Nations had made a report on both the Manchurian and the Shanghai situations, despite the fact that Stimson felt that he and the United States had been "let down."⁷⁶

In the meantime, Japan's internal political situation was becoming increasingly critical. On February 9, Inouye Junnosuke, a leading Minseito

⁷³ For transcripts of Stimson's telephone conversations see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1932, III, 280-85, 296-98, 301-05, 335-40, 341-45. See also Hugh Wilson, *A Diplomat between Two Wars* (New York, 1941).

⁷⁴ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁷⁵ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 82.

⁷⁶ See especially *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1932, III, 352-56. For an interesting appraisal of Stimson's policy at this juncture see Griswold, *op. cit.*, p. 431. See also Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32, for a partial refutation by Sir John Pratt of Stimson's allegation that Britain would not "go along" on the invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Cf. also the exposition of Pratt (*op. cit.*, pp. 271-74) and his aversion to what he calls "the symptoms of a certain impatience in American diplomacy" (p. 228). Pratt states, however, that "the one serious error which the Foreign Office made in 1931-32 was its failure to gain the confidence and goodwill of Mr. Stimson (p. 226)."

politician, was assassinated, and Japanese politics thereafter took an even more reactionary turn. On February 18, in an effort to distract attention from the activities of their military forces in Shanghai, the Japanese issued a declaration of Manchurian independence and proclaimed the creation of Manchoukuo. While bombs rained on Shanghai, the Japanese general election of February 20 gave the reactionary Seiyukai and Prime Minister Inukai control in the lower house of the Imperial Diet.

Concurrently, the Western powers were concentrating on stopping the heavy Japanese attack on Shanghai and on the Nineteenth Route Army. On February 16 the neutral members of the League Council appealed unofficially to Japan as the responsible party not to begin large-scale hostilities in Shanghai. In reply, the Seiyukai government, on February 23, denied responsibility for the Shanghai affair, asserted that "the appeal was addressed to a quarter where it was not necessary," and expressed the belief that Japan "is naturally and necessarily in a far better position to appreciate the facts than any distant Power can possibly be."⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the American fleet had been concentrated at Hawaii for previously scheduled maneuvers.

Determined to invoke the Nine-Power Pact, but discouraged by British reluctance to join in such an invocation, Secretary Stimson, on February 23, issued his thoughts about Japanese aggression in a public letter to Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In explaining the purposes of this document, Stimson observed:

From its face it can easily be seen that it was intended for the perusal of at least five unnamed addressees. It was intended as a message of encouragement to China; as an explanation of policy to the public of the United States; as a suggestion of possible future action to the nations who were to be assembled at the coming meeting of the assembly of the League of Nations; as a gentle reminder to the Conservative party which was now in control of the British government, that they through Lord Salisbury and Balfour, were joint authors with us of the Open Door policy and the Nine Power Treaty; and finally, as a reminder to Japan that if she chose to break down one of the group of treaties arrived at, at the Washington Conference, other nations might feel themselves released from some of those treaties which were as important to her as the Nine Power Treaty was to us.⁷⁸

In his letter to Borah, Stimson concisely reviewed the Manchurian question and gave his views on the applicability, not only of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, but also of the Nine-Power Treaty.

⁷⁷ League of Nations, *Official Journal* (Geneva, 1932), 13th year, No. 3 (Part I), pp. 384-86.

⁷⁸ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

On the same day (February 23), Japan dispatched its reply to the League. The publication of Japan's position coming on the same day that Stimson's letter on America's position appeared gave the world a clear view of the differences between the two approaches. As Stimson realized, the Japanese assertion that China was not entitled to the respect and rights due a sovereign state was in direct contrast to his policy of insisting upon strict observance of the treaties with and pertaining to China.⁷⁹

The Sino-Japanese hostilities begun on January 29 at Shanghai lasted until March 4. Military action extended even beyond the Shanghai precincts—to Kiangwan and Wusung at the mouth of the Yangtze. On February 29, the Hanchow airdrome, more than one hundred miles south of Shanghai, was bombed, and two days later similar operations were carried out a few miles east of Kunshan (or Quinsan) some forty miles west and a bit north of Shanghai. For more than a month the Nineteenth Route Army under General Ts'ai T'ing-chieh put up a remarkably spirited and successful opposition. Later his forces were aided by the 87th and 88th Divisions of the Chinese Bodyguard Army—a mere 15,000 men unused to modern warfare. This was the first occasion in modern times on which the Chinese faced the Japanese down in such a manner, and the Japanese were intensely surprised and chagrined.

In accord with China's request of January 29, the Assembly of the League was convened in extraordinary session on March 3, the day before the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai. On March 4, the Assembly by resolution, and not informed of precise developments at Shanghai, called upon the contending powers to end hostile actions, requested the other powers having "special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation" to cease hostilities was being executed, and recommended that negotiations be undertaken by Chinese and Japanese officials to "render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces."⁸⁰

The later actions of the Assembly echo to a degree and clearly reflect the influence of the declarations made by the Japanese and the American governments on February 23. Speeches by representatives of the smaller powers generally shared the point of view expressed by Foreign Minister Edward Benes of Czechoslovakia who emphasized that no country possessed "the right to take justice into its own hands."⁸¹ In this special session it was the general opinion that Japan had acted in an unwarranted fashion, and there was far more agreement in condemning such actions than had been the case before the attack on Shanghai. Especially caustic

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁸⁰ League of Nations, *Official Journal (Special Supplement No. 101)*. *Records of the Special Session of the Assembly* (Geneva, 1932), I, 43-44.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

were the comments in regard to Japan's assertion of February 23 that China had not reached a sufficiently high stage of development to enjoy international respect. On March 11, the Assembly adopted a second resolution, drawn up by a special committee and proposed by the British government, partially at the instigation of Stimson. It enumerated basic duties of League members with respect to the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, and declared in line with Stimson's policy of nonrecognition, but in more cautious language, "that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenant,"⁸² or to the Pact of Paris. Section II dealt with the Shanghai situation and requested "the powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements . . . , if necessary, to co-operate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone"⁸³ between the opposing armies. Section III announced the Assembly's decision to set up a Committee of Nineteen to report on the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, and among other things "to propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary," and "to submit a first progress report"⁸⁴ by the latest on May 1, 1932. By this unanimous action of the Assembly, the American policy of frank disapproval of Japanese actions was accepted by the rest of the world. The decision to present a united stand of the interested observers helped generally to clear the atmosphere, but it in no way judged or implied judgment of the great question of responsibility.

Although the Assembly's resolution was denounced in Japan,⁸⁵ no revival of hostilities occurred at Shanghai. That undertaking had been too disastrous for Japanese prestige and for world understanding of their Asiatic policy. The resistance of China was correspondingly strengthened after the Assembly had condemned the Japanese action. The withdrawal of Japan from Shanghai after March 4 has never been explained any more satisfactorily than the initial use of military force in the Yangtze Valley. Probably, the Shanghai episode was originally intended to break the boycott and to mask further activities toward "independence" in Manchuria. When it was observed, however, that the Chinese were determined to resist and that the foreign powers were generally sympathetic to Chinese resistance, the Japanese retired from the Shanghai area and began once again concentration of troops and propaganda in Manchuria. On May 5, the local representatives of the neutrals at Shanghai and indirectly the Committee of Nineteen working with representatives of the Chinese and Japanese governments arranged an armistice which was carried into effect during the next few months. The presence of neutrals at these armistice

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ See Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

negotiations was a concession quite out of accord with Japan's normal position of insisting upon direct and independent negotiations between the parties concerned. Possibly the departure from the customary was one reason for the success of the armistice arrangements.

THE FORMATION OF MANCHOUKUO

While negotiations at Shanghai were at a crucial stage on February 18, 1932, a declaration of independence came out of Manchuria. Despite Japanese assertions to the contrary, an organized independence movement in the area of China's three eastern provinces had not existed before the incident of September 18, 1931. The requirements of the Japanese army and chaotic conditions of government after Japanese occupation made necessary the immediate organization or reorganization of local government units. This was carried out under Japanese supervision, and during the course of negotiations several prominent Japanese remarked in public about the desirability of annexing Manchuria to the Japanese Empire.⁸⁶ An inspired independence movement, meanwhile, went through several stages. As early as September 24, 1931, Japanese authorities in Mukden invited a number of Chinese led by Yüan Chin-kai to form a Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order. Although at the outset Yüan disavowed intention of leading a separatist movement, a month later the Committee was known as the Liaoning Province Self-Government Office. This group transformed itself by November 7 into the Liaoning Provincial Government *ad interim*, severed officially connections with Nanking, and on November 20 changed the name of the province to Fengtien. In a similar fashion other local self-governing administrations were established by the end of January, 1932. Thereafter, the national independence movement was directed and organized by the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden, which was in turn operated by the Japanese Kwantung army. On February 16-17, 1932, a conference was held at Mukden between the new officials and a Dr. Chao Hsin-po, mayor of Mukden and a leading spirit in the independence movement. As a result of these meetings, the new state of Manchoukuo received its form of government, and on February 18 the declaration of independence was published.⁸⁷

Throughout the history of this separatist movement, the Japanese army browbeat Chinese into accepting public offices, and frequently imprisoned those who refused the doubtful honor. Celebrations were staged, and posters prominently denounced Chang Hsüeh-liang and praised the actions of the Japanese. The key positions in business and in governmental

⁸⁶ See the allegations presented by Assessor V. K. Wellington Koo in his *Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission* (New York, 1933), 1931, pp. 824-28. The army went ahead with "independence" plans despite Shidehara's objections (*Judgment . . .*, Part B, chap. VI, pp. 568-69), and threatened to declare itself independent of Japan.

⁸⁷ Based on the *Report of the Lytton Commission*, chap. VI.

agencies were occupied by Japanese or those known to be Japanese sympathizers. To give the appearance of self-determination, the provinces held conventions during February at which representatives of various groups were permitted to express their joy at the dawn of a new era. The final expression of self-determination was the All-Manchuria Convention held at Mukden on February 29 at which every motion was unanimously approved. On the following day the Convention's declaration was issued from Mukden expressing to the world the joy of Manchuria's thirty million inhabitants at the founding of the new and independent state.

Manchoukuo⁸⁸ was officially designated a Republic under a chief executive called a Regent. On March 4, the Hsüan-t'ung emperor of China, known since 1911 as Henry Pu-yi and who had been taken into custody several months before by the Japanese, accepted the Regency, and was officially installed on March 9-10 with the other members of the new government. As Regent Pu-yi promised that the new state would found its policy on "morality, benevolence, and love." A notice was then issued by his government on March 12 telling the world about the formation of Manchoukuo and requesting that formal recognition be extended to the new state. Of the sixteen major countries receiving notification telegrams, the United States was the only nation to ignore it completely. The other countries, except Japan, merely acknowledged receipt.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, the organization of Manchoukuo's government continued apace. The legal structure was worked out to a great extent by Dr. Chao Hsin-po, a lawyer who had studied in Japan for eleven years and who had obtained a doctorate from Tokyo University. On March 9, an Organic Law and a Guarantee Law of Civil Rights were promulgated. By the first of these documents complete executive authority was vested in the Regent, who also possessed absolute veto powers. In addition to the executive branch, the Organic Law provided for legislative, judicial, and supervisory divisions. As aides to the Regent, the executive division included a cabinet and a strong Premier. No elections were held under the Organic Law of 1932, accordingly the Legislative Council existed in name only. The Guarantee Law of Civil Rights also existed only as a piece of paper. The most significant feature of the governmental structure was that Japanese officials were prominent openly in all important departments. Of particular significance was the Nipponese domination of the omnipotent Board of Affairs with its budgetary and dismissal powers.

The aim of government was to rule in accordance with the Confucian principle of *Wang-tao* (the equivalent of Japanese *Kodo*). In general, this term means ruling by legal means rather than by the Bismarckian principle of "might makes right." The term also has associations with the

⁸⁸ Means literally "the Manchu state."

⁸⁹ Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 385, nn. 188-189.

Manchu and earlier imperial rule of China, since, literally, it means the "Way of the King." In assuming control over traditional Manchuria, the government of Manchoukuo promised to restore order and stability with the aid of Japan's occupying forces. Economic reorganization was the first major undertaking of the new state, and this action meant consolidation of Chinese and Japanese economic institutions under the Manchoukuo government. Frequently, economic reorganization also meant confiscation of Chinese property for the benefit of Manchoukuo and Japan.

Because of Japan's close ties with Manchoukuo, the Tokyo government established on March 11 a special committee for dealing with the new state. The first declaration of the Japanese cabinet regarding Manchoukuo's request for recognition came in a note of March 18, when Japan expressed approval of the formation of Manchoukuo and implied that *de jure* recognition would be forthcoming once the new regime was firmly established. Dissatisfaction among the more militant groups in Japan was at once pronounced. At the meeting of the Diet of March 20, criticism was expressed in both houses against the increase in powers assumed by the reactionaries. Thereafter, military criticism of the parliamentary regime likewise increased perceptibly. Intelligent observers began to realize that Japan in May-June, 1932, was rapidly moving toward totalitarian control. After the conclusion of the Shanghai armistice and the gradual withdrawal of the invading forces, the military in Japan began to get out of hand. On May 15, military and naval personnel attacked the residence of Prime Minister Inukai and assassinated him after he had repeatedly refused to follow the dictates of the armed services. Meanwhile, others attacked the headquarters of the Seiyukai and the homes of many men influential in politics and business. Bad conditions in the farming area had caused widespread discontent with the internal policy of the political parties, and the connections between business and the political parties had led to corruption and inefficiency. In addition, there was general disgruntlement over the unsuccessful presentation of Japan's case to the League of Nations and the failure of the Shanghai episode. As a result of these actions by the military, reaction in Japan was accelerated, and on the recommendation of Prince Saionji the emperor appointed Admiral Saito Minoru to form a new government.⁹⁰

On the day of Premier Inukai's murder, the new American ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, was in Chicago en route to Tokyo.⁹¹ During the summer that followed in Japan, the new ambassador and his colleagues were concerned with the evolution of Japan's determination to extend recognition to Manchoukuo. On June 3, Matsuoka Yōsuke, a returned student from the United States, advocated in the Imperial Diet the immediate recogni-

⁹⁰ For further details see *ibid.*, pp. 380-84.

⁹¹ See Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, 1944), p. 4.

tion of the new state. In his remarks Matsuoka, like many of his contemporaries, cited the example for such action provided by the United States in its recognition of Panama in 1903.⁹² On June 14, its last day of meeting, the Imperial Diet requested the government to give Manchoukuo legal recognition at once. A week later, General Araki, in addressing the Supreme Military Council, bluntly asserted that League actions could not be binding upon Japan in its relations with Manchoukuo. On July 14, Count Uchida Yasuya, Japanese Foreign Minister and former president of the South Manchuria Railway, verbally warned the members of the Lytton Commission to expect Japan to recognize Manchoukuo at an early date. Two days later, Ambassador Grew notified Washington that in conversations with General McCoy, American member of the Commission, it was obvious that "the Commissioners are unanimous in finding Japan's action in Manchuria is based on two false premises: (1) the argument of self-defense and (2) the argument of self-determination for Manchuria."⁹³ In fact Grew reported that the "Commissioners have proved to their satisfaction that the blowing-up of the railway and every subsequent incident in Manchuria . . . were carefully planned and carried out by the Japanese themselves."⁹⁴ Grew also states that the Commissioners' feelings were clearly and openly expressed in their conversations with Count Uchida. In concluding his remarks concerning the probability that Japan would recognize Manchoukuo, Grew advised the State Department that he "believed . . . American representation against Japanese recognition of Manchoukuo at the present time would be unwise," inasmuch as the Japanese press representing the military viewpoint could easily have used such a statement to force even quicker action.⁹⁵ Secretary Stimson agreed with Ambassador Grew's interpretation of conditions in Japan and Washington continued to pursue a policy of watchful waiting.⁹⁶

Despite American efforts to remain temporarily out of the far eastern imbroglio, the Japanese Foreign Office (and perhaps Shiratori Toshio especially) took the occasion of Secretary Stimson's speech⁹⁷ of August 8, 1932, to the New York Council on Foreign Relations "to pour fuel on the temporarily quiescent flames of public animosity against the United States."⁹⁸ Ambassador Grew in a dispatch of August 13 was emphatic in stating that the Japanese reaction was symptomatic of a dangerous national temper, and warned almost prophetically that "the Japanese military machine . . . has been built for war, feels prepared for war and

⁹² Consult Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 387; *cf. infra*, p. 146.

⁹³ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 93.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁹⁶ See Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁹⁷ Entitled "The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development" and included as a special supplement of *Foreign Affairs*, XI (October, 1932).

⁹⁸ Grew to Stimson, *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 99.

would welcome war. . . . I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies.”⁹⁹ As an additional diplomatic pin-prick to the United States, Count Uchida in an address, on August 25, to the Imperial Diet stated that the Japanese government not only intended to grant *de jure* recognition to Manchoukuo, but also insisted that Japan could not be considered guilty of violating the Nine-Power Treaty since that document did not guarantee China against “secessionist movements.”¹⁰⁰ By September 3, Grew wrote to Stimson his opinion that “the Japanese regarded the United States as their greatest stumbling block. . . .”¹⁰¹ As the eyes of the world focused on Tokyo, the Japanese government brought its “positive policy” to a dramatic climax by recognizing Manchukuo on September 15, even before the Assembly of the League and the nations of the world had had an opportunity to study the report of the Commission of Inquiry.

REPORT OF THE LYTTON COMMISSION

After six months of intensive first-hand study of the Sino-Japanese dispute, the report of the Lytton Commission was completed on September 4, 1932. During the course of its travels, the commission had visited Japan from February 29 to March 11, 1932, and had then returned to the island empire from July 4 to 16. Upon leaving Japan the first time, the group led by Lord Lytton visited China south of the Wall from March 14 to April 20, and then toured Manchuria from April 21 to June 4, especially the large urban centers of Dairen, Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, and Tsitsihar. On June 5, the main party returned to China proper until its trip to Tokyo on July 4 by way of southern Manchuria and Korea. After leaving Japan the Commission returned to China, and on July 20 started at Peiping the final preparation of its report. The last group did not leave Peiping until September 5, the day after the completion of the Commission’s work.

During the course of their studies and travels, the members of the Commission were literally bombarded with official and unofficial appeals, reports, memoranda, documents, letters and books prepared by Japanese, Chinese, and by some who were allegedly neutral. In addition, the advisers and the members of the Commission interviewed individuals and groups representing various shades of opinion. While in Manchuria, the Commission received about 1550 letters in Chinese and 400 letters in Russian in addition to numerous communications in western European languages. Among the dignitaries receiving the group were the Japanese

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹⁰⁰ Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 389–90.

¹⁰¹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931–41), I, 102. In his diary entry of September 3, Grew (*op. cit.*, p. 39) stated his belief that “the Japanese government intends to proceed with its program in Manchuria unless prevented by superior physical force.” For the complete documentation for this period see *U. S. For. Rel.*, 1932, Vol. IV.

emperor, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the Regent Pu-yi. Throughout its investigations the Commission interpreted its function according to the Council Resolution of December 10, by which it was to examine the causes, development, and status of the Sino-Japanese dispute, and recommend a possible solution.

On September 23, 1932, the sixty-eighth session of the Council was opened at Geneva. In a letter dated September 24, the Japanese at the Council asked that a minimum delay of six weeks should be granted between receipt of the Lytton Commission's report and the Council's consideration of it. The purpose of this period was stated to be for study of the report and for the drafting of observations thereupon.¹⁰² In presenting this question to his colleagues, Eamon de Valera, representative of the Irish Free State and President of the Council, stated:

I should, however, be lacking in frankness, both to the Japanese Government and to the Members of the League as a whole, if I were to recommend to the Council the acceptance of this delay without giving expression to the regret which I am sure is felt by the generality of the Members of the Council that before the discussion of the report of the Commission, before even the publication of that report, Japan has, not only by recognizing, but also by signing a treaty with what is known as the Manchukuo Government taken steps which cannot but be regarded as calculated to prejudice the settlement of the dispute.¹⁰³

Although a delay of six weeks was granted in accord with Japan's request, De Valera's frank disapproval of Japan's action in entering upon treaty relations with Manchoukuo was in harmony with the sentiment prevailing at Geneva among most neutrals.

As decided by the Council meeting of September 24, the report of the Commission of Enquiry was communicated on October 1 to the two governments concerned and to the membership of the League. The first eight chapters of the one hundred thirty-nine page report summarize the historical background of the dispute in a detailed and impartial fashion. Chapter I, dealing with the then recent developments in China, gives full recognition to the lawless conditions prevailing in twentieth-century China without minimizing the progress that had been made by the Kuomintang toward national reconstruction. The report also points out that Japan, as China's nearest neighbor, had suffered by these disruptive conditions. The Commission emphasized, however, that the most effective way to eliminate these friction-producing conditions in China was not by unilateral action, but by international co-operation and encouragement.

¹⁰² League of Nations, *Official Journal. Minutes of the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Council*, 13th year, No. 11, Annex 1394, p. 1860.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 1731.

Chapters II and III deal with the history of Manchuria and the history of the contending forces within Manchuria. At the outset the Commissioners emphasized that the vast majority of the population is made up of Chinese or assimilated Manchus. They also called attention to the fact, quite properly, that Manchuria has often been divorced from China proper in times past, but never upon the initiative of Manchuria's inhabitants. The report asserts also that the connection between the Manchuria of Chang Tso-lin and his son, Hsüeh-liang, and the Chinese Nationalist government was more nominal than real. Nevertheless, the Commission recognized that the Chinese had for centuries regarded Manchuria as their buffer against Russia and Japan. Conversely, the report gives credence to the idea of Japan's "special position" by holding that "patriotic sentiment, the paramount need for military defence, and exceptional treaty rights . . ." plus "historical associations . . . and pride in the achievement of Japanese enterprise in Manchuria" combined to produce this indefinable sentiment. The conflict between China's nascent feelings of nationalism and Japan's feeling of "special interest" resulted in a series of economic conflicts, attacks on individuals, and universally wounded feelings.

In the light of its historical conclusions, the Commission reviewed in Chapter IV the events of September 18, 1931, and the incidents and conditions which ensued thereafter. Although the Commission acknowledged that "an explosion undoubtedly did occur on or near the [South Manchurian] railway . . . the damage . . . was not in itself sufficient to justify military action." The extensive military operations undertaken by Japan's Kwantung Army could not in the opinion of Lord Lytton's group "be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." Although the Commission also studied to some extent the Shanghai and Nanking conflicts of 1932, Chapter D of the report purposely did not review them in detail and did not present an opinion concerning these sidelights to the Manchurian issue.

Chapter VI constitutes a detailed study of the origins and early government of Manchoukuo. The Commission flatly stated that the new government was dependent on the Japanese troops of occupation for its domestic and foreign authority. In general, the Commission expressed the conclusion "that there is no general Chinese support for the Manchoukuo government, which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese." In other words, the new government lacked the support of the majority of twenty-eight million of the area's thirty million inhabitants.

Chapters VII and VIII are concerned with economic problems, and particularly with the questions surrounding the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. The Commission recognized that the boycott movement had had official Chinese encouragement, mainly through the Kuomintang. On

the question of the boycott's legality under international law as a defense against military aggression, the Commission did not commit itself but declared that economic problems of this sort should be settled by international agreement between the parties concerned. With regard to Manchuria's economic problems, the Commission deemed it "essential that the principle of the Open Door should be maintained . . . in the actual practice of trade," in accord with the best economic interests of Manchuria, China, and Japan.

The two final chapters of the Lytton Report deal with suggestions for settlement. The authors warned that "the issues involved . . . are extremely complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them." Among the suggestions for solution presented to the League of Nations Council, the Commission stressed the fact that the government of Manchuria ought to be modified, not by recognizing Manchoukuo, but by granting a large degree of local autonomy while retaining Chinese sovereignty. The report also proposed a meeting of representatives from China and Japan with representatives from Manchuria. The aims of such a meeting, the report suggests, should be the establishment by China of a special administration for Manchuria, a Sino-Japanese treaty dealing mainly with Japanese economic interests in Manchuria, a Sino-Japanese treaty of conciliation, nonaggression, and material assistance, and a commercial agreement.

Although the report had found many historical and understandable causes for Japan's interest in Manchuria, the controlled Japanese press was unanimous in condemning the Commission for its outspoken disapproval of Japan's alleged "self-defense" operations during the night of September 18, 1931, and later. Other Japanese considered it unfair that the commission should have refused to pass upon the international legal aspects of the boycott issue. Although numerous Japanese scholars and critics agreed substantially, or in part, with the facts set forth by the commission, most of the more level-headed felt they could not but criticize the "unrealistic" conclusions of the report. In fact, the American owned and edited Tokyo *Japan Advertiser* commented that "the report is a legal and literary masterpiece which may some day adorn the shelves or records of the League museum, but without practical value as an international instrument."¹⁰⁴ The Japanese war office was particularly outraged at the assertion that the existence of Manchoukuo was due to "the connivance of the Japanese army."¹⁰⁵ The general reaction of righteous indignation and sword-rattling bluster was not shared, however, by all Japanese in official

¹⁰⁴ As quoted in Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, p. 400, n. 250.

¹⁰⁵ Dispatch of October 3, 1932, from Grew to Stimson, *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 103-04.

positions.¹⁰⁶ To neutrals generally, Japan's case appeared to be extremely weak from the beginning. In fact, General McCoy in conversation with Ambassador Grew made it plain "that the case against Japan was made perfectly clear [to the Lytton Commission] in their conferences by the Japanese themselves, even if they [the Commission] had talked with no Chinese at all."¹⁰⁷

On October 7, the Japanese Cabinet appointed a special committee of the foreign, war, and navy ministries to draft observations on the Lytton Commission's report. Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, received the Japanese observations on November 18,¹⁰⁸ and three days later the Council undertook consideration of the report. The new Japanese representative to the Council, Matsuoka Yōsuke, had been a vice-president of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and with his impeccable command of English was a clever advocate of the Japanese position. In his speech of November 21, Matsuoka summarized the attitude of his government by stating that "the report has not been as full or as proper in many of its deductions and conclusions as a longer study of the problem would have produced."¹⁰⁹ At the outset he made clear that Japan could not share the optimistic attitude of the Commission regarding the possible improvement of conditions in China. He argued that the Commission was incorrect in regarding Manchuria as ever having been an integral part of China, and stated that Japan considering the establishment of Manchoukuo to be the only possible solution would hear of no alternative. Matsuoka asserted emphatically: "We acted spontaneously in self-defence; and, when we acted, the independence movement developed spontaneously."¹¹⁰

At the afternoon session of the same day, Wellington Koo stated the views of the Chinese government on the report. He reported that public opinion in China was enthusiastic about the conclusions of the Commission. He complained in detail, however, about "the unnecessary obstacles placed in the way of the visit of the Chinese Assessor [Koo himself] to Manchuria in association with the Commission. . . ."¹¹¹ He asserted that Chinese residents in Manchuria had been unable to establish contact with the Chinese Assessor without the approval of the Japanese police. In attacking the problems under dispute, Koo forcefully remarked: "It is a singular yet significant fact to be noted that Japan, while never ceasing to complain to the world of a disunited China, persistently pursues a policy

¹⁰⁶ See letter of Grew to Stimson of October 8, 1932, Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-67. Also Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-402.

¹⁰⁷ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 94.

¹⁰⁸ See League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 111. Cf. Stimson's comments in *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 105-07.

¹⁰⁹ League of Nations, *Official Journal. Minutes of the Sixty-Ninth Session of the Council*, 13th year, No. 12 (Pt. I), p. 1871.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1876.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1878.

of preventing unification in China.”¹¹² Koo insisted that Japan’s positive continental policy, more than China’s disunity, was responsible for the unrest in eastern Asia. In commenting upon the boycott as a measure of self-defense, Koo argued that the extension and more rigorous use of the boycott were necessary until the League could take action. In concluding his remarks, he also asserted that China could take no part in a discussion of the outstanding issues between the two countries until Japan had withdrawn its forces from Manchuria. In urging the League to take immediate action to redress China’s grievances, Koo eloquently maintained: “Further hesitation will not only entail more bloodshed and suffering to the thirty million Chinese people in Manchuria, but will perhaps irretrievably shake the general confidence in the efficacy of this great institution of peace.”¹¹³

The principles of settlement suggested by the Commission were not fully accepted in the Council meetings of November 21-28 by either representative. In fact, Matsuoka, on November 27, stated his doubts about the Commission’s right to propose a possible solution. Perhaps it was Japan’s unconciliatory attitude in the Council which prevented China’s representative from accepting any of the Commission’s proposals except the one which referred to negotiating a solution to conform to the principles of the Pact of Paris, the Covenant, and the Nine-Power Treaty. On November 28, the report and the minutes of the Council meetings were transmitted to the Assembly for further consideration and disposition, in spite of Japan’s continued objections which were based mainly upon fear of condemnation by the small powers dominating the Assembly.

CONCILIATION AND ADJUDICATION

On December 6, 1932, the Special Assembly of the League convened for consideration of the Lytton Report. W. W. Yen and Matsuoka presented the viewpoints of their countries, following essentially the same lines of argument which had characterized their speeches before the Council. These opening addresses were followed by general discussion for the next three days. Nine representatives from the smaller nations spoke, and, in general, advocated a firm policy in dealing with Japan. They were worried mainly about the establishment of a precedent which would permit the strong to aggress against the weak without being checkmated by League action. The representatives of the large powers, however, were much more cautious about advising strict judgment of Japan’s actions. In fact, Sir John Simon, in a speech of December 7 reviewing the report, emphasized those phases least to the liking of the Chinese, and on the following day, the Canadian representative also called attention to the Commission’s

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1880.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1890.

criticisms of China.¹¹⁴ *The Times*, which often expresses the official British attitude, had earlier written editorially (September 16, 1932) on the creation of Manchoukuo:

What Japan did in Shanghai found little support in this country; but her position in Manchuria is very different. Her economic interests there are vital to the prosperity of a rapidly increasing population; she saved the country from Russia at the beginning of this century; and she has since protected it from the chaos and anarchy which have beset other parts of China. She legitimately acquired economic rights, which were illegitimately obstructed by the Chinese; and she failed through long patient means to obtain redress by diplomatic means. It can be argued with some force that the rules of conduct which the League lays down are not equally applicable in every part of the world; but the point is apt to be ignored in the Assembly, where all states are in a general way presumed to be equal, and all members are assumed to have reached approximately the same stage of evolution.

Secretary Stimson, on the other hand, although not present in person or by representative, was staunchly behind the attitude expressed by the smaller powers. He felt "that the League should proceed promptly and decisively to a judgment against Japan, thereby bringing to bear upon that single nation . . . all the momentum of public opinion. . . ."¹¹⁵

On December 9, the Special Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Special Committee of Nineteen to study the Lytton Commission's report, to draw up proposals for settlement, and to submit the proposals for settlement to the Assembly as soon as possible.¹¹⁶ In conformity with article xv, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the first task before the Committee of Nineteen was to arrange possible measures of conciliation. On December 15, two draft resolutions for conciliation were submitted to China and Japan, and copies of the resolution were sent to the governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. for their consideration. The disputing powers proposed numerous amendments and the Committee of Nineteen resolved on adjournment until January 16, 1933, to give the Chi-

¹¹⁴ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 111. *Records of the Special Session of the Assembly* (Geneva, 1933), pp. 49-51. A good analysis of Cahan's imperialistic and conservative background is included in A. R. M. Lower, *Canada and the Far East—1940* (New York, 1941), pp. 19-23. Professor Lower also remarks: "The Canadian press was almost unanimous in its criticism of the Cahan attitude" (p. 20). In Australia and New Zealand public opinion was also very much divided on the Manchurian question. Many in both states were ready to condone Japanese action in any area so long as they stayed out of the south Pacific [see J. Shepherd, *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940), pp. 36-38, and I. F. G. Milner, *New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940)]. In his "Memoirs" (*New York Times*, February 3, 1948), Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State at the end of the Manchurian affair, wrote about Sir John Simon: "I believed . . . that he showed too much consideration for the Japanese, and I still think so. He surprised us by conceding that Japan had some special rights in Manchuria."

¹¹⁵ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

¹¹⁶ League of Nations, Special Supplement No. 111, pp. 74-75.

nese and the Japanese representatives, in company with M. Hymans, President of the Committee, and Secretary-General Drummond, an opportunity to discuss the proposed measures of conciliation.¹¹⁷

Meanwhile, events in the Far East had once again shifted world attention from the quiet conversations of the conciliators to the sword-rattling activity of the Japanese military. In Manchoukuo a series of campaigns was being carried out against the Chinese irregulars and bandits of various types. From its inception, in March, 1932, the new state had claimed the strategically located Chinese province of Jehol as an integral part of itself. On December 29, 1932, Japan reported the mobilization of Chinese troops directed against Jehol; three days later, fighting took place in Shanhaikwan and Japan occupied the city on January 3, 1933. The Japanese were now prepared to invade Jehol from the south as well as from the east, and this they proceeded to do during the next several months.

By the time the Committee of Nineteen reconvened on January 16, 1933, it had been made clear that Japan did not favor negotiations with China under the aegis of the League, and that it would not agree to the undoing of the existing regime in Manchuria. League action was further facilitated on January 17 by a pronouncement of President-Elect Franklin D. Roosevelt to the effect that his administration would follow the Stimson line on the Manchurian controversy.¹¹⁸ Therefore, on January 20, after the failure of the efforts at conciliation, the Committee requested a definite answer from Japan as to whether the principle of nonrecognition of Manchoukuo would be accepted, or if Manchoukuo would be maintained. By declining once again to relinquish the fruits of conquest, the Japanese forced the Committee to give up conciliation and to advance from action under paragraph 3 to paragraph 4 of article xv. This part of the Covenant called for "a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto." By February 14, the Committee had adopted the draft of the report which it submitted to the Assembly ten days later.

On February 24, 1933, the Assembly formally and unanimously adopted the Committee's report in spite of Matsuoka's eloquent plea asking that the Assembly "deal with us on our terms."¹¹⁹ The report drawn up by the Committee for the Assembly is divided into four parts. Part I is introductory and reiterates the attitude of the League with reference to the impartiality and fairness of the Lytton Report. Part II is concerned with the "Development of the Dispute before the League of Nations," whereas Part III analyzes the "Chief Characteristics of the Dispute." In concluding Part III the report declares that it is

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹¹⁸ See Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹¹⁹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 112 (Geneva, 1933), p. 20.

indisputable that, without any declaration of war, a large part of Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by Japanese troops and that, in consequence of this operation, it has been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. . . . While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before September 18, 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side or the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since September 18, 1931.¹²⁰

Part IV of the Assembly's report comprises the recommendations deemed "just and proper in regard to the dispute." They were based on the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the principles laid down in chapter ix of the Lytton Report. Specifically they included: (1) the evacuation of Japanese troops outside the zone of the South Manchuria Railway; (2) Manchurian autonomy under Chinese sovereignty; (3) negotiations for a settlement between China and Japan "with the assistance of a Committee set up by the Assembly." In conclusion, the member-states of the Assembly pledged themselves not to recognize the Manchuokuo regime either *de jure* or *de facto*. A separate resolution, issued by the Assembly on the same day, provided for the appointment of an Advisory Committee of Twenty-one, which was to "invite the governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to co-operate in its work" of following the situation.¹²¹

As expressed in Russian newspapers, the government in Moscow was unwilling to become embroiled in what was viewed as a row between Japan and other capitalist powers over the division of spoils in China. Critical internal conditions caused by Kulak opposition to more comprehensive collectivizing of agriculture and political tension fomented by "Trotskyites" contributed also to Russia's unco-operative attitude.¹²² On March 7, the Soviets formally refused to participate in the deliberations of the Advisory Committee but added that they were "looking to the most rapid and equitable settlement of the conflict and the consolidation of peace in the Far East."¹²³

Meanwhile, on February 25, Secretary Stimson wrote to the Secretary-General of the League that "the American government expresses its general endorsement of the principles [of settlement] . . . recommended."¹²⁴ In

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹²¹ See *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹²² Consult particularly chap. II of H. L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy* (Princeton, N. J., 1945); also Ernest Oppenheimer, "A Comparative Study of Selected World Opinions about the Sino-Japanese Controversy, 1931-32" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, International Relations, University of Chicago, 1948), chap. VI.

¹²³ Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹²⁴ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 115-16.

a statement of March 14 the State Department revealed that Minister Hugh R. Wilson was again to co-operate with the Committee, though not as a voting member. Wilson was to serve as an informative contact between the United States and the League, to consult freely and frankly—but not to bind his government.¹²⁵

Although the Chinese delegation was in hearty accord with the Assembly's unanimous adoption of the Committee of Nineteen's report, their feeling was strong that the measures taken were not adequate to the situation created by Japan's attacks. Neither sanctions nor provisions for military force were included in the recommendations. To the Japanese the outcome of the deliberations was regrettable. Matsuoka declared that "the Japanese Government . . . has now reached the limit of its endeavors to co-operate with the League in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences."¹²⁶ Immediately thereafter, the Japanese delegation walked from the Assembly room. After many cabinet sessions and after consultation with the emperor and with Prince Saionji, the Japanese government on March 27 transmitted to Geneva its decision formally to withdraw from the League after the required notification period of two years had elapsed.

WORLD REACTION

Hostilities did not cease in Manchuria or in China south of the wall until several months after Japan's withdrawal from the League. The Advisory Committee established by the Assembly did nothing except to suggest methods for making effective the adopted policy of nonrecognition. An effort was made to prevent "Manchoukuo from participating in the benefits of international agreements such as the Universal Postal Union."¹²⁷ The Assembly, turning to other problems, did not direct its attention to Sino-Japanese relations again until 1937. No question of sanctions was permitted to rise under article xvi of the Covenant, there having been no declaration of war, and because nonco-operation by the United States would have reduced the effort to a fiction. The only possible method left of bringing military hostilities to an end was by direct negotiation between China and Japan.

Japanese successes in Jehol and Hopei provinces continued during April and May, 1933. In an effort to conciliate the Japanese in the vicinity of Tientsin and Peiping, Generalissimo Chiang's government sent General Huang Fu to administer the political council at Peiping. Long known as a student of Japan and as one favorably inclined toward that country,

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹²⁶ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 112, p. 23.

¹²⁷ Recommendations made on June 12, 1933. For details see *The China Year Book* (1934), pp. 720-22.

General Huang was successful in arranging a truce agreement at Tangku on May 31.¹²⁸ By this arrangement Japan's Kwantung Army agreed to withdraw to the Wall, and the Chinese troops undertook to withdraw to regions south and west of a line running a few miles north and east of Tientsin and Peiping. The area between the two armies was to stand as a demilitarized buffer zone under the jurisdiction of special Chinese police. Despite assurances to the contrary by Wang Ching-wei, president of the executive Yüan,¹²⁹ the temporary cessation of hostilities in northern China meant that China's nonrecognition of Manchoukuo was weakened from a legal standpoint.

As far as the rest of the world was concerned, events in Europe, such as the rise of Hitler to power, had forced Sino-Japanese difficulties into the background. None of the great nations was willing in those depression-stricken days to risk involvement with Japan over a problem so far removed from its immediate interests. The United States had just repudiated the Hoover regime, and Secretary Stimson in part, by calling the New Deal into existence. Nonrecognition was as far as any of the nations in 1933 felt able to go in branding Japan's actions in China.¹³⁰

The Manchurian crisis presented the League with its first real test, and the League came off second best. Nevertheless, for the first time in history an international organization presented to the world the outstanding facts of a dispute involving a great power, and reached a verdict unfavorable to the actions of that power. World opinion was crystallized solidly behind the League's decision and behind the idea of nonrecognition as a possible form of moral condemnation. Possibly, the co-operative action of the nations prevented an outright declaration of war, an economic blockade of China, and Japanese direct annexation of China's three eastern provinces. The fact remains, however, that a League of Nations in which two of the great far eastern powers—U.S.S.R. and the United States—were not represented was from the beginning too badly handicapped for effective action. The failure to act more quickly and competently in forcing Japan to cease hostile actions while negotiations were underway gave the Japanese militarists the opportunity needed for co-ordinating and digesting their gains. Furthermore, the methodical and judicial approach of the League, backed by no physical force, increased Japan's determination to settle relations with China by direct negotiation and military action. The moral obloquy of the world by itself could do nothing to arrest Japan's headlong plunge into the alluring, but dangerous

¹²⁸ For full document see *ibid.*, p. 720.

¹²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 363–64.

¹³⁰ For an interesting analysis of the shifting tides of American opinion see chap. XIV of F. R. Dulles, *China and America* . . . (Princeton, 1946); also Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, chap. I.

waters of imperialistic venture.¹³¹ Nor could protest remove the example of Japan's success in defying the League and the United States. To a degree, at least, the Japanese pattern was followed in Europe by the German dictator who assumed power at just about the time when Matsuoka and his colleagues walked dramatically out of the Assembly meeting.

¹³¹ Ambassador Grew wrote: "Were the [Japanese] Government to temporize or compromise with the League of Nations, further assassinations if not internal revolution would almost certainly result" (*op. cit.*, p. 76), and "Japan is perfectly capable of replying to any action of the League in applying active sanctions by promptly occupying North China. This really constitutes the danger for the future" (*ibid.*, p. 77).

CHAPTER X

CHINA FROM MUKDEN TO MARCO POLO BRIDGE

"Warlordism," and the efforts of individual politicians and militarists for self-advancement, continued in the years before 1937 to be important in China's chaotic internal picture; invasion by Japan, however, served to unite—to an uncertain degree—hitherto irreconcilable elements in protest against Nanking's weak policy, and aroused groups, usually apathetic, to a fervent and belligerent nationalism. Confusion over the proper attitude to take toward Japan was aggravated, however, by the continued growth of the Chinese Communists in strength and in numbers. Many who might have been willing to proceed quickly and forcefully against Japan were worried by the steady progress being made by the Soviets in China even under the most difficult conditions. Counsels at Nanking and elsewhere were divided as to whether to fight the internal or the external "scourge" first. Despite the Chinese Communists' efforts to co-operate with the Kuomintang against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the rightist members of the Nationalist Party were at first determined to eradicate Communism before undertaking a war against Japan. Although an uneasy truce was concluded during 1937, mutual suspicions and unofficial hostilities between Nanking and the Communists continued thereafter to be a serious threat to China's war effort.

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL REACTIONS TO THE MANCHURIAN CONFLICT

The bellicose rulers of China, north and south, grudgingly came to the conclusion in 1931 that, for the time being, their rivalries might temporarily be compromised by diplomacy. With this end in view Hu Han-min was released after more than seven months' enforced residence at Nanking. From Shanghai, on October 15, he dispatched a telegram to the southerners in Canton, calling upon them to send delegates to that city to discuss measures for the pacification of the country and resistance to foreign aggression. Hu declared that, although the diplomatic tension was almost as great as in 1895, the disorder and unrest throughout the country were worse than at this time. This, in the main, he frankly attributed to

the complications which have time and again disrupted the Party and the ill-advised political measures which have been taken in times past. As individual members were bent upon arrogating to themselves part of the strength of the Party as their own, the Party lost its unity; and as

individual members became selfish and each attempted to undermine the position of the other, complications have become increasingly frequent. They were thus engrossed over 'persons' and neglected 'affairs.'¹

Shortly after sending this message, Hu himself took refuge in Hongkong, assuming the role of Achilles in his tent and refusing all overtures to participate officially in governmental affairs.

The release of Hu and his call for unity had been preceded by negotiations in Hongkong between representatives of the rival governments. On October 21, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, Eugene Chen, and others appointed by Canton reached Shanghai where a preliminary conference was held from October 27 to November 7. Despite the Japanese advance in Manchuria, bargainings were prolonged and confusion reigned supreme. Hu Han-min and the southerners were determined that Chiang Kai-shek should retire from office. Students by the tens of thousands rioted; demanding vociferously a reorganization of the government and a declaration of war upon Japan, they poured into Nanking from all directions. When railway traffic was disrupted and officials refused to accede to their demands for free passage they stretched themselves across the tracks and dared the train crews to move the carriages. Hunger strikes over "national humiliation" were appointed, while one group decided to weep loudly before the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum in an attempt to arouse in the minds of the officials a sense of duty. Late in September, C. T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was mobbed, beaten, and seriously wounded by students in Nanking. He resigned, to be succeeded for a period by V. K. Wellington Koo as officiating foreign minister. The latter's tenure of office was equally uneasy; several times in December attacks by students were made upon the Foreign Ministry. Kuomintang headquarters also was attacked as was the plant of a local newspaper. Two of Nanking's recent negotiators with the Cantonese, Dr. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, sometime Chancellor of Peking National University and Minister of Education, and General Ch'en Ming-ch'u, were badly injured, the former being dragged some distance by students before he was rescued. The government finally resorted to sending home batches of students under military escort.

On November 30, Marshall Chiang appealed to the southern leaders to come to Nanking to participate in the convening of a new C. E. C. This the latter, mindful of the experiences of Li Chi-shen and Hu Han-min, refused to do until Chiang should retire. Accordingly, on December 16, the President of the National Government resigned all offices and flew to his home in Chekiang—retaining, nevertheless, through his Minister of

¹ *China Year Book*, 1932, p. 545.

War, General Ho Ying-ch'in, control of the government armed forces. The C. E. C. formally accepted the resignation on the day it was tendered, likewise that of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang from the post of Vice-Commander-in-Chief of China's defense force. The latter, however, was immediately appointed Pacification Commissioner for Peiping.

The cat having withdrawn, the mice proceeded forthwith to the capital. As a result of the partial healing of the breach between Nanking and Canton, the Central Executive and Central Supervisory committees had been reorganized, during November, through the convening of party congresses at Nanking and Canton. The former was designated the Fourth Kuomintang Congress; the latter, the Fourth National Congress of Party Delegates. At the preliminary peace conference in Shanghai (October 27–November 7) it had been agreed that all 112 members of the First, Second, and Third Executive and Supervisory Committees—excluding the Communists—should be re-elected and that forty-eight new members for the two committees should be elected by the Nanking and Canton congresses, respectively, on a fifty-fifty basis.

During the week of December 22–29 the new (Fourth) Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees convened in Nanking and amended the Organic Law of October, 1928.² Although not directly avowed, the main objective was the strengthening of civilian at the cost of military elements in the government—with consequent clipping of the wings of Chiang Kai-shek if, and when, he should return to Nanking. This was accomplished, in assumption, by the decision that the C. E. C. should, as earlier mentioned, select and appoint a President of the National Government who should “represent the National Government both internally and externally, but . . . have no actual political responsibility . . . [and] not hold any concurrent government post,”³ and by the additional provision that “all mandates of the National Government and orders for the modernization of military forces shall be issued upon the signature of the President of the National Government, but they shall not become effective unless countersigned by the Presidents of the [five] *Yüan* and the Heads of the Ministries concerned.”⁴ Like the President of France, the President of the National Government was, henceforth, neither to reign nor to rule.

Governmental authority, as contrasted with party power, was, according to the Revised Organic Law, to be held by, and emanate from, the Executive *Yüan* which was declared to be “the highest executive organ of the National Government” and which was to “establish Ministries to

² *Ibid.*, p. 552.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 691: Articles 11 and 12, The Revised Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China. Promulgated at Nanking on December 29, 1931.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 14.

which shall be entrusted the various executive duties.”⁵ The Executive *Yüan*, therefore, legally approximated a French Cabinet while the president of that *Yüan* exercised functions similar to those of a premier. The latter received power to recommend appointments to, and dismissals from high official posts. His recommendations were to be accepted and put into effect by the figurehead President of the National Government. The analogy between the governments of France and China would be notable were conditions in the two countries similar.

Despite these changes, provision for the retention of Marshal Chiang in the national administration was made. He was to serve (with Messrs. Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, and five others) as a member of the Standing Committee of the C. E. C. More important: he and Wang and Hu were to constitute the Standing Committee of the Central Political Council, which Council was thereafter to be composed exclusively of the total membership of the Central Executive and the Central Supervisory Committees.⁶ Bearing in mind the fact that, during the tutelage phase of the revolution, the national government was the creature of the Kuomintang, it will be comprehended that supreme authority was thus being offered to a triumvirate of rivals of long standing, namely, Chiang, Wang, and Hu.

To the innocuous position of President of the National Government, Lin Shen, a relatively unknown septuagenarian native of Foochow and sometime resident of California, was elected. Sun Fo became president of the Executive *Yüan*, while Eugene Chen took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs—General Ho Ying-ch’ing retaining the post of war minister.

Having reorganized the government to its apparent satisfaction, the first plenary session of the Fourth C. E. C. adjourned leaving the new administration to assume authority as from January 1, 1932. The “national government” at Canton ceased to exist as such, but immediately its components organized there three new South-West Councils: Executive, Political, and Military—on the theory, apparently, that there is after all very little in a name.

Harmony was restored for the nonce and by January 21 Chiang, Wang, and Sun were back in Nanking. Scarcely had they arrived than a split took place between Foreign Minister Eugene Chen, who advocated a vigorous policy toward Japan with an immediate break in diplomatic relations, and Messrs. Chiang and Wang, who stood for what Chen dubbed a passive policy which endangered the whole Chinese national movement. The foreign minister thereupon resigned and withdrew to Shanghai, where he continued to excoriate Chiang. Sun followed to beg Chen to reconsider but, unsuccessful, himself resigned the presidency of the Executive *Yüan*,

⁵ *Ibid.*, Articles 19 and 20.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 552–53.

expressing the hope that the post might be filled by "a person of ability and power."⁷

On the day which witnessed the outbreak of hostilities with the Japanese in Shanghai (January 28, 1932) Sun's resignation was accepted. Wang Ching-wei was appointed his successor, Sun being transferred to the presidency of the Legislative *Yüan*. At the instance of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Lo Wen-kan, a Cantonese, sometime Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in Peking and later a member of Chang Tso-lin's government in that city, took over the foreign ministry as successor to Eugene Chen. Simultaneously Chiang Kai-shek was chosen chairman of a proposed National Military Council which should include the northern warlords, Fêng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Chang Hsüeh-liang. Two days later, as a result of the Japanese invasion of intramural China and the increase in number from three to seven of Japanese warships in the river off Nanking, the National Government moved from Nanking to Loyang. There it remained until December 1, 1932, when it re-established itself in Nanking.⁸

As intimated, the attempt to form a coalition government, which should rule a united China and cope vigorously with the Japanese invaders, was far from successful. Sun Fo and Eugene Chen were scarcely in before they were out. Hu Han-min, who had too recently, and for too long, been in Nanking involuntarily, was determined to stay out—at least as long as Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei were in. Marshal Chiang, an exponent of the strategy of retreating to advance further, had three times withdrawn—but was now as strong as ever despite his relinquishment of the titular presidency of the National Government. T. V. Soong, the ablest finance minister produced by modern China, although unloved, unhonored, and unsung by the southerners, had retired in December with his brother-in-law—and returned with him to power. Only Wang Ching-wei, the brilliant but restless researcher-magnificent, leader of the Kuo-mintang Left Wing, appeared to have found peace. It remained to be seen how long he, and others, would enjoy it.

From April to December, 1932, Marshal Chiang, as chairman of the National Military Council, was engaged in campaigns against the Communists in central China. In the meantime, a split occurred between Wang Ching-wei, president of the Executive *Yüan*, and Chang Hsüeh-liang, pacification commissioner for Peiping. In June, Wang journeyed to Peiping to confer with Chang over defense measures against the Japanese. The former implied, not too subtly, that Marshal Chang was inept; the latter murmured that the failure of the government to supply his forces with funds, arms, and ammunition accounted for the conditions which

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1933, pp. 241–42; also *ibid.*, 1934, p. 359.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1933, pp. 242 ff.

Wang criticised. On August 6, amidst a shower of telegrams, Wang announced his resignation from the presidency of the Executive *Yüan*. Adhering to old custom, the Young Marshal two days later submitted his resignation. Wang succeeded outwardly in his purpose; refusing to reconsider his own resignation he strenuously advocated the acceptance of Chang Hsüeh-liang's. This was done. A Branch Military Council was then ordered to be formed in Peiping; to preside over this Generalissimo Chiang requested Chang Hsüeh-liang to remain in the former capital. All attempts to persuade Wang Ching-wei to return to his post proving fruitless, T. V. Soong was placed in the acting-presidency of the Executive *Yüan*. On October 21, Wang, whose resignation had not been accepted, sailed for Europe on sick leave, having on the preceding day published a farewell statement calling upon the people and the government to unite in co-operation for the sinking of factional differences and a settlement of the Japanese issue, by either peace or war. Like Hu in the preceding year, Wang evinced greater apparent facility at appealing to others to co-operate than in co-operating himself.⁹

The withdrawal to Europe of the president of the Executive *Yüan* approximately synchronized with the decision of the government to return from Loyang to Nanking; with plans for the convening of the third plenary session of the fourth C. E. C.; with the renewal of conferences between the adherents of Nanking and those of Canton, having for their objects, in part, agreement upon plans for armed resistance to Japan and the prevention of the formation in Nanking of a dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek; with the plans of Hu Han-min to establish a Right Wing Kuomintang government at Canton; with the return from Hankow to Nanking of Chiang Kai-shek from his anti-Communist campaign; and with the decision of the government, on December 14, to renew diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia which had been severed five years before.

The year 1932, which had witnessed the outbreak and conclusion of civil wars in Shantung, Szechwan, and Kweichow, in addition to the military struggles with the Japanese and the Communists, and the intra-party conflicts outlined above, ended with the convening at Nanking (December 16-22) of the third plenary session of the Fourth C. E. C. The compromise made at the first session of the Fourth C. E. C. (December, 1931) by which the Chiang-Wang-Hu triumvirate constituted the standing committee of the Central Political Council had proved a failure. It was now decided that the standing committee of the Central Political Council should henceforth consist of the members of the standing committee of the C. E. C. itself. This change occasioned no difficulty. Not so, however, in the case of two other resolutions adopted by the session for the purpose of giving the people a voice in the government. The one proposed the

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-50.

convening, in 1933, of a National People's Assembly; the other looked toward the convocation in March, 1935, of a National People's Congress which should adopt a Permanent Constitution proclaiming the imminent passing of the country from the second, or tutelage, stage of revolution to the final, or constitutional, stage. These resolutions, in conjunction with the seizure by the Japanese of Shanhaikwan on January 1, 1933, and Jehol in February and March, stimulated the recalcitrants of Canton to a new outburst of criticism which embarrassed Nanking to a minor degree but the Japanese not at all. The southerners accused Marshal Chiang's government of talking about the Japanese without acting, a charge which, perhaps, true in part, some felt applied equally, if not more, to those who made it.

The successive advances of the Japanese in the north resulted in the resignation on March 10, 1933, of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, who shortly left for Europe. His troops passed under the control of Marshal Chiang who appointed General Ho Ying-ch'ın commander-in-chief in the north. A week after Chang's resignation, Wang Ching-wei landed in Shanghai from France. His most recent aversion now having been temporarily shelved, he resumed the presidency of the Executive *Yüan* at the end of the month. Chang was out; Wang was in; Hu was neither quite the one nor the other.

Nanking now proposed to call an emergency meeting of the National Congress for July, 1933. Twenty-six of the southern leaders, including Hu Han-min, issued a circular telegram, on April 4, protesting against this decision. Criticizing the Nanking leaders for their failure to solve either the Japanese or the Communist problem, they called upon them to resign. In this action the southerners were shortly supported by a group of C. E. C. members in Shanghai.

While verbal exchanges were keeping the wires hot, sanguinary Sino-Japanese passages at arms were taking place at the Kupeikow and Hsi-fengkow (passes) in the Great Wall north of Peiping. By mid-May, 1933, fighting stopped, the passes having been taken and the Japanese being able to seize Peiping and Tientsin at their pleasure. On May 31, an armistice agreement was signed at Tangku on behalf of the governments of China and Japan which were still officially, and from the viewpoint of international law, at peace.¹⁰

Nanking's failure to stem the tide of Japanese invasion, and its decision to accept the terms of the Tangku truce, had immediate repercussions in both north and south. Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang, who had been simmering for some time, suddenly boiled over with an announcement from Kalgan of his self-appointment as "Commander-in-Chief of the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army." He accused Nanking of insincerity in not

¹⁰ See *supra*, p. 336, and *infra*, p. 367.

having dispatched against the invader "more than one-twentieth of the Chinese troops . . . while the Chinese air force and navy [?] were never used at all." He declared that he would defend Chahar, to the west of Jehol, and would consider as his enemy, and would attempt to "remove," those who were "opposed by the people" and who had "no real intention to fight the Japanese."¹¹ In his revolt against Nanking, Marshal Fêng was joined and supported by General Fang Cheng-wu,¹² a member of the C. E. C., and by several lesser lights from the Nationalist army.

Hu Han-min also was inconsolable over the truce at Tangku, and declined to be mollified by the conciliatory spirit emanating from Nanking. On July 6, 1933, he scored Wang Ching-wei for having tacitly agreed to the truce by not resigning, for having lost his "former revolutionary spirit," and for having been "completely subjugated" by Nanking.¹³ Other figures at Canton were equally indignant. Plans were laid for the establishment of a rival Cantonese government which would collaborate with Fêng Yü-hsiang in a campaign against Nanking. Although the leaders of the southeastern provinces continued to seethe with indignation, they were unable to reconcile internal differences sufficiently to render possible the establishment of an independent government. Aside from appealing by wire to various fence-sitting militarists in the north to go to the aid of Fêng, the southern critics of Nanking were able only to send a small sum to Fêng for military expenses. Having failed to obtain better support for his nation-wide revolt against Chiang Kai-shek Fêng found it expedient to retire early in August of 1933 to Shantung—allegedly to relieve an attack of asthma!

FOOCHOW UPRISING

Time after time unity of policy and action on the part of the southerners had been demonstrated to be unattainable; meanwhile the numbers of office-seekers constantly increased. Further evidence of disunity was offered late in November, 1933, when a group consisting of Generals Ch'en Ming-ch'u, Chiang Kuang-nai, Li Chi-shen, and Tsai Ting-kai declared the independence of Fukien and established at Foochow a People's Government or Federal Revolutionary Government. The significance of the precedent established by Chang Tso-lin's declarations of independence for Manchuria and the failure of Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang to stir opposition on a national scale to both Tokyo and Nanking was lost upon this faction. The moving spirit was Ch'en Ming-ch'u, who had withdrawn from Nanking, traveled in Europe, and become the head of a

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

¹² For details of Fang's career in the resistance movement see Chan Hansu, "General Fang Chen-wa, North China's Champion against Japanese Invasion," *China Today*, Vol. II, No. 4 (January 1936), pp. 68-71.

¹³ *China Year Book*, 1934, pp. 365-66.

Social Democratic Party in opposition to the Kuomintang. Chiang Kuang-nai, another Cantonese, was Chairman of the Fukien Provincial Government; two years earlier he had served as commander-in-chief of the Nineteenth Route Army which Tsai Ting-kai had commanded during the Shanghai hostilities. The major positions in the new government were filled by the four mentioned. That of minister of foreign affairs was obligingly taken by Eugene Chen, the wielder of a trenchant pen and master of a vocabulary of invective, who had opposed Chiang-Kai-shek on various occasions since 1927.

Two anti-Kuomintang political factions known as the Third Party and the Social Democrats, under the leadership respectively of Huang Chi-hsiang and Ch'en Ming-ch'u, were merged to form a Producers' Party which claimed to hold dear the interests of the poor. Those of the new association who belonged to the Kuomintang now resigned from the latter; its offices in Fukien were closed, and all portraits of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were removed.

The new government at Foochow issued a manifesto outlining eighteen immediate objectives: (1) abolition of "unequal treaties" and the substitution for these of reciprocal ones; (2) confiscation of such foreign-controlled business and cultural organizations as might be considered "detrimental to the interests of the Chinese people"; (3) readjustment of state debts with repudiation or revision when desirable; (4) state control of foreign trade; (5) absolute tariff autonomy; (6) exclusion of counter-revolutionary imperialists and militarists from politics; (7) equality of races within the republic with right of local autonomy; (8) freedom of the people to form societies, declare strikes, and stage demonstrations; (9) introduction of a plebiscite system; (10) abolition of "irregular and illegal taxes and duties"; (11) equal distribution of land; (12) state ownership of mountains, rivers, forests, mines, wastelands; and (13) of banks, communications, and all enterprises having a direct bearing on public welfare; (14) state capital to develop scientifically agriculture and industry; (15) prohibition of high rates of interest; (16) state control of distribution of daily necessities with prohibition of "illegal profits" by merchants; (17) labor and farmer organizations to be assisted by the drafting of laws to protect farmers; (18) enforcement of the conscription system.

A number of these points were as will be recalled, strongly reminiscent of the objectives of the Kuomintang during the period 1925-27 when co-operation between that party and the Communists was the order of the day. With the establishment of the Nanking government in 1927-28 the dominant elements of the Kuomintang had veered to the right, compromising with the "capitalistic," and "imperialistic" upper bourgeoisie, Chinese and foreign, to the indignant disappointment of the more doctrinaire and radical members of the Left. Among others, Mme. Sun

Yat-sen, sister-in-law to Chiang Kai-shek, had never ceased to oppose and denounce publicly the Nanking government which she charged with betrayal of the principles of the Party Leader.¹⁴ To what degree, if any, the leaders of the Producers' Party and the People's Government in Foochow were influenced by the words of Mme. Sun and other possibly unselfish critics of the Nanking Government, and to what extent they were motivated by the "self-interest" and desire for "division of spoils" which she condemned, it is impossible to say. Ostensibly at least they were aiming at socialism; apparently they were inclined to co-operate with the Communists of Kiangsi. The Communists, however, disdained military co-operation, or anything more than benevolent neutrality and trade in essential commodities.

The Nineteenth Route Army, which had gained immortal fame at Shanghai less than two years before, but which now contained many raw recruits, became the nucleus of a People's Revolutionary Army. This was to be supported, it was hoped, by Kwangtung and Kwangsi in an attack upon Nanking.

Invited by Ch'en Ming-ch'u to assist, prior to the formation of the government, Fêng Yü-hsiang had courteously refused, not having recovered strength after his recent exertions against Nanking. Mme. Sun, suspicious perhaps that spoils, rather than self-sacrifice for the poor, constituted the motivating principle in the formation of the new party and government, disclaimed relationship with the movement. Hu Han-min, instead of co-operating, urged the insurgents to reconsider. Nevertheless he remained irreconcilable with respect to the national government as he made clear in a statement on December 15, 1933. In this, Chiang Kai-shek was accused of a secret understanding with the Japanese and of fighting the Communists as rivals for power rather than on the basis of principle, inasmuch as he used other than his own troops in the anti-Communist campaigns; accordingly, to aid Nanking was to aid Chiang and keep the country under the control of a military machine. To support the Foochow government on the other hand, Hu believed, was to aid the Communists to control south China. Therefore, both Nanking and Foochow should be overthrown and a new anti-imperialist, anti-militarist, anti-Communist government should be established which should complete the application in practice of the principles of Dr. Sun and the true Kuomintang.

Meanwhile, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei had been attempting, without recourse to bloodshed, to bring about the dissolution of the Fukien government. Appeals were issued by Chiang to the Nine-

¹⁴ See T. A. Bisson, "Ten Years of the Kuomintang: Revolution vs. Reaction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 25 (February 15, 1933), pp. 303-06; consult also the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, December 21, 1931.

teenth Route and to the Bandit Suppression armies: to remind the former of its glorious record and the "hundred pitched battles" in which it and Chiang had "faced death and shared hardships together"; to make clear to the latter the evil reputation of Ch'en Ming-ch'u—who during his "tenure of office as Minister of Communications last year [had] accepted heavy bribes [and had] had to leave the country on a tour of Europe"—and to urge upon it the necessity for continuing to fight the Red bandits. On November 28, Wang Ching-wei delivered a speech at Nanking in which he reviewed the history of the republic and defended the government's foreign policy as well as his own role in bringing about the Tangku truce.

On the same day the South-West Political Council at Canton called upon Chiang and Wang to resign their posts charging them with maladministration responsible for the Fukien outbreak. Of the latter the Cantonese leaders piously expressed thorough disapproval.

After weeks of mediation on the part of both Nanking and Canton, it became apparent that force alone could end the Fukien insurrection. Therefore, while negotiations were still in process and the leaders of the new government were feeling relatively secure—their forces having advanced into Chekiang and seized several towns—Marshal Chiang suddenly dispatched air forces which during December bombed Foochow and other cities. Land and sea forces advanced simultaneously. Amoy and Foochow were taken on January 13, 1934, Eugene Chen and several of his colleagues retiring precipitately to Hongkong. The Nineteenth Route Army was evicted from its headquarters at Changchow on the twenty-first. One week later the rebellion was officially declared to have ended, although part of the rebel troops held on a few days longer. General Tsai Ting-kai joined his recent colleagues-in-revolution in Hongkong. Thence, a little later, he proceeded to the United States where, with a greater degree of safety, he was able to continue criticism of Marshal Chiang, aid in the organization of the China National Revolutionary League, a party devoted to cessation of civil war, preach resistance to the Japanese, and urge economic reform.¹⁵

By swift action Nanking had prevented the Communists of Kiangsi from changing their minds and merging their efforts with those of the Foochow government. Twenty thousand of the rebel troops were now taken over by Marshal Chiang and six thousand were placed at the disposition of Canton.¹⁶ Fukien was rehabilitated under the governorship of General Ch'en Yi, a native of Chekiang, a graduate of the Tokyo Military

¹⁵ Consult the articles by Hu Chou-yuan, "The 19th Route Army and the Chinese Liberation Movement," *China Today*, Vol. III, No. 5 (February, 1937), pp. 58-9; also his "The Nineteenth Route Army," *Amerasia*, Vol. I, No. 3 (May, 1937), pp. 127-32.

¹⁶ *North China Daily News*, December 31, 1934.

Staff College and one who was *persona grata* to Japan and its "special interests" in Fukien.

EARLY CHINESE COMMUNISM

Although associated with the Kuomintang from early 1925 until the spring of 1927, the Chinese Communists had worked actively and continuously for the expansion of a "class-conscious" revolutionary movement. While it existed as a legal party, the Kungch'antang (Chinese Communist Party) had organized important Workers' Syndicates in the metropolitan centers, but had made only slight headway among the rural masses. Although the Party's Central Executive Committee favored gradual preparation of both urban and rural masses for revolutionary action, elements within the party had refused strict adherence to its line. Li Li-san favored immediate revolts and permanent revolutionary action, and was ultimately branded a Trotskyite and dispatched to Moscow in 1931 for further "study." The "rightists" within the Communist Party were led by Professor Ch'en Tu-hsiu, onetime teacher of Mao Tse-tung. Ch'en urged immediate emancipation of China from the encroachments of the imperialists, and advocated class co-operation rather than class struggle. Although important in the founding and directing of the Kungch'antang, Ch'en was expelled for the failure of his program in 1927, and thereafter was imprisoned by the Kuomintang until his death in 1942.¹⁷

After the purging at Hankow in the summer of 1927, the Chinese Communist Party went underground and established headquarters in the French Concession at Shanghai. Under the direction of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists thereafter began systematic organization of a hierarchy of its own based upon the pattern of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia. In a variety of ways, therefore, the organizational scheme of the Kungch'antang is similar to that of the Kuomintang since both were cut after the Russian pattern. For instance, the Central Committees, the executive organs of both parties, are elected in both parties by National Congresses. Youth movements and secret police also are important features of both organizations. The "Blue Shirts" of the Kuomintang were especially effective in the prewar years in weeding out agitators and other purveyors of "dangerous thoughts," whether Communist or non-Communist.

During the summer and autumn of 1927, the resistance of the purged Chinese Communists began to assume its first definite outlines. Revolts were staged at Nanchang during July and August by the first independent

¹⁷ For discussion of Li's schism and Ch'en's "heresy" see Victor A. Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets* (New York, 1934), pp. 121-29; for a particularly good summary of the attitudes of Ch'en and Li see Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York, 1938), pp. 144-46, 161-63. See also the account in D. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (New Haven, 1949), *passim*.

Red army units to be organized in China. Failure to consolidate their hold in Nanchang and other cities of central and southern China forced the Communists to turn to the agrarian movement for their main support.¹⁸ Using the hills of Kiangsi province as their rendezvous and base of supplies, the soldiers of Ho Lung, Yeh Ting, and Chu Teh began to extend the revolution to the farming and village areas of Kiangsi and its neighboring provinces.¹⁹ In November, 1927, the Redarmyists set up the first Soviet Republic of China at Haifong on the Kwangtung littoral. Although it was soon overrun, the Haifong experiment was important as a pioneering effort.

By assuming leadership in the indigenous agrarian revolution, the Communists were able to recruit large numbers for their army from the peasant unions of the south and from discontented elements in the Kuomintang armies. Party membership also expanded considerably after 1927. Converts were attracted mainly from the villages and small towns of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, Hupeh, Hunan, and Anhwei. Between 1930 and 1934, numerous Soviet governments were established in scattered areas of the aforementioned provinces. Mao Tse-tung, who had become prominent in party activities after 1928, estimated in later years that there were at this period nine million persons in six Sovietized areas of southeastern China.²⁰

The successes of the Soviet movement are to be attributed mainly to the sincere effort of the Communists, whether for political advantage or not, to help the Chinese peasantry achieve a better level of living. Rural reform based in part upon confiscation of land followed occupation of an area by the Red Army. The peasant slogan "No rent to the landlord, no taxes to the Kuomintang authorities, no payment to the usurers" virtually became a reality in the Sovietized regions. Capitalists, priests, and landowners were frequently dispossessed, and were usually deprived of all political rights and sometimes of their heads. To elect a Soviet government, the political commissars attached to the occupying force ordinarily convoked a general assembly of picked delegates representing peasants, workers, and soldiers. Thereafter, the new government dominated by party members would proceed to repartition the land, to nationalize large enterprises and banks (if any), to organize workers' syndicates in the industries of the region, and to formulate a fiscal program designed to tax individual enterprisers out of existence. Collective farmers were also given choice

¹⁸ Revolts in the cities were brought about in part by the influence of Li Li-san's teachings. Mao Tse-tung became prominent in the Kungch'antang only after it assumed leadership in the agrarian movement.

¹⁹ For a concise account of the Red Army's early development see Chan-She, "The Struggle of the Chinese Red Army," *The Communist International*, Vol. XI, No. 6 (March, 1934), pp. 224-34.

²⁰ See E. Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, p. 146, and others give eighty millions, but this is gross exaggeration—or simple misinformation.

lands and the industrial co-operatives were granted priorities and other privileges. Youth organizations and other authorized societies were established as agencies for educating, indoctrinating, and entertaining the rank and file.

To unite the Sovietized areas, the First All-China Congress of Soviets was convened at Juichin, Kiangsi, on November 7, 1931. One of the first official actions of the delegates from the Soviet areas, the Red army, and the Red syndicates was to vote the Chinese Soviet Republic into existence. They also promulgated a provisional constitution designed to sweep away the remnants of feudalism, to restrict the growth of capitalism, to eliminate the power of the imperialists, and to develop class-consciousness through the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat.²¹ Sovereignty was asserted to be in the hands of the toilers, but the Central Executive Committee of the party functioned as the final authority. Administration of the new regime was entrusted to Mao Tse-tung as the Soviet Republic's first president.

Although the peasants were usually attracted to Communism because of land-hunger, unbearable taxes, and intolerable rates of interest, the official party line from the outset attempted to discourage wholesale confiscations of private property. The experiences of the Communists in Russia with "permanent and unrestrained revolution" conditioned the Comintern's attitude toward the Chinese movement. Compromise with petty capitalists and small landowners was consistently advocated by party leaders. The first task of Communism in China was considered to be the emancipation of the toiling masses from the oppressive economic system and from the burdens imposed upon them by the imperialist powers. Bourgeois property relations were frowned upon, but were permitted to continue in operation as long as the enterprisers could pay the heavy taxes. Class lines were to be reduced, but by gradual rather than by precipitate action.

Almost immediately after its formation, the Chinese Soviet Republic denounced Japanese imperialists as heartily as it railed against the "counter-revolutionary" Kuomintang. On April 26, 1932, the Provisional Government at Juichin circularized a telegram in which it declared the existence of a state of war against Japan.²² Since the Chinese Soviets were not at this time in contact with the Japanese, the declaration constituted a bid for the support of those elements in China dissatisfied with Nanking's hesitant attitude toward the Nipponese. The timeliness and effectiveness

²¹ Complete text reprinted in Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-21. Max Beloff reports (*The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941* [London, 1947], I, 70, n. 1) that the handbook published in 1942 entitled *Strany Tikhovo Okeana (Countries of the Pacific)* has almost nothing to say about early Chinese Communism. The Chinese Communists probably received encouragement, when they received any at all, through Comintern spokesmen (*ibid.*, p. 217).

²² Complete text reprinted in Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-38.

of the Soviet declaration can be fully appreciated only by recalling that it was issued while the Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai were still in progress.


Generalissimo Chiang's determination to exterminate the Communists was one of the main reasons for his failure to act more strongly against the encroachments of Japan. Dating back to his days of association with Borodin, the Kuomintang leader was unrelenting in his hatred of them. Until 1930, he was content to hunt out the scattered Reds individually and largely through the agency of the "Blue Shirts." Even liberal Chinese, not formally affiliated with the Kungch'antang, were subjected to rigorous questioning and imprisonment sometimes for merely advocating resistance to Japan.²³ After the Chinese Soviet declaration of war on Japan, anti-Japanese sentiment was often sufficient to identify an individual as a Communist or, at least, as a "fellow-traveler." Political arrests multiplied as tension between Chiang and the Communists became increasingly acute. Foreigners also were subject to surveillance, or worse, if suspected of collaboration with the Reds. The Japanese and the Political Police of the French Concession were particularly co-operative in helping the Kuomintang stamp out the "Communist menace."²⁴

In December, 1930, Chiang launched his first major offensive against the Kiangsi Soviet area. Employing some 100,000 troops left free after the termination of hostilities with Fêng and Yen in the north, the Generalissimo tried to end organized Red resistance. The outnumbered Communists, however, retreated skillfully before the onslaughts of the Kuomintang armies. By compelling the Nationalists to overextend themselves, Red army units were able to isolate groups and gradually force the withdrawal of Chiang's troops to the protective covering of city walls. In his first anti-Communist campaign Chiang learned, as the Japanese were to learn later, that it was one thing to dislodge the Communists, but something quite different to annihilate them. Nanking also experienced at first hand the effectiveness of Red propaganda as many unpaid and discontented Nationalist soldiers deserted to the Red army.

In the early summer of 1931, another Kuomintang drive was launched. Although Chiang's forces were again numerically superior, they were still unable to achieve their objective. During the late summer and autumn of 1931 a third major offensive was undertaken against the Soviets to which

²³ During 1932-1933, certain liberal members of the Academia Sinica became so concerned about the activities of the "Blue Shirts" that they organized a League of Civil Rights. Among its moving spirits were Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Madame Sun, Lin Yu-tang, Lu Hsün, Harold Isaacs, Agnes Smedley, and Yang Chien. After a short period of activity, Yang Chien was killed, apparently by "Blue Shirts," and the movement was thereafter suppressed. For details see Agnes Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China* (New York, 1943), pp. 111-13.

²⁴ See, for example, the document issued by the French Police, Political Branch, French Concession at Shanghai, *Report on Discovery of the Shanghai Central Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party* (Shanghai, 1935).



China, 1933 to 1937



Area in which Japan sought to establish an autonomous North China



Manchoukuo



Denotes Communist-controlled areas



Denotes the "Long March" of the Chinese Communists



Denotes the routes of the 4th Front Army

Demilitarized zone of the Tangku Truce

Chiang committed around 300,000 men. Meanwhile, the Japanese launched their attack on September 18, against Manchuria, and cries rose that "Chinese must cease fighting Chinese." Chiang, however, would give the Communists no permanent quarter. Large-scale hostilities were suspended temporarily, but in April, 1933 (contemporary with Japan's withdrawal from the League), a fourth "annihilation drive" was undertaken—and again the Communists repulsed the Nationalists.

While Chiang's fourth offensive was occupying the Reds, Nanking's military staff was busy reviewing and revising its strategy under the direction of General von Seeckt, German adviser to the Nationalists. Rehabilitation of the Nationalist forces was also made possible during the autumn of 1933 by a large Wheat and Cotton loan negotiated in the United States by T. V. Soong. Despite Soong's protests, Chiang diverted these funds to aid in carrying on hostilities against the Reds. Military roads and blockhouses were built as the forces of the Kuomintang gradually encircled the whole Red area. Troops from the south also aided in the final drive against the Reds which lasted from October, 1933, until October of the following year. Encirclement by armies and a multitude of blockhouses and pillboxes made it impossible for the Reds to maneuver and to trade time for space. As the pincers closed, lack of salt and other vital commodities added to the serious danger besetting the Reds. Unable longer to hold out, the Communists concentrated their forces on the southwestern sector, broke through the Kuomintang lines, and began the exodus in September–October, 1934, that was to be called the "Long March."²⁵

The partial success of Chiang's fifth campaign was a tribute to the organizing skill of the Kuomintang officers and their foreign advisers, but there were on the Communist side mistakes of strategy which contributed to Nanking's victory south of the Yangtze. According to Mao Tse-tung's testimony:

In this period [October, 1933–October, 1934] we made two important errors. The first was the failure to unite with Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai's army in 1933 during the Fukien rebellion. The second was the adoption of the erroneous strategy of simple defense, abandoning our former tactics of manoeuvre. It was a serious mistake to meet the vastly superior Nanking forces in positional warfare, at which the Red Army was neither technically nor spiritually at its best.²⁶

Successful in forcing the flight of the Reds from the south, Chiang was chagrined by the failure of his iron belt completely to encircle and

²⁵ For details on Chiang's five campaigns consult E. Snow, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–81; also Frederick V. Field, "The Recent Anti-Communist Campaign in China," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 16 (August 14, 1935), pp. 123–29; see also A. Smedley, *China's Red Army Marches* (New York, 1934); and for the Kuomintang viewpoint T'ang Leang-li (ed.), *Suppressing Communist-Banditry in China* (Shanghai, 1934) chap. V.

²⁶ As quoted in E. Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

crush the Red Army. The halfhearted efforts of the Cantonese in fighting the Communists were blamed by many. "So long as the Reds could be headed off from Kwangtung, Canton would do nothing either to risk diminution in its own strength or, by facilitating too conclusive a defeat of the Reds, assist in the further aggrandizement of Nanking."²⁷ The Kuomintang forces chased the Communists in their epochmaking retreat, but no large unit of the Red army was again ensnared into positional combat.

The "Long March" of more than 100,000 Communists from the hilly districts of southern China to the border region of the northwest was one of the great migratory movements of history. Although Nanking periodically reported the "utter rout" and "elimination" of the retreating Communists, a considerable organized remnant made the "zigzag" journey of over 8000 miles. During most of the trek the Reds were harassed by government airplanes and cavalry. By heroic efforts and almost superhuman feats, the Redarmyists crossed rivers and mountains and withstood the ravages of disease and weather. At the end of 1935 they emerged from the Tibetan marches, Kansu, and the provinces of the west into northern Shensi. There they joined forces with the small Communist group organized in Shensi during 1932-33 by Liu Tsu-tan and his followers. Although the Reds were at first limited to the small villages, they captured Yen-an in 1936 and established there a capital for the new Soviet area, a capital which they held, and from which they ruled or influenced a very considerable part of northern China, until the spring of 1947.

NANKING'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS

During the years of the Manchurian crisis and in the interval of "peace" prior to the Marco Polo Bridge "Incident" the Kuomintang government was notably unsuccessful in attaining internal harmony for itself and China, and in organizing political unity. Its task, however, was no easy one. Floods, famines, economic depression, invasion, and civil war would have made impressive accomplishments almost impossible for any government. The key to the understanding of Nanking's failures, however, is in the ineffectiveness of its measures for economic and social rehabilitation. With the nation torn and bleeding from incessant civil war and its attendant evils, Nanking failed to minister to the most wretched and numerous elements of the population. Bent upon rooting out the Communist "bandits," Generalissimo Chiang's government subordinated, almost to the point of ignoring, the desperate plight of both rural and urban poor.

It would be unjust, however, to hold the Kuomintang alone responsible for the inequities existing in Chinese society. Problems of land, popula-

²⁷ *North China Daily News*, December 21, 1934.

tion, tenantry, and interest rates have plagued China's agricultural economy almost since the dawn of history. Traditionally, and to a large extent even yet, control by the central government in China virtually ceases at the *hsien* level. The lower levels of administration are dominated by the families of means and education. As landlords the leaders of these groups wield great economic power; as the men of money they normally act as usurers, and from their ranks come most of the educated children who ultimately occupy the strategic offices of both local and central government. Because of their unchallenged powers in local affairs, the support of the landed gentry has ordinarily been indispensable to the organization and maintenance of a successful central governing body.²⁸ Chiang's association with persons friendly to or members of the landed families, and his determined fight against the Communists, ought therefore to be understood in relation to the continuing strategic role of the landed gentry. In addition, Chiang has also been hand in glove with the seaport capitalists who have financed numerous "revolutionary" operations since 1927, and who have helped to make the Kuomintang respectable in international circles.

After the break with the Communists at the Wuhan Cities, in 1927, the Kuomintang sought to reorganize society along lines acceptable to its own people and in accord with the rest of the world. Laws were promulgated, agencies were organized, and constitutions were sketched out in detail. Western legal, social, and economic practices were introduced in almost every phase of government. Between 1929 and 1931 the substance of China's Civil Code was published. Based upon French, German, and Swiss practices, it constituted an excellent example of the attempt to impose modern institutions upon a traditional social pattern. As a result of its inadequate recognition of customary practices, most Chinese still live according to established customs irrespective of their legality. Wages and hours laws, for instance, were carefully worked out and adopted, but had comparatively little effect upon familiar practices. Advanced legislation regulating child labor found its way into the statutes, but children of all ages continued to be exploited in the customary ways. As a concession to tradition, however, the Civil Code recognizes the family as the basic unit of society, but avoids deliberately giving recognition to existing inequalities based upon sex.²⁹

Beginning with the achievement of tariff autonomy in 1930, Nanking also endeavored seriously for a period to rationalize its fiscal policies. Under the generally able guidance of T. V. Soong, agencies were established for economic planning and a new central bank was organized.

²⁸ On this point see particularly Kurt Bloch, "Reflections on the Social Structure in China," *Social Research*, Vol. IV, No. 4 (November, 1937), pp. 500-01.

²⁹ Consult Werner Levi, "The Family in Modern Chinese Law," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (May, 1945), pp. 263-73.

Loans for flood and famine control were granted by various American agencies, such as the Federal Farm Board and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.⁸⁰ In the years 1931–33, the government's income from taxation (mainly customs, salt, and internal revenue) steadily increased. In 1933, China's currency was established on a silver standard, and the silver dollar became the normal currency unit. Two years later, a managed paper currency was introduced in an effort to mitigate the effects of depression at home and the American silver purchase policy.⁸¹ Continued progress, however, was rendered extremely difficult by the practice of diverting funds from the pursuits of peace to the pursuits of war.

Roads and railroads were constructed and some already in existence were extended, but mainly to facilitate the movement of troops. Foreign advisers were brought into industry and into the army. Western techniques were more widely adopted than ever before, but Western ideology was largely ignored or openly condemned. In education, ambitious plans for schooling were carefully worked out. Emphasis at all levels was upon "practical" and scientific subjects. During 1934, the Minister of Education, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, outlined a plan to provide a small but increasing amount of free education to every child. Improvement in the quality of instruction at all levels was constantly emphasized. A dearth of teachers and a lack of funds, however, hindered constructive educational measures and many programs had to be shelved indefinitely after the resumption of open hostilities between China and Japan.⁸²

Meanwhile, a program of mass education was outlined by Chiang in an address at Nanchang on March 11, 1934. The Generalissimo outlined the principles of the New Life Movement and stressed its connection with the moral tenets of Confucius. As an outgrowth of the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps of the Nationalist army, the New Life Movement has general moral and ideological reform as its objective. Endeavoring to revive the virtues of ancient China, and taking the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., and Four H associations as models, the Chinese movement hopes to cultivate among the rank and file a respect for order and punctuality, cleanliness, simplicity, and frugality. Madame Chiang Kai-shek was particularly influential in inaugurating community recreational programs, public health measures, and devices for mass education. Although some Westerners and educated Chinese were inclined to scoff at the "anti-expectoration" and "swat-the-fly" campaigns as ridiculous in a country where mass concern for subsistence is the major problem, the New Life Movement has had desirable, even

⁸⁰ Further discussion in Kao Ping-shu, *Foreign Loans to China* (New York, 1946), pp. 26–27.

⁸¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 374–75.

⁸² Excellent discussion of "Modern Education" by F. L. Hawks Pott in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *China* (Berkeley, 1948), pp. 427–40.

if limited effects upon the everyday life of the people.³³ As a substitute for more fundamental reform, however, its appeal has been distinctly limited. Morale could be improved among those who had rice; moral disquisitions and exhortations, free library facilities, and appeal to traditional Chinese virtues were, however, empty substitutes for livelihood.

With the ending of Communist rebellion in the Kiangsi area, the Kuomintang again turned its attention to domestic problems. At the session of the Central Executive Committee in January, 1934, it was decided to resume discussion of the permanent Constitution which had been in process of being drafted ever since the National government in 1932 had ordered the Legislative *Yüan* to begin work on it. In January, 1933, Sun Fo, the president of the Legislative *Yüan*, had appointed a committee charged with the drafting of a constitution. Among the forty-two members, Dr. John C. H. Wu and Chang Chi-pen were the leading experts. After the issuance of numerous drafts and seven revisions, a final draft was published on May 5, 1936.³⁴ According to original plans, the May 5 draft was to be considered for ratification by the People's Congress supposed to convene toward the end of 1936. Internal conflicts, the Sian incident, and the steady encroachment of Japan made impossible, however, its election and convocation at the appointed time. The swift descent thereafter into the Marco Polo bridge events of 1937 and their aftermath forced postponement for ten years of the promised People's Congress.

The Draft Permanent Constitution of 1936 optimistically provided for the retention of Manchuria, Jehol, Mongolia, and Tibet as integral parts of the Republic. The five *Yüan* form of government was retained. The president of the republic was to have important powers but was to be responsible to, and elected by, the People's Congress. To be elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage, the People's Congress was to meet at least once every three years at the seat of the Central government. Since it was designed to include all parties and to give the widest representation possible, the Congress, as conceived, was an unwieldy body and, hence, had but few prescribed functions. It was empowered to elect the President, Vice-Presidents, and members of the Legislative and Censor *Yüans*, and it was granted the right of recall with reference to the officers of the other *Yüan*. The Congress might also initiate laws, hold referenda on laws, and amend the constitution.

Its multiparty character and its heavy reliance—for China—upon the People's Congress made powerful enemies for the 1936 constitution among

³³ Consult Randall Gould's description of a two-weeks official tour of Kiangsi in January, 1935 ("Communism Leaves Kiangsi," *East*, Vol. III, No. 5 [February 4, 1935], pp. 19-25; No. 6 [February 11, 1935], pp. 17-30). See also R. K. Gould, *China in the Sun* (New York, 1946), p. 80.

³⁴ For details see Pan Wei-tung, *The Chinese Constitution* (Washington, 1945), chap. III, and for its text see *ibid.*, appendix O. Summary discussion in Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang K'ai-shek* (Boston, 1941), pp. 25, 31.

the Conservative members of the Kuomintang. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1937, reactionary elements were able to use the war as an excuse for postponing final consideration of the constitution. Although it never functioned as the law of the land, the constitution was for a decade after 1936 the focal point of Chinese political and constitutional debate.

THE SIAN INCIDENT

Issuance of the Draft Permanent Constitution in 1936 was indicative of the trend of the times. After the suspension of active hostilities against Japan in 1933 and against the Communists in 1934, students and other intellectuals began to call for formal ratification of the new constitution, and for an end to the period of political tutelage. Comprising less than one per cent of China's population, the membership of the Kuomintang was often accused of being out of harmony with the desires and needs of the nation. The minor parties, such as the Third Party, the National-Socialist Party, and the Social Democrats, had no legal existence until 1938, and were generally somewhere to the left of the Kuomintang. They had no large following and no military backing, but acted effectively as minority pressure groups in attempting to end the exclusive control of the Kuomintang.

The Generalissimo's reluctance to permit criticism of his policies, his impatience with opposing political parties, and his failure to stand firmly against the Japanese aroused even the politically apathetic Chinese to action. Beginning in 1935 among the students in China's most important universities, the National Salvation movement was inaugurated. It urged the cessation of civil war and appeasement. Unlike the Communists and the Nationalists, the National Salvationists held to no particular ideology and organized no formal hierarchy. As a popular movement, it was an expression of the nation's impatience with internal conflicts and its indignation over Japan's unchallenged and arrogant aggression. Strange as it may seem to most Westerners, particularly Americans, the fact that the movement was inaugurated by scholars enhanced its prestige among the masses accustomed to rule by the literate. Ere long, the membership had become more numerous, and more truly representative, than that of any other political group.

Contemporary with the growth of the National Salvation movement in China's great cities, the Kungch'antang, now definitely on the defensive, advocated on August 1, 1935, the organization of an anti-Japanese united front.³⁵ Since their newly occupied territory in Shensi was directly endangered by the advance of the Japanese, the Communists were more than

³⁵ Consult James F. Bertram, *First Act in China, The Story of the Sian Meeting* (New York, 1938), p. 102; also Chu Yin, "People's Front Movement, in China," *Amerasia*, Vol. I, No. 2 (April, 1932), pp. 68-72.

ever eager to combine with other Chinese parties against the common national enemy. Adoption of united front tactics and temporary abandonment of social revolution were also policies in line with those being advocated by the Comintern in other parts of the world.³⁶ The united front in China, however, was designed to include all parties, not only those of the left.

Hereafter, Communists began to participate in the student demonstrations and parades held in Peiping and in other cities where the movement of national resurgence had taken hold. As time wore on, and as Chiang remained adamant before the appeals of the National Salvationists, the Communists' program appeared to be increasingly more reasonable and sane to people genuinely concerned over China's future. Chiang's decision in October, 1935, to send General Chang Hsüeh-liang and about 130,000 *Tungpei* (northeastern, that is, Manchurian) troops to Sian to blockade the Communists met with dissatisfaction in all parts of the country. The *Tungpei* warriors themselves were much more anxious to fight against the Japanese invaders of their Manchurian homeland than they were to "pacify" the "Red bandits" in the Northwest. A manifestation of the widespread disgruntlement with Nanking's policy was the shooting and wounding of Wang Ching-wei on November 1 at the opening meeting of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang. As foreign minister, Wang's advocacy of a mild policy towards Japanese aggression was considered traitorously reprehensible.³⁷

With the removal of Wang and his clique from the government at the end of 1935, the Generalissimo was forced to assume personal responsibility for policies emanating from Nanking. Even the most loyal of his supporters hereafter found it difficult to blame anyone but Chiang for Nanking's temporizing. His policy of proclaiming martial law to end student demonstrations, and his hardheaded insistence upon ruthless suppression of all criticism, endangered the strong foundation of his personal popularity. In an effort to circumvent the government's repressive measures, the Peiping Student's Union began systematic organization of an anti-Japanese boycott. At the end of May, 1936, representatives of the National Salvationists from all over the country convened at Shanghai. In their manifesto the students called upon all parties and groups in the country to cease domestic hostilities, to free all political prisoners, and to participate in a joint anti-Japanese program.

One response to the National Salvationist appeal came from the restless warlord elements of the Southwest. On June 3, a manifesto was issued

³⁶ For the official rationale of the united front in China see Wang Ming's speech on August 7, 1935, to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in the pamphlet entitled, *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries* (New York, 1935), pp. 12-33.

³⁷ Details in T. A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York, 1938), p. 78.

from Canton demanding a national war against Japan. During the next two months, Generals Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Li Chung-jen, military rulers of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, respectively, endeavored to use the national sentiment aroused against Nanking as an aid in eclipsing Chiang. Their position was strengthened by virtue of the fine reputation the Kwangsi faction enjoyed for efficient and progressive administration at the provincial level. Troops maintained by the Kwangsiites were moved northward and civil war but narrowly averted. Following a classical rule of Chinese warfare, however, Chiang was able to suppress the southwestern uprising by bribing General Ch'en's subordinates. Significantly enough for subsequent events, this was the first instance in which Nanking used other than military means to settle an internal dispute.³⁸ The National Salvationists also repudiated the southerners as more concerned about their group aggrandizement than national welfare. By the middle of July, 1936, Ch'en had fled, and the Kuomintang had ordered the abolition of the Southwest Political Council. Thereafter, Nanking enjoyed its first period of control over Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Warlordism in the south had been dealt a serious blow.

Meanwhile, the Communists were also reconsidering the united front program. In June, 1935, on the eve of the convening in Moscow of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, Wang Ming (pseudonym for Ch'en Shao-yu), the Kungch'antang's representative to the Comintern, blamed the failure of united front efforts upon "the weakness of our Party organizations in the Kuomintang districts."³⁹ Later in the summer of 1936, the Chinese Communist Party extended formal overtures to Nanking to participate in the united front.⁴⁰ Chiang, however, refused to hear of compromise with the hated "bandits" of the Northwest.

At Sian, meanwhile, Chang Hsüeh-liang's *Tungpei* troops had virtually suspended hostilities against the Communist armies. During the summer and autumn of 1936, Chang himself was gradually won to the National Salvationist point of view. Moreover, he established friendly relations with Chou En-lai, liaison official for the Communists. Nanking belatedly realized that the troops in the Northwest were unreliable and were not pushing the war against the Reds. In October, a Northeastern Peoples' National Salvation Association was organized at Sian. The following month, Chiang himself flew to Shensi to investigate the character of transpiring events. At Chiang's first visit to Sian, Chang Hsüeh-liang pleaded with him personally for the organization of a united front. The Generalis-

³⁸ See Ch'ao-T'ing Chi, "New Alignment in Chinese Politics," *Amerasia*, Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1937), pp. 33-38.

³⁹ "The Struggle for the Anti-Japanese People's Front in China," *The Communist International*, Vol. XIII, No. 6 (June, 1936), p. 745.

⁴⁰ See the sympathetic statement of August 10, 1936, by Mao Tse-tung, "Reply of the Chinese Soviets to Program of the National Salvation Union," *China Today*, Vol. III, No. 4 (January, 1937), pp. 40-44.

simo, however, remained adamant in his determination to exterminate the Communists before moving against Japan.

During November, 1936, public opinion in China was further outraged by the failure of Nanking to resist Japanese encroachments in Suiyüan, the gateway province to China's vast northwest. Indignation ran particularly high because Chiang was at the same time sending reliable replacements into the environs of Sian to continue hostilities against the Communists and to watch over the activities of the discontented *Tungpei* troops. When seven officers of the All-China National Salvation Association were arrested in Shanghai, public wrath reached the boiling point. On November 27, Chang sent a heated letter to the Generalissimo at Nanking pledging his loyalty and that of his troops if only Chiang would assume leadership in a national crusade against Japan.

On December 4, Chiang for the second time arrived in Sian—with several members of his staff.⁴¹ Determined to bring an end to *Tungpei* recalcitrance, he hoped also to prepare for a new offensive against the Communist "traitors." His staff members occupied the Guest House, the best hotel in Sian, while the Generalissimo and his bodyguard were housed at Lintung Temple outside the city. In the negotiations with the "Young Marshal" and Generals Yu Hsüeh-chung and Yang Hu-ch'eng, Chiang was unable to convince his subordinates that they should participate in still another drive against the Reds. Even while deliberations were going on, the city of Sian and the *Tungpei* troops were seething with determination to proceed against Japan. Parades and demonstrations demanding reinforcements for Suiyüan were held on December 9. On the following day, however, Chiang announced his determination to continue the fight against the Communists. Chang Hsüeh-liang was also to be relieved of his command and the *Tungpei* troops were to be dispatched to the south.

At this juncture the recalcitrant generals determined to act. On December 12, picked *Tungpei* warriors invaded the Guest House and captured Chiang's entourage, while others took the Generalissimo into custody at Lintung. Contrary to many reports, the "kidnapping" of Chiang was not a Communist plot.⁴² Probably Communist headquarters at Pao-an knew nothing of the *coup d'état* until it was an accomplished fact. Shortly after the event, however, Chou En-lai and other Chinese Soviet representatives were flown to Sian to negotiate with the mutineers and with Chiang.

As part of the effort to give the Generalissimo "advice by military force," Chang Hsüeh-liang dispatched a telegram to Nanking demanding reorganization of the government to include all parties, cessation of civil

⁴¹ Details in Bertram, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–70.

⁴² Consult *ibid.*, p. 133; Bisson, *Japan in China, loc. cit.*, pp. 169–70; moreover, in an interview of February 25, 1945, W. H. Donald confirmed the assertion that Chou En-lai had not been responsible for Chiang's detention, but that he had actually aided the Generalissimo to escape unscathed from Sian (*New York Times*, February 28, 1945).

war, immediate release of patriotic leaders from imprisonment, a grant of civil rights, and a prompt convocation of a National Salvation conference. Nanking's response to these demands was taken without regard for the Generalissimo's safety. General Ho Ying-chin, minister of war, favored an immediate punitive expedition against Sian. Ho also summoned Wang Ching-wei to return from his exile in Germany. Before returning by plane to China, Wang hurried off to Berlin for a secret conference with Hitler and



General Ho Ying-chin. Acme Photo

other important Nazis. Ho and Wang flatly refused negotiations with Sian, and were probably plotting to assume control of the government in case of Chiang's death.

In Nanking, Madame Chiang and her advisers ultimately took the initiative in establishing contact with the Generalissimo.⁴³ On December 14, W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to the Chiangs, and longtime friend and adviser of the "Young Marshal," flew to Sian to ascertain the facts about Chiang's captivity. Meanwhile, the arguments and threats of the

⁴³ For discussion of events in Nanking as well as in Sian see the volume written by the two Chiangs: Mayling Soong Chiang, *Sian: A Coup D'État* and Chiang Kai-shek, *Sian, Extracts from a Diary* (Shanghai, 1938). For details about Donald's activities see E. A. Selle, *Donald of China* (New York, 1948).

Tungpei rebels fell on deaf ears, even as the troops dispatched by General Ho were beginning to reconnoiter the city. Nanking consistently refused to send an official negotiator, but directed military action. On December 19, T. V. Soong joined Donald at Sian, and two days later both men returned to Nanking. Finally on December 22, Madame Chiang was granted clearance in Nanking, and forthwith proceeded to Sian accompanied by Donald and her eldest brother. Only after reports of the serious political disaffection at Nanking had reached Chiang did he consent to negotiate with his captors.

The "Young Marshal" and the Communists were as greatly concerned about the Ho-Wang combination as was Chiang himself. By this time it had become clear to all parties that Chiang was the only one with sufficient power and prestige to unite the nation. Although the Generalissimo refused to make specific commitments, he evidently gave Chang and his cohorts the definite impression that their viewpoint would receive considerate attention. Despite the insistence of many *Tungpei* rebels that Chiang should be tried as a traitor to the nation, Chang and the more level-headed mutineers succumbed to pressure from Chou En-lai to release the Generalissimo as a sign of their sincere desire to aid in the realization of China's unity. On Christmas day, 1936, therefore, the "Young Marshal" accompanied Chiang and his entourage on the flight back to Nanking.

THE UNITED FRONT

Although the Generalissimo's reappearance must have given War Minister Ho and Wang Ching-wei some bad moments, the immediate results of the Sian kidnapping upon Nanking's policies were far from promising. The "Young Marshal" was forbidden to return to Sian and the military blockade around the Northwest was tightened. Trustworthy Nanking officials were dispatched to Sian to dissipate what remained of the revolutionary atmosphere. Although the *Tungpei* rebels resisted temporarily, other Nationalist troops in February were able to occupy Sian without a battle. To all appearances Chiang seemed to have reassumed his former role and attitudes without seriously meditating upon the broader implications of the Sian episode.

In the latter part of February, 1937, the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang was summoned at Nanking. On the second day of discussions, proposals for arbitration and internal peace were forwarded to Nanking from Communist and National Salvationist leaders. Based upon the principles earlier issued by Chang from Sian, the proposals involved the question of rapprochement with the Communists. Although Madame Sun, Sun Fo, and other Kuomintang liberals advised co-operation and

national unity, the conservatives remained adamant toward all appeals.⁴⁴ However, before Chiang would make a formal appearance at the meetings, he demanded that Chang Hsüeh-liang be restored to his civil rights. On February 20, Chiang himself presented his diary of the Sian kidnapping to the convening Party members, and on the same day the anti-Communist war was formally canceled. In the final manifesto of the session, however, the old guard temporarily reasserted its position. While pledging "forbearance in domestic issues in order to achieve internal solidarity," the manifesto added with reference to the Communists that "because of their innumerable crimes, it is impossible to take their word at face value."⁴⁵

Despite Nanking's nominal objections to the proposals of the Communists, there was evidence even at the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang that the Central Government was about ready to negotiate. Chiang's personal popularity had reached a new high point after the kidnapping, for most Chinese surmised that his release was an indication that he had accepted the major features in Chang Hsüeh-liang's proposals. Anticipating reconciliation between the opposing parties, Chinese press and periodical writers began to build up Chiang as the hero of the unity movement.⁴⁶

During March, therefore, negotiations between Yen-an and Nanking were formally opened. In return for Chou En-lai's promise that the Communists would stop confiscations of land and halt their efforts to overthrow the Kuomintang, Chiang agreed to the cessation of civil war and the opening of hostilities against Japan. In accordance with the new Communist line, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

Communists entertain no illusion of the realization of Communism at the present time. They are seeking for the realization of national revolution. . . . Instead of a Soviet republic we propose to organize a national and democratic republic. Instead of confiscation of private land we propose to make every farmer own his own land.⁴⁷

By agreeing further to reorganize the Yen-an area into an integral, but Communist-ruled, part of the Chinese nation, and by consenting to place the Red Army under the command of Nanking, the Communists followed through in their effort to make the united front possible. Chiang on his

⁴⁴ Main conservatives were Chiang Tso-ping, Minister of Home Affairs; Chang Chia-ngau, Minister of Railways; Wu Ting-Ch'ang, Minister of Industries; Chang Chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War; and Wang Ching-wei.

⁴⁵ Manifesto translated as a whole in Fang Fu-an (ed.), *Chinese Opinions on Current Events* (Translated from Chinese Periodicals), No. 36 (March 3, 1937), pp. 10-15.

⁴⁶ The Generalissimo was even urged by the *North China Daily News*, and American newspapers in China to make peace with the Communists. See article in *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, March 15, 1937.

⁴⁷ Mao Tse-tung, "The Mission of Chinese Revolution after the Reunion of the Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang," *Chan Shi Ta Hsueh* (War-Time College Weekly), Vol. I, No. 2 (November 6, 1937), as translated in Fang Fu-an (ed.), *Chinese Opinions on Current Events*, No. 65 (November 17, 1937), pp. 1-4.

side agreed to permit civil rights, to move toward more democracy in government, and to institute measures for improvement of the people's livelihood.⁴⁸ By such concessions on both sides, a partially effective working arrangement was concluded for a time.

During March, 1937, Japan adopted a surprisingly conciliatory attitude, even while additional reinforcements were moving toward the mainland. Attractive proposals of economic co-operation were dangled before the eyes of Kuomintang officials, many of whom were still decidedly skeptical of the desirability of concluding peace with the Communists.⁴⁹ As *Tungpei* armies were gradually transferred from the Sian area to the south, the Communists suffered tremors of suspicion. On April 28, the Congress of Young Communists warned Nanking not to be deceived by Japan's "new smiling-face policy."⁵⁰ Fortunately for China, however, Japan's last diplomatic offensive failed to wean Chiang away from his determination to conclude internal peace. By June, interviews with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai "breathed a certainty that the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists, which had existed for ten years, was in the process of being healed."⁵¹ After the Japanese attack on the Marco Polo Bridge, July 7, 1937, the agreement for a united front was cemented for a period in fear of a common enemy.

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, February 20, 1937.

⁴⁹ Reference here is to the Kodama Economic Mission of March, 1937.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, April 30, 1937.

⁵¹ Consult Bisson, *Japan in China*, pp. 180-81.

CHAPTER XI

INTERLUDE OF DIPLOMACY

1933-1937

THE JAPANESE IN NORTHERN CHINA

With the conclusion of the Tangku truce on May 31, 1933, a four-year interlude of uneasy peace succeeded the period of acute international tension excited by the Manchurian crisis. In Japan, these years were marked by the final triumph of totalitarian forces, the repression of moderate elements, and the gradual convergence of Nippon's policies with the ambitious programs of Germany and Italy. Lining up staunchly behind the powers fighting international Communism, Japan instituted police actions at home and military operations in China which were designed in part to halt the spread of the "Red menace." At the same time, a studied effort was made to penetrate northern China and to establish there another "new state" cut on the Manchurian pattern.

In the economic sphere also Nippon pursued an aggressive and exclusive policy. While demanding extraordinary industrial and commercial privileges for its nationals, Japan virtually ordered the Western nations out of China. Simultaneously, Nipponese naval and civilian diplomats conducted negotiations leading to termination of the Washington (1922) and London (1930) naval treaties. Moreover, Japan inaugurated a comprehensive naval-building program and began fortifying its Pacific island holdings, including those under League mandate. After 1933, peace and stability *might* have been possible in eastern Asia, *but only on Japan's terms*.

After the successful severance of Manchuria and Jehol from China's political entity, the Japanese developed a keen interest in the provinces to the west and south of Manchoukuo. Especially attractive prizes were Chahar and Hopei provinces. The strategically important city of Kalgan, the Chahar terminus of the caravan routes from Russia and Mongolia, commands the entrances to Inner Mongolia; Peking, China's imperial city and most important center in the north, lies just south of the wall in northern Hopei. In addition to its strategic value for further conquest west and south, the Hopei-Chahar area is also abundantly rich for China in iron and coal deposits. Japan was anxious to control, directly or indirectly, sufficient territory in northeastern Asia to organize a buffer against the penetration of Communist influences from Russia and Outer

Mongolia. With Hopei-Chahar and Inner Mongolia forming a *cordon sanitaire*, the Japanese hoped that the insidious Comintern would not be able to outflank Manchoukuo and invade directly the precincts of the Mikado's empire.

With the world still buzzing over Japan's audacity in Manchuria, the Nipponese were not willing to force an immediate showdown in what remained of China's northernmost provinces. The Japanese hoped rather to induce disgruntled Chinese military and political leaders to organize "autonomy" movements with their help and protection. This policy of inspired and forced "co-operation" was coupled with deliberate efforts to intimidate Nanking through diplomatic and economic pressures to accept gradual penetration and ultimate loss of territories over which it possessed legal control. Until 1937, the Japanese, without important opposition from the Western powers or from China itself, were notably successful in advancing steadily southward and westward into intramural China. Nevertheless, progress was unsatisfactory to those who already envisaged a China subject to control from Tokyo.

The provisions of the Tangku truce permitted Nippon to hold an extraordinary position in northern China. Although not published in its entirety until 1937,¹ the truce was from its outset recognized in China and elsewhere as a serious defeat for the Nanking government. By its arrangements, the Chinese armed forces were required to withdraw south and west of a line running immediately north of Peiping. After supervising the Chinese withdrawal, the Japanese retired to a line based on Shanhaikwan and the Great Wall. In the demilitarized zone thus created, the Chinese were required to provide protection by armed units not "hostile to Japanese feelings." Meanwhile, the islanders, according to arrangements imposed upon China in the Boxer Protocols of 1901, were free to maintain armed units of their own at most of the important towns within and south of the demilitarized zone. By commanding the passes to the Great Wall, and as virtual masters of the demilitarized area, the Japanese possessed a springboard from which to launch additional subversive enterprises in northern China.

They were particularly successful in playing upon the traditional antipathy existing between the agrarian Chinese and the pastoral Mongols. Age-old resentments had been intensified in 1928 when the Nanking government divided and organized Inner Mongolia into the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan, and Ninghsia. By occupation of Jehol in 1933,

¹ It was suspected for several years that secret protocols had been attached to the truce arrangements. Actually, the most serious omission in the versions first published was the failure to include the second sentence of article 4: "The said police force [Chinese constabulary in charge of maintaining of peace and order in the demilitarized zone] shall not be constituted by armed units hostile to Japanese feelings." For the complete text see *The Chinese Year Book*, 1936-37, 2nd issue, p. 917; for additional discussion see T. A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York, 1938), pp. 44-46.

the Japanese established close contacts with rebellious Mongol princes. Of these, the most important was Prince Teh, a youngish and vehement nationalist. By co-operating with him, the Japanese were able to acquire important native support for their Mongolian "autonomy" movement. Because it had permitted the organization in Manchoukuo of a separate, and in part self-governing, Mongol province, the "young Mongols" hoped that Japan would also support their efforts toward independence. Hoping to halt the trend toward secession, Nanking permitted the organization in April, 1934, of an independent Mongolian Autonomy Council. Included in this arrangement was a guarantee that China would stem the tide of Chinese colonization that had been moving into Mongolia.²

During 1934-35, the Chinese government pursued a conciliatory policy designed to prevent "incidents" of the sort which would provide the Japanese military with excuses for formal occupation of additional strategic centers in the north. The Nanking policy of "exterminating the Communists" also made impractical a firm attitude toward the encroachments of the Nipponese. By taking advantage of Nanking's preoccupation and timidity, the Japanese almost succeeded in realizing their continental program. Under pressure from Tokyo, the Kuomintang government permitted the resumption of almost normal postal and railway communications between Manchukuo and northern China, despite the fact that such agreements were tantamount to *de facto* recognition of the "new state."³ As a further illustration of its "mild policy," the Chinese government protested to Moscow, in March, 1935, but not to Tokyo, when the Chinese Eastern Railway was sold to Manchoukuo.⁴ In the following June a "good-will mandate" was issued requiring the Chinese people not to engage in provocative or discriminatory activities toward "friendly nations."

One of the most serious threats to Chinese sovereignty and security took the form of a highly organized program of smuggling sometimes known more politely as "special trade."⁵ Using as a base for their continental operations the demilitarized zone created by the Tangku truce, Japanese agents began wholesale smuggling operations in 1935 designed to rob China of much of the important revenue normally derived from customs. At the same time, smuggling helped the Japanese to undermine the economic interests of the Western powers in China, since smuggled commodities undersold tariff-paying commodities in all markets. Prefer-

² See discussion in H. S. Quigley and G. S. Blakeslee, *The Far East. An International Survey* (Boston, 1938), p. 83.

³ Concluded in contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the recommendations of the Far East Advisory Committee of the League to refuse recognition to Manchoukuo in any way whatsoever. For full text of the recommendations see *Records of the Special Session of the Assembly, 1932-33*, V, 11.

⁴ See Quigley and Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁵ Burke Inlow, "Japan's 'Special Trade' in North China, 1935-37," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VI (1947), 139-67.

ential treatment for Japanese nationals and their wares was also gained by constant political and military pressure. Illicit goods flooded the markets of China's northern cities and soon appeared in the south. Equality of opportunity became to the Japanese nothing more than annoying phraseology mouthed by diplomatic and consular officials out of touch with reality. Of interest, however, were the fears expressed by some Japanese enterprisers that the "special trade" program would make the situation in China impossible for Japanese merchants engaging in legitimate commerce.

In eastern Hopei and Shantung the operations of the smugglers were openly under the protection of Japanese consular and military authorities. Silver was confiscated and systematically exported to Japan as a means of increasing financial chaos in China. The Japanese concession at Tientsin was also the central headquarters for the "dope ring" which peddled opium and narcotics in China south of the wall. Simultaneously, the sea lanes connecting Japan with the coastal towns of eastern Hopei and Shantung were kept open for the smugglers by diplomatic and naval pressure. At all points, the Japanese flouted the ineffective Chinese tariff and preventive systems until the spring of 1937.

Contemporary with their gigantic smuggling operations, the Japanese began to apply pressure for the organization of so-called "spontaneous autonomy movements." Using a frontier incident as a pretext, the Kwantung army in southern Manchuria dispatched units in January, 1935, to southeastern Chahar. Simultaneously, recommendations were forwarded to Prince Teh and the Mongolian Autonomy Council advocating union of Inner Mongolia with Manchuokuo. By midsummer, the Japanese had managed to install advisers in the Mongolian government operating in Kalgan. Meanwhile, on June 27, an agreement (known as the Chin-Doihara agreement) over Chahar was signed at Peiping between representatives of China and Japan. By its provisions, Nanking's governor in the city of "Northern Peace," General Sung Che-yuan, was dismissed, the Kuomintang organizations in the province were dissolved, Chinese colonists were forbidden admission, and all Chinese military forces were compelled to withdraw.⁶

Not content with this initial success in Inner Mongolia, General Doihara Kenji, chief of the Kwantung Army's Special Service section, planned gradual redemption of Suiyüan for the Mongols. During 1936, Prince Teh was "taught" to rely increasingly upon Japanese advisers and troops.⁷ On June 27, the first anniversary of the signing of the Chahar

⁶ For a detailed discussion of the Chin-Doihara agreement consult Bisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

⁷ Itagaki and Minami were mainly responsible for winning the co-operation of Prince Teh. See *Judgment, International Military Tribunal for the Far East* (no place, 1948), Part B, chap. V, pp. 653-54.

agreement, as a result of Japanese encouragement, the Mongolian Autonomy Council proclaimed the independence of "Mengkukuo." Although the secessionists claimed sovereignty over Chahar, Suiyüan, and Ninghsia, the "new government" had virtually no control outside of Chahar. By thus forcing the creation of a new puppet state Japan definitely linked the partition of China with its longtime effort to establish a *cordon sanitaire* between Japanese and Russian spheres of influence.

While Inner Mongolia was being fitted into Japan's continental design, developments in Hopei and Shantung were also moving rapidly toward a climax. By the summer of 1935, Japanese "regionalists" had become impatient with waiting for native autonomy movements. Even the most aggressive and disgruntled of the northern warlords had failed to rise easily to the Japanese bait. Encouragement and promises had proved insufficient to tempt most of the militarists and politicians of northern China. No one had been willing to risk Nanking's wrath by leading a secessionist movement, unless the Japanese would underwrite the endeavor with specific guarantees.

During June, 1935, the Japanese therefore began to clear the way for inspired "independence" movements. General Umetsu Yoshijiro handed General Ho Ying-chin, representative of the Nanking government, a series of nine demands with regard to Hopei. Although the Chinese attempted appeasement with the "good-will" mandate of June 10, Nippon refused to settle for anything less than complete concurrence. On July 6, China accepted the demands by signature of the Ho-Umetsu arrangements. Nanking was thereby required to dismiss officials of Hopei not satisfactory to the Japanese, and to suppress all anti-Japanese groups and activities throughout China. Kuomintang agencies and Central government troops were to withdraw as completely from Hopei as they had from Chahar. Thus, Nanking was to retain only nominal sovereignty in another of its most important and strategic northern provinces.

Once the Kuomintang's control had been emasculated in the north, it was not long before native puppets felt secure enough to organize "spontaneous" separatist movements. In August, the Peiping Political Council, a Nanking administrative group, was abolished under Japanese pressure. Grandiose schemes concerned with the creation of a "North China Autonomous Regime" began thereafter to appear regularly in Japanese publications.⁸ On September 24, 1935, General Tada Hayao, commander of the North China garrison, issued a proclamation which demanded elimination of Western interests in China and the dissolution of the Kuomintang. Nor were these pronouncements made only by "irresponsible"

⁸ For discussion of a few of a large number of Japanese documents captured after 1941 see T. K. Koo, "Some Economic Documents Relating to the Genesis of the Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VI (1946), 65-77.

military spokesmen. Tokyo's civilian officials also became more forthright in their demands upon Nanking.

During October the Hirota government began to formulate a "new China policy." Foreign office emissaries were sent to the major continental cities to confer on the spot with diplomats and soldiers. Partly as a result of these discussions, Foreign Minister Hirota, on October 28, presented to China and to the world the basic "three principles" of Japan's new and "positive" China policy agreed upon by both the military and civilian branches of government.⁹ In the words of Professor Hsü Shu-hsi:

. . . the three Hirota principles meant practically this: that China shall recognize the *fait accompli* in Manchuria, Jehol, Hopei, and Chahar, forsake the world, and make common cause with Japan against [Chinese Communism and] Soviet Russia.¹⁰

Although not officially proclaimed to the Japanese Diet until January, 1936, the policy of "active and effective collaboration" between Japan and China was immediately considered by Japan to be the *sine qua non* of peaceful relations.

Shortly after Hirota's statement of policy, the Japanese army in northern China swung into action. Although Nanking protested vehemently, the Japanese themselves took charge of suppressing anti-Japanese activities in the major northern Chinese cities. Officials and intellectuals were detained and imprisoned by the Japanese. Student protest groups were dispersed and those who boycotted Japanese goods were intimidated. While the Japanese were implementing their "positive" program, the situation was further complicated for Nanking by the protests voiced at the meetings of the Fifth National Kuomintang Congress. Although many delegates urged a firmer attitude Chiang was indecisive about his course. At no time did he openly denounce Japan's "three principles." Like the Japanese, he appeared willing to deal with northern China as a *special* situation in which *special* rules might obtain.

While discussions were underway at Nanking, Doihara's machinations were progressing favorably in the Peiping area. On November 24, Yin Ju-keng, a Japanese collaborator and chief of the demilitarized zone, announced the organization of the Anti-Communist Government of East Hopei in the area of the former demilitarized zone. At the same time he sent identical messages to the administrations of the five provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyüan, Shantung, and Shansi urging them to follow suit.

Although Yin's plea for support did not evoke immediate response, Nanking's position was critically weakened by his action. General Sung

⁹ Hirota presented the "three principles" to Ambassador Chiang Tso-pin as the latter was preparing to leave for Nanking to attend the meetings of the Fifth Kuomintang Congress (see *ibid.*, p. 75). See also *Judgment* . . . , Part B, chap. V, pp. 658-66.

¹⁰ *The North China Problem* (Shanghai, 1937), p. 82.

Che-yuan, former Kuomintang governor of Chahar, wrote to Nanking on November 30 that popular agitation for autonomy was getting beyond control. In an effort to conciliate Japan while still retaining nominal jurisdiction, the Chinese government on December 11 agreed to the organization of a Hopei-Chahar Political Council under the direction of General Sung. In this connection it should be recalled that the Mongolian Autonomy Council also created to appease Japan had failed in its purpose. During the last days of 1935, it therefore appeared that Doihara's plans for an autonomous "North China" would shortly materialize.

The tempered optimism felt in Japan over the successes of the new China policy was expressed by Hirota in a speech of January 21, 1936, to the Diet. Notable in this address was Hirota's claim that China had agreed to collaborate with Nippon along the lines laid down by the "three principles." Although Nanking immediately published a disclaimer, the government of Chiang Kai-shek never openly rejected Hirota's program as a basis for negotiation, but neither did China accept it. Since China had acknowledged tacitly the *de facto* existence of Manchoukuo, and since Nanking was already at war with Communism, the Kuomintang might easily have collaborated if only the Nipponese had been content to respect what remained of China's territorial and administrative integrity.

Although Nanking's conciliatory policy had stirred patriotic groups in China to fervent appeals for a firmer attitude, each concession merely whetted the ambitions of Japan's military and civilian regionalists. After the Tokyo meeting of February, 1936, the pressure upon China was increased as both civilian and military branches of Japanese officialdom were "purified," and as the "Basic Principles of National Policy" were evolved.¹¹ Kawagoe Shigeru, formerly an active diplomat in northern China, was meanwhile named Japanese ambassador. Events were simultaneously being accelerated in Inner Mongolia, and pressure was exerted particularly toward Suiyüan. In September, conversations were instituted between Ambassador Kawagoe and Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Chun. During the course of eight successive conferences, Kawagoe attempted to convince the Kuomintang that China's future lay in acquiescing to an extended version of Hirota's principles. Although the negotiations dragged on until December 3, the Nanking government, even if it had so desired, could not yield fully to the Japanese. By the end of 1936, the nation was so aroused against the Nipponese "invaders" that capitulation by Chiang would have meant political suicide. The Generalissimo, however, was not ready to agree until the beginning of the next year that hostilities against the Communists would have to cease before China could possibly stem the flood tide of Japanese expansion.

¹¹ See *infra*, pp. 394-95.

ECONOMIC RIVALRIES IN CHINA

Extension of Japanese control in the north sapped the life from the principle of equality of economic opportunity in China. Military pressure and mass smuggling made it impossible for Western business interests to compete equally with the Japanese in northern and central China. Moreover, the studied policy of undermining China's customs was also of serious concern to the Western powers since most of the numerous loans extended to China were backed by revenues normally derived from the tariffs. In addition, Japan's effort to close the "Open Door" synchronized with the depression years when the Western nations were most seriously in need of foreign markets, and with the Japanese attempts to break into British, American, and third markets. Finally, the political implications of economic penetration were not lost upon any of the contesting powers in the China arena.

Great Britain, Japan, and the United States had the heaviest stakes in intramural China. Measured in terms of investments, however, the American interest was conspicuously insignificant when compared with the heavy commitments of the British and Japanese. In foreign trade, although the United States has usually been one of China's most important customers, China's purchases have always been of relatively slight importance to the United States. Nevertheless, American businessmen and statesmen have persisted in the hope and belief that China, needing everything for modernization, will become an excellent field for future investments and trade. Although not interested enough to support the "Open Door" with strong action, the United States, during the years between Mukden and Lukouchiao, was determined to thwart the Japanese effort to gain exclusive control over China's economic life.¹²

Although their stake in China was by far the largest, the British did not at the outset adopt a strong stand against Japanese penetration. Having taken in general a conciliatory attitude toward Tokyo during the Manchurian imbroglio, London continued to pursue a policy of watchful waiting. Moreover, Western business interests in Shanghai were in general quite as opposed to China's new nationalism as a threat to their interests as they were to Japan's economic imperialism. Bent upon preserving the *status quo* in China, the British accepted the Nationalists and the Japanese with equal reserve, and hoped that they might be counteracting influences. It was not until 1935 that the British government began to take a sincere interest in aiding the Chinese to maintain what remained of their financial independence.¹³

¹² For a more detailed discussion see chap. III of Ethel B. Dietrich, *Far Eastern Trade of the United States* (New York, 1940); a general, but penetrating, analysis of America's interest in China is the subject of chap. XIII of Foster Rhea Dulles, *China and America, The Story of Their Relations Since 1784* (Princeton, 1946).

¹³ See *infra*, pp. 377-79.

The failure in 1933 of the World Economic Conference to re-establish the conditions necessary for the revival of international trade—and thereby stimulate production and provide employment—also had serious effects upon China. Although three years earlier the British had agreed to remit £11,000,000 in indemnities to China, the total effect upon foreign trade was slight. In 1933, Italy also tried to assist China and herself by remission of the Boxer indemnities still outstanding. In an effort to encourage railway building and simultaneously aid German iron and steel producers, the Reich made China loans for lengthy periods at low rates of interest. None of the efforts by individual nations, however, provided anything more than a temporary stimulant.

Every effort by the Western powers to bolster China's economy was regarded by Japan with mounting suspicion. German loans and military aid were particularly disturbing to the Japanese. Establishment of a Shanghai branch of the Otto Wolff concern was viewed with special apprehension, because Wolff's enterprises were guaranteed by the Reich government.¹⁴ Since United States government subsidies were granted to the Pan-American airways for development of commercial and mail air transportation across the Pacific,¹⁵ heavy participation of this corporation in the financing of the China National Aviation Company also inspired fear in the Japanese. Italian financial and advisory help in organizing military aviation for the Chinese was also viewed with hostility.¹⁶ To the sensitive Nipponese, avowedly innocent of aggressive designs upon their neighbor, it seemed that China was being outfitted and subsidized for eventual hostilities against them.

By 1934, the cyclical depression was upon China. The worst evils of deflation had been avoided as long as China's silver currency had remained stable. Devaluations of American and British currencies, however, resulted in the appreciation of China's currency in terms of gold. In an effort to alleviate that country's financial chaos, the World Economic Conference had recommended the conclusion of agreements among the powers most concerned with silver currencies. In June, the American government, however, operating under pressure from domestic silver interests, inaugurated an independent silver purchase policy which raised even higher the price of silver on the world market in terms of gold.¹⁷


¹⁴ See Kurt Bloch, *German Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940), pp. 24–26.

¹⁵ Consult Dietrich, *op. cit.*, p. 96; also T. A. Bisson, *American Policy in the Far East, 1931–40* (New York, 1940), pp. 36–37.

¹⁶ See Frank M. Tamagna, *Italy's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1941), pp. 18–19.

¹⁷ Cf. discussions of silver problems in H. B. Elliston, "Silver, East and West," *Foreign Affairs*, XIII (1934–35), 666–79, and Sir John T. Pratt, *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943), p. 234; for later developments regarding America's silver policy consult Dietrich, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

In consequence, China gradually became an exporter rather than an importer of silver and the supply of silver currency in circulation began to dwindle. Deflation, the attendant evils of unemployment, and a failing purchasing power resulted in a serious decline for domestic and foreign trade. Since Nanking was uniquely dependent upon customs revenues, the slump in foreign trade meant less revenue and less chance that it would be able to repay foreign loans in the near future. Deflation also implied heavier reliance than ever upon foreign financial aid.¹⁸



Joseph C. Grew. Wide World Photo

While negotiations were underway in London, Washington, and Nanking for additional loans to China, Tokyo began to warn emphatically about the consequences of financial imperialism. Japan was particularly perturbed by the determination of London to aid in the stabilization of China's currency. Since British interests in Shanghai and Hongkong were especially hard-hit, and were demanding action from the home government British attention to conditions in China was inferred in Tokyo

¹⁸ For pertinent data regarding loans to China see chap. III of Kao Ping-shu, *Foreign Loans to China* (New York: Sino-International Economic Pamphlet No. 2, 1946).

to mean that the English, like the Americans, would hereafter support the Kuomintang. Tension became acute when the Japanese learned that the British and other members of the League of Nations were investigating the possibilities for a new consortium.

The upshot of Japan's sensitivity was a peremptory declaration, sometimes referred to as "the Japanese Monroe Doctrine," issued on April 17, 1934, by Amau Eiji, Chief of the Japanese Bureau of Information attached to the Foreign Office. Declared Amau:

We oppose . . . any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. We also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations [referring *probably* to the projected consortium] undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical *or* financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance.¹⁹

Although eight days later, Foreign Minister Hirota explained that "Amau had given out the statement without his knowledge or approval,"²⁰ foreign observers were able to recall several unofficial declarations—such as the Tanaka Memorial—which expressed far more accurately the Japanese viewpoint than the veiled language of official diplomacy. Although Hirota insisted that Amau had given "the world . . . a wholly false impression of Japanese policy,"²¹ Ambassador Grew recorded at the time that "the substance of the statement seems to have the unqualified approval of practically all Japanese."²²

In reply to Amau's declaration, Nanking issued on April 19 an "informal statement" to the effect that China as a sovereign state—the reality of which Japan questioned in the League discussions—should be permitted to choose its own associates. Nanking also remarked that "no state has the right to claim the exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace in any designated part of the world," and Chinese diplomats contemporaneously averred that "no nation which does not harbour any ulterior motives against China needs to entertain any fears concerning her policy of national reconstruction and security."²³

Although the Chinese statement ended the exchange of declarations, Amau had forced the international diplomatic cauldron to a boil. France and Great Britain, although excited by the Japanese *démarche*, accepted with mild scepticism the explanation advanced by Hirota that Amau's

¹⁹ Complete text of the declaration in *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 224-25; also in Quigley and Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-87.

²⁰ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 227.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ten Years in Japan, 1932-42* (New York, 1944), p. 130.

²³ For the complete text of the Chinese reply see the *China Year Book* (1934), p. 726.

verbal statement had not reflected official Japanese policy.²⁴ Secretary of State Hull, however, sent an *aide-memoire* to Hirota to remind him that "recent indications of [Japan's] attitude . . . in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored."²⁵ The American note also reminded the Japanese minister that treaties and agreements already in existence could not be modified by unilateral statements. Secretary Hull was thereby once again following the policy laid down by Secretary Stimson.

More than any other power Britain was seriously affected by the currency crisis and the deflation in China. London's reluctance actively to oppose Japanese military and diplomatic procedures in China was the result mainly of pressures brought to bear by domestic commercial and industrial interests. For example, during 1934, the Federation of British Industries sent a mission to the Far East to investigate possibilities of trade with Manchoukuo.²⁶ Many in both government and business circles were convinced that Britain must co-operate with Japan if its interests were to enjoy remunerative trade in eastern Asia. On the whole, however, the economic chaos of 1934-35 caused by China's financial predicament convinced conservative groups in London, Shanghai, and Hongkong that Britain must support Nanking even though such action meant estrangement of Japan.

During 1935, China began serious study of its economic problems. Under the leadership of financial expert T. V. Soong, Nanking gradually concluded that a managed paper currency provided the only feasible alternative to silver currency. But to enact such a reform very considerable foreign aid was necessary, and because of Britain's heavy interests in China, Soong first appealed to London. To the dismay of Japan, British experts revived talk of an international consortium. In June, the London government dispatched Sir Frederick Leith-Ross to the Far East at the head of an economic mission to study and discuss "the problems to which the present situation gives rise." On September 21, the Leith-Ross mission reached Shanghai via Canada and Japan. London suggested that the United States, France, and Japan should send similar missions but these powers refused.²⁷

²⁴ Consult *ibid.*, pp. 727-29; also Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 133, and Irving S. Friedman, *British Relations with China, 1931-39* (New York, 1940), pp. 44-47.

²⁵ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 231; also consult Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-34.

²⁶ Sir John T. Pratt, adviser to the British Foreign Office on Far Eastern Affairs from 1925 to 1938, discusses the F. B. I. mission as "a somewhat humiliating episode in our Far Eastern record . . . [the] importance [of which] should not be exaggerated (*op. cit.*, pp. 231-32)." Additional details are in Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.

²⁷ Divergent accounts of the reasons for the dispatch of the Leith-Ross mission are given in Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-70, and Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35. Pratt repudiates Friedman's point that the mission was a "clear example of individual aid" from Britain to China; he asserts that "their [the British government's] aim was no less than a complete restitution of the whole complex of political relationships established by the Washington

During the autumn of 1935, the Leith-Ross mission conferred with Chinese officials and businessmen. Apparently, the object was to obtain information concerning ways and means of helping China most effectively to stabilize its economic and political life. During the course of the discussions Nanking issued a series of decrees for nationalization of silver and a regulated paper currency. Despite Leith-Ross' assertion that his mission "had no responsibility for China's new monetary program,"²⁸ the Chinese government certainly received encouragement and co-operation from the British experts. While Japanese denunciations of financial imperialism in China were exaggerated, the British obviously committed themselves to the support of Nanking and contributed thereby to the straining of relations between Nanking and Tokyo. Since British co-operation with China was inaugurated during the time when civil war threatened in Spain, when Hitler began remilitarizing the Rhineland, and when Mussolini started marching into Ethiopia, it became certain that London had finally realized the need for standing staunchly behind the Kuomintang.

Since Nanking had neglected to consult Tokyo, the new monetary policy was viewed even more suspiciously in Japan. Moreover, Britain's requirement that its nationals conform strictly to the letter of China's new monetary decrees added to Tokyo's ire. On November 8, the Japanese Foreign Office threatened "appropriate steps" to combat foreign meddling in China.²⁹

Flouting Japan's admonitions, the Western powers continued to lend money and to send military advisers to China. During 1936-37, eight loans were obtained by China for construction of new strategic railways. Great Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium granted loans totaling \$607,528,813, for the development of China's inadequate transportation system.³⁰ Meanwhile, Italian money, planes, and personnel continued to aid the Chinese Aeronautic Bureau; Germany supplied more military advisers to the Kuomintang for its campaigns against the Communists. During the spring of 1937, Italy emulated Britain by sending an economic mission to China under the leadership of Alberto de Stefani, a former Minister of Finance.³¹

Meanwhile, Japan attempted by cajolery and threats to establish economic co-operation with China. Diplomatic pressure and military actions were combined with appeals to "fellow-Asiatics" and the organization of

Conference and the Nine-Power Treaty as it had existed prior to Japan's seizure of Manchuria." Pratt, however, appears to be neither just nor accurate when he declares that "Mr. Friedman has, in perfect good faith, drawn a wholly imaginary picture not a single detail of which corresponds with the facts."

²⁸ Quoted in Bisson, *Japan in China*, p. 86, n. 11. See also the text of the King's Regulation binding British subjects to observe the Chinese decree in E. M. Gull, *British Economic Interests in the Far East* (London, 1943), pp. 157-58.

²⁹ Bisson, *Japan in China*, p. 87.

³⁰ See Kao Ping-shu, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³¹ Consult Tamagna, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Sino-Japanese Trade Associations.³² In the face of mounting anti-Japanese sentiment in every Chinese social and economic group none of these overtures could be successful. To the consternation of the Nipponese, China accepted financial aid from practically every other available source, while Japanese goods were systematically boycotted. Instead of economic resistance crumbling as Japanese military pressure in the north increased, the Chinese became more than ever determined to make Japan suffer economically. Japanese properties in China were sacked, while Nipponese carpet-baggers often disappeared completely, or were found dead. Normal commercial relations became increasingly impossible as Japan relentlessly forced the Chinese from semi-passive to active hostility.

NAVAL RIVALRIES IN THE PACIFIC

While the Japanese were systematically penetrating China, Showa's navy was also showing signs of aggressiveness. After the conclusion in 1922 of the Five-Power Naval Treaty at the Washington conference, naval politicians in Nippon had continued to protest against what they considered their country's "inferior ratio." The 5:5:3 naval tonnage ratio was regarded as deprecatory of Japan's equal status with the leading naval powers. Japan had argued at Washington for a 10:10:7 ratio, but the system adopted nevertheless gave Japan security, as attested by the failure of the United States and Great Britain to challenge effectively the subsequent Japanese policy of expansion on the Asiatic continent.

In the first years after the Washington conference, the moderate groups in the Japanese government refused to yield to naval pressure for treaty revision. Until the thirties, the tendencies toward disarmament stimulated by the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact prevailed in Japan as well as in the West. In the hope of developing practically the idealism of this epoch by the negotiation of additional naval agreements, a conference of the signatories to the Five-Power Naval Treaty was called for 1930 in London.³³ The main object was to apply the Washington ratio to the categories heretofore exempt, and to extend the holiday in construction of capital ships. Although successful in prolonging the Washington arrangements for five years, the London conference also marked the resumption of serious naval rivalry. In Japan, the moderate Hamaguchi government lost prestige by agreeing to the new treaty at a time when the moderate elements required unqualified support. Britain and the United States apparently failed to realize that more important matters than domestic retrenchment were involved in naval limitations. The determination of France and Italy to follow their own designs and

³² See additional details in Quigley and Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

³³ For details see *supra*, pp. 235-38.

to desert the five-power naval group brought the first important break in international co-operation. Introduction of the "escalator" clause virtually emasculated the Washington and the London—and subsequent—international naval arrangements. Hereafter, all of the participating nations became impatient with, and suspicious of, the Washington and London treaties.

The crises of 1931 in Europe and Asia were followed in 1932 by the abysmal failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In the following year Japan openly defied the League and ultimately withdrew formally from what it had revealed to be an impotent instrument. Depression in most of the highly industrialized nations of the West also seriously diverted attention from foreign to domestic problems. Efforts to overcome the worst international economic evils were thwarted by the failure of the World Economic Conference of 1933. Simultaneously, the Third Reich was being organized as Europe and the world made ready to plunge into a maelstrom of international anarchy and turmoil.

In June, 1934, Great Britain and the United States, and, in October, Japan, opened formal naval conversations in London preliminary to the conference scheduled by the Washington and the London treaties to convene in the following year.³⁴ It soon became apparent that Japan's attitude toward naval limitations, as would be expected, was controlled by the militant and reactionary elements rather than by the moderate and statesmanlike foreign office groups which had helped conclude the London treaty. Most observers recognized that Tokyo would hereafter refuse limitations unless such should be fitted to its designs. The country's civilian diplomats seemed to believe that their only task was to negotiate skillfully enough to give the impression that Japan alone could not be held responsible for denunciation and abrogation of the naval treaties.

In the London conversations of 1934, the Nipponese stressed their need for adequate naval strength, not only for national protection, but also for the maintenance of peace in eastern Asia and argued that new conditions created by naval and air construction required new arrangements. They contended, furthermore, that the "inferior ratio" inspired in China a feeling of contempt for Japan. On the positive side they proposed "a common upper limit . . . within which each nation would be left free to equip itself . . . for its defensive needs." At the outset, however, it became obvious that the disagreements were too fundamental, and the Japanese position too rigid, for successful negotiations.

The American thesis, to which the British also gave general—but not enthusiastic—approval, was based upon the maintenance and elaboration

³⁴ For pertinent documents and observations on the October to December conversations see *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 249-76. The Japanese viewpoint is given further expression in Seiji Hishida, *Japan Among the Great Powers, A Survey of Her International Relations* (New York, 1940), pp. 334-36.

of the existing treaties. In opposition to the Japanese demand for parity, the United States contended that the more realistic approach was emphasis upon "equality of security and equality of self-defense." The Japanese demand for equal tonnage was viewed as an effort to obtain overwhelming preponderance in the western Pacific, and thereby to make even easier the advances upon the Asiatic mainland. The Americans in general argued that the Washington treaties were so interrelated and interdependent that elimination of the naval arrangements would seriously disturb international equilibrium.

On December 19, 1934, the preliminary conversations were concluded, and ten days later Japan issued a denunciation of the Washington naval treaty to become effective at the end of 1936. Meanwhile, the United States had also resumed naval building. Not having built up to treaty limits (after 1922), the American navy in 1934 inaugurated a schedule of replacement and expansion designed to approximate by 1942 the ceilings imposed in the treaties. Authorization for this program was contained in the Vinson-Trammell Act of March, 1934—passed by Congress, it may be noted, before the preliminary conversations of 1934 had been inaugurated.³⁵ Contemporary with Japan's denunciation, the United States announced naval maneuvers for 1935 in the central Pacific. All this was grist for the Japanese propaganda mill and contained more "concrete" evidence of the need for mathematical equality in naval armaments.

On October 24, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare summoned a naval conference to meet in London in December "to secure agreement on as many aspects as possible of naval limitation with a view to the conclusion of an international treaty which would take the place of the two Naval Treaties expiring at the end of 1936."³⁶ At first, Japan was determined to attend the conference only if the other powers should accept in advance the principle of a common upper limit of global tonnage. After protracted negotiations, however, the Nipponese agreed to participate on the condition that their "equitable claim regarding the naval question will be fully understood and recognized by the Powers during the course of negotiations."³⁷

The first plenary session of the conference met on December 9, 1935, in an atmosphere of suspicion. The participants vainly sought to find a solution which would circumvent both the common upper limit and the ratio. Norman Davis, chairman of the American delegation, pointed out

³⁵ Consult especially Bisson, *American Policy in the Far East*, pp. 35-37. See also the statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he urged naval construction in 1935, *New York Times*, February 5, 1948.

³⁶ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41)*, I, 278. For the attitudes of the participating powers see the expression of the American attitude in Admiral William V. Pratt, "The Setting for the 1935 Naval Conference," *Foreign Affairs*, XII (1933-34), 541-53; the British view is expressed by Admiral Sir Hubert W. Richmond, "Naval Problems of 1935," *ibid.*, XIII (1934-35), 45-58; the Japanese proposals are outlined by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," *ibid.*, pp. 196-203.

³⁷ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41)*, I, 281.

repeatedly that parity would give the Japanese navy complete domination of Philippine and Alaskan waters. Admiral Nagano Osamu countered with the argument that as long as the ratios remained in force, "Japan was worried, not about the safety of distant possessions, but about the safety of Japan herself."³⁸ He and his colleagues also refused to discuss qualitative apart from quantitative reductions. Although the British and the Americans persisted in hoping that Tokyo would agree to continue the ratios in fact if not in name, its delegates steadfastly refused all agreements that continued inequalities in any form. Unlike the Tokyo government in 1930 and its representatives at the London conference of that year, the Japanese were now united in their determination to win their point, and, on January 15, 1936, on instructions from the cabinet, the Japanese withdrew from the Naval Conference.

Eager to avoid blame for the rupture in negotiations, the Japanese Foreign Office was much "distressed" by this turn of events. It had long been apparent to interested statesmen, however, that the rigidity of Japanese naval thought would force such a conclusion. Although the Western delegates continued to negotiate a treaty among themselves, it was not to be supposed that the Japanese would subscribe to a document concluded in their absence by Great Britain, United States, and France. In June, 1936, Japan announced its refusal to adhere to the new tripartite pact. Without the participation of Japan and Italy, the period of effective international agreement upon naval limitations was clearly at an end.

The expiration of the Washington and London treaties at the end of 1936 weakened even further the hopes for peace. In April of that year Japan increased naval appropriations to a new peacetime level. Washington's suggestions in June of the same year that the American destroyer "Olden" should be permitted to enter certain of the hitherto unopened ports in the Japanese mandated islands was emphatically rejected. After protracted negotiations, Japan refused to subscribe to an agreement limiting gun calibers for battleships to fourteen inches. Hereafter, sixteen inch guns became normal. In October, Great Britain suggested to the United States and Japan that last-minute bilateral negotiations should be undertaken to renew article xix of the Washington Treaty respecting fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. In reply, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson rejected the British proposal and asserted that "fortifications must be met with fortifications. One menace must be met with another menace."³⁹

Even before January 1, 1937, a naval and fortifications race had been entered upon in the Pacific—in the mandated islands and in the Aleutians. Docks had been built, harbors dredged, and airports laid out, but mostly

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

³⁹ *New York Times*, October 8, 1936.

by the Japanese. On October 21, 1936, the Pan-American Clipper Ships inaugurated regular passenger air service between California and the Philippines via Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam. By May, 1937, Clipper Ship service had been established between Manila and Hongkong connecting with planes of the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. Since government subsidies had helped in the establishment of the Pan-American routes to the Far East, Japan viewed the new undertaking with suspicion. After 1936, Nippon also hastened to increase in number, and expand in size, the naval and air bases between the home islands and the mandated groups to the south and east. Even at this early date, the Nipponese were committing but slightly less than one-half of their national income to armaments.⁴⁰

INTERNATIONAL ENMITIES AND ALIGNMENTS

To 1937 the problem of China in revolution remained the focal point of international conflict. Failure of the ancient "Middle Kingdom" to achieve internal harmony and stability contributed significantly to tensions and discords of international scope—even as these contributed to the unhappy situation in China. Nanking's timidity in the face of Japanese encroachments irritated the governments and diplomats of the West, who, in turn, were accused by the Chinese of having failed adequately to support resurgent China during the Manchurian and subsequent crises. American protests against the closure of the "Open Door" were matched by Japanese accusations of Western financial, political, and cultural imperialism in China. Soviet discomfiture at the military aggressiveness of Japan was balanced by Nipponese animosity and fear at the spread of Communism to and in China. Nevertheless, the unilateral activities of the Japanese on the continent and in the western and southern Pacific areas were to a very considerable degree responsible for the seething cauldron of disorder in the Far East.

From 1922 to 1935, the policies of the major far eastern powers were relatively fluid and unresolved. Great Britain, for instance, by its participation in the League of Nations and by its adherence to pertinent international agreements, was committed officially to the support of Nanking. Meanwhile, however, unofficial business groups made numerous studied overtures to Tokyo. London's moderate reactions to the Amau statement and to Japan's rigid attitude in the preliminary naval conversations can be accounted for partly by the powerful influence exerted upon the government through the Federation of British Industries and by persons in important official and unofficial positions.⁴¹ Despite protests from Australia,

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, December 31, 1936.

⁴¹ According to an article by H. Kamikawa ["An Anglo-Japanese Agreement," *Contemporary Japan*, V (1936), 346-47], Sir Samuel Hoare, British First Lord of the Ad-

New Zealand and Canada, the tendency to appease Japan for business reasons prevailed until 1935. The dominions, on the other hand, were affected immediately and adversely by the tremendous expansion of Japanese trade in the Pacific, in Asia, in Europe, in North and South America, and even in Africa.

By the summer of 1935 the lines of international conflict were becoming clearer and darker. The conclusion of the Chin-Doihara and Ho-Umetzu agreements appeared to foreshadow the success of Japan's effort to promote a separatist regime in northern intramural China. In Europe and Africa the powers were also beginning to discern the outlines of events to come. Mussolini was preparing for the annexation of Ethiopia, Hitler was discarding the Locarno agreements; and in Spain conflict was smouldering and smoking. The Western powers were gradually coming to realize that they must re-examine their foreign policies, particularly with reference to Soviet Russia. Formal relations between Moscow and Washington had been opened in 1933, and in the following year the U.S.S.R. had become a member of the League of Nations. By 1935, many Western conservatives and Russian Communists had overcome sufficiently their mutual repugnance to take the first faltering steps toward co-operation.

The outlines of these new alignments could be dimly discerned in the new set of programs and conflicts developing in the Far East. Indicative of a gradual orientation of British policy away from compromise with Tokyo to support of Nanking was the agreement of April 9, 1935, to establish a commission to work out a compromise solution of the long-standing dispute over the Yünnan-Burma border.⁴² The raising of the British legation in China to the status of an embassy on May 15 of the same year was also significant. Japan, Germany, and the United States followed suit, but the British action was the most significant in its diplomatic implications.

After 1935, Britain began to concentrate upon European affairs, and abdicated its traditional position of leadership in the Far East to the United States. As earlier indicated, in the naval conversations, the United States was the major opponent of Japan's proposals—Washington, unlike London, not being as subject to pressure from business groups on behalf of a moderate Japanese policy. Although W. Cameron Forbes had led a trade mission to Japan during 1935, influential American business interests were too greatly perturbed by the influx of Japanese exports in cheap

miralty, planned to propose a rapprochement based on British recognition of Manchoukuo. In October, 1934, the London press took exception to the unofficial views expressed in Tokyo by members of the Federation of British Industries mission relative to the desirability of reviving the Anglo-Japanese alliance (*cf. U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 258). See also the detailed data on British opinion favoring cooperation with Japan in Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58.

⁴²Details were not completely worked out until April 24, 1937. In the final agreement China was guaranteed sovereignty over three-fifths of the disputed area.

manufactured articles to urge moderation on Washington. Nipponese penetration of markets in the Philippines and South America also aroused indignation among American exporters who looked upon these markets as virtually their own preserves.⁴³ American fishing interests in Alaska and along the West Coast were also outraged by the poaching of the Japanese in Alaskan waters. Since the Japanese showed little regard for the conservation measures, to which American enterprisers were required to conform,⁴⁴ salmon canners, in particular, demanded government action.

Reacting positively to Japan's commercial expansion in Asia, in the Pacific, and elsewhere, the American government took the lead in the inauguration of economic counter-measures. Spurred on by public pressure groups, such as the "Buy American" campaigners, Washington refused to include Japan among those nations offered reciprocal trade agreements. On the contrary, in response to the flooding of its textile markets by Japanese manufacturers, the American government on June 20, 1936, raised the tariff on cotton textiles by an average of forty-two per cent, thus seriously affecting about three-fifths of the Japanese cotton goods sold in the United States. Since the main object in flooding American markets was the acquisition of foreign exchange sufficient to purchase the requirements vital to an expanding military machine, the American action was viewed with undisguised hostility in Tokyo. Protests from the United States over Japanese salmon fishing in Alaskan waters continued also to be a source of international irritation. During 1937-38, moreover, the United States took the initiative in condemning Japan's opium policy in northern China—American experts referring to it as an "open scandal."⁴⁵

Until 1935, Italian policies toward the Far East were formulated mainly along lines of political expediency. As a co-signatory of the Washington treaties, Italy's interests in the Far East were out of proportion to the actual value of trade relationships. In the Shanghai Consular Commission of Inquiry of 1932, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian *chargé*, had acted as chairman and leading spirit in the discussions. In the following year, Italy backed China and the League by assisting the former through loans and the transference of other assets. Italy also played an important part in the organization of China's military aviation units. Until 1935, Mussolini backed China, in preference to Japan, as part of his program of strengthening the weak front of the Western democracies and China. But with the apparent success of the Ethiopian enterprise he abruptly ended

⁴³ For additional information on American-Japanese trade rivalry see Dietrich, *op. cit.*, chap. II. Consult also W. W. Lockwood, "Trade and Trade Rivalries between the United States and Japan," *Problems of the Pacific* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 220-32.

⁴⁴ For details on the salmon fisheries dispute consult Homer E. Gregory and Kathleen Barnes, *North Pacific Fisheries* (New York, 1949); also Catherine Porter, "Philippines Neglect Fisheries Resources," *Far Eastern Survey*, IX (1940), 155-57.

⁴⁵ See reports in *New York Times*, May 29-30, 1936.

his policy of guidance through co-operation. Hereafter, the world interests of Japan and Italy began to merge.⁴⁶

Until 1937 co-operation between China and the Third Reich was close and effective. At first, the Nazis hoped for long-term commercial gains. For instance, the government-sponsored enterprises of Otto Wolff were made possible by German loans to China in return for railway contracts. Later, Germany particularly required Chinese tungsten for rearmament. Especially friendly toward the Nazis were certain right-wing members of the Kuomintang, such as Wang Ching-wei and T'ang Leang-li. Generalissimo Chiang also welcomed the German generals who were sent to Nanking to help in streamlining the Nationalist armies, and to aid thereby in the extermination of the "Red menace." Because of the clear ideological understanding between Berlin and influential elements at Nanking, Hitler continued to aid China even after committing himself to Japan in the hope that the Kuomintang government might decide to "co-operate" with Japan and eventually become a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact.⁴⁷

The decision of the Comintern in 1935 to adopt a policy of collaboration with all elements willing to form a united front against the totalitarian regimes drew an immediate response from Japan and Germany. The Communists in both countries had suffered severe repression, and each was determined to prevent them from reviving. Japan, moreover, was seriously concerned about Communist activities in Manchoukuo, Outer Mongolia, and in China proper. The possibility of a Communist rapprochement with the Kuomintang seemed unlikely in 1935 and through most of the following year. Hence moderate optimism prevailed among German and Japanese officials that Chiang Kai-shek might adhere to a definite Anti-Comintern pact. In July, 1936, negotiations were conducted at Berlin to plan a common defense against Communism and the U.S.S.R. The decision to call the German-Japanese treaty an Anti-Comintern Pact was taken to give it an ideological rather than a political-military appearance. Concurrently with the published treaty the signatories initialed a "secret addendum" which clearly stated that the treaty was in reality a political-military instrument directed against the U.S.S.R. and not exclusively against the Comintern.⁴⁸ As formally signed on November 25, 1936, the agreement included provisions for exchange of information regarding Communist and Russian activities, for consultation with regard to defense measures, and for close co-operation in measures undertaken. The contracting parties then invited others who were interested to join

⁴⁶ See Tamagna, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27.

⁴⁷ See Bloch, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-36.

⁴⁸ Text of the "secret addendum" found in the captured German political archives. For discussion see DeWitt C. Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (1946), 136-38.

them. In December, 1936, Italy also adhered to the pact; China never joined it.

Soviet-Japanese relations provided the Far East with its most spectacular military and diplomatic clashes of the early thirties. After the Japanese establishment of Manchoukuo, the U.S.S.R. demonstrated an increased interest in Outer Mongolia. As the Japanese drives into Chahar progressed, the Soviet Union and Japan began to test each other's frontier defenses at strategic points along the borders of China's three eastern provinces and Outer Mongolia. Japanese militarists worried lest the citadel of Manchoukuo be outflanked, while the Russians felt quite properly that Japanese penetration of Outer Mongolia would leave the Trans-Siberian Railway defenseless at those points where it skirts the northern border of Outer Mongolia. To assure the integrity of the Mongol area, Moscow concluded with it in 1934 a Gentlemen's Agreement for mutual assistance. In March, 1936, this informal transaction was formalized by the conclusion of a Mutual Assistance Pact.⁴⁹

As part of the general policy of consolidating its holdings in north-eastern Asia, the U.S.S.R. sold to Manchoukuo in 1935 its interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway. Thereafter, the Soviets began to construct a redoubtable system of fortifications and communications in eastern Siberia. Military settlements also were planted at strategic points as the Soviets prepared strong defenses against Japan's "imperialist" forces.⁵⁰ During 1936-37, the armies on either side of the Amur began to test the fortifications of the other by sporadic raids and isolated attacks. Serious clashes along the frontiers numbered well over one hundred every year after 1934. Japan became even more belligerent during the years of the Moscow trials and executions, and particularly so after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 with Germany.

When the details of the Tokyo-Berlin Pact were published on November 24, of that year, the Japanese Foreign Office hastened to reassure Moscow that that agreement was not directed against the U.S.S.R., but against the "independent" Third International of the Communist Party. It was pointed out that in 1935 the International had begun to organize "popular fronts" with less radical, but anti-Fascist elements, and planned intensive activity in Germany and Japan. The anti-Comintern partners, therefore, argued that theirs was a defensive action. Moscow, however, viewed the pact correctly as the beginning of a "Fascist" effort to encircle Russia preparatory to the launching of the "second imperialist war."⁵¹

⁴⁹ Nanking protested that the agreement was in violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924 by which the U.S.S.R. recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Chinese Republic and under the sovereignty of Nanking. Consult H. L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-45* (Princeton, 1945), p. 65.

⁵⁰ For a description of the fortress developed north and east of the Amur see William Mandel, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia* (New York, 1944), especially chap. I.

⁵¹ See Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-76.

Hereafter, Litvinov and other Communist officials began to press for collective security through collective action. Even though the Western powers did not respond with the desired enthusiasm, Soviet policy in the Far East was orientated toward co-operation with Nanking and firmness with Tokyo. The areas of agreement which had previously existed between Japan and the U.S.S.R. were transformed into areas of disagreement. The Fisheries Conventions granting Japan certain rights in Soviet waters were concluded for one-year periods only, instead of the customary long-term arrangements. Annually after 1936, when the Conventions came up for discussion, the terms for Japan were made more rigorous as political relations became more tense.⁵² Moreover, the Soviets opened new questions about the oil and coal concessions held by Japan in northern Sakhalin.⁵³ At every juncture the Soviets made the Nipponese toe the line, even as, contemporaneously, the United States became more rigid in its dealings with Japan on trade, fishing, and naval questions.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. began to cement its relations with Chiang Kai-shek—particularly after the Sian Incident had forced a truce between Chinese Communists and Nationalists. Preparatory work was begun on numerous inland trade routes between China and the U.S.S.R. These arteries ran through Mongolia, Kansu, and Sinkiang to the inland cities of China. On August 21, 1937, just about one month after the Marco Polo Bridge episode, Moscow bolstered Nanking's wavering morale, by signing with Nationalist China a nonaggression pact.⁵⁴ Thereafter, Russia helped China in numerous practical ways to wage war against the Japanese. By the late summer of 1937, the interlude of precarious truce had ended, the lines of diplomatic and military demarcation had been drawn, and the second far eastern phase of the Second World War was about to begin.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 49–54.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 72–74.

⁵⁴ Text in *ibid.*, pp. 224–25.

CHAPTER XII

TOTALITARIAN JAPAN

POLITICAL CHANGES AFTER 1931

The assassination of Premier Inukai Tsuyoshi on May 15, 1932, heralded the dawn of an era during which Japanese life was patterned mainly after the wishes of military and extremist groups. As a reaction to the failures of the "liberal" government, the rank and file of the army in combination with restless farm elements began to strike out recklessly in the hope of gaining political and economic control. Depression, the unsuccessful China policy, and the increasingly notorious political alliance between the great financial houses, the *Zaibatsu*, and the political parties had brought the so-called liberal regime into disrepute. The new emphasis of the thirties was upon increased governmental control in every aspect of life, a return to Japan's own traditions, and the extension of Nipponese control to continental Asia and the islands of the southeastern Pacific.

Failure of the parliamentary regime can be traced in part to certain features inherent generally in the whole of Japanese history and specifically in the constitutional document of 1889. Dual government, for instance, in which the armed services retained their independence, made it almost impossible for civilian authority alone to weather severe political, social, and economic storms. After the bank failures of 1927, the military party feverishly began to increase its political activity. The Shidehara policy of peace and trade had failed to alleviate the increasingly serious agricultural problems, and was unsuccessful in cushioning for Japan the world-wide depression of the late twenties and early thirties. Moreover, it became increasingly clear that the "positive policies" advocated by the military and the Seiyukai had wide support. Economic liberalism, like parliamentary institutions, appears never to have penetrated deeply. Autocracy and military predominance were more congenial to the ordinary Japanese when action of some kind seemed to be the only possible means of relieving internal crises.

Although representative government in form had been granted by the constitution of 1889 it was in fact carefully circumscribed by restrictive provisions. Universal suffrage existed on paper after 1925, but the corruption attending elections made free voting a practical impossibility. The Lower House of the Diet had only indirect control over the cabinet

through its rights of interpellation and censure. Under no circumstance was it possible for the elected representatives to use the "power of the purse" as a means of exercising or extending their control. In case the government's proposed budget failed to pass in the Diet, the constitution provided that the current budget should be automatically continued. Thus, the parliamentary privileges normally prevailing in the Western democracies were not a part of representative government in Japan. In retrospect, however, the civilian control and the independent thought of the twenties gave the appearance of liberalism and democracy when contrasted with the Japanese scene during the thirties and the years of foreign war.

When the Tanaka government held its Far Eastern Conference on June 1, 1927, the world began to realize that many officials in the Island Empire were favorable to more radical domestic policies and a stiffer attitude on foreign affairs. Thereafter, the trend toward more vigorous action at home and abroad was encouraged by the army in spite of the moderate attitude of the country's political leaders. Co-operation in the London Naval Conference of 1930, conciliation of China, retrenchment measures and their effect upon proposed expansion of the armed forces were advanced by the Seiyukai and the army as reasons for the difficult and ignoble times. Inflation at home and expansion abroad were put forward as the necessary panaceas. By contrast with the less spectacular and more restrictive program offered by the Minseito, this "positive policy" appealed to the traditionally patriotic and self-consciously proud Japanese.

Even before the startling events of May 15, 1932, the military had begun to terrorize business and liberal groups. Political assassinations, or attempts at political murder, became more frequent, and, by repetition, more acceptable to the Japanese public. The attempt in May, 1931, on Premier Hamaguchi's life was followed by the murders of Inouye Junnosuke in February, 1932, and Baron Dan Takuma, in March of the same year. Meanwhile, independent thinkers, such as Professor Nitobe Inazo, were forced to disavow their "dangerous thoughts." In March, 1932, Nitobe was dragged from his hospital bed to apologize before the Ex-Service Men's Association meeting at Yasukuni Shrine for having remarked at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations that Japan was suffering not only from Communism, but also from the activities of numerous military cliques.¹ More important even than the events occurring before and on May 15 was the fact that terrorism and repression of opinion were apparently viewed by thinking Japanese as inevitable.

By May 15, 1932, many assumed that the parties had been permanently removed from the political scene. After consulting with the emperor about selecting a successor to the assassinated Inukai, Prince Saionji

¹ For details see the *North China Daily News*, April 11, 1932.

decided upon Admiral Saito Makoto, "a statesman, well proved for imperturbable courage and sobriety of judgment."² The cabinet selected by Saito was the first of what came to be referred to in Japan as "national cabinets." Five portfolios were assigned to party members, while the remaining posts were divided among representatives of the peerage, the army, and the navy. Takahashi Korekiyo, Seiyukai financial wizard, continued as minister of finance, and hoped by mild inflation and by restricting the budget for the armed services to ease the economic situation and to limit the importance of the military. Count Uchida, aggressive former president of the South Manchuria Railway, accepted the post of Foreign Minister, and General Araki Sadao, extreme militarist and hero of "young Japan," became War Minister. Again, Japanese government revealed within the Saito cabinet that dualism so characteristic of its whole history.

Until July 3, 1934, the Saito government continued in office by being all things to all men. No group was satisfied with the "national cabinet."³ It managed, however, to survive the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations, and its aggressive diplomatic and trade policies and actions abroad relieved immediate problems of unemployment in the manufacturing centers at home. Agrarian unrest and "patriotic" dissatisfaction, however, continued to increase. Villagers in the northern sections of the country were reported living on husks and roots. Unrest was still thought by many to be the result of corruption in party government, betrayal of the country by business interests, and the failure to live simply and frugally in good Japanese tradition.

The liberal elements even more so than the political assassins of 1932 were suspected of evil designs. In fact, trials for the army, navy, and civilian conspirators of May 15 were not formally opened until July, 1933. The conspirators' pleas of patriotic motives were heard sympathetically throughout a country smarting from a feeling of international isolation. The thesis that the nation had been deceived by its Minseito leaders was widely accepted as reason enough for the May 15 incidents.⁴ Eventually, nevertheless, the conspirators did receive sentences ranging from eight to fifteen years. Simultaneously, "the police and the judiciary pursued thought with an implacable and almost insane severity."⁵

As the result of corrupt financial manipulations by Vice-Minister of Finance Kuroda, the Saito cabinet was replaced on July 3, 1934, by a new "national cabinet" under Admiral Okada Keisuke. Like Saito, Okada was chosen by Saionji to lend the navy greater prestige in the preliminary naval conversations which were in progress, and to minimize the domestic and

² A. Morgan Young, *Imperial Japan, 1926-38* (New York, 1930), p. 171.

³ See in particular the bombastic article by Yōsuke Matsuoka, "Dissolve the Political Parties," *Contemporary Japan*, II (1934), 661-67.

⁴ Cf. *New York Times*, July 25, 1933.

⁵ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

foreign influence of the army. Traditionally, the Japanese navy was known to be less jingoistic than the army. The more moderate attitude of the navy can largely be accounted for by reason of its more select personnel and their greater experience in foreign countries. Certainly, the Okada cabinet was no more welcome to the army than the Saito government had been. Indeed, the Seiyukai, which had been committed to support of Saito's government, was also antipathetic toward the moderate Okada. The premier, therefore, was confronted by a disgruntled army group and a belligerent majority in the lower house of the Diet, while his main support came from the navy and the Minseito.

Even though—from the Japanese viewpoint—there was a short and popular liberal revival during the Okada regime (July, 1934–February, 1936), the strength of reactionary forces continued to grow. In 1935, a Seditious Literature Bill extended the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 to include a scheme for censoring “dangerous subjects.”⁶ It was forbidden to discuss in printed matter anything relating to the arrest of Communists, the abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo, and the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Professor Minobe's liberal interpretation of the emperor's role under the constitution was also subjected to the scrutiny of the police, and was evidently found wanting in fervent adherence to what the “competent” authorities divined as the correct constitutional interpretation.⁷ Political murders were also revived as a means of expressing discontent with the mildly moderate Okada regime. On August 12, 1935, General Nagata Tetsujan, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, was murdered by Aizawa Sabuso, a disgruntled member of the young officer clique.⁸ Again many Japanese, with fervent emotion, urged on behalf of the murderer the purity of his patriotic motive.

After stemming the tide of Seiyukai and army criticism for a year and a half, the Okada cabinet was forced to dissolve in January, 1936. By winning 205 seats in the February elections however, the Minseito, despite strong army opposition, gained the majority position in the Lower House. After this unexpected success of the despised Okada government, the army and “patriotic” groups once more resorted to “government by assassination.”

Less than one week after the election, extremist elements revolted against the Okada government in one of the most serious uprisings of Japanese history. Numerous jingoistic societies had begun long before to talk of direct action. The Ex-Servicemen's Association (*Taikoku Zaigo Gunjinkai*) and the Imperial League of Young Officers (*Kokoku Seinen Shoko*

⁶ See Hugh Borton, *Japan Since 1931, Its Political and Social Developments* (New York, 1940), pp. 107–108.

⁷ Consult *North China Daily News*, April 8, 1935.

⁸ Details in Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 273–76; also see K. K. Kawakami, “Japan's Political Murders,” *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1936.

Domei) were determined advocates of resolving national problems by force and in accordance with Samurai spirit. The former group included some three million members and was dominated by the high ranking officers of the active army. The "young officers," although fewer in number, were even more ardent proponents of terror and rule by force. In addition to these two important societies, many other patriotic groups had similar, or even more drastic aims.⁹

Before the "February mutiny," there had been much talk in 1936 about a "Showa Restoration." By analogy with the Restoration at the time of the Meiji Emperor, the "patriots" hoped to destroy the liberal politicians who had allegedly usurped the power of the imperial house. The "Showa Restoration" was designed to restore the power of governing to the *tennō*, and to exalt by reflection the traditions and institutions of old Japan. Western customs and Minseito government were castigated as the instruments used by unscrupulous politicians and businessmen to control the emperor, and to force Japan into the corrupt and weak system prevailing in the Western democracies.

Beginning on February 26, more than one thousand members of the Third Infantry Regiment (First Division), then stationed in Tokyo, attempted to "restore" Hirohito in their own fashion.¹⁰ Early in the morning the troops left their barracks as if on regular drill. The main body surrounded the home of Premier Okada, while other picked groups assassinated Viscount Saito, the former premier, Takahashi, the aged and highly respected finance minister, and Lieutenant-General Watanabe Jotaro, Inspector-General of Military Education and conservative army opponent of Araki. Unsuccessful attempts were also made on the lives of Saionji and Admiral Suzuki Kantaro. Although Okada was originally presumed murdered, it was revealed after the rebellion had been quelled that his brother-in-law had been killed, when the would-be assassins had mistakenly taken him for the Premier.

In addition to the planned murders, the troops occupied the Metropolitan Police Headquarters, the War Ministry, and the new Diet building. For three and one-half days the mutineers held out in the center of Tokyo. The remainder of Okada's cabinet had meanwhile sought sanctuary in the grounds of the Imperial Palace. All communications were severed with the rest of the world, while loyal troops were hurried into Tokyo, and General Kashii Kohei hastened to place the city under martial law.

⁹ Excellent discussions of patriotic societies in Kenneth W. Colegrove, *Militarism in Japan* (Boston, 1936), pp. 33-39; see Borton, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33; O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (London, 1934), pp. 69-127, 173-227. Also consult chap. II in John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism. Its Cause and Cure* (New York, 1945).

¹⁰ For the events of the "February mutiny," see the accounts in the *New York Times*, February 27, 28, 29, and March 1, 1936. Further illuminating details are in Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, 1944), pp. 169-78.

Finally, the rebellious troops capitulated when an imperial order and the threat of force overawed them. They hesitated, however, in obeying the imperial decree, and by such irreverence outraged public opinion.

Although the February mutineers failed to take Okada's life, their revolt brought about the fall of his cabinet. Prince Saionji, however, once again delayed the army's march toward complete assumption of power by appointing Hirota Koki, a comparatively moderate leader, to the premiership. Until January, 1937, the conciliatory Hirota tried, unsuccessfully, to halt the extremist elements in their fight for power.

When Hirota took office on March 5, 1936, he was committed to stern measures against the February mutineers and to a policy of reforming civilian government. As a result of imperial and business pressure, the generals, who had apparently encouraged the younger officers in their "extremism," were forced to retire from the Supreme War Council.¹¹ General Minami Jiro was thereafter transferred from his post in Manchoukuo to Tokyo where he became chief of the Supreme War Council. Under the presidency of General Terauchi, a secret military tribunal held immediate trials for the conspirators. In a speech to the Diet on May 5, Showa Tennō took the unprecedented step of deploring the outrages of February.¹² Since they had committed the crowning offense of hesitating in their obedience to a direct imperial command, justice was unusually swift in dealing with the responsible officers. On July 7, seventeen were condemned to death and five were given sentences of life imprisonment. Five days later the executions were carried out, and martial law was lifted in the Tokyo area. With the restoration of "discipline" in its own ranks, the army subsequently demanded immediate reform and purification of the civilian side of government.

One of the first issues requiring clarification was foreign policy. During the summer of 1936, therefore, the War and Navy ministries proposed the "Basic Principles of National Policy" which were finally accepted on August 11, 1936, by a Five Ministers' Conference, including the Premier and the War, Navy, Foreign, and Finance ministers. As outlined by the armed services, the principles prescribed:

1. Japan must strive to correct the aggressive policies of the great powers and to realize the spirit of the "Imperial Way" [*Kodo*] by a consistent policy of overseas expansion.
2. Japan must complete her national defense and armament to secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia.
3. Japan expects the sound development of Manchoukuo and thus hopes to stabilize Japan-Manchoukuo national defense; in order to

¹¹ The following Generals "retired": Hayashi, Araki, Mazaki, Abe, Horijo, Kashii, Hari, Sugiyama, and Furusho.

¹² See the *New York Times*, May 6, 1936.

promote economic development, Japan intends to get rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R.; to prepare against Britain and the United States and to bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China; in the execution of this continental policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.

4. Japan plans to promote her racial and economical development in the South Seas, and without rousing other powers will attempt to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful means. Thus with the establishment of Manchoukuo, Japan may expect full development of her natural resources and develop her national defense.¹³

Especially important in these principles is the use of the term "national defense" when outright expansion was coldly being planned.

During the summer and fall of 1936, the government was also pushed by the army to begin "national renovation." Included in the projected revisions of civilian government was the army proposal of a super-cabinet, or a civilian general staff, to formulate broad national policies. The army also complained because funds for its huge rearmament budget were not more rapid in materializing, for the government had originally obtained army support by assuring the Supreme War Council that adequate funds would be available. Premier Hirota was therefore forced seriously to consider the army's proposed reforms if he were to continue in office. Among the army's aims were new tax measures, nationalization of electric power, central control of fuel, and reform of the rural land system. Because Hirota did not co-operate wholeheartedly in the army's plans for internal reform, the totalitarians launched a drive to gain for themselves complete control of the government.

In December, 1936, the life of Hirota's cabinet was endangered by Soviet Russia's studied refusal to renew fishing agreements—in part in reprisal for Japan's co-operation in the Anti-Comintern Pact. Business interests, which had hitherto supported Hirota, were frightened and outraged by the Russian action. After Hirota lost the support of the important moneyed interests, the rightist elements were able to make even more headway against his "national renovation" cabinet. Meanwhile, international tension created by the Sian coup against Generalissimo Chiang temporarily rescued Hirota. Contemporaneously, however, the struggle going on between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists convinced aggressive groups in Japan that Chinese unity was an illusion. The time to "stabilize" eastern Asia seemed to be close at hand.

In the midst of this struggle for power, the Diet was formally opened by the emperor on December 26, 1936. As if to make even more ludicrous

¹³ As translated in *Judgment. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Part B*, chap. V, pp. 668-69.

the shadowy power of parliamentary organization, the new Diet building—constructed at a cost of \$18,500,000, and which was the largest public structure in Japan—was used officially for the first time. In January, when the Diet got down to business, it was controlled by a substantial Minseito majority. Therefore, with good reason, it was expected that the representatives would balk at the huge appropriations demanded by the armed forces. When they convened on January 21, 1937, the new building was surrounded by a guard of fifteen hundred armed men.¹⁴ Notwithstanding such obvious pressure, the parliamentary body refused to approve the proposed budget. When the army called for dissolution of the Diet, Hirota refused, thereby losing the support of the army and bringing about the collapse of his government.

During the final struggle with the Hirota cabinet, General Terauchi wrote the following expression of the army's political feelings:

The attitude of the political parties, both before and during the [Diet] session, had convinced the army that the views of the parties on the existing emergency situation differ radically from those of the army. It becomes evident that the two great tasks—namely, the restoration of discipline and renovation of the administration—cannot be carried out under these circumstances.¹⁵

In answer to the army's demand for elimination of party representation in the cabinet, General Hayashi Senjuro, the new premier, organized a completely nonparty government. In addition, he was required to promise a military budget of \$400,000,000—or about half the proposed expenditures for 1937–38. In April, Hugh Byas reported from Japan: "there is a tacit and universal admission that the times are not suited for party government. . . ." ¹⁶

With the advent of Hayashi's government, many Japanese business groups began to withdraw from the opposition.¹⁷ There remained, however, a hard nucleus of resistance in the Diet, the House of Peers, the Privy Council, and among the older bureaucrats. From February to June, 1937, a seesaw struggle raged over the huge military budget. Certain Japanese also argued that the recurrent crises in China were manufactured by the military. Even the foreign minister, Sato Naotake, became suspicious of the numerous and dubious "incidents."¹⁸ Elections held in April brought a sweeping victory for the anti-government parties.¹⁹

¹⁴ *New York Times*, January 20, 1937.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, January 24, 1937.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, April 18, 1937.

¹⁷ Borton, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–53.

¹⁸ In a speech to the House of Peers, Sato frankly denied the existence of a "crisis" in China (*New York Times*, March 14, 1937).

¹⁹ Writing from Japan in the spring of 1937, T. A. Bisson observed: "Public opinion is generally lined up with the moderate business and financial groups; the Army is closely

Hayashi, however, refused to resign as long as he retained the support of the army. Because he failed to respond to the national will, the premier was ultimately reprimanded by the House of Peers and the Privy Council. When, in May, it had become apparent that the nation was not going to tolerate his recalcitrance, General Hayashi resigned to be replaced by Prince Konoye Fumimaro.

Since it had been designed to eliminate friction and to carry out co-operatively the internal reforms projected after the February uprising, the Konoye cabinet was also constituted without party representation and was referred to as the "national union." Its alleged aims of reconciling divergent internal interests and seeking to build a "new Japan" were quite in harmony with the military program of regimentation at home to facilitate expansion abroad. With the outbreak of the "China Incident" in July, there was no question but that Konoye would easily be able to swing the nation behind the war effort. Even though the labor unions opposed expansion,²⁰ the vast majority of the Japanese patriotically forgot immediate differences and plunged wholeheartedly into what was now a very real "incident" and a genuine "crisis."

ECONOMIC REGIMENTATION

Although *laissez-faire* theory had had an important influence in post-Restoration Japan, it should be recalled that strict economic liberalism was already beginning to decline in the West when Nippon was first exposed to its direct influence. As early as the Restoration the government had begun to subsidize and otherwise encourage the expansion of Japan's "strategic" industries. Monopolistic practices and the creation of huge corporate empires were also responsible for eliminating free competition. During the course of the First World War, the government moved swiftly to control economic life for national defense. Although the decade of the twenties permitted the return of a limited amount of unfettered private enterprise, the depression years brought even stricter control by the state. Of its own accord, and with government encouragement, industry also began a systematic program of rationalization, a process which helped to delimit even further the area of free enterprise. The growth of the regimented economy of the thirties, therefore, must be understood in relation to Japan's historical attitude toward government in business, and in the light of the world trend toward planned and controlled economies.

It was not until after 1931 that control by the state took the form of direct administration. Subsidies, tax exemptions, mild inflation, and protective tariffs were continued as a means of encouraging and aiding in-

linked with the reactionary magnates of finance and industry ('Behind Japan's Internal Crisis,' *Amerasia*, I [1937], 151)."

²⁰ See Borton, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

dustrial development. Recovery, economic rehabilitation, and the pressure of population appeared, so the Japanese argued, to require more direct encouragement, protection, and control. Regulation of prices, control over distribution, issuance of export and import licenses, and increased use of state monopolies, were the devices upon which the Japanese built their hopes for a stable economy.

Beginning in 1930, the Minseito leaders, and their cohorts of the *Zaibatsu* characteristically pinned their hopes for recovery upon rationalization of industry. Considered broadly, rationalization was designed to eliminate the "irrationalities" of free enterprise. Greater efficiency was sought for within and between industries. Elimination of "excessive" competition by joint purchases, compulsory price arrangements, and sales quotas were agreed upon by the major industrial and financial groups. By rational organization of markets and prices within the nation, the small producers were sacrificed one after the other to the great family concerns. Inherent in this drastic policy was the hope that Japanese industries by increased efficiency would be able to compete more profitably in foreign markets. With increased sales of Japanese goods throughout the world the prospects for buying producers' goods, and other commodities necessary to further industrial expansion, would become correspondingly brighter. Foreign trade, therefore, was looked upon by the Minseito as the solution to Japan's economic woes.²¹

The deflationary policy of the Minseito was brought abruptly to an end, however, by the political and military events of 1931 and 1932. Retrenchment and rationalization were not sufficient to relieve Japan's pressing agricultural problems. Appalling conditions in the villages and on the farms were not immediately improved by the expansion of foreign trade. In 1932, large-scale agrarian revolts were thought by some observers to be a distinct possibility.²² Since the rank and file of the army had come originally from Japan's rural areas, the chronic distress of agriculture touched the armed forces deeply. Peace and trade with China, the Minseito policy complementary to rationalization, were also roundly criticized as weak, ineffective, and out of harmony with Japan's traditions. Immediate measures of relief and rehabilitation were demanded by agriculturists, small producers, and merchants.

Even after the Manchurian "Incident," and the events of May 15, 1932, the "forgotten men" of Japan continued to suffer. On the farms it was impossible to live by agriculture alone. Although almost one-half

²¹ For excellent discussions of "rationalization" see C. B. Fahs, *Government in Japan: Recent Trends in Its Scope and Operation* (New York, 1940), pp. 24-29, and G. C. Allen, "State Intervention in Industrial Organization," in E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchoukuo* (New York, 1940), pp. 748-51. See also G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867-1937* (London, 1946), chap. X; F. Barret, *L'évolution du capitalisme japonais* (Paris, 1945-46), 3 vols.

²² See especially the detailed accounts in the *North China Daily News*, June 11, 1932.

the nation's gainfully-employed population was on farms or in villages, the annual value of agricultural products during the early thirties averaged only about twenty per cent of the national income. Therefore, farmers had to rely heavily upon home industry if they were to remain debt free.

Debts, excessive local taxes, and the tenancy system have long constituted the main problems of Japanese agriculture. To a limited extent, during the thirties the farmers' economic situation was relieved by government sponsored co-operative loan associations. Regulation of the fertilizer industry, and rural reconstruction by government agencies, also brought a minimum of relief. Market and price stabilization of vital commodities, such as rice and silk, likewise brought more security into rural life. The problem of tenancy, however, remained apparently insoluble.

Although in 1932, an Agricultural Economic Recovery Bureau was organized, the government never really came to grips with the enigma of farm tenancy.²³ In 1934, about forty-seven per cent of the area under cultivation was rented by about one-third of the country's total population. Almost one million landlords, great and petty, were supported by the labor of tenant cultivators. Of those owning about forty-five per cent of the country's arable area, twenty per cent lived away from the land. With the exception of the upper ten per cent, however, the landlords were not wealthy men. They had, nevertheless, to pay national and local taxes which often were four times those assessed upon merchants and manufacturers of a similar financial situation. The deflationary policies of the Minseito were thus particularly disastrous to the small landlords and their tenants. After 1932, however, the price rise of the inflationary period helped the rural population, both landlords and tenants, to live more comfortably. This was especially true after the surplus farm population had been drained off into the large and ever-expanding armed forces. Thus, through inflation and military expansion, the rural population was temporarily relieved in part of their hitherto terrible financial distress.²⁴

The uprising of 1932, in conjunction with more positive diplomacy, brought an end to financial retrenchment. The Saito cabinet financed its increased spending by borrowing, by printing more money, and by reducing drastically the foreign exchange value of the yen.²⁵ Through introduction of these inflationary measures, the "national cabinet" hoped to bring speedy relief to agriculture and business. At the same time, an inflationary policy would have been foolhardy without increases in government control over currency, prices, production, and foreign trade.

²³ Consult Miriam S. Farley, "Japan's Unsolved Tenancy Problem," *Far Eastern Survey*, VI (1937), 153-57.

²⁴ See Miriam S. Farley, "Japan Struggles to Control Rising Prices," *Far Eastern Survey*, VII (1938), 176-78.


²⁵ See A. M. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 184; also Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

Although certain elements in the *Zaibatsu* protested inflation as being shortsighted, they were in no position after May 15 to stand firmly against the military, the farmers, and the unemployed of the cities. Meanwhile, however, the great family firms continued the rationalization of industry, a program which the new government also favored because of its emphasis upon increased efficiency.

In 1930, the "business-minded" government had been responsible for the inauguration of the Major Industries Control Law. Its object was further rationalization through the organization of the various major industries into cartels. By 1932, the military and reactionary groups dominating the government realized that no unbridgeable gulf separated a rationalized industry from the prospect of state control. Increased technical efficiency and elimination of competition could be used to advantage in the expansion program of the military. While the government deliberately fostered the growth of the metal, machinery, and chemical industries, encouragement and subsidies were granted many other established businesses. The general industrial expansion of the thirties, coupled with increased diversification, was reflected in foreign trade by an upswing in the volume and value of Japanese exports, and by the introduction of new export lines.²⁰ When, during this period, it is recalled that the major industrial and capitalist nations of the world were faced with widespread unemployment and drastic contraction of their industrial and commercial organizations, Japanese industrial and trade expansion prior to 1936 was particularly impressive.

In 1933, an accelerated program of cartelizing was inaugurated to accompany the expansion of producers' goods and defense industries. The steel industries were combined into a semi-official corporation called the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company. A Foreign Exchange Control Law was adopted by the Diet to institute rigid control over transactions involving foreign exchange and securities. In the following year the Petroleum Industry Law became effective in the home archipelago, Formosa, and Korea. This law subjected the production, refining, and importation of oil to government license. In an effort, during 1936, to extend state control even further into the various facets of the national economy, six semi-official companies were organized. Before the renewal of hostilities with China in the following year, a direct challenge to the industrial supremacy of the *Zaibatsu* was presented by the organization of the "independent" Japan Production Company (*Nippon Sangyo Ka-bushiki Kaisha*) which was financed by a numerous group of small stockholders.





Thus, in summary, by the end of 1936, the lines for regimenting Japan's economy had been laid down.²⁷ The government owned and operated most of the railways and the communication services, and held monopolies of tobacco, camphor, and salt. By the organization of semi-official companies, the government joined with the major capitalists in exploiting and regulating "strategic" industries at home and in the overseas possessions. After 1932, foreign trade—upon which Japan is extraordinarily dependent—was also controlled and rationalized to fit into the new industrial and agricultural scene. The inflationary spiral continued and even partial control of it required the introduction of additional regulations on currency, prices, production, and foreign trade. Although the nation had the external appearance of being on its way back to economic prosperity, it was really on the way toward an expansionist policy which could culminate only in conflict.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

Economic and military expansion were reflected in the everyday life of the Japanese. It is surprising, however, to what an extent the old internal problems continued to be the problems of the era of regimentation. Population pressure, for instance, was one of the themes constantly harped upon by the writers of propaganda. In the days of the "liberal" Hamaguchi cabinet, Foreign Minister Shidehara had expressed the hope of dealing with the population question by industrialization. During the thirties industry and the armed forces absorbed large numbers. Nevertheless, the problem of population pressure continued acute. Between 1930 and 1940, the population increased by about one million each year. In 1935, the country had the highest recorded birth rate in the world. In the same year it was reported to have a population density of 184 to the square kilometer by comparison with 8 for Russia and North America, and 73 for the European continent. Emigration, industrialization, and service overseas mitigated, but by no means solved, the problem of population pressure.²⁸

²⁷ For a more sympathetic point of view see the discussion by E. B. Schumpeter, "Industrial Development and Government Policy, 1936-1940," in Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 789-96. The following is an example of her attitude on development between 1931 and 1936. Mrs. Schumpeter writes: "The recovery period [1931-36] was one of rapid industrial and commercial expansion with some increase in government control for the purpose of coping with the depression, and for strengthening the position of the small trader and the small producer in relation to the middleman and the more powerful financial and industrial groups. Similarly, there was an increase in government spending, especially for armaments, but this increase in expenditure was accompanied by a proportionate increase in the national income" (p. 790).

²⁸ For careful discussions of the more detailed problems see Allan B. Cole, "Japan's Population Problems in War and Peace," *Pacific Affairs*, XVI (1943), 397-417; consult also, for excellent statistical analysis of the 1940 census, Edwin G. Beal (trans.) of Kojima Reikichi, "The Population of the Prefectures and Cities of Japan in Most Recent Times," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, III (1944), 313-61; also Jesse F. Steiner, "Population Trends in Japan," *American Sociological Review*, IX (1944), 36-40.

Until 1931, the Japanese had tried fruitlessly to encourage emigration and to expand industry by normal peacetime methods. The attack upon Manchuria was viewed by many as the beginning of an effort to open by direct action a vast and rich area for exploitation. Access to one of the richest repositories of natural resources in the Far East was of immeasurable aid in providing raw materials for Japan's expanded industries. Colonization of Manchuria, however, failed almost as badly as had earlier efforts in Formosa and Korea. It became clear after 1933 that food and security for the Island Empire must be obtained through industrialization and increased foreign trade.

Beginning in 1936-37, the government reversed its stand on overpopulation. With war a reality, official publications expressed concern over the declining birth rate and the fall in net population increase. As in the totalitarian states of Europe, Japan advanced loans to newlyweds and reduced tax burdens for large families. Demographic experts also pointed out that industrialization of China—under Japanese occupation or on China's own initiative—would probably result in an expansion of continental population to the relative disadvantage of Japan. In summary, Japan was troubled by a population "too large for the achievement of maximum per capita production in the home islands, but too small for the achievement of permanent economic and political domination of the three-quarters of a billion people in eastern Asia."²⁹

Although industry expanded and foreign trade swelled in volume, the urban laborer and his country cousin lived barely above the subsistence level. After 1931, unemployment was reduced. Nevertheless, great numbers continued to leave the farms and villages to seek employment in the cities. Chinese and Koreans also emigrated looking for work in Japan's booming industrial plants. A low plane of living in Nippon's crowded cities was better than life in the agricultural communities of the continent, especially as pay envelopes became continually thicker.

This scene of apparent prosperity was soon revealed to be little more than a mirage. Although wages were going higher, prices preceded them at almost every advance. The products of industry continued to be beyond the reach of working people. Despite the influx of laborers to the cities the vast majority continued to work at agriculture and in small enterprises. Partly as a result of low real wages, practically no home market existed for the products of industry. Inability to keep wages on a par with prices meant that discontent began to spread among urban workers as well as through the depressed peasantry.³⁰

²⁹ I. B. Taeuber and Edwin G. Beal, "The Demographic Heritage of the Japanese Empire," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXVII (1945), 70-71.

³⁰ See W. Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Unrest in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, XVII (1938-39), 426-33.

Failure to raise appreciably the level of living made large numbers among the working and peasant groups easy converts to extremist doctrines. Although labor and radical parties had become potent political influences after the Universal Suffrage Act of 1925, they did not function effectively as harmonious agencies of protest. The most influential groups (such as the Social Democratic Party led by Bunji Suzuki and Abe Isoo) were usually advocates of moderate reform. The Communists and other small radical units were systematically repressed even before 1931. After the Manchurian Incident, open discontent and radical political activity were further curtailed by fervent appeals to patriotism. In general, the moderate groups supported the military adventuring on the continent.⁸¹ After 1932, genuinely radical parties, as well as radical individuals, were openly persecuted.

During the thirties the uprooted and discontented in Japan gravitated to the patriotic societies. Chauvinist organizations of all varieties expanded tremendously. Led by the servicemen's and veteran's organizations, these nationalistic groups criticized business and liberal elements and ruthlessly aided in suppressing radical activity. Militarism, imperialism, and "Japanese virtues" were reverently extolled. Certain societies were also openly anti-capitalist and vehemently anti-Western. As their numbers increased, the cry for direct action and immediate relief of economically depressed classes became more bitter and violent. By 1937, patriotic groups in Japan had virtually eliminated the old-line political parties as well as the radical and semi-radical opposition. After the outbreak of the "China Incident," the ordinary Japanese was forced to join one of the chauvinist societies or remain politically inarticulate.

After 1932, control of opinion, thought, and education became increasingly the concern of government. Acting as vigilantes, the patriotic societies, rounded up Communists, malcontents, and such intellectuals as Nitobe and Minobe. Capitalists were also squeezed by the nationalistic groups. In 1932, after the assassination of Baron Dan, the House of Mitsui was allegedly "required" to establish a foundation to alleviate distress among farmers and fishermen.⁸² Members of the peerage who opposed the militarists were also subjected to indignities and repression.⁸³ After May, 1932, no cabinet and no Home Minister could afford to show tolerance or leniency toward "dangerous thinkers."

Strict censorship of foreign and domestic publications was also a part of totalitarianism. On the charge that it would be injurious to peace,

⁸¹ Although several of the labor parties appear to have been embarrassed by the Manchurian incident, the All-Japan Labor, Farmer, and Masses Party was one of the few to oppose publicly the government's imperialist policy. See H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics* (New York, 1931), pp. 243-44.

⁸² See the account in *Time*, November 13, 1933.

⁸³ Consult J. B. Powell's interesting report on the peerage and the farmers, *Chicago Tribune*, April 15, 1934.

order, or public morality, any publication might be prohibited or confiscated. By 1935, certain topics of the day—for example, the arrest of Communists—could not be discussed in print. Domei, the Central News Agency, was charged with the distribution of national and foreign news to the newspapers and radio stations of Japan, Formosa, and Korea. Foreign language newspapers owned by non-Japanese interests were “urged” to sell out to native publishers. In 1936, the president of Domei stated publicly and with emphasis that news organizations must be operated in accordance with “nationalistic ideals.”³⁴

Education was also used as an instrument for indoctrinating young people easily. Compulsory elementary schooling made it simple for national history to be taught to fourteen million children as a course in the evolution of the national spirit. Worship of the imperial house also fitted neatly into educational regimentation. Military drill and “right thinking” were preached with more intensity and purpose than ever before. Radical students in the universities were sought out and punished as relentlessly as were those who made a career of radicalism. In 1937, A. Morgan Young wrote: “. . . though it was never true that the military party had lost its power in Japan, there was in 1927 an amount of independent civilian thinking which five years later it did not seem possible that there ever could have been.”³⁵

WAR YEARS

With the outbreak of the “China Incident” in July, 1937, Japan catapulted headlong into a constantly expanding and an increasingly disastrous war situation. From the beginning, the war in eastern Asia was advertised at home as a national crusade. The first Konoye cabinet concentrated its efforts upon “spiritual mobilization.” *Kokutai* (“National Polity”) and *Kodo* (“Imperial Way”) became the catch words of the new Japanese spirit. In general, *Kokutai* and *Kodo* emphasized the close connection between the people and the imperial house. They stressed also the need for loyalty to the line of emperors “unbroken for ages eternal,” and to the peculiar traditions and beliefs of Nippon.³⁶ Although *Kodo* was not a new term, the “imperial way” after 1937 was envisaged as the achievement of world peace and order through Japanese control over the “backward” peoples of eastern Asia.³⁷ Even labor organizations and certain radical groups were ultimately convinced of the sacred character of Japan’s mission. Although internal dissent existed after 1937, the sceptical were mainly concerned over means rather than ends. Patriotic fervor

³⁴ *New York Times*, November 10, 1936.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

³⁶ See especially the unpublished dissertation by John Paul Reed, “*Kokutai, A Study of Japanese Nationalism*” (University of Chicago: Dept. of History, 1937).

³⁷ See Robert K. Reischauer, *Japan: Government-Politics* (New York, 1939), p. 159.

and sincere conviction about the justice of the "holy war" ran through all social classes.

The political and economic regimentation of prewar years was also intensified. Totalitarian controls were technically placed upon all phases of life in an effort to complete the organization of the "divine state" for war. With total energies focused upon military victory, war preparations were supposed to become the aim of all groups and all activities. Controls already in existence were generally made more comprehensive. Trade, industry, and agriculture were mobilized in the national welfare. The National Planning Board, Hayashi's creation, was authorized to direct and organize the productive and distributive sides of the national effort. By October, 1937, Konoye had organized the Cabinet Advisory Council as an administrative device through which all groups might participate in, and thereby assume responsibility for, the decisions of his government.

During March, 1938, the National General Mobilization Law was enacted in the hope of correlating and extending the existing governmental controls.³⁸ Practically every phase of human activity was thus made legally, even if not actually, subject to rigid regulation. Labor disputes in defense enterprises were prohibited and the government was authorized to mobilize labor and determine satisfactory working conditions. Production and exchange of commodities, as well as prices and profits, were also proclaimed to be within the government's jurisdiction. Private enterprises could be required theoretically to produce needed articles at stipulated prices. Failure to abide by government orders could result in requisitioning or confiscation of movable and immovable properties by the state. Capital could be conscripted, if necessary, to circumvent dangers from inflation, or to bolster the international position of the yen. In general, totalitarian measures were designed to conserve and utilize more efficiently Japan's limited material and financial resources.

General mobilization was accompanied in 1938 by a series of semi-nationalization measures. On March 26, a series of four laws passed the Diet by which the electric power industry was to all intents and purposes placed under governmental control.³⁹ During the summer of 1938, the petroleum control law was also extended and a government agency (Japan Petroleum Joint-Sales Company) was organized to distribute petroleum more equitably and efficiently.⁴⁰ A "link system" was made applicable

³⁸ Consult the following for more details: M. S. Farley, "The National Mobilization Controversy in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), 26-27; C. B. Fahs, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51; H. Borton, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-65.

³⁹ See M. S. Farley, "Electric Power Nationalized in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, VII (1938), 139-40; also Borton, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁰ Control of petroleum distribution provides a good example of the cleavage between the agricultural and commercial groups in Japan. Excellent discussion in Lawrence K. Rosinger, "Petroleum Control in Japan Reflects Internal Conflict," *Amerasia*, IV (1940-41), 42-46.

to twenty-six major commodities. It stipulated that sale of these commodities outside the yen bloc (Japan, Formosa, Korea, Manchoukuo, and North China) would carry with it the privilege of importing raw materials equal in value to the raw materials contained in the export commodity.⁴¹ Capital and labor were also diverted from peace and export industries to enterprises producing war materials. By these extraordinary measures, the Konoye regime attempted to bring the hostilities in China to a quick conclusion and to prepare for a "big war" if one should come.

Although Konoye and his "national union" cabinet succeeded for a time in winning co-operation from Japan's most influential groups, the strain of protracted war inevitably produced internal frictions. Although the military had won spectacular victories in China, reactionary groups held that Konoye's compromise policies were not strong enough to bring victory in eastern Asia. The deteriorating international picture in Europe also stimulated the desire in Japan for a government more in harmony with the designs of the European dictators. Although Konoye had attempted to strengthen his cabinet by periodic reorganizations and by the creation of an "inner cabinet" charged with co-ordinating the various agencies of government, his regime was ended early in 1939. On January 5, Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, former chief of the totalitarian National Foundation Society (*Kokuhonsha*), was asked to form a new cabinet.

Even though military and naval officers were prominent in both the Konoye and the Hiranuma cabinets, it should not be assumed that Japanese expansion was hampered by a nonco-operative *Zaibatsu*. Disagreements between civilian and military groups, and conflicts within the armed forces themselves did exist. The main cleavages, however, were about *means* of conquest and the extent of government control over private enterprises. In general, the representatives of business had far more to do with expansion than they have at times been credited with.⁴² At the same time, violent disagreements also existed between the branches of the armed forces. Certain circles advocated absolute regimentation. Others favored monopoly capitalism and more intensive Westernization. Questions of high military and naval strategy were also regularly in dispute. Although Japan gave an external appearance of unity, bitter factional strife seethed just beneath the apparent calm.⁴³

Appointment of Baron Hiranuma's cabinet signified a temporary victory for totalitarian elements.⁴⁴ Their major dispute with business inter-

⁴¹ For the details of the "link system" see C. B. Fahs, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; also Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴² Consult especially G. B. Sansom, "Liberalism in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (1940-41), 553.

⁴³ See R. K. Reischauer, "The Disunity of the Japanese Militarists," *Amerasia*, I (1937-38), 28-33.

⁴⁴ Refer to K. W. Colegrove, "The New Japanese Cabinet," *Amerasia*, II (1938-39), 572-73.

ests in 1939 concerned mobilization of capital. On April 10, Hiranuma invoked the controversial article eleven of the National Mobilization Act. Specifically, corporate dividends were limited to reduce costs of production and to help check the inflationary trend. Peculiarly enough, while the government sought to limit the major incentives of capitalist production, it hoped simultaneously that production would increase without further nationalization of industry. Compromises of this sort, and jockeying for position, made impossible the formulation of rational and unwavering economic and political policies.

On August 30, shortly before the outbreak of the European war, the Hiranuma cabinet was replaced by a reshuffled totalitarian group under the premiership of General Abe Nobuyuki. Like most of Japan's military governments, Abe's cabinet failed to give adequate attention to internal problems. Drought in the summer of 1939 had sharply curtailed food production and had forced radical cuts in the estimated production of hydroelectric power. Food and power shortages caused disruption and unemployment precisely at the time when internal stability was most necessary. Hostilities in Europe, and American economic measures, had created new problems which required for solution at least a modicum of internal agreement. During the last days of 1939, opposition to the "weak-bodied" policy of the Abe cabinet became vehement, for rationing of power had hampered heavy industry and had thereby prevented the regular expansion of Japan's war machine. On January 14, 1940, the Abe cabinet was forced out of office to the surprise of nonmilitary groups.

Two days after Abe's resignation, Admiral Yonai Mitsumuso's cabinet was formed.⁴⁵ It included more party and business representation than had either of the two preceding cabinets. Mukio Sakurachi, leader of the Minseito, was appointed Minister of Finance. In the February meeting of the Diet, a leading member of the Minseito audaciously questioned the wisdom of Japan's policy in China.⁴⁶ However, these few sparks of "liberalism" caused more smoke than fire. The questioning member was forced out of his party and ultimately expelled from the Diet. Meanwhile, the Diet heard a report on February 10 that the war in China had already cost about four billion dollars. Less than two months later, one of Japan's largest wartime budgets was adopted; of this, almost one-half was allocated for military purposes. Whatever his intentions, Admiral Yonai was not able to keep the totalitarian forces in check.

During the summer of 1940, the fate of the political parties was decided. In June, Kuhara Fusanoke and Prince Konoye relinquished their government posts to begin organization of a new totalitarian party, since, as

⁴⁵ See K. W. Colegrove, "The Cabinet of Admiral Yonai," *Amerasia*, III (1939-40), 537-41.

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Konoye reportedly said, "the existing political parties, based on liberalism, democracy, and socialism, are not fit for a nation!"⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the Yonai cabinet was forced to adopt a rationing program for food and consumer's goods.⁴⁸ Although it was remarkable that Japan had been able to avoid rationing until the third summer of active war, its inauguration made the Yonai government unpopular with the masses. The totalitarian organization of Konoye also criticized Yonai's cabinet for failing to strike in southeastern Asia immediately upon the fall of France and the Netherlands in Europe. On July 17, therefore, Yonai was forced out of office and Konoye began organization of a second cabinet.

During July, 1940, Konoye began to lay the foundations for Japan's "New National Structure."⁴⁹ The political parties were required to vote themselves out of existence and trade unions were completely suppressed. A four-man "inner cabinet" (including the Premier, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, War Minister Tojo, and Navy Minister Yoshida) was set up to intensify diplomacy and war-making. On August 1, Konoye redefined the "New Order" to include "Greater East Asia" (China, Indo-China, and the Netherland Indies). The yen bloc was thought of as the economic cement holding the new edifice together. The crowning glory of the "New Structure" was the tripartite pact (Axis agreement) concluded with Germany and Italy on September 27.⁵⁰

Religion, education, and the press were also more closely co-ordinated with government. In August, 1940, representatives of forty Christian denominations in Japan were called together to formulate plans for the establishment of a national Christian Church. Numerous long discussions and heavy pressure by government resulted during 1941 in the founding of a united Protestant group (excluding Episcopalians and Seventh-Day Adventists) called the Church of Christ in Japan. The Roman Catholic Church was permitted to continue as an independent organization. The Ministry of Education conducted lectures for Shintoists, Buddhists, and Christians on the place of religion in the "New Structure." Christian schools were also nationalized more intensively than hitherto.

The foreign press in Japan, meanwhile, was gradually squeezed out of existence. In January, 1941, the *Japan Chronicle* of Kobe, the last of the foreign-owned newspapers, was sold by its British owners to a Japanese publisher. Newspapers operated by the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* chains never dared criticize general policy and made only infrequent protests against local applications of policy. The military published the flaming *Kokumin*

⁴⁷ Quoted in a news dispatch in *ibid.*, p. 244.

⁴⁸ Consult M. S. Farley, "Japan Experiments with Rationing," *Far Eastern Survey*, IX (1940), 203-04.

⁴⁹ Ambassador Grew wrote in his diary on September 1, 1940: "The 'new structure' is going ahead fast and Japan is rapidly becoming a regimented nation, although in its main outlines this regimentation cannot be said to be either Fascism or Nazism (*op. cit.*, p. 327)."

⁵⁰ See *infra*, p. 488.

as its organ of expression. By such means, public protests were made almost impossible. More than ever, the masses were molded in the "New Structure" to mental and spiritual conformity.⁵¹

The only serious opposition to Konoye's totalitarian policies came from business groups and a few isolated intellectuals. On October 12, 1940, members from these potential oppositionary groups were included on the membership roster at the first meeting of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Japan's "unitary" political organization. Although the busi-



Konoye, Matsuoka, Yoshida, and Tojo. International News Photo

ness groups feared economic reorganization by force, they were consoled by Konoye's assurances that changes would be effected voluntarily and through the customary business channels. By 1941, most of the great business houses were willingly co-operating in the organization of Konoye's totalitarian regime. Few protests were heard even from intellectuals. In November, 1940, however, a Japanese historian had retained enough perspective to write in a secret communication:

These immutable sacred policies are, in the eyes of every foreign friend of Japan, unnatural and hypocritical, irrational and short-sighted, mean and most arrogant. What is far worse, they are violently contrary to the spirit of her history, and to the ever-broadening movement of the

⁵¹ Even Baroness Ishimoto and other feminists were arrested for anti-war activities and dangerous thoughts when they continued their agitation after the official dissolution of the Women's Suffrage League (see *Christian Science Monitor*, June 24, 1941).

whole world. It should, at least, be evident to Japan, that, if she were in the place of the victims of these policies, she would not for an instant submit to such shameful impositions.⁵²

Although other protests were voiced in Japan after 1940, totalitarian instruments of propaganda and repression practically eliminated all organized opposition. The co-operation of the *Zaibatsu* with Konoye's program made possible great industrial expansion in war goods. In fact, from 1937 to 1941, despite the requirements of the armies in China, Japan's stockpiles of war goods had increased far beyond anything imagined by the economists of the Western nations. During January, 1941, Konoye remarked in the Diet: ". . . there must not be any doubt that there is no thought of banning pursuit of private interests."⁵³ During the spring months, several new appointments raised representatives of the *Zaibatsu* to official positions of importance. By July, 1941, government and business had moved so close together that most private banks and financial institutions were made into subsidiaries of the Bank of Japan.

Beginning in 1941, the nationalization of industrial and financial concerns was directed by representatives of Japan's great economic families. By the Major Industries Association Ordinance of September, the existing cartels of the *Zaibatsu* were transformed into official controlling agencies with absolute jurisdiction over materials, labor, and capital in the various major industries. Small producers were absorbed or driven into bankruptcy, since priorities, subsidies, and regulations were designed to eliminate competition adverse to the financial magnates.⁵⁴

In July, 1941, suspension of trade between Japan, on the one side, and Britain and the United States on the other, meant that additional controls became necessary to prevent economic chaos within the island empire. International transactions had to be carefully regulated to prevent Japan's foreign exchange from vanishing completely. The cotton goods and silk industries suffered most. About one-fifth of the spindles in the factories were idle by September. Silk glutted the market, and the government ordered many of the farmers to convert their mulberry fields to wheat and barley. Unemployment thus began to creep into certain industries in the midst of an economy undergoing serious inflation. Living levels for the urban population thus continued to go down, even though hours and wages increased. As long as the financial structure of

⁵² Quoted from a letter written by an anonymous Japanese historian to Count K-, Privy Councillor. Translated into English in October, 1941. Copy in personal files of the authors.

⁵³ Quoted in a dispatch in *Amerasia*, V (1941-42), 43.

⁵⁴ See especially on this point T. A. Bisson, "The Zaibatsu's Wartime Role," *Pacific Affairs*, XVIII (1945), 356-58; also the same author's *Japan's War Economy* (New York, 1945). Consult also J. B. Cohen, "The Japanese War Economy," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 361-70.

the country continued to be based in part upon free enterprise, it was impossible to control completely the fluctuations of profits, prices, and wages.

Meanwhile, the international situation was becoming increasingly more complicated. In the preceding April, Matsuoka had concluded a five-year neutrality pact with the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ Outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, however, had put Japan in the position of being friends with both belligerents. During July, Matsuoka was dropped from the Konoye cabinet and replaced by Admiral Toyoda Teijoro. Agitation became strong for action against Britain and the United States. Economic measures by the Western powers were felt acutely by the Japanese in both their economy and in their national pride. In the following month a Japanese "patriot" expressed disapproval of the "weak-bodied" policy by attempting to assassinate Baron Hiranuma, Vice-Premier in Konoye's reorganized cabinet.⁵⁶ Hiranuma's advice to proceed cautiously had been viewed by the extremists as betrayal.

During the autumn, Japan and the United States attempted to find a meeting ground through diplomatic conversations.⁵⁷ Failure brought about the fall of Konoye's second cabinet in mid-October. During its last days Konoye's government had established a new and separate National Defense Headquarters by which control of the military was removed from Imperial Headquarters and placed directly in the hands of the emperor.⁵⁸ By this move the government apparently hoped to check the "impetuous" militarists, and simultaneously remove all possibility of popular criticism of the armed forces. When General Tojo Hideki became Premier, on October 18, the country had been groomed to follow his admonition to "move as one cannon ball of fiery resolution."⁵⁹

In mid-November the Diet was called into session and Tojo warned the members of new sacrifices in the immediate future; possibly he advised them that war with the United States was a distinct possibility. He outlined for home and foreign consumption Japan's minimum requirements for peace. Among these were included an end to economic blockade and military encirclement by the ABCD powers (American, British, Chinese, and Dutch). In addition, he demanded a free hand for Japan in China. Although protests were voiced about living levels and taxation, the Diet quietly (or so it appeared) granted an extraordinary war fund of almost nine hundred millions of dollars.⁶⁰

With the attack upon Pearl Harbor (December 7), and the expansion of the war effort, the Tojo regime clamped more controls upon Japanese

⁵⁵ See *infra*, p. 490

⁵⁶ Excellent account of Hiranuma's career and political position given in the *North-China Herald*, August 20, 1941.

⁵⁷ See *infra*, p. 543.

⁵⁸ Account in *Christian Science Monitor*, September 12, 1941.

⁵⁹ See *ibid.*, October 20, 1941.

⁶⁰ Consult *New York Times*, November 18, 1941

life. A general election of April 30, 1942, revealed, however, that military victories were not always enough to compensate the Japanese masses for wretched living conditions.⁶¹ On this occasion considerable opposition appeared toward candidates proposed for office by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Independent candidates managed to win some ninety seats in the Lower House; most of the votes they received came from the discontented and impoverished urban workers and small businessmen. By 1943, when military victories became fewer, protests became more serious and considerably louder.⁶²

During the spring of 1943, drastic measures became the order of the day. The Diet approved administrative reforms giving Tojo the power to control industry and production completely. Industrialists were called in to advise the premier personally on production problems—particularly with regard to the vulnerable and vital ship-building industry. As criticism of failures in battle and in production began to mount, the government decreed the death penalty by administrative procedure for any person attempting “to change the government’s policies or plans during wartime.” Morale began to flag even more noticeably when the home front was “reorganized for defense” in the summer of 1943. Middle-school and university students lost their exemption from mobilization.⁶³ Boys under sixteen were often inducted into the armed forces, while women and young girls were mobilized for industry. Tokyo and other important cities evacuated their nonessential citizens in anticipation of the air raids that would inevitably come.

As the war gradually began to turn against Japan, the *Zaibatsu* assumed a more and more prominent place in government. In November, 1943, war production was placed completely under the control of the Munitions Ministry.⁶⁴ At the same time, Premier Tojo appointed a Cabinet Advisory Council chosen from the great financial enterprisers. Thereafter, government economic policies were designed exclusively by the *Zaibatsu*. Concerns permitted to engage in foreign trade were reduced from six thousand to six hundred with the giant corporations surviving and increasing their area of dominance.

Early in 1944, wages were pegged for industrial workers, even though living costs continued to mount rapidly. Employees often labored twelve

⁶¹ Details and election statistics given in Kurt Bloch, “Japanese Election,” *Far Eastern Survey*, XI (1942), 114–16.

⁶² Hoshino Naoki’s role in intensifying the “New Structure” is interestingly depicted in C. N. Spinks, “The Man Behind in Japan,” *Asia and the Americas*, XLIII (1943), 218–21. For a more detailed discussion see T. A. Bisson, *Japan’s War Economy*, chap. IV.

⁶³ See C. N. Spinks, “Indoctrination and Re-Education of Japan’s Youth,” *Pacific Affairs*, XVII (1944), 65; also C. Burnell Olds, “Education for Conquest: The Japanese Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, XXI (1942–43), 34–43.

⁶⁴ For details see Bisson, “The *Zaibatsu*’s Wartime Role,” *loc. cit.*, XVIII (1945), 358.

hours a day, seven days a week.⁶⁵ Occasionally, the same workers were required to do night-shift. As industry became more nationalized, a "military type" labor system with conscription was used for acquiring and holding workers. At times, conscription of Korean, Formosan, and Chinese labor was seriously considered, but never acted upon. Conscription for the military services, however, was ordered in both Korea and Formosa. A bid for colonial support was also made by the Japanese when a bill was passed calling for appointed representatives to the Diet from Korea, Formosa, and Karafuto.

Of the low-income groups in Japan, the farmers were the only ones to profit directly by inflation and war.⁶⁶ Food shortages and high prices naturally brought a limited degree of prosperity, especially since many men had left the farms for the armed forces. After the air raids began in the large cities, the farmers and small-town inhabitants were substantially better off than urbanites. When the latter fled from their homes, they were happy to pay almost anything for food and shelter. Black-markets were also lucrative sources of profit for the farmers. It is not surprising, therefore, that agrarian discontent was at a new minimum during the war years, and that most of the government's repressive measures were designed to stifle urban unrest.

During the last months of the war in 1945, the government called for a "people's volunteer army" to defend the homeland. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, discredited after three years of functioning as Japan's only political party, had been disbanded at the end of March. General Minami headed a new Political Association of Great Japan—designed to bring about "sure victory."

The cabinet of General Koiso Kuniaki, which had replaced Tojo's regime in July, 1944, was dominated by Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests. Although Koiso's government endeavored to interest the United Nations in a negotiated peace with honor, the Western powers remained aloof.⁶⁷ In April, 1945, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro became Japan's last war premier. After having been in retirement since the "February mutiny" of 1936, Suzuki's aim was to win peace by any means except complete capitulation.⁶⁸ Although Tojo held the post of Foreign Minister in the Suzuki cabinet, the military element had been badly eclipsed. In the midst of war, Suzuki made an overture to the United States by extending his "profound

⁶⁵ Additional material on Japanese labor in A. G. Menefee, "Japan's Faltering Home Front," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV (1945), 34-47.

⁶⁶ See C. N. Spinks, "Japan's Not-So-Desperate Peasants," *Asia and the Americas*, XLVI (1946), 173-76.

⁶⁷ For Japan's diplomatic effort to get out of the war see *infra*, pp. 511-12.

⁶⁸ See T. A. Bisson, "The Suzuki Cabinet," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV (1945), 105-06.

sympathy" to the American people on the death of President Roosevelt.⁶⁹ In June, he was granted emergency powers to deal with "imminent invasion." Although efforts were extended to organize the home front more effectively, Japan was forced in August by atomic bombs and Russian attack to accept unconditional surrender and to witness the end of its totalitarian regime.

CHAPTER XIII

MANCHOUKUO

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

In the history of the twentieth century, the case of Manchoukuo provides the observer with a clear example of the techniques and devices employed by an important nation in aggrandizing itself purposefully at the expense of one of its neighbors. In striking contrast to the confused and corrupt warlord government of the days before the Mukden incident, the puppet government of Manchoukuo created by the Japanese in 1932 acted with dispatch and efficiency uncommon in the history of eastern Asia.¹ Gradual co-ordination of Manchuria's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions with those of totalitarian Japan is also of interest as a case study in the techniques of ruling directly by indirect methods. Moreover, the example of Manchoukuo provides a veritable classroom demonstration of the Japanese political experiments to be performed elsewhere after 1937 as in northern China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma. The demise of the new state at the end of the Second World War also enhances its value as a moral and historical example.

As a result of Japan's sudden attack, pressure from within and without forced in Manchuria quick development of the theory and practical institutions of administration. It was evident, at once, that the new government was the creation and the puppet of the Japanese military clique. The revived dynasty, the elaborate administrative hierarchy, and the traditional, but vague theory of *Wang-tao* were to act mainly as screens to further Japanese expansion. Alterations in governmental structure, and deviations in principle, were to be introduced whenever and however they were needed to aid in the extension of Nippon's authority.

The original Organic Law of Manchoukuo (March 9, 1932) served Japanese requirements for two years. During this period of settling down, control of post offices, telephone and telegraph systems, air lines, and railways avowedly passed into the hands of the new government. The Tokyo-controlled South Manchuria Railway Company, however, was appointed on March 1, 1933, to manage the railway system for the government. Gradually, Japanese direct and indirect control over public utilities resulted in more efficient and effective service. The pretense of Manchoukuo's independence was ludicrous, however, since Japanese officials held

¹ For details see *supra*, pp. 322-26.

most of the strategic civil offices and were responsible primarily to the Japanese ambassador, who was also the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung army and the governor of the leased territory. General Minami Jiro acted as Japanese authority in Manchoukuo until 1936, when he was succeeded by General Uyeda Kenkichi.

Beginning on March 1, 1934, the original Organic Law of 1932 was replaced by a new instrument of government modeled on the Japanese constitution of 1889. Hoping to make clearer the close cultural bond uniting Japan and Manchoukuo, Chief Executive Pu-yi was "petitioned" to ascend the throne "in compliance with the will of Heaven." Although the official declaration explicitly stated that the new monarchy was not to be confused with the restoration of the Ch'ing dynasty, the reaction in China was immediate and profound. It was feared by some that Pu-yi, as "emperor" of Manchuria, would provide the Japanese with a convenient excuse for the further conquest of China. Others contended that the revival of the dynasty divided the far eastern problem into an open two-way struggle between absolutist and democratic countries. Actually, the new constitution and the enthronement resulted internally in more nearly absolute control and fewer guarantees of individual rights; externally, the main accomplishment of these changes was closer harmony with Japan and its imperial traditions.

In his enthronement speech at Hsinking, the new Emperor Kang-te proclaimed: "In co-operation with our great neighbor, Japan, our course will remain as unaltered as the sun in heaven."² "Reconstruction" was emphasized by the "emperor" as the immediate goal of the new government. Politically, the new state was centralized and strengthened by the issuance of a law (October 11, 1934) for the organization of ten provincial governments, in addition to the predominantly Mongol area of Hsingan. The ten new provinces were carved out of the four old Chinese provinces, and were given strong and fairly efficient administrative hierarchies dominated by young Japanese. By 1940, the political divisions had increased to eighteen, counting the Hsinking Special Municipality and the four separate provincial territories of the Hsingan area.³ The Kwantung leased territory and the South Manchuria Railway zone were never incorporated as part of Manchoukuo.

After the collapse of Chang Hsüeh-liang's central control, the *Pao-chia* system of local administration common to China prevailed in Manchuria only until 1936.⁴ With the gradual extension of the new government's control into the localities, this native system was absorbed into the police organization of the new regime. "Trustworthy" administrative officials

² *New York Times*, March 2,

³ See Edwin G. Beal, Jr., "The 1940 Census of Manchuria," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, IV (May, 1945), 255-62.

⁴ For discussions of system in China proper see *infra*, p. 457.

were appointed, and civil service was made compulsory rather than optional. Meanwhile, a "protective village" system came into existence to make even more effective the police power of the central government.⁵

Early in 1937, contemporary with the tightening of totalitarian controls in Japan, there arose the problem of the imperial succession in Manchoukuo. Since the emperor had no male descendant, the succession was fixed on Pu Chieh, the emperor's younger brother. Shortly thereafter, the new heir apparent was married in Tokyo with Shinto rites to a Japanese commoner named Kiroko Saga. By these arrangements, Japan evidently hoped to guarantee the continuation in Manchuria of an agreeable dynasty.

The summer of 1937 brought further abrupt changes. In May, Manchoukuo's supervisory councils were abolished along with the most important of the "independent" ministries. These were replaced by six bureaus with Prime Minister Chang Ching-lin the only responsible minister. The imperial decree making these changes effective was issued on July 1, six days before the occurrence of the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge. Thereafter, economic controls, as well as political measures, became steadily more restrictive as Manchoukuo was groomed to function as Japan's military base for continental operations.

PACIFICATION AND BORDER PROBLEMS

In the negotiations at Geneva, Japan insisted in 1932-33 that the original incident at Mukden, and the numerous incidents thereafter, were basically measures of defense against lawless elements. Inability of the Chinese government to protect Japanese nationals against the "bandits" of Manchuria was bemoaned repeatedly by Matsuoka and others. In fact, the "bandit menace" provided Japan with an excuse for asserting that China could not expect equal treatment with other major nations, as long as Nanking remained unable to quell the warlords within the nation, and continued too impotent to guarantee the lives and property of foreign residents in China. On the other hand, Chinese spokesmen asserted that the Japanese encouraged the "bandits" and gave them arms to provide a reason for military actions.⁶ The Japanese invasion itself was thought by some to be largely responsible for the increase in the number of habitual "bandits." For example, Chinese guerrilla forces and those loyal to Chang Hsüeh-liang were often termed "bandits" by the Japanese. Thus, from its inception, Manchoukuo was confronted by an internal pacification problem of frightening proportions.

According to Japanese estimates, there were operating in Manchuria before the Mukden imbroglio around 55,000 habitual "bandits"; in the

⁵ For further details see *infra*, pp. 418-19.

⁶ See especially the "memorandum on banditry" in V. K. Wellington Koo, *Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission* (New York, no date), II, 675-91.

following year, there were around 200,000 of all types.⁷ In addition to the Hung-hu-tzū, or traditional "bandits" of Manchuria, the Japanese overlords were plagued by the Tu-fei (native rebels), the Ping-fei (army deserters), and the Kung-fei (Communist organizers of agrarian discontent).

As the Japanese army moved into area after area, kidnapping of Japanese officials and influential Westerners became correspondingly more common—particularly in heavily wooded sections of the country. The army of General Honjo was, therefore, compelled to keep careful watch over railway lines and other means of communication and supply. Orders were issued to remove all trees and kaoliang growing within one hundred kilometers of the railway tracks. Through such measures, the Japanese hoped to remove the convenient hiding places hitherto used by the "bandits" before and after attacks upon the railway tracks or upon the trains themselves. "Bandits" were also tempted to surrender voluntarily by a grant of amnesty and the promise of employment on the highways planned by the new regime.

Manchoukuo defense forces—army and police—were recruited from former forces and from the civilian population. Active co-operation with the Kwantung army made of the native force a simple extension of the Japanese army. Police administration, however, was centralized and policemen were trained for bandit-suppressing activities. The presence of the Kwantung army, the superior training of the native constabulary, the more centralized organization, and improved economic conditions in certain areas, accounted for the Japanese assertion in 1936 that banditry had been reduced to a comparatively minor problem. According to their own estimates, Japan had meanwhile been forced to appropriate for bandit suppression almost one-half of its total financial investment in Manchoukuo.⁸

Pacification was particularly difficult in an area where at least seventy per cent of the population is rural. One of the main means used after 1936 for pacifying the countryside was the earlier-mentioned system of "protected villages." Farmers from wide areas were herded into designated centers, while their individual homes were burned and their grain was expropriated. Every individual in the "protected villages" was registered. Through periodic checkups, the authorities were able to determine whether nonregistered persons had filtered into the walled compounds. Millions of farmers were thus kept in protective custody and were forced to labor on the strategic roads being built by the invaders. Protected villages also made easier the problem of assessing and collecting the taxes so badly

⁷ South Manchuria Railway Co., *Third Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1932* (Dairen, 1932), p. 95. For further information consult the *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book* (1933).

⁸ *New York Times*, October 18, 1936.

needed by the government. In addition to the "protective village" system, the government of Manchoukuo issued a decree regarding "Regional Protection Implication." The "implication" of this measure was to be found in the unit system it created. Generally, six to ten households were constituted as a unit responsible for reporting to the authorities any persons carrying weapons, creating public disturbances, or suspected of "bandit" activity. Failure of the unit to perform its prescribed function resulted in a "reprimand" for all its members. Despite these stringent measures the Japanese were forced to admit even at the end of 1938 that at least 10,000 "bandits" were still at large.⁹

Of more significance than the actual "bandit" problem was the "bandit" bogey raised by the militarists to justify to the Japanese homeland, if nowhere else, encroachments upon additional territories in northeastern Asia. Early in 1933, the Japanese had begun to report "bandit activities" around Shanhaikwan, at the eastern end of the Great Wall. Simultaneously, the Chinese reported large-scale movements of Japanese troops in that area and on the borders of Jehol. Although the Japanese had occupied Shanhaikwan by January 6, they contended in their communications to the League that they attacked only because Chang Hsüeh-liang was massing troops for action against Jehol.¹⁰

Early in the history of Manchoukuo, the Chinese province of Jehol (Eastern Inner Mongolia) was claimed by the new state as an integral part of Manchu territory. The strategic location of Jehol made it a natural base for Chinese guerrilla activity, and, therefore, made its possession a matter of importance to both of the contending states. Since these outbreaks came precisely at the time when the League's Committee of Nineteen was trying to conciliate the far eastern situation, it is not surprising that the neutral powers quickly came to believe that their efforts would again be fruitless. Large-scale hostilities, however, did not commence in Jehol until Japan was certain that the Assembly would adopt the condemnatory report of the Committee of Nineteen.

On February 20, 1933, Tokyo notified the League that "the operations that will be necessitated by Chang Hsüeh-liang's attitude (about Jehol) differ in no way from those that have already been carried out in northern Manchuria for the purpose of restoring order."¹¹ Chinese resistance in Jehol was easily overwhelmed. On March 4, the Japanese occupied Jehol city forcing Governor Tang Yu-lin to flee. Thereafter, the province was simply incorporated into Manchoukuo, and China was forced to accept its loss. In an effort to protect its gains in Jehol, the Japanese army moved the following month into northern Hopei province. After fierce resistance,

⁹ See H. Kondo, "The Manchurian Bandits," *Contemporary Manchuria*, III (1939), 81.

¹⁰ League of Nations, *Records of the Special Assembly*, Special Supplement, No. 112, IV, 42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

the Nanking government was forced to conclude the Tangku truce (May 31) by which China virtually recognized the existence of Manchoukuo, and accepted its southern boundaries.¹²

"Bandit activity" was also inspired and directed in numerous instances by the Korean Revolutionary Army from its headquarters in the Chientao region of the Tumen river valley.¹³ By 1936, Korean revolutionaries were uniting with Communist forces in Manchuria. The product of this joint effort was a large anti-Japanese armed force drawing its support from Chinese and other discontented agrarian elements. Numerous attacks upon Japanese forces and sporadic agrarian uprisings, inspired in part by the Communist agitators, troubled the overlords of Manchuria from 1936 to the end of the war. It was estimated in 1937 that the partisan forces in Manchuria could count upon an army corps or a total of 150,000 men.¹⁴ Although this figure was probably much too high, leadership and material aid were certainly received from the Chinese and particularly the Chinese Communist Party. Liaison and exchange of information between the guerrilla forces of China and Manchuria were apparently developed long before the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 7, 1937.

A widely publicized conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Japan occurred over the question of the western and northern boundaries of Manchoukuo. There existed, traditionally, no clear demarcation of boundaries between Manchuria and the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia) to the west, for the large and fluid Mongol population in western Manchuria made extremely difficult the establishment of exact boundaries. Manchoukuo's Mongol problem had been recognized early in 1932, when Hsingan was organized as the first distinct province of the new state. Hsingan was unique in that it had Mongol governors, and a greater degree of local autonomy than any other part of Manchoukuo. Nevertheless, as Japanese control became stricter after 1933, the tendency in Hsingan was to look to Outer Mongolia for leadership, aid, and perhaps a Russian-supported unity movement. In fact, Mongol hopes were given concrete form in the secret mutual assistance pact between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic concluded in November, 1934, and announced publicly on March 12, 1936.¹⁵

After 1933, border clashes, mutual recriminations, and maltreatment of each other's nationals were common problems in Manchoukuo's relations with its northern and western neighbors. Railway construction and emigration policy in Manchoukuo were clearly designed to provide sup-

¹² Cf. *supra*, pp. 336, 367.

¹³ See A. J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944), pp. 65-67; also V. Avarin, "Anti-Japanese War in Manchuria," *China Today*, II (1935), 31-35.

¹⁴ *China Today*, III (September, 1937), pp. 167-68.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, April 8, 1936. Text of the agreement included. See also Harriett L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 185-86.

port for an aggressive frontier program. Settlements of Japanese army reservists in villages near the disputed boundary areas played a large part in Japan's expansion hopes, while relief of agrarian distress and pacification were probably the "good" rather than the "real" reasons for the planting of semi-military villages. Air reconnaissance and bombing operations were also frequently mentioned in the newspaper and official accounts of the continuous, although sporadic, border warfare. Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Senjuro estimated in February, 1937, that there had already been 2300 border disputes between Manchoukuo and Soviet Russia.¹⁶

Beginning in June, 1935, a series of conferences was held by the contesting parties—the U.S.S.R. and the Mongol People's Republic on one side and Manchoukuo and Japan on the other—in the asserted hope of resolving the problems of the western boundary. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese suggested the creation of commissions to investigate and propose possible remedies for the boundary controversies.¹⁷ Distrust, suspicion, and the intertwining forces of world politics combined, however, to thwart these belated efforts at discussion. After the adherence of Japan to the Anti-Comintern Pact (November, 1936), negotiations were discontinued. Border warfare was, meanwhile, resumed, and the military establishments of both major powers were shortly brought to wartime strength.

Contemporary with the breakdown of negotiations, word got abroad that the U.S.S.R. had planned and was building a military railway line from Taishet to Komsomolsk. Shortly thereafter, railway connections with Manchoukuo were suspended. Meanwhile, the Soviets were also reinforcing their far eastern army to balance the Japanese armies based in Manchuria. Conflicts arose along the Amur in the north, and severe fighting began over control of strategic border locations such as Changkufeng. Large-scale hostilities in the vicinity of Lake Buir and the Khalka river district, near the undetermined Outer Mongolian border, also aroused general alarm in the years 1937–40 about an eventual Russo-Japanese war.¹⁸ Japan's failure to end hostilities in China forced the militarists, however, to refrain from provoking the Soviet forces in Siberia. The Soviet Union was also compelled to adopt a conciliatory policy until the highly inflammatory situation in Europe could be checked.

Meanwhile, in 1940, Manchoukuo announced a new three-year program for rehabilitation of the Mongols. In an effort to win the support of their Mongol minority, the government agreed to spend M¥10,000,000 for sanitary improvements, education, encouragement of agriculture and

¹⁶ *New York Times*, February 22, 1937.

¹⁷ For further discussion see H. S. Quigley and G. H. Blakeslee, *The Far East: An International Survey* (Boston, 1938), pp. 73–75.

¹⁸ See the *China Weekly Review*, July 15 and July 22, 1939

expansion of communications.¹⁹ The far eastern and, indeed, the world situation had, meanwhile, become confused in the extreme by Soviet Russia's agreements with Germany and Japan. Signed on April 13, 1941, by Molotov and Matsuoka, the Soviet-Japanese treaty included a provision by which Japan agreed to recognize the "inviolability" of the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union likewise recognized the "inviolability" of Manchoukuo.^{20, 21} By October, 1941, Ambassador Togo at Moscow had reached certain definite agreements with the Soviet foreign office about Manchoukuo's northeastern border.²² These negotiations were dependent almost completely for their success upon the broader problems of contemporary world politics. At no time were Japan and the U.S.S.R. able to view the boundary difficulties as an independent problem. Both nations were apparently convinced during the thirties and the early forties that war in northeastern Asia was inevitable.

ABSORPTION OF THE MANCHURIAN ECONOMY

The close association between government and business in Japan was clearly reflected in the economic structure of Manchoukuo. While the organs of political and social control were being established, the economic life of the new state was also directed toward the maintenance of Japanese hegemony. Vested interests of trade and industry (*Zaibatsu*) in Japan hoped to exploit Manchoukuo's economic resources with a minimum of government control. At the outset, however, it became obvious that private profit would be subordinated to the military's aggressive continental program, even though the economic development of Manchoukuo would necessarily be dependent upon the amount of capital invested by Japanese business interests.

Using Dairen as their spearhead of economic penetration, the Japanese, in the years prior to 1937, cornered the major portion of Manchuria's trade and dictated the direction taken by that area's industrial, agricultural, and commercial programs. Japanese subsidies for Manchurian trade, encouragement of capital investments, and intensive propaganda contributed to the development of closer economic relationships of an official, semi-official, and private character. As early as 1934, approximately sixty-five per cent of Manchoukuo's imports came from Japan. Thereafter, effort was made to weld the two economies more closely by directing both into the channels designed by the militarists.

¹⁹ Consult J. R. Stewart, "Manchoukuo Announces a Mongol Program," *Far Eastern Survey*, IX (1940), 58-60. For a good general analysis see also Owen Lattimore, "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria," *Foreign Affairs*, XI (1932-33), 315-30.

²⁰ Text included as an appendix in H. S. Quigley, *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941* (Boston, 1942), pp. 296-97.

²¹ See *infra*, p. 490.

²² For further details see *ibid.*, p. 255

Hoping to relieve population pressure at home while insinuating Japanese into the Manchurian economy, the island empire as early as 1932 launched several programs to settle large numbers of its subjects in Manchuria. Although subsidies were granted and incessant propaganda for emigration was dinned into the ears of Japanese farmers,²³ the process of transplanting them had but a limited success. In general, the Japanese farmer managed by intensive agriculture to eke out a better existence at home than in the vast open spaces of Manchuria. When the Japanese did emigrate, differences in climate, the need for new agricultural techniques, and the insecurity caused by the hostility of the local population affected seriously their ability to develop farms in Manchoukuo. In addition, the agriculturist from Japan usually could not compete with the greater efficiency and the lower level of living of the Chinese and Korean settlers. Failure of the Nipponese farmer to succeed in Manchuria is most striking when it is recalled that the economy of northeastern Asia is based even yet upon agriculture.

Although ex-soldiers were sent into the northern and eastern parts of the country as early as 1933, the "armed emigrant" was not sent out in large numbers until 1935 and thereafter. Relief of agrarian troubles and pacification of the hinterland were allegedly the reasons for establishing strategic settlements of soldiers. Protective and collective village systems for preserving internal order were greatly aided by the introduction of trained personnel. The real reason, however, for sending army reservists into Manchuria was to provide a nucleus from which an organized army could easily emerge in case of major hostilities with the Soviet Union. After the outbreak in 1937 of unofficial war in China, the military colonization project was expanded rapidly.²⁴

Although Manchuria's economy had traditionally an agricultural base, the Japanese overlords did little before 1937 to encourage farming. Measures taken to relieve acute distress and to provide protection from bandits were the major concerns of the new regime in handling agricultural problems. In 1934, a Federation of Rural Credit Associations was organized with headquarters at Hsinking, the capital of Manchoukuo, and a system of public granaries was established with the object of storing grain for emergency use. The Japanese army planners and civilian financiers, however, were mainly concerned with industrial and commercial developments. Their lack of interest in farming was increased by the demonstrated failure of Japanese farmer-emigrants to make a satisfactory place for themselves.

The Japanese who stayed on in Manchuria were usually professional,

²³ John F. Embree (*Suye Mura, A Japanese Village* [Chicago, 1939], p. 187), discusses the efforts in the agricultural school at Menda to encourage second sons to emigrate to Manchuria.

²⁴ Consult J. R. Stewart, "Japan's Strategic Settlements in Manchoukuo," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), 39.

business, or administrative people. In fact, in 1932 the "white-collar" group became predominant in strategic business and official posts and set the tone of urban living. In 1933, only 3,695 Japanese were classified in the statistics as farmers, while 149,007 were termed "miscellaneous inhabitants," presumably officials, professional personnel, and businessmen.

In line with the encouragement of Japanese emigration, it is important to recall the railway program outlined in March, 1933. Working through the South Manchuria Railway's construction bureau, the new state apparently had in operation, by September of that year, 1943 more miles of track than did China south of the wall. This elaborate building program was beyond both the basic needs and the financial capabilities of Manchoukuo. In fact, many of the lines built after 1932 extended into remote frontier districts of negligible economic importance. As in other fields, the guiding principle in railway construction was the establishment of strategic communication between the frontiers and the bases of supply.

Highway construction with hired and impressed labor was also started in March, 1933, and by the end of slightly more than a decade, according to Japanese estimates, around 40,000 miles of state highways had been completed. Government-owned buses were put into operation to connect outlying districts with the larger towns and cities. Air service also was established as a connecting link between the major cities. Even more intimately associated with the strategic program of communications, however, were the new sea bases, such as Rashin in northern Korea. A tiny fishing village in 1933, Rashin was enlarged by the South Manchuria Railway, so that it shortly was well on its way toward becoming an important part of Japan's strategic organization in northeastern Asia.

The South Manchuria Railway Company did not confine its efforts to development of Manchoukuo's railway system. As earlier, it also undertook industrial, commercial, and mining operations. The Showa Steel Works, the Shale Oil Plant and the coal mines at Fushun, and extensive participation in most major economic enterprises were part of the S. M. R.'s functions. Its quasi-official relationship to the Japanese government lent its projects unlimited encouragement and official sanction. This politico-economic combination was suited for a time to foster and undertake projects of semi-economic and semi-strategic importance. As they themselves unblushingly proclaimed, "the South Manchuria Railway Company . . . has been . . . the carrier of the light of civilization into Manchuria."²⁵

National control of industrialization, however, was introduced at the outset—"to avoid the baneful effects of unbridled capitalism, and to utilize the fruits of capitalism—so that a sound development in all branches of the

²⁵ South Manchuria Railway Co., *Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936* (Dairen, 1936), p. 68.

people's economy may be realized."²⁶ Rationalization of the industrial structure to conform to strategic necessities was also the aim of ever-tightening control measures. After 1935, regimentation became tighter as the Japanese Empire girded itself for hostilities. On July 15, 1935, a joint Japanese-Manchoukuo economic commission came into being for the purpose of bringing the two economies into even closer relations.²⁷ Tokyo was beginning to feel the effect of sinking millions of yen into the Manchurian economy without receiving the long expected substantial returns.

A closer economic link was also forged between Japan and Manchoukuo by the formal creation of the yen bloc. Monetary unification and stabilization had been one of the new regime's earliest and most enduring achievements. With the opening of the Central Bank of Manchou on July 1, 1933, the Manchoukuo *yüan* was thereafter made the unit of currency. Local and foreign currencies circulating in Manchuria were rapidly replaced by the *yüan*, so that by December, 1933, seventy-five per cent of the old notes had been redeemed. By the following October, the *yüan* reached its highest value of 118.38 yen; by September, 1935, it was managed so as to establish it at par with the yen. Two months later, it was announced that the two currencies would be kept at par. By this move, Manchoukuo became virtually a part of Japan's domestic market, since no foreign exchange transactions were required to carry on trade between the two areas. The yen bloc also served to place Japan, *vis-à-vis* Manchuria, in an economic position highly unsatisfactory to the rest of the commercial powers.²⁸

CLOSURE OF THE "OPEN DOOR"

Among the earliest actions taken by the Japanese army was the expropriation of Manchuria's public utilities and the funds of the salt gabelle. Shortly after the issuance of its declaration of independence (February, 1932), Manchoukuo assumed responsibility for administering the salt inspectorate and agreed to continue payments on foreign loans secured by the salt revenue. Similar to the problems of the salt gabelle were the questions raised by the seizure of the customs administration in Manchuria. Although the superintendents and commissioners of the Chinese Maritime Customs were at first permitted to carry on their duties, Japanese advisers were soon appointed to each Manchurian port. Revenues, however, were remitted to Shanghai until the formal establishment of the new state. Thereafter, it was only a question of time until the funds accumu-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁷ See Manchoukuo State Council, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁸ W. S. Hunsberger, "The Yen Bloc in Japan's Expansion Program," *Far Eastern Survey*, VII (1938), reprinted in *China Weekly Review* (December 10, 1938), 37-55.

lated in the several banks of collection and deposit were seized, and the appointees of the Chinese customs removed from their posts.²⁹

Sir Frederick Maze, Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, was most concerned with the problem of servicing the foreign loans secured on the customs and of maintaining the integrity of the service in behalf of the interested foreign powers—including Japan! Maze's position was supported by many influential Shanghai bankers, who brought pressure on the Chinese government not to endanger relations with the Western powers by precipitantly closing the customs houses in Manchuria remaining under its control. National sentiment in China during 1932, however, would not permit the numerous compromise solutions suggested by Sir Frederick, the British government, and the Japanese foreign office. Finance Minister T. V. Soong was adamant in his insistence upon retaining the newly won Chinese control over customs in fact as well as in name. Soong repeatedly refused to recognize what many of his contemporaries—Chinese and foreign alike—referred to as the "realities" of the situation.³⁰

By June 9, 1932, the issue of the customs reached a climax in the Fukumoto incident at the port of Dairen. On this date, remittances to Shanghai from the Dairen office were cut off. Fukumoto, the Japanese commissioner at Dairen, was dismissed on June 24 by Sir Frederick on charges of gross insubordination. Three days later, Fukumoto and his staff were retained by Manchoukuo to continue at their posts. Although Japan was interested in the integrity of the customs, no action was taken by the authorities of the Kwantung Leased Territory to prevent the seizure by Manchoukuo. Japan argued that this was a problem affecting directly no nations except China and Manchoukuo. Ambassador Debuchi, on June 29, in conversation at Washington with Under-Secretary of State Castle, protested Fukumoto's dismissal and "insisted that Mr. Mase [*sic*] was rather changing his ideas and that it might be possible to come to some arrangement whereby Fukumoto would not be disgraced."³¹

In taking over the customs, the government of Manchoukuo agreed to discharge its just proportion of the annual payment toward the foreign loans and indemnities secured by the customs. The surplus revenue, however, was absorbed by the new state for local use. After mild protests by the American government and other foreign powers, the customs' problem finally faded into insignificance as the government of Manchoukuo remitted with fair regularity its share of the international payments. Once again, action by *force majeure* had triumphed.

Nippon-Manchoukuo economy became increasingly more intimate and interdependent in the months and years following the seizure of the cus-

²⁹ Sir Frederick W. Maze, "An Act of International Brigandage," *The People's Tribune*, III (August 16, 1932), 51-57.

³⁰ See the article by T. V. Soong, *North China Daily News*, June 23, 1932.

³¹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-1941), I, 91-92.

toms. As the gears of the military's new policy began to mesh, the powers, and the United States in particular, complained regularly about violations of the "Open Door" in Manchuria. On May 3, 1933, Komai, a privy councilor of Manchoukuo, stated unequivocally that the new state could not keep its doors open to those who refused to recognize its existence.³² Meanwhile, import and export duties were revised to favor closer economic relations with Japan to the exclusion of other national business groups. On October 6, 1933, Secretary of State Hull advised Ambassador Grew to consult with the Japanese concerning discrimination against America's commercial and business interests in Manchoukuo. These efforts were unavailing because the Japanese government repeatedly refused to take formal notice of such protests, arguing that these were the problems of Manchoukuo and in no way concerned the Japanese Government.³³

Meanwhile, Manchurian authorities were working toward governmental monopoly of the strategic petroleum industry. As early as October 14, 1933, Ambassador Grew formally inquired at Tokyo about the plan for an oil monopoly.³⁴ Such a project was protested violently by the American firms of Texaco and Standard-Vacuum, and the British-Dutch enterprise known as Asiatic Petroleum. On February 21, 1934, the Manchuria Petroleum Company, a semi-official organization, financed by Manchoukuo and semi-official Japanese enterprises, was granted a monopoly over the distribution of petroleum. At the same time rigid controls were issued covering the processing, importing, and exporting of oil. On August 31, 1934, the government of the United States made representations to the Japanese foreign office emphasizing the monopolistic character of Manchoukuo's oil legislation and reasserting the treaty rights of American nationals.³⁵ During the same month, Britain and the Netherlands also lodged protests. By November 13, all subterfuges were abandoned, and the government of Manchoukuo promulgated an oil monopoly law.³⁶ This measure was frankly designed to keep in the hands of Manchoukuo the control over a commodity indispensable to "national defence" and economic well-being. As enforced after April 1, 1935, the result was to divert almost all the oil business from the Western concerns into the waiting hands of the Japanese. On April 15, 1935, Ambassador Grew wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota: "I am also instructed to state that the American Government is constrained to express its considered view that upon the Japanese Government must rest the ultimate responsibility

³² Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-26.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

³⁶ Text of the oil monopoly law given in *ibid.*, pp. 135-43; discussion of the law by an anonymous author in an article entitled "Government Monopolies in Manchoukuo," *Contemporary Manchuria*, II (March, 1938), 33-36.

for injury to American interests resulting from the creation and operation of the petroleum monopoly in Manchuria.”³⁷

While the oil question was still critical, the United States and the League of Nations began discussions about the opium problem in Manchoukuo. In January, 1933, the new state had instituted an opium monopoly. It was designed to check the traffic in narcotics by a system of rationing. Since no regulations were instituted at the outset to deal with the manufacture of opium derivatives, such as morphine and heroin, Dairen and Mukden became great centers of narcotic production.³⁸ In November, 1933, Stuart Fuller, assistant chief of Far Eastern affairs in the American State Department, addressed the Opium Commission of the League on the dangers of government-fostered opium production. Most irritating to Japan and Manchoukuo was Fuller's insistence upon refusing to recognize the latter's independent status. Unofficial speakers in the United States also attacked Manchoukuo as the future infection center for spreading the use of narcotics.³⁹

Traditionally, Jehol had been one of China's most important opium-producing areas. Although the government of Manchoukuo avowedly made an effort after 1933 to license production as well as distribution and consumption, “the opium law proved to be virtually ineffective at the outset, resulting in uncontrolled cultivation by farmers.”⁴⁰ Because of initial failures and subsequent world criticism of Manchoukuo's opium policy, a rigid narcotic law was promulgated in July, 1937, and followed in the next month by announcement of a comprehensive and constructive ten-year plan for eradicating the opium menace.⁴¹ Thereafter, there was little criticism of Manchoukuo's sincerity in attempting to root out the opium habit. World indignation, however, was aroused by the studied “opium policy” of Japan in the occupied areas of intramural China.⁴²

While these social and economic controversies were in progress, the new state was seeking to supplement Japanese investments by obtaining capital from foreign sources. This gesture was made futile by the almost exclusive economic association with Japan. In fact, at the end of May, 1935, the National City Bank of New York closed its Mukden branch for lack of business in southern Manchuria. Western business was crowded even more by the mining laws of August, 1935, by which all mineral wealth was declared a government monopoly.

³⁷ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-1941)*, I, 148-49.

³⁸ Cf. Frederick T. Merrill, “The Opium Menace in the Far East,” *Foreign Policy Reports*, XII (March 1, 1937), 294-304.

³⁹ *New York Times*, November 3, 1933, for Fuller's speech and the same newspaper of November 30, 1933, for a speech by Captain R. P. Hobson, president of the World Narcotic Defense Association.

⁴⁰ An admission by the anonymous author of “Government Monopolies in Manchoukuo,” *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 22-25.

⁴² Cf. *infra*, p. 480.

Meanwhile, British exports to Manchuria and the Kwantung peninsula declined in value during the period from 1934 to 1936 to the extent of £100,000; imports from Manchuria to Britain declined in value during the same period about £350,000.⁴³ During the same years, Italian exports to Manchoukuo declined in value from MY4,300,000 in 1934 to MY400,000 in 1936. Meanwhile, Italian imports from Manchoukuo increased from MY700,000 in 1934 to MY1,600,000 in 1936.⁴⁴ Although American trade in the years between 1931 and 1936 experienced no radical rise or fall because of the exclusive policy of Japan and Manchoukuo, it is not to be assumed that equality of opportunity existed.⁴⁵ American trade fluctuated because Manchoukuo had to buy particular items necessary to reconstruction, and because Manchoukuo could dispose of its soybean supplies in the United States.

Like the Western nations, Soviet Russia also lost its economic hold in Manchuria after 1933. The Russians protested that disorders along the Chinese Eastern Railway were countenanced and encouraged by Manchoukuo in the hope that the Soviets would be glad to dispose of a troublesome piece of property.⁴⁶ In May, 1933, Soviet Commissar Litvinov proposed the sale of the railway to Japan or Manchoukuo, since Japanese occupation made continued Soviet control of the railway and its properties a questionable financial and political asset. Despite China's protests that the sale was in violation of the Sino-Russian treaty of 1924, the Soviets continued to negotiate during the summer of 1933. The U.S.S.R.'s attitude of facing the "reality" of Manchoukuo's existence was viewed with anger in China.⁴⁷ In answer to Chinese criticism, the Soviet Foreign Office asserted that "in any event Manchoukuo was contemplating seizure of the railway." Negotiations, however, were hampered by the inability of the powers to agree upon a sale price. Therefore, it was not until March, 1935, that the terms of sale were concluded. Manchoukuo agreed to pay ¥170,000,000—a mere pittance—for the railway and its adjacent properties. The name was immediately changed to the North Manchuria Railway, although not until January 4, 1940, did Manchoukuo make its final payment and then only after diplomatic wrangling. Equally significant was the implied *de facto* recognition accorded Manchoukuo by Soviet Russia through having negotiated such a settlement.

⁴³ Board of Trade figures quoted by E. M. Gull, *British Economic Interests in the Far East* (London, 1943), p. 146.

⁴⁴ See table in Frank M. Tamagna, *Italy's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1941), p. 80.

⁴⁵ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-1941)*, I, 156.

⁴⁶ For details see H. L. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65. Also Quigley and Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND RECOGNITION

Closely related to the problem of the Open Door, as Japan constantly reminded the American State Department, was the formal recognition of the new state. In standing firmly on the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition, the League members and the United States were inexorably forced out of Manchuria's economic life. Need for foreign trade, currency, and investments, however, prevented the complete assimilation of Manchoukuo to the Japanese economy. Until 1935, Japanese capitalists managed, through the South Manchuria Railway Company, to finance most of Manchoukuo's new enterprises without asking foreign help. The failure, however, of the new industries, mines, railways, and hotels to yield adequate returns complicated the investment and finance picture to the embarrassment of the Japanese overlords. Impressive as the public improvements were to the tourist, Manchoukuo was far more of a financial liability than an asset when reckoned in purely economic terms. Therefore, it was not surprising that Japan began seriously in 1935 to seek wherever possible the necessary financial support for Manchoukuo.

Before 1937, the only states according *de jure* recognition to Manchoukuo were Japan (September 15, 1932) and El Salvador (March 3, 1934). The Central American state was allegedly seeking new markets for its surplus coffee. Neutral observers also hinted that El Salvador was possibly co-operating as the American agent in the illegal narcotic traffic conducted by Japan and Manchoukuo.⁴⁸ With Hitler's rise to power in 1933, rumors were afloat that Germany also would recognize the new state. Although pressure for British recognition was put upon the mission sent by the Federation of British Industries to Hsinking in October–November, 1934, the U.S.S.R. was the only major state to grant anything approaching *de jure* recognition before 1937. Establishment of consulates in their respective territories for facilitating the negotiations with Japan and Manchoukuo over trade and the Chinese Eastern Railway certainly implied *de facto* recognition by the Soviet government.⁴⁹ The Russian attitude of facing up to the "realities" of the situation was quite in harmony with the Soviet policy during the crisis and controversy evoked by the "Mukden Incident."

Needing foreign investments and credits, Manchoukuo turned for aid after 1935 to Japan's totalitarian friends in Europe. In 1936, Hitler's government sent Dr. Otto Kiep, formerly Consul-General in New York, to Manchuria as the head of an economic mission. As a result of these negotiations, a trade pact was signed between Manchoukuo and Germany

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, May 22–23, 1934.

⁴⁹ *The Manchuria Daily News* (March, 1934) asserted that Manchoukuo consulates were established at Blagoveshchensk in September, 1932, and at Chita in February, 1933. The same edition remarks that Manchoukuo opened passport visa offices at frontier stations.

(April 30, 1936). Two months later a German-Manchoukuo-Japan triangular barter and clearing agreement was also put into effect. Germany's main interest in these agreements was the cheap edible fat to be derived from soybeans—Manchoukuo's largest export crop. The Nazis agreed to pay for twenty-five per cent of the soya imports by shipping German products to Manchuria; the other seventy-five per cent was to be checked off against Germany's surplus exports to Japan. By disposing, through international bartering arrangements, of its major export surplus, Manchoukuo automatically forced upward the world price of soybeans. Thus, the price of soybean exports to nonco-operating countries became continuously greater.⁵⁰

Although Germany had established commercial relationships with Manchoukuo, Hitler did not grant final *de jure* recognition until February 20, 1938. Meanwhile, Japan was arranging for the partial, and ultimately complete, abolition of extraterritoriality (December 1, 1937), in Manchoukuo. At intervals, the presence therein of American and British consuls was questioned with reference to their governments' policies of nonrecognition.⁵¹ In 1937, Manchoukuo took action by abolishing unilaterally the principle of most-favored-nation treatment and began granting extraordinary privileges to Japan and its political partners.

Meanwhile, Italy—needing support in its Ethiopian venture—accorded formal recognition on November 29, 1937, and established a legation at Hsinking.⁵² A subsequent visit by an Italian economic mission to the Far East brought into existence a commercial agreement between Italy and Manchoukuo. Trade relations for one year after September 1, 1938, were to be conducted on the basis of barter. Soybeans, groundnuts, and other agricultural commodities were sent to Italy in return for industrial machinery, motors, and other industrial products. Manchoukuo was to pay Italy with its agricultural commodities for Japan's purchases of materials and products essential to war. The result of this agreement was a rapid increase in trade until Italy in 1940 became actively engaged in the European war.⁵³

Barter agreements did not, however, bring to the "yen bloc" the indispensable foreign exchange. Timber for reconstruction, machinery, and scrap metal had still to be purchased in foreign markets, and, generally, in countries not politically agreeable to Tokyo. After 1937, purchases of war material and capital goods in American markets reached a new peak.

⁵⁰ See Kurt Bloch, "German-Japanese Partnership in Eastern Asia," *Far Eastern Survey*, VII (1938), 241-45.

⁵¹ *New York Times*, November 30, 1936.

⁵² *Japan Today and Tomorrow* (1938), p. 22, published by the *Osaka Mainichi*, and anonymous, "Italian Recognition of Manchoukuo," *Contemporary Manchuria*, II (March, 1938), 75-89.

⁵³ See J. R. Stewart, "Italy Rounds Off Fascist Ties with Manchoukuo," *Far Eastern Survey*, VII (1938), 190-91; also Tamagna, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46.

Wheat and wool were bought from Australia and Canada, even though Manchoukuo grew large quantities of both, as Japan assiduously built up her stockpiles for war.

On December 1, 1937, Japan formally recognized the Franco regime in Spain, and twenty-four hours later, the Spanish and Manchoukuoan governments also established legal relations.⁵⁴ At the beginning of 1938, Poland, in need of additional markets, completed arrangements for the establishment of a consulate at Harbin. By November, Poland announced its intention to recognize the new state, and thereby won the dubious distinction of being the first European power not definitely associated in the Anti-Comintern Pact to take the step.⁵⁵ As German and Italian influence mounted in the Balkans, Hungary, in January, 1939, accorded legal recognition to Manchoukuo; almost two years later, in December, 1940, Rumania followed suit. On November 30, 1940, the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei in China granted formal recognition to its Manchurian prototype. Under Japanese pressure, Thailand, on August 1, 1941, became the last nation to grant recognition. Japan's constant emphasis on formal recognition was inspired, of course, by the studied efforts on the part of most League powers—and the United States—to ignore studiously the new state's existence.

WAR YEARS

A twenty-year program for mass colonization of Manchoukuo's agricultural territory was launched in 1937 with the aim of increasing agricultural production and of providing a nucleus of young trained men for military action. Production of commodities essential to war was encouraged by larger subsidies and more favorable legislation. On January 1, a Five-Year plan was put into effect to accelerate and rationalize agricultural and industrial development.⁵⁶ Purchases abroad, as previously indicated, were concentrated in capital goods and materials necessary for military activity. In 1936, the United States exported to Manchoukuo goods valued at \$3,500,000, whereas, by the following year, exports by the United States to Manchoukuo had risen in value to \$16,100,000.⁵⁷ The strain of such increased purchasing on the yen bloc's supply of foreign exchange can be easily comprehended.


Although agricultural exports aided their buying program, the Japanese were also forced to utilize Manchuria's full industrial capacity, even

⁵⁴ *Japan Today and Tomorrow* (1938), p. 22.

⁵⁵ For more details see *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵⁶ For a detailed study see E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchoukuo, 1930-40. Population, Raw Materials, and Industry* (New York, 1940), pp. 376-87. See also several interesting chapters in D. M. B. Collier and C. L. E. Malone, *Manchoukuo, Jewel of Asia* (London, 1936).

⁵⁷ Figures quoted from *U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan* (1931-1941), I, 155; see also J. R. Stewart, "United States Exports to Manchoukuo Reach New High," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), 82-83.



Prepared by Norton S. Ginsburg

Note—Line from Nen-chiang to Hei-ho Unconfirmed by Later Reports

though certain units came into direct competition with some of Japan's essential industries. On May 1, 1937, an Industrial Control Act was promulgated whereby twenty-one key industries were placed under national control.⁵⁸ To the disgruntlement of Japanese capitalists, and particularly the South Manchuria Railway Company, this decree provided for price regulations, production quotas, government audits, and a restricted personnel. Contrary at times to the aims of the military expan-

⁵⁸ J. R. Stewart, "Manchoukuo Sets the Pace in Controlled Economy," *Far Eastern Survey*, VI (1937), 147-48. For a list of controlled enterprises see Manchoukuo State Council, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-38.

sionists, Japan's old financial families refused to invest additional funds in enterprises from which the profits, if any, were almost certain to be small. The failure of the South Manchuria Railway to adjust quickly its spending and production program to the army's requirements resulted in the organization of the Manchuria Industrial Development Company. Financed half by the Manchoukuo government and half by the Japan Industry Company (*Nissan*), the Manchuria Industrial Development Company, unlike most Japanese-sponsored concerns, was not controlled by the great financial families. The Nissan concern was an open enterprise having around fifty thousand stockholders, mainly from among the younger Japanese financiers. In an effort to make investments attractive, the government of Manchoukuo guaranteed a six per cent return for ten years, removed restrictions on dividends, and made the tax burden as light as possible.⁵⁹

Particularly prominent in the Five-Year plan was the supporting role of agriculture to industrial and military expansion. Increased sales of farm products were to finance buying in non-yen-bloc areas of capital goods essential to the creation of Japan's advanced industrial base on the mainland. German engineering skill and technical instruments were used to the utmost. Essential to industrial expansion also was the hydroelectric program begun in 1937 to use the potential power of the Sungari and the Yalu rivers. Iron, steel, nonferrous metal, and synthetic industries were able to use electric power.⁶⁰

Although expansion of agriculture, immigration, and industry were rapid in the first two years of Sino-Japanese hostilities, none of the programs ever reached the high expectations of the Japanese militarists. In 1937-38, Manchoukuo's and China's wheat crops were so small that flour imports from Australia had to be increased appreciably.⁶¹ Aside from natural disaster, agriculture was handicapped by the "protective" village system in which the men were policemen as well as farmers. Restriction of Chinese immigration, and the traditional policy of exerting economic pressure on the Chinese farm population, worked against the speedy revival of agriculture. Manchoukuo was also forced, in 1938, to rely to a marked extent upon Korean and Formosan food exports. More important, however, as an indication of the failure of agriculture in the Five-Year plan, was the decision to permit Chinese migratory laborers to accept seasonal work in Manchuria. During 1940, special trains and ships were scheduled for the Chinese workers. Three years later it was estimated

⁵⁹ Cf. Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 394-95.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 413-15; also J. R. Stewart's, "Hsinking Authorities Push Water-Power Projects," *Far Eastern Survey*, IX (1940), 178-791.

⁶¹ Jack Shepherd, *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940), pp. 175-76, gives the exact figures.

that over one million Chinese of all categories were emigrating annually to Manchoukuo.⁶²

The failure of agriculture was also closely linked to the failure of Japan's wartime emigration program. The announced goal of one million farm families was never even sighted. Young men sent out by the government and followed by "picture-brides" constituted the majority of the Japanese settling on the farms. Efforts were made in 1940 to streamline the colonization agencies and to grant more privileges to colonists. Such measures, however, availed little in the absence of a natural colonizing movement.

Failure of the elaborate program of industrial expansion was an even more striking defeat. Until the outbreak of the European war in September, 1939, Germany helped Manchoukuo considerably with capital goods, technical advice, and loans. During the following year drastic curtailment in Manchurian industry was forced on the Japanese by the growing scarcity of funds and materials. Most of the invested capital had been used for opening new mines and building new factories—although but few of Manchuria's factories or mines were operating at full capacity. Labor shortages—particularly skilled labor—and lack of production machinery forced declines in production and a serious fall in the amount of material that could be exported to Japan and northern China. Efforts were made therefore to concentrate on projects that could be completed with the men and materials available in the yen bloc. The failure of Manchoukuo to become a huge and efficient producer of heavy goods also brought strong protests from Japanese businessmen, who had invested vast sums in the ill-fated continental enterprises.⁶³

Industrial and agricultural losses were intimately linked to the effects of the war upon the foreign trade and financial position of Manchoukuo. As one of the yen bloc states, Manchoukuo was a party to the barter and trade arrangements negotiated by Japan with Germany and Italy. Although these treaties resulted in brisk trade, foreign credits were still pressingly needed. The inclusion of northern China in the yen bloc also cut off another of what had been one of Manchoukuo's important sources

⁶² J. R. Stewart's two articles "Manchoukuo Restricts Entry of Chinese to Seasonal Laborers," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), pp. 9-10; and "Chinese Migration to Manchuria Setting New Records," *ibid.*, IX (1940), pp. 214-15. Also see A. J. Grajdanzev, "Manchuria: An Industrial Survey," *Pacific Affairs*, XVIII (1945), 322.

⁶³ In May, 1940, J. Tsushima, vice-president of the Bank of Japan, and R. Tanaka, Chairman of the Mitsubishi Trading Co., denounced the Japanese government's economic policy with respect to Manchoukuo (see Kurt Bloch, "Open Friction between Japan and Manchoukuo," *Far Eastern Survey*, IX [1940], pp. 191-92). On the tenth anniversary of the Mukden incident, Yoshisuko Aikawa, president of the Manchuria Industrial Development Co., complained to an interviewer from the newspaper *Yomiuri* that Japan's politically aggressive policy was largely responsible for the nation's inability to industrialize Manchuria (see K. Mitchell, "Manchoukuo, From 'Lifeline to Liability,'" *Amerasia*, V [1941], pp. 335-36). See also the excellent article in the *Christian Science Monitor*, September 8, 1941.

of foreign exchange and trade. In fact, trade with non-bloc areas was sometimes granted preference in the desperate hope of acquiring foreign exchange.

Matters within the yen bloc states were complicated even more as the result of an inflationary trend after 1937. Since inflation usually encourages capital investments in production goods, a controlled inflation was considered advantageous and necessary in the development of Nippon's war economy. However, in an effort to prevent excessive monetary speculation and to keep watch over the depreciated currencies of the yen bloc, Japan and Manchoukuo instituted rigid exchange and price controls.⁶⁴ Currency depreciation and price increases were nevertheless widespread throughout the area and were aggravated by black-market activities. Price controls also were relatively ineffective in Manchuria, as evidenced by the general twenty-eight per cent price rise, in Hsinking between July, 1937, and June, 1938.⁶⁵ In August, 1939, the Manchoukuo Staple Products Company was organized to regiment the trade in soybeans in an effort to avoid excessive price rises in that vital commodity. Suspension of trade with Germany in the following month resulted in a drop in the price of beans. During October, 1939, the currencies of the yen bloc were switched from their nominal link with British sterling to a theoretical tie with the American gold dollar. This switch was symptomatic of the increased importance of the American "neutral" market to the Japanese-dominated states.⁶⁶

After the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan was forced to become more dependent than ever upon Manchoukuo. The problem of making the state into a huge producer of heavy goods continued to become more complicated by the complete lack of foreign trade, the shortage of labor and equipment, and the concentration of Japanese troops presumably waiting for orders to attack the U.S.S.R. The "neighborhood factory" technique, used so successfully in the crowded cities of Nippon, was adopted in Manchoukuo in a belated, but unsuccessful, effort to stimulate production. Pressure for production probably became unbearable near the closing days of the war, especially after Japanese broadcasts predicted that Manchuria might become Japan's bastion for a final stand.⁶⁷

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

Manchoukuo's population statistics in and prior to 1940 reveal constant growth in numbers. On the second anniversary of the Mukden

⁶⁴ Schumpeter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 849-54.

⁶⁵ See Kurt Bloch, "Inflation and Prices in the Yen Bloc," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), pp. 183-90.

⁶⁶ Yen fixed at about \$.24. See Kurt Bloch, "Yen Bloc Currencies Switched from Sterling to Gold," *Far Eastern Survey*, VIII (1939), pp. 274-75.

⁶⁷ M. S. Culver, "Manchuria: Japan's Supply Base," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV (1945), 160-63.

incident, the Manchoukuo legation in Tokyo announced a population of 30,929,000. At the end of 1934, the official publication, *General Survey of Conditions in Manchuria*, estimated that the area of 450,000 square miles included a population of 32,500,000, exclusive of the Kwantung territory. On a comparative basis, this survey revealed that Manchoukuo's population living in about twice the area numbered about one-third that of the Japanese Empire proper. The first census in Manchuria's history, that of 1940, revealed, according to the preliminary report, that the country at that date actually had an area of 503,013 square miles, and a population of 43,233,954.⁶⁸ The great effort to establish the Japanese group at twenty per cent of the total population had resulted in dismal failure. During the war years, Chinese workers began once again to emigrate to Manchuria where many took up permanent residence. By 1945, the steady influx of Chinese—Communists, Nationalists and non-partisans—resembled the emigrations of the years before 1931.

Throughout the thirteen years of Manchoukuo's existence, the Chinese and Korean groups were the country's agriculturists. Although conditions for Koreans in Manchuria were far from ideal, the majority were better off than in their Japanese-controlled native land. Korean emigration to Manchuria was planned after it had become clear that Japanese farmers could not compete with the Chinese. The Japanese hoped the Koreans and Chinese would compete against each other, and would forget their common overlord.⁶⁹ This "divide and rule" policy in agriculture was fairly successful in the early years when Manchoukuo was being prepared for industrial expansion. After 1939, however, when agricultural production was badly needed, the Japanese collected bitter dividends of unrest, uprisings, passive resistance, and banditry. Belated efforts to collectivize agriculture were also notably unsuccessful in increasing production.

The farms were in the main owned by Chinese small farmers, Japanese capitalists, or Japanese-controlled enterprises. Although the South Manchuria Railway Company maintained agricultural experiment stations and research institutes, the individual farmer was either unwilling to accept the advice of the scientists, or it was not easily available to him. Agricultural and grazing methods remained primitive and uneconomic throughout the years of Japanese domination. Farmers existed at the subsistence level. Relief was forthcoming in time of flood, drought, or other great natural disaster, but the level of living for the majority of the population remained almost what it had been under Chinese warlord government.

In the urban communities, the new industrial, commercial, and public works projects were operated and managed by the Japanese, while Chinese,

⁶⁸ E. G. Beal, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 243-62.

⁶⁹ Cf. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea*, p. 82.

White Russian, and Manchu laborers worked as hirelings. By 1936, Hsinking had been made into a model and modern capital with impressive office buildings, planned highways, and a street car system. Other Manchurian cities and towns, for example Antung, mushroomed into large and busy centers of production and trade.

The non-Japanese urban citizens of Manchuria were even more seriously affected by Japan's ambitious economic program than the farm-dwellers. After 1937, large numbers of White Russians were forced to leave Harbin and other urban centers for China. Many of the Russians had been dispossessed, exorbitantly taxed, or chastized for holding contrary political opinions. The Chinese and the Manchus also found the tax burden crushing; by 1940 such essentials as opium, salt, oil, matches, soybeans, and even rice were government monopolies. Shortages also developed in most of these commodities because of the demands of Japan's war machine.

After 1937, the effort of the Manchoukuo government to end the illegal use of narcotics appears to have been genuine. A national anti-opium crusade was launched, registration and follow-up were more rigid, retail purveyors were more closely controlled, and the quantity of the drugs in the prepared mixture sold by the government was gradually reduced. In connection with this new program, however, it must be remembered that a new—and vast—dumping-ground for opium was being opened south of the wall as the Japanese armies moved into China. Nevertheless, by the end of July, 1938, a total of 592,354 opium smokers in Manchuria had admitted their addiction. These were probably nothing but the worst cases, for, as the Japanese admitted, the general populace feared that registration was merely an excuse for levying additional taxes, or exacting more forced labor.⁷⁰

After the Mukden Incident of 1931, the Japanese had ordained that the educational system of Manchuria should be based upon "Confucian" precepts rather than upon the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. The emphasis upon "Confucian" doctrine was thought to be in harmony with the more general principle of *Wang-tao*. Education in Manchoukuo was nationalized under a special department. New text-books were issued, and those used before 1931 were prohibited. In the planning of an educational program, "special emphasis . . . [was] given to character building based upon *Li Chiao* or Confucianism and vocational training."⁷¹ "Confucian" ideals of virtue, right conduct, propriety, and benevolence were made Manchoukuo's educational aims, since devotion to the emperor was considered the highest object of education. Nothing was mentioned of the doctrine

⁷⁰ See T. Nagashima, "Opium Administration in Manchoukuo," *Contemporary Manchuria*, III (1939), pp. 31-32.

⁷¹ S. M. R., *Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936* (Dairen, 1936), p. 134.

advanced by Mencius which proclaimed the right of the people to revolt whenever the emperor lost the "mandate of Heaven."⁷²

Of particular importance was the failure of the Manchurian regime to appropriate funds adequate to educational necessities. As a result, primary education suffered and advanced education was practically non-existent. Vocational and civic training were stressed in an effort to build up a backlog of trained workers, while keeping individual expression to a minimum. In July, 1932, Tatung Academy was founded at Hsinking for training youths destined for government service. Although a few medical training centers and colleges were operated by the South Manchuria Railway Company and other semi-official agencies, the National University at Hsinking was not opened until May, 1938, and then with an enrollment of but one hundred and fifty students. Under the direct supervision of the government, the university offered a six-year course divided into an upper and lower course of three years each. In both courses of the university's program the aim of training was "to inculcate the spirit [and basic ideals] of the founding of Manchoukuo."⁷³ The government also provided scholarships for a few selected individuals to undertake advanced work in Japan. At every educational level, the basic consideration was to prepare the peoples of Manchuria for maintaining the "harmony of the five races" under Japanese guidance.

Civic training in Manchuria was in the hands of the semi-official Concordia Society (*Hsieh-ho-hui*), "the oblique organization of Manchoukuo." Like most Manchoukuoan organizations, the staff of the Concordia group was dominated by government officials and well-trained Japanese. The main function of the society was to harmonize the five "races" by developing sympathy in them for the aims of Japan. After 1937, the society acted as the propaganda agent of the Japanese army by trying to convince the Chinese population of Manchuria that its real interest lay in co-operating with Japan against their countrymen south of the Wall. Patriotic celebrations, national contests, pamphlets, radio programs, and films made up part of the program offered the Japanese, Chinese, Manchu, and Mongolian inhabitants. Artificial as its program was, the Concordia Society gained influence by bringing minor diversions and much propaganda into the drab lives of the fun-starved people.⁷⁴

The rigorously controlled press was able to publish only those materials circulated by the Manchoukuo News Agency and the Manchuria News Publishing Association. News of China, Japan, and the rest of the world came into Manchuria through Domei, the Japanese news agency. Edi-

⁷² Cf. T. A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York, 1938), pp. 372-73.

⁷³ "Milestones of Progress," *Contemporary Manchuria*, I (November, 1937), 105; also see T. Shimizu, "School Education in Manchoukuo," *Contemporary Manchuria*, III (1939), 119-21.

⁷⁴ Cf. Bisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-82.

torial opinion and controversial news stories were practically eliminated from publications in all languages. Foreign newsreels were not shown unless carefully censored. Broadcasts were also designed to promote patriotism to the new state. Individual expression was practically an impossibility. As in Japan, "dangerous thoughts" were also subject to careful scrutiny by government officials, and frequently brought severe punishments.

After 1937 concessions were periodically made to discordant elements, such as the Mongols, to insure loyalty. Although a comparatively large Manchoukuo army existed after 1932, the steady drain on Japan's military personnel forced Manchoukuo to order conscription (April 6, 1940) for 1941. This measure was apparently designed to release more Japanese troops from Manchuria for action in China and in southeastern Asia. When the Pearl Harbor attack came on December 7, 1941, Manchoukuo also began formal participation in the war against the United States and its allies.

Although the war years were tragic for many individuals and families, there was no widespread effort at internal revolt. An indication, however, of the tension in Manchuria was implicit in the wartime special penal law (May 2, 1944) designed to punish those who hampered production, shirked their duties, or agitated among the half-starved people. When the Russians attacked during the last days of the war, the entire artificial façade crumbled along with Japanese control. Pu-yi and his state were taken captive by the Communist forces. After negotiations between Moscow and Chungking, treaty arrangements were concluded whereby Nationalist Chinese armies won permission to occupy the area following the gradual withdrawal of the Red Army.⁷⁵ The U.S.S.R., however, was to be permitted to use Port Arthur as a naval base and was to have lease rights for trading at Dairen. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. was to reassume its share of control in the Chinese Eastern Railway and the two nations were likewise to control jointly the South Manchuria Railway. Sovereignty in Manchuria thus returned to China, but, as after 1896, with a substantial measure of Russian influence still remaining.

⁷⁵ For details on these arrangements see chapter XVI, especially pp. 522-23.

CHAPTER XIV

CHINA'S RESISTANCE, 1937-1945

THE JAPANESE ADVANCE

In the early morning hours of July 8, 1937, radio listening posts and newspaper offices around the world were informed of the occurrence of another "incident" in northern China. As in the case of the Mukden conflict of six years before, observers and commentators were not immediately aware of the menacing character of the reports of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao, or Ditch-of-weeds Bridge). Although, since 1931, the number of Sino-Japanese "incidents" had aroused international discussion, actions in China were still thought to constitute but remote threats to world peace and order. Indeed, the news from the Far East in the early summer of 1937, had lulled the West generally into believing that a solution would ultimately be effected through "negotiations" between Tokyo and Nanking. The Sian truce had apparently insured China's internal peace. It was hoped that a compromise arrangement might also be expected to preserve international peace. Speaking in September before the League Assembly of the six months before the July outbreak, Anthony Eden declared that "the omens seemed more auspicious than for some time past for co-operation between the nations in that part of the world."¹

After the Sian coup the Japanese military, in particular, had watched anxiously the progress in China toward peace and stability. Diplomatic overtures and economic proposals were offered to Nanking in the hope of winning co-operation without incurring the expenditures of war. Still clear in the minds of the Japanese was the hornet's nest of opposition which Doihara had stirred up in 1935 by his efforts to organize an autonomy movement in China's five northern provinces. An outraged and increasingly united China, it was felt, would prove difficult to cope with. Given leadership, unity, and peace, the Nipponese realized that China would become constantly more resistant to Japan's plans for reorganization of eastern Asia. Although important Tokyo business interests continued to advocate a policy of peaceful penetration, the more "realistic" Nipponese diplomats and militarists understood that China would have hereafter to be forced into "co-operation."

¹ As quoted in Wunsz King, *The Crisis in the Far East, 1931-1937* (Brussels, 1937), p. 16.

As a matter of course, the circumstances of the Marco Polo Bridge episode were disputed.² The Chinese accused the Japanese troops stationed at Lukouchiao of having deliberately created another incident, so that additional concessions might be forced from Nanking. The Japanese pointed to the occurrence as another example of China's inability to live up to her international obligations. Standing upon their treaty rights, the Nipponese demanded a formal apology, evacuation of Chinese troops from Lukouchiao, and adequate suppression of anti-Japanese activities. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the details, patriotic Chinese were infuriated once again by the presence and demands of Japanese troops on China's soil. The conflicts of nationalisms in the far eastern picture were not greatly dissimilar to those that had existed between England and France in the years before and during the First Hundred Years' War. No permanent solution was possible so long as Japan persisted in aggressive actions. China's new and popular nationalism was highly sensitive to affronts and restrictions, particularly from another Oriental people.

It appeared at first as if both powers would willingly submit the conflict to negotiation. While reports of progress in discussions came steadily from the capitals involved, the Japanese continued to pour troops and supplies through the eastern Hopei corridor into the Peiping-Tientsin area. Meanwhile, foreign experts, conservative elements in the Kuomintang, and high ranking officers of the Chinese Army warned that China was not prepared to resist the highly efficient armed might of Japan. But even while compromise was being urged in official circles at Nanking, unofficial groups, such as the National Salvationists, were demanding resistance based upon the new United Front. Businessmen, students, teachers, workers, and the lower ranks in the army were determined that China should not capitulate again at another "Tangku." Boycotts were tightened and demonstrations were staged while members of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council attempted vainly to settle upon a course of action.

Responding to popular pressure, the Generalissimo on July 16 reported the circumstances of the dispute to the League and the non-League powers.³ Three days later he issued a proclamation outlining China's "minimum conditions" for peace. He refused to accept Japan's demands that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council act as a free and independent government, and he turned down Japan's demands that China withdraw the 29th Army from the Hopei area. Merely by resolving thus to stand on its sovereign rights, the Chinese government virtually threw down the gauntlet to the aggressive Japanese. Nanking was careful, however, not to close the door completely to a diplomatic settlement. Failure to acqui-

² For the opposing accounts see *ibid.*, pp. 1-20, and the pamphlet published by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York entitled *The Sino-Japanese Crisis, 1937* (New York, 1937).

³ For efforts at mediation see *infra*, p. 475.

esce readily was nevertheless viewed by the Japanese as a virtual ultimatum. After July 20, the situation became tenser, local incidents multiplied, and by the end of July "real," if still informal, war had come to northern China.

On July 26, an ultimatum was presented to General Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Having acted as intermediary in Sino-Japanese negotiations, General Sung was believed to be less anti-Japanese than most of his colleagues. However, even he could not accept Japan's demand for complete evacuation of Chinese troops from the Peiping area. With the expiration of the ultimatum's time limit, the Japanese, on the morning of July 28, launched what was termed a "punitive expedition"; the first campaign of the new phase of the protracted and disastrous war was thus entered upon.

Although the Chinese had plenty of war spirit, they lacked unified aims, organization, equipment, and leadership. During the July episodes the 29th Army, even while it was at the center of most discussions, formulated no well-developed plan for meeting Japanese attack. At first, the invaders met almost no organized resistance. Time after time Chinese troops were surprised in their barracks. Nor had they, or civilians, been trained to take shelter from the machine-gun fire of strafing airplanes. In consequence, the roads leading south and west from Peiping were strewn with the bodies of thousands of fleeing soldiers and civilians. By October, 1937, most of the strategic points and practically all the important cities in northern China, such as Peiping, Tientsin, and Kalgan, had been occupied by the Japanese. As both Nanking and Tokyo suspected, it appeared that Chinese resistance could not last long.

From Hopei the Japanese in the north launched their next major offensive action toward Shansi and the area defended by the Chinese Communists under the command of General Chu Teh. On September 10, 1937, after protracted negotiations between Yen-an and Nanking, the Red Army had been formally incorporated into the National Army and had received its designation as the Eighth Route Army (later called officially the Eighteenth Group Army, but the earlier term persisted until the end of the war). This army used tactics similar to those employed in Kiangsi during the years before the "Long March." Chu Teh and his colleagues had long since learned the consequences of attempting to fight positional battles when confronted by superior forces. Accordingly, guerrilla tactics were adopted as the best means for harassing the Japanese. Depending also to an unusual degree upon support from the local population, the Eighth Route Army was able, in November and December, to blunt the Japanese spearhead and to isolate and annihilate segments of the main Japanese forces. Even though Taiyüan, capital of Shansi, fell on November 9, the

Japanese were unable during the next eight years to enlarge significantly their hold on Shansi, or to obliterate the Communist border area.

Agitation against the Japanese also reached fever pitch in Shanghai and other important urban centers. Attacks upon Japanese nationals and businesses forced the Nipponese to evacuate most of their civilians from the Yangtze area. Nanking meanwhile ordered additional troops into the vicinity of Shanghai. The purpose of this move was to provoke Japan to attack China at its strongest point, and thereby to force the invaders to divide their energies. Moreover, Nanking also hoped to obtain greater foreign support by shifting the center of Sino-Japanese hostilities to the area where the Western powers had their greatest financial and commercial stakes. Nanking's effort met with quick response. In August, 1937, large-scale hostilities broke out in Shanghai and its environs. At first, the Chinese resistance was surprisingly strong, and more than faintly reminiscent of the resistance offered five years earlier by the Nineteenth Route Army. Although the Japanese were outnumbered by more than three to one, their superior equipment, training, and staff work finally paid high dividends in success. By November 9, the Chinese armies had been routed and disorganized, and no serious effort was made thereafter to defend Nanking. By December 13, the Nipponese were in China's capital, and subjected it to one of the most systematic pillagings—with accompanying raping and other cruelties on a vast scale—a conquered city has ever endured. After this Japan and the rest of the world felt that the war in China would draw abruptly to an end.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government had moved from Nanking to Hankow after the fall of Shanghai and had indicated that it would eventually seek refuge, if necessary, in the remote Szechuanese city of Chungking. Simultaneously, the Japanese had transferred forces north from Shanghai and south from Peiping along China's main railways with the object of co-ordinating and integrating their conquests in northern and central China. During the period of warfare along the railways, Governor Han Fu-chu of Shantung was induced to yield his province to the Japanese after virtually no fight at all. By May 19, 1938, after considerable resistance by Nationalist units under General Ch'ih Feng-ch'eng, the Japanese captured Hsüchow, junction of the Lunghai (east-west) and the Tientsin-Pukow railways. Thereafter the main force of the Japanese turned westward with the object of capturing the Peiping-Hankow railway, and Hankow itself. By October 25, they had invested that city with troops who had traveled up the Yangtze. The Peiping-Hankow railway line was never completely captured by the Nipponese, and the troops who were supposed to move down it to aid in the attack upon Hankow never arrived.

Contemporary with the battle for Hankow, the Nipponese launched a naval attack against Canton. After no more than token resistance the Chinese forces withdrew. Japan had thus won with ridiculous ease one of China's most important centers of supply and contact with the outside world.

Although the invaders continued to press their advantage from place to place and from time to time, the China war hung in suspended animation after the capture of Canton and Hankow. For a long period thereafter the Japanese were kept busy consolidating the captured areas, wiping out isolated pockets of resistance, and fighting the organized "behind-the-lines" efforts of the Communist guerrillas. Sporadic efforts to extend the Japanese lines into the interior met with practically no success. The Nipponese found eastern China a bite almost impossible to chew. Important centers and main rail lines had been captured with comparative ease; it was quite another matter to suppress resistance among the villagers of the countryside. As the phase of positional warfare ground to an inconclusive standstill a war of attrition began.

THE "NEW ORDER" IN CHINA

Long before the Marco Polo Bridge episode, the Japanese had protested, officially and unofficially, that they had no aggressive designs upon China. In the March, 1937, issue of *Bungei Shunju*, Lieutenant-General Doihara, sometimes dubbed the "Lawrence of Manchuria," wrote:

It is absolutely necessary for Japan to make the Chinese people understand thoroughly that she has no territorial ambition whatever toward China, and at the same time enlighten them that the real menace which would precipitate their country to its downfall is not Japan, but Communism. Without Japan, there will be no stability in the Orient. . . . In order to do away with the anti-Japanese sentiment in that country [China], Japan will have to win the hearts of the people directly, showing them the sincerity of her purpose. . . . Under such circumstances, therefore, Japan may come to an understanding with the Chinese central government only after winning the hearts of the Chinese people and creating a favorable atmosphere, in which the latter may carry on negotiations with the former for a co-operation.⁴

From September, 1931, to October, 1938, the Japanese were apparently seeking to create "a favorable atmosphere" for Chinese-Nipponese co-operation—by conquest, extermination, and pillage of the former.

When endeavoring to fathom the naïveté of the Japanese, it is instructive to recall Doihara's attitude as well as the actions of the Japanese

⁴ Translation in Okamura Shigeyashi (ed.), *Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics . . . in Japanese Magazines, Books, and Journals*, No. 165 (February 25, 1937), pp. 11-12.

army. Peace by the sword; co-operation from the conquered; forgiveness from those whose homes were sacked and whose loved ones were brutally mutilated or killed: such paradoxes seemed wholly reasonable to the sons of Nippon. Their pellucid sincerity in making "Asia free for Asiatics," by putting Asiatic countries to the sword, they felt should be understood and welcomed by men of good will. Assuming the justice of their cause, they failed to realize that others might recoil from the means adopted.

Shortly after the fall of Canton and Hankow in the autumn of 1938, Tokyo issued an official statement of objectives:

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tri-partite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China [note the order of names] in political, economic, cultural, and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed, is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and the progress of the world.⁵

At no time, apparently, if the Chinese would do as Japan wanted, did the Japanese envisage the elimination or absorption of the Chinese state; certainly, it was never mentioned. One of Tokyo's main and immediate concerns was to have acquiescent and co-operative governments at Hsinking and Nanking.⁶

The first major step in the governmental reorganization of intramural China was the adaptation to Japan's designs of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. On December 14, 1937, this was formally converted to the "Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic" with its headquarters at Peking (restored name for the former capital revived after Japanese occupation). The personnel of the "Provisional Government" was dominated by Japanese advisers and Chinese malcontents. The Peking "collaborators" were mostly members of the old Anfu clique and anti-Kuomintang Chinese who had held official positions in the imperial government. Disgruntled by their political eclipse, certain of the mandarins of former years hoped to re-establish the old regime under Japanese auspices. The Renewed Peoples' Association (*Hsin-min-hui*), although organized in northern China to replace the New Life Movement, was also vehemently anti-Communist and largely anti-Western. Traditional moral and political

⁵ S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (eds.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations, January, 1938-June, 1939* (Boston, 1939), I, 229-30.

⁶ T. K. Koo, "Some Economic Documents Relating to the Genesis of the Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (November, 1946), pp. 65-77.

precepts were held aloft as basic ideals. In numerous other respects it also ran parallel, rather than counter, to the teachings of Generalissimo Chiang's New Life group, but it never gained widespread influence. Throughout the war years the "Provisional Government" continued to function actually, if not legally, as one of the Japanese governments for China; never was it more than a puppet regime.⁷

As part of the Kwantung Army's advance into Chahar and Shansi provinces, a puppet government for Inner Mongolia was also established. Using Prince Teh's "young Mongol" group as a political spearhead, the Japanese organized the occupied sections of Inner Mongolia and adjoining areas into what was called Mengchiang (Mongolian Marches). With Kalgan as its seat of government, this puppet regime claimed autonomy over a large part of the northern border region, but its actual control was limited to the occupied areas. Supposed to be independent of the Peking regime, both governments were tarred with the Japanese brush.

On the fall of Nanking, another new ward was adopted into the family of Japanese-sponsored governments. On March 28, 1938, the "Reformed Government of the Chinese Republic" appeared in the southern capital. Organized along the lines of the Kuomintang's "Five-Power" government, the "Reformed" group attempted to act as the legitimate government of central China. Personnel of the same stripe used in Peking occupied the offices of the new regime. The Great People's Association—*Ta-min-hui*—was organized along the lines of the *Hsin-min-hui*. Since both sponsored regimes claimed to be the legal government of China, the Japanese were forced, in September, 1938, to establish a "United Council of China" with representatives from both Peking and Nanking. Although this cumbersome machinery functioned as the official government of occupied China until 1940, its various agencies were rarely more than instruments through which the Japanese military executed policies decided upon in Tokyo.

As the stalemate continued, the Japanese came to realize that they must establish an effective government for China, or themselves undertake the task of administering the occupied area. On December 16, 1938, the China Affairs Board had been set up in Tokyo as a cabinet agency responsible for occupied China. At no time, however, did it undertake the governing of China: its activities were confined to policy making.

As illustrative of Japan's desire for an agreeable and effective Chinese government, reference should also be made to the Japanese peace overture following the capture of Nanking. Acting through the German ambassador to China, an agent whom the Japanese Foreign Office had employed for mediation as early as November 5, 1937, Tokyo proposed at the beginning of 1938 that Chiang be induced to ask for peace. The conditions

⁷ For details on the emergence of the Peking regime sponsored by Japan see especially George E. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China* (New York, 1940), pp. 17-34.

were that Generalissimo Chiang again should remain in power, collaborate with Japan against Communism, agree to the presence of Nipponese troops in certain strategic areas, form an economic alliance with the yen bloc, and pay the "necessary" indemnities.⁸ Unable to deter the army hotbloods long enough for negotiations to crystallize, the Japanese were likewise unable to win Chiang's agreement.

With the failure of German mediation the Japanese began a search for other candidates who might enjoy a degree of popular respect and who might be more co-operative. Following several unsuccessful attempts to entice Chiang into co-operation, the Japanese and their Chinese colleagues sought General Wu P'ei-fu. But he refused to collaborate as long as Japanese troops remained on Chinese soil; in 1939, the old General died of an undetermined cause. As third choice, the Japanese turned to Wang Ching-wei. In his earlier years Wang had been one of Dr. Sun's closest associates; after Sun's death, he had tried unsuccessfully many times to wrest control of the Kuomintang from Chiang Kai-shek. As a civilian, Wang was never able to make good his pretensions by resort to military action. Nevertheless, he had commanded respect from most groups in the Nationalist government and had a small following of active disciples. With the passage of years, however, Wang's stock had declined. This was particularly true after Chiang's tremendous rise in popularity at the time of the Sian episode. When the Japanese bait was dangled before his eyes, Wang probably felt that his last opportunity to acquire power had come. Feeling that their cause was hopeless, he deserted his former colleagues at Chungking in December, 1938. After lengthy negotiation of terms with Japan, on March 30, 1940, he assumed at Nanking the presidency of the newly "Reorganized National Government of China."⁹

Wang was accompanied in his disaffection by an appreciable number of important figures in the Kuomintang. Many of the politically conservative preferred co-operation with the Japanese to possible association with the Communists. Others rationalized their desertion by arguing that Chiang was fighting a useless and hopeless battle. Political expediency seemed to dictate that national welfare required compromise with Japan to prevent either the Western powers or the Communists from gaining ascendancy in China. Political unity, Wang apparently believed, could be preserved only by accepting Japan's terms for economic collaboration.

The Japanese-sponsored Nanking government was designed to function as a reorganized version of that of the Kuomintang. Wang allegedly held to the principles of Dr. Sun, and the agencies of his government were based

⁸ See H. S. Quigley, *Far Eastern War* (Boston, 1941), pp. 81-84. For more recent data see James T. C. Liu, "German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VIII (1949).

⁹ Consult L. Rosinger, *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 33-36; also his *China's Crisis* (New York, 1945), pp. 58-64.

in form upon the Five-Power Constitution. His party was allegedly a reorganized version of the Kuomintang and pretended to be even more orthodox. In all events Wang sought to appear legitimate. Never did he succeed, however, in winning a significant following among his countrymen, nor did his regime exercise effective authority in northern China. Whatever authority his Nanking government had ended where Japanese control ended, and sometimes even sooner. Although he had wrung concessions from the Japanese in return for collaboration, the independence of his government was merely a fiction. On November 30, 1940, Japan tried to perpetuate the fiction by signing a treaty with Wang based upon Nippon's cherished method for handling the "China incident." The "Chinese government" agreed to work in harmony with the Mikado's realm through economic co-operation and joint defense against Communism. Northern China and Inner Mongolia were destined to become under this program mere satellite states in Japan's expanding economic and military empire of northeastern Asia.¹⁰

It was through use of Wang's regime and by economic penetration that the Japanese hoped to extend their control from the cities and railway lines into the vast hinterlands. Beginning in 1937, Japan began working to incorporate "North China" as a smooth-working cog in the yen bloc. On November 7, 1938, the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were organized as supervisory agencies (virtually holding companies) for strategic business enterprises in occupied China. The Japanese were particularly concerned in northern China with the exploitation of vital coal and iron resources. In central China the occupation authorities concentrated upon food and industrial production. However, the failure of the masses to accept the decrees and orders emanating from Nanking made the co-ordination of China's economy, always extremely difficult, an almost insuperable task. Although Japan managed to draw increasingly large supplies from the continent, the occupied territories in no sense fulfilled expectations.

The social and economic groups most responsive to the enticements of collaboration were the politically defunct among the warlords and the conservative gentry. By using the traditional, as well as the newer totalitarian, devices for exacting the utmost from laborers and peasants, the Chinese collaborationists managed to satisfy the minimum requirements of their insular overlords. As a condition of recognition by Japan, Wang's regime gave tacit recognition to Manchoukuo. Apparently, however, Wang continued to be dissatisfied by the crumbs of prestige which fell his way. In June, 1941, he journeyed to Tokyo for an interview with the Japanese emperor. The object of this visit was probably to request a

¹⁰ Details in Quigley, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

greater degree of independence and wider recognition for his regime.¹¹ In the following month Japan's European partners (Germany, Italy, Spain, Rumania, "Slovakia," and "Croatia") accorded formal recognition to the "orthodox Kuomintang" regime. No greater degree of independence was forthcoming until two years later.

As the Pacific war began to turn in an unfavorable direction, the Nipponese were forced to rely more heavily than before upon Wang's government. With the withdrawal of important armed units from central China for use in other theaters of war, a Chinese armed force under the Nanking authorities was permitted existence. Soldiers were recruited by impressment and promises. In the hope of improving their lot, numbers deserted from the Nationalist forces and joined with Wang. On October 30, 1943, Tokyo sought to demonstrate its good intentions by entering a treaty of alliance with Nanking.¹² In a propaganda effort to counteract the effects upon China of the American-British decision to relinquish extraterritoriality, the Japanese returned their concessions, abolished extraterritorial rights, and transferred control of numerous official monopolies to Nanking. Thus, as the Japanese became weaker, Wang's cherished hope of more control appeared to be approaching reality.

The mirage of independence, however, vanished completely as it gradually became apparent that the Western powers were determined to maintain Chiang in power. Less than a year before Japan's final collapse, Wang Ching-wei died. Although he was succeeded by Chen Kung-po, another somewhat widely known Kuomintang figure of prewar days, the "Reorganized National Government" had already started on its descent to oblivion. In its wake Wang's regime left a heritage of thorny problems regarding ownership of confiscated properties, distrust of one social group for another, and a countryside suspicious of all central authority.

NATIONALIST CHINA

In July, 1937, many responsible officials in the Kuomintang National Government believed that their country's resistance would collapse before the end of the first year's hostilities. Indeed, it was not until six months after the Marco Polo Bridge outbreak that Nanking's minister to Tokyo was recalled. Public statements by high-ranking officials also reflected a deep scepticism about China's ability to maintain a long resistance.¹³ In addition to those whose doubts were honest there were others who preferred a Japanese victory. They feared that Chinese success under the

¹¹ *Chicago Daily News*, June 16, 1941.

¹² Additional material in Ai-li S. Chin, "Japanese Rule in China," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XIV, No. 5 (March 14, 1945), pp. 56-57.

¹³ See Rosinger, *China's Wartime Politics*, pp. 29-30.

auspices of the United Front would give the liberals and Communists an undesirable amount of prestige and influence.

The truce concluded after the Sian episode was felt by the majority in both parties to be, at best, an undesirable, but necessary compromise. It had not been effected by a negotiated agreement, but by parallel statements emanating from Nanking and Yen-an. That the Japanese were conscious of the divided counsels in the Kuomintang camp was testified by their persistent, and frequently successful, efforts to negotiate with important figures in the Chinese government. Their frequent peace offensives were also launched with the hope of winning co-operation without further sacrifices. The Germans, who were closer to both the Japanese and the Chinese governments than other neutrals, were often asked either to initiate, or to act as intermediaries, in the transmission of peace proposals to Generalissimo Chiang. After the fall of Canton and Hankow in the autumn of 1938, many felt that the time had come for the conclusion of negotiated peace. When Chiang and his group in the Kuomintang determined to continue resistance, Wang Ching-wei and his supporters deserted to the enemy in the hope of establishing a government acceptable to both the Chinese and the Japanese.

Possibly Chiang decided upon continued resistance because of the tremendous upsurge of popular favor which swept to his regime during its dark hours. Even after it had become obvious to the most fervent patriots that the Chinese armies alone would never be strong enough to drive the invaders from the occupied areas, the Chinese people responded to Kuomintang leadership with far more loyalty and courage than they ever displayed before. Nevertheless, defeatism existed in all layers of society and in all political groups. At no time before or since, however, have the Chinese been fired by the willingness to fight, irrespective of class or educational lines, as a nation for the nation's independent existence. By responding to popular sentiment, Chiang's political stature was immeasurably increased for a time among both his own people and Westerners.

While the National government was located in Hankow, the Kuomintang Congress, on March 29, 1938, issued its declaration of "Resistance and Reconstruction."¹⁴ In the statement on economic affairs, the Congress advocated policies designed to encourage co-operatives, to initiate stricter financial regulations, to improve facilities of communication and transport, and to enact legislation for control of speculation and war-profiteering. Reorganization of education was also planned. Emphasis hereafter was to be placed "on the cultivation of morals, scientific research, and the expansion of research facilities." In line with Communist policy, the army was supposed to receive more political training. Furthermore, the Congress in an effort to appease discordant elements pledged the or-

¹⁴ Text in *ibid.*, pp. 100-103.

ganization of a representative People's Political Council (P. P. C.) to advise the government. It also ordained that "all classes of people shall be mobilized for war. The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat." These were fair words and probably more in accord with popular demand than anything issued by the Kuomintang during the remaining years of war. For once, it appeared that Chinese would act together, fight alongside of each other, and work in harmony for the common welfare.



Chungking. Courtesy *Life*, copyright *Time*, Inc.

It was hoped that "Free China" would truly strive toward greater unity and more democratic institutions.

Hope was short-lived. Almost immediately after the withdrawal of the National government to Chungking, the war settled down to a test of endurance. During the years of essential stalemate in and after 1938 the old discords and antagonisms reappeared. Even in the new environment of the Southwest, traditional lines of political, social, and economic cleavage were strictly drawn. The deeds of the Kuomintang failed to match its words. By midsummer of 1938, the United Front began to show unmistakable signs of strain. Hope nevertheless flamed again with the first meetings of the People's Political Council. Even the Communists thought

of the new Council "as a clear expression of the tendency toward democracy in China."¹⁵

As originally constituted, the first P. P. C. was supposed to represent geographical and political divisions of the country. Representatives were also present from Mongolia and Tibet and from among the vast Chinese population overseas. Nominated by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the members were selected from most social and economic classes, but not on a proportionate basis. Although a large proportion of its two hundred members were adherents of the Kuomintang, seven Communists sat in at the first meetings. Among its powers the P. P. C. had the right to consider all important domestic and international proposals of the government. It could also raise problems for the government's consideration, receive and discuss government reports, and interpellate responsible officials. At its first meeting, in Hankow, on July 6, 1938, Wang Ching-wei was elected Chief Speaker, an office held by him until his flight from Chungking in December.¹⁶

The second session of the first P. P. C. was held in Chungking from October 27 to November 6, 1938. Although war's disruptions prevented many members from attending the meetings, the second session was noteworthy for its expression of firm determination to continue resistance. At the same time the first faint criticisms of the Kuomintang's censorship policy were heard from spokesmen representing various shades of opinion. It was shortly after the P. P. C. and the Kuomintang had determined upon the policy of continued resistance that Wang Ching-wei deserted to the enemy. In a forthright statement of December 26, 1938, Chiang announced to Japan and the world that China, despite hardships and disaffections, would continue its "sacred struggle for international justice."¹⁷

During 1939, unoccupied China began to implement the reconstruction phase of its announced program. In the southwest industrialization became the watchword. Although facilities were primitive and modern communications unknown, numerous business concerns had endeavored to transport their industrial plants from the coastal cities to the hinterland. As they fled hastily before the Japanese advance, only a few reached Szechwan intact. However, some of the blast furnaces and steel furnaces of the Hanyehping Iron Works, the largest iron and steel works in China, were transplanted from Hupeh to Szechwan. Although the original owners were at times successful in re-establishing themselves, they were often forced to call upon the government for aid. The government itself evinced real concern for the rational organization of its new industrial base.

¹⁵ As quoted in Pan Wei-tung, *The Chinese Constitution: A Survey of Forty Years of Constitution-Making in China* (Washington, 1945), p. 95, n. 27.

¹⁶ For additional details see *ibid.*, pp. 89-95.

¹⁷ Text in Quigley, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-93.

Chungking quickly took the initiative in marking out new industrial regions, in granting priorities to strategic enterprises, and in regulating activities of capitalists and laborers. With the development of close relationships between government and business, officials in government became interested in business enterprises, and industrialists came to regard their interests as being identified with the maintenance of a favorable political regime. The trend of close co-operation thus inaugurated under pressure of war developed, in and after 1943, into a regimented economy.

At the outset the Kuomintang government agreed to permit the organization of a network of industrial co-operatives. Under the leadership of Rewi Alley, a most able crusading New Zealander, and with considerable Western—particularly, American—aid, the co-operative movement made, for some three years, rapid progress. During 1939, more than one thousand industrial co-operatives provided many Chinese with experience in practical democracy. Soon, however, shortages of funds and materials, inadequate and untrained personnel, factional disputes over organization, and the trend toward reaction in government confronted the co-operatives with insurmountable difficulties. The conservatives were especially alarmed by the marked successes of the co-operatives in the Communist areas. By 1942, the number of societies declined, and their influence waned, as government funds, and other expressions of approbation, were withdrawn.¹⁸

Industrialization was further complicated by the country's precarious financial position. In the prewar years the central government had depended almost exclusively upon the customs and the salt taxes for revenue; provincial authorities generally collected and disbursed the proceeds from the land tax. With the occupation of the seaboard cities and the ports of entry, the Nationalist government lost most of its tariff revenues. Chinese and foreign capital fled from native to foreign banks, the latter enjoying the rights and protection of extraterritoriality. Meanwhile, in an effort to confuse China's money markets, the Japanese circulated bogus currency. In the later stages of the war, at least eight currencies were circulating in China. Indeed, because of the widespread confusion in exchange rates, many enterprises were reduced to barter. Currency depreciation and rising prices bred black markets in money and commodities. During each subsequent year, financial confusion and disappearing commodities eventuated in a whirling cataclysm of inflation.¹⁹

Although the government endeavored to bring a degree of order out of the hopeless financial chaos, it was unsuccessful. Black markets ex-

¹⁸ Additional details on the ill-fated Indusco experiments in Hubert Freyn, *Free China's New Deal* (New York, 1943), pp. 53–58; see also Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang K'ai-shek* (Boston, 1941), pp. 223–34. For a re-evaluation of the movement see Ida Pruitt, "Six Years in Indusco," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV (1945), 45–52.

¹⁹ See Freyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–35.

panded until the area of legitimate business was narrowed almost out of existence. Loans were floated abroad, but until 1941 they were of insignificant proportions. For instance, American loans before Pearl Harbor were secured for the most part on Chinese exports and amounted to \$170,000,000. They were also timed as political maneuvers to keep the Chinese in the war.²⁰ Most advantageous to China before 1941 were the credits and barter agreements with the U.S.S.R., and of primary importance was the Sino-Russian trade treaty of June 16, 1939.²¹ After the break on December 7, 1941, in peacetime relations between Japan and the Western powers, the American loans to China were designed to help restore confidence in the Nationalist currency—the government printing presses having been working overtime—to stabilize commodity prices, and to aid in the purchase of foreign commodities. According to Washington estimates, American aid to China from Pearl Harbor to the end of 1946 amounted to more than two billion dollars.²² Figures of themselves, however, had but little meaning. To stricken China, goods on the spot were far more vital than credits in foreign banks.

Failure of the Chungking government to deal effectively with its financial problems may be attributed to the normal strains of war, to inflation, and to the domination in the government of those who opposed basic economic and social reform. Unable to pay for their purchases in any other way, the government issued paper money. As the paper depreciated in value, prices spiraled, particularly as shortages of consumer goods became critical. Landlords, speculators, and hoarders profiteered at the expense of the fixed income groups, such as the civil servants and the professional people. Prices of rice fluctuated so violently that it became impossible to operate on a monetary basis. In 1941, a land tax payable *in kind* was introduced by the central government.²³ Barter was also more frequently resorted to during the war years. Although Chungking issued control measures, price-ceilings, anti-hoarding decrees, and collected ever higher taxes, the machinery for enforcing the measures was either lacking or inadequate. Black marketeers, moreover, had sufficient influence in official circles to be virtually inviolable. Corrupt officials used official information for their side-line profiteering activities. The tax *in kind* fell far more heavily upon the small landowners than upon the wealthy gentry.²⁴ Inflation was especially disastrous to government employees, teachers, students, small merchants, and workers. During 1942, regular rice allowances were made by the government to sustain the inflation-stricken groups

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

²¹ Text in H. L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-45* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 189-99.

²² *New York Times*, December 31, 1946.

²³ Detailed discussion of its operation in Freyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-85.

²⁴ See Rosinger, *China's Crisis*, pp. 178-79.

who lived on fixed or semi-fixed incomes. The effect of economic disorganization upon the military and political efforts of the Kuomintang can hardly be overemphasized.

While endeavoring to meet the economic crisis, the Chungking government also concerned itself with spiritual mobilization. Patriotism was stressed as the only influence strong enough to awaken in profiteers a sense of self-denial, or in tax evaders that of the need to pay their taxes.²⁵ A National Enemy-Resisting Oath was propounded in twelve articles and was supposed to be administered in every hamlet. Devotion to the nation was stressed in public addresses. The ideals of the New Life movement were given wartime meanings: propriety was interpreted to mean "good discipline"; justice was expanded to "ungrudging sacrifice"; integrity was to mean "thrift"; and conscientiousness came to imply "heroic struggle." Defeatism, cliquism, and evasion of responsibility became "deadly sins" in a country fighting for its life.²⁶ Although many responded nobly by military effort or financial contributions, the war and the inflation continued to go against the Kuomintang. Then, in July, 1940, when Britain was forced to close the Burma Road, many "experts" wrote the Chungking government off as a noble experiment.

Another phase of the reconstruction program reopened in the third session of the Peoples Political Council (February 12-21, 1939) was the question of the gradual movement of the country toward constitutional democracy. The small parties, as well as the Communists, demanded concrete assurances that individual liberties would be guaranteed, that the constitutional program of prewar days would be revived, and that the nation would continue its democratic direction in spite of the stress of war. Elements within the Kuomintang, as well as government opponents, viewed with suspicion the steady accretions to the Generalissimo's powers, and the arbitrary conduct of many influential figures in the government. Centralization was something new to modern China. The gradual extinction of Chiang's warlord enemies was primarily responsible for the reduction of provincial autonomy, and for the growth in authority of the central regime. The warlord regimes in the southwest, particularly those in Szechwan and Yunnan, had ceased, during the war years, to be major threats to the political or economic authority of the Kuomintang.²⁷ Fear of the Japanese and removal of Kuomintang headquarters to the west were the main reasons for the spread of central authority to these former strong-

²⁵ See particularly the text of the Generalissimo's speech at the opening meeting of the third general session of the first P. P. C. in the *News Releases of the China Information Committee*, No. 348, February 23, 1939.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 346, February 20, 1939.

²⁷ Consult the excellent discussions of "modernization in the provinces" in Freyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-227.

holds of resistance. Thereafter, systematic efforts were undertaken by the government to eradicate the remaining nonco-operative elements.

After limiting provincial autonomy, the Kuomintang inaugurated in some areas a reorganized system of local government. Where possible, provincial governments were incorporated in the new administrative organization merely as adjuncts of the central regime. Local problems, administrative and economic, were, in general, assigned to the jurisdiction of the county (*hsien*). As issued in September, 1939, the new *hsien* law provided for a high degree of self-government in the county and its subdivisions.²⁸ The counties were divided into communes (town and villages), whereas the communes consisted traditionally, and under the new law, of *pao* and *chia*. According to established norms, the *chia*, as the smallest unit of administration, includes about ten families. A *pao* consists of approximately ten *chia*. The average commune comprises anywhere from twenty to thirty *pao*, and the *hsien* includes all the villages and market towns within an area established by geography, tradition, economic organization, or governmental decree.

As planned in theory, by the law of 1939 the officials at each level in the county were eventually to be elected and responsible to the governing councils. In the *chia* the household heads were to constitute the legal governing body, whereas representative councils were to rule in the *pao*, the communes, and the counties. Until the system could be more fully organized and made to function, the local officials were to be appointed by the central government. In the meanwhile, schools were founded in many villages and towns to train eligible persons for political office. Responsibility to local councils, and to provincial and central authorities, also requires trained administrative personnel. This need for efficient administration also dictated Kuomintang emphasis upon training citizens for the responsibilities of self-government. In 1944, more than eighty per cent of the counties in the seventeen provinces controlled by Chungking were functioning on paper, at least, under the new system. Szechwan, the wartime seat of the central government, was developed as the "model province."²⁹

The "county system" has been one of the Kuomintang's answers to its critics. Spokesmen for the government have repeatedly argued that China must undergo systematic preparation for democracy before trying to introduce it. The magnitude of the task, it is asserted, precludes quick results. Training of personnel for official posts, reduction of illiteracy,

²⁸ See Chien Tuan-sheng, "Wartime Local Government in China," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (December, 1943), pp. 441-60; for the effects of the new system upon a small community see Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village, Taitou, Shantung Province* (New York, 1945), pp. 244-46; cf. also Sun Fo, *China Looks Forward* (New York, 1944), pp. 79-82.

²⁹ Figures taken from Chu Fu-sung, "Progress toward Constitutional Government" in H. K. Tong (ed.), *China after Seven Years of War* (New York, 1945), pp. 160-61.

and gradual growth of local democratic institutions were advanced as measures necessarily prior to constitutional democracy on a national scale.

Critics of the government accused it of failing to carry its plans into practice. For instance, the Communists insisted that democracy would be possible only by redistribution of wealth. The government, it was pointed out, hoped to realize political democracy while upholding the landlord-gentry class, and while failing to work sincerely toward improving the peasant's lot. Even while county units of government were being organized, the central regime did fail to move positively to reduce rents or to regulate rates of interest. Reminiscent of what the Japanese had done in Manchuria in the countryside, the *pao-chia* system was used as a police force "to get the people of a locality to keep watch upon one another." Every *pao* was held responsible for the actions of each family within its jurisdiction. The new system of local government was also used to help in the drafting of soldiers and laborers, fighting bandits, and suppressing of the opium traffic.³⁰

At the fourth session of the People's Political Council (September 9–18, 1939), the whole problem of constitutionalism and the convocation of a People's Congress was reopened. With the permission of Chiang Kai-shek, a Constitutionalism Promotion Committee was created for the purpose of publicizing and reconsidering the May 5 (1937) draft. Shortly thereafter, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang also yielded to pressure sufficiently to set November 12, 1940, as the date for the first meeting of the People's Congress. After these decisions, discussions became heated and partisan politics reassumed something of their former importance. After six months of debate, the government postponed the promised constitutional meeting "on account of communications and other difficulties," for it was during July–October, 1940, that the Burma road was closed, that British troops were withdrawn from China, that France had fallen, and that the Japanese had on September 10 joined the Axis.

With the failure of the People's Congress to convene, the critics of the Kuomintang lashed out violently against the government's repressive measures and the increasing degree of centralization. The decision in the spring of 1938 to force all non-Kuomintang youth organizations to register with the government was one of the first measures which all but obliterated organizations such as the National Salvation Association. Registration certificates were almost impossible to obtain except on terms unacceptable to independent or opposition groups. Contemporaneously, the government organized the official San-min-chu-i Youth Corps with its slogan of "One Doctrine, One Party, One Leader." After 1938, the corps' influence as a secret service group continually expanded. Most of its functions

³⁰ Cf. discussion *supra*, pp. 416–17.

and objectives were confined to the glorification of the Party's creed and to arbitrary actions against dissenters. Such measures may have been in part the inevitable consequences of total war, but the political opposition viewed them as arbitrary, and designed to perpetuate the power and influence of single-party government.³¹

During January, 1941, the first open break after the Sian truce appeared in the relations of the Kuomintang and the Communists. Hostilities broke out in the Yangtze valley between a section of the Communist New Fourth Army and Nationalist forces. Violent recriminations resulted, and contradictory manifestos were issued by Chungking and Yen-an. Although a pretense of unity was maintained until the end of the war, it was evident to participants and observers alike that Yen-an hereafter acted as an independent government. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang tightened its blockade of the Communist area by concentrating thousands of troops badly needed elsewhere in the vicinity of Sian. Moreover, frequent discussions took place in Chungking as to whether the Japanese or the Communists constituted the major enemy. The conservative members of the Kuomintang were, in general, strong advocates of proceeding directly against Yen-an irrespective of consequences.

To prevent resumption of civil war in China, the minor political parties and the independents stepped into the breach. Like the Communists, they had no clear-cut legal existence, but they were tolerated. They functioned as small, but important, pressure groups. In March, 1941, when the Communists refused to dispatch their delegates to the meetings of the new People's Political Council, the small parties banded together in the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties and Political Groups. Included in the Federation were the Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the Third Party, the National Salvation Association, the Rural Reconstruction Association, the Vocational Education Association, and many unaffiliated individuals. Their objects were to promote unity, and to spur on the movement toward democracy and constitutionalism.³²

On October 10, 1941, the Federation of Democratic Parties issued a ten-point program³³ calling for unity, termination of one-party rule, discontinuance of the close financial and political relationships between the Kuomintang and the government, abolition of secret police organizations, concentration camps and indoctrination centers, introduction of civil lib-

³¹ Cf. the discussions of the Kuomintang's youth program in *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 1941; Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, ed. by P. Jaffe (New York, 1947), pp. 214-29; Sun Fo, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-22; and Linebarger, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-53.

³² Consult the accounts in Tseng Chao-lun, "The Chinese Democratic League," *Current History*, Vol. XI, No. 59 (July, 1946), pp. 31-37; also Agnes Smedley, "The Social Revolution," in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *China* (Berkeley, 1946), pp. 185-86. For details in Kuomintang's relations to the other parties see *China Handbook, 1937-43* (New York, 1943), pp. 49-55.

³³ Complete text in Rosinger, *China's Wartime Politics*, pp. 122-23.

erties, and effective control of profiteering and black-market operations. Criticism was also directed against the tendency of certain Kuomintang conservatives to urge compromise with the foreign invaders rather than compromise with the Chinese Communists. Good relations between the Communists and the majority of the parties in the Federation were fairly constant, mainly because the Communists welcomed their support, because of their mutual interest in social and economic reforms, and because of their common mistrust of the exclusiveness of Kuomintang policies.

With the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, China felt assured, for the first time since 1939, that aid would be forthcoming from the industrial nations of the West. The Federation welcomed the psychological influence of alliance with the democracies as much as members of the government welcomed what they expected would be an avalanche of war materials. Although America and Britain gradually managed to start a trickle of supplies moving toward Chungking, the two years after Pearl Harbor were more difficult for the defenders of China than the years before. The United States and England showed their "good will" by renouncing all extraterritorial rights in China.³⁴ Overtures, however, were not grist for the mill of war, or for the stabilization of a shaky economy. Trucks crept over the tortuous Burma route, and planes valiantly braved mountains and weather to transport men and materials from India. Loans were granted, but the necessary goods were too long in arriving to aid materially until 1944.

Dispirited and disillusioned by the repeated failures of substantial aid to arrive, the leaders of the Kuomintang again became more conciliatory toward the Communists and the minor parties. American and British statesmen also encouraged reconciliation in the hope that China might thereby be enabled to continue in the war. Liberals within the Kuomintang, such as Madame Sun Yat-sen and Sun Fo, gained in prestige by virtue of the appeal of their programs to British and American observers. Sun Fo's effort to democratize the Kuomintang, and thereby introduce democratic reforms throughout the country, was viewed from Washington and London as a sane and practical approach to political reconstruction. The Political Science group (*Cheng-hsüeh-hsi*), including mainly bankers and industrialists, was also favored by the Western powers. Its power, however, had been eclipsed by the loss of China's port cities and industrial centers.

Rise in prestige for the liberal and moderate wings of the Kuomintang was temporary. Still powerful in the councils of the Generalissimo was the Militarist group known as the Huang-p'ü (Whampoa, after the famous military academy) clique led by such personages as General Ho Ying-chin, the War Minister. The San-min-chu-i Youth Corps, headed by the

³⁴ Details *infra*, p. 505.

Generalissimo, also continued to act as a secret service group. Education and the Party machine were still dominated by the C. C. clique of Chen Li-fu and his brother, Chen Kuo-fu, and their friends.

It was Chiang's political art to maintain a precarious balance among the political groups within the Kuomintang, while simultaneously appeasing domestic and foreign critics. Although various shifts in government took place, almost always the established officials were simply reshuffled. No group was permitted an excess of control, and, correspondingly, no group was ever completely eliminated. A striking feature of the Kuomintang after its break with the Communists was the continuing domination of the party by almost the same groups and the same individuals.

As the war and the inflation continued to mount in seriousness after Pearl Harbor, conservative groups gradually reassumed the foremost position. Liberals were permitted greater freedom of speech and press than heretofore, but possession of the strategic offices remained in the hands of Chiang's conservative supporters. The Generalissimo himself increased immeasurably in power and popularity during the war years. After the death of Lin Sen, titular President of the Chinese Republic to August, 1943, Chiang added the presidency to his long list of honors and offices, and it was enlarged to fit his stature. After his election as President in September, 1943, Chiang exercised almost dictatorial powers through the presidency and his numerous other official positions.³⁵ Like other dictators and "absolute" rulers, however, at no time was he completely free from dependence upon the support of pressure groups and followers immediately surrounding him. Most of the government's actions, apparently, were undertaken not on his personal initiative, but rather with his yielding to one form of pressure or another.

Typical of the Kuomintang's policy during the years at Chungking was *China's Destiny* (*Chung-kuo Chih-ming yüan*) written in part by Chiang and circulated in China during and after 1943. With the aid of Tao Hsi-sheng, a former professor at Peking—or Peiping—National University, the Generalissimo prepared this highly controversial document explaining the principles and ideals of his government. Appearing on March 10, 1943, it sold widely in every part of unoccupied China. In 1944, a revised Chinese edition was brought out which was permitted to circulate outside the country.³⁶

³⁵ Lists of Chiang's many offices are included in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *Voices from Unoccupied China* (Chicago, 1943), p. xvii, and in Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (New York, 1946), pp. 124-25.

³⁶ In January, 1946, the U. S. Department of State continued to classify its translation of *China's Destiny* as a "secret." An official English translation was not published until it became obvious that Philip Jaffe was about to issue an "unofficial" version in the first months of 1947. The authorized translation was by Wang Chung-hui, and includes an introduction by Lin Yu-tang. Chiang's other utterances are compiled in *The Collected Wartime Messages of Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-45* (2 vols.; New York, 1946).

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Designed to clarify and inculcate party and personal doctrine, *China's Destiny* reviews China's "history" from the viewpoint of Chiang and part of the Kuomintang—with an eye to the present and future in terms of control by conservative elements. Its "historical" sections are noteworthy for their distortions of fact and for the "moral" object lessons which the Generalissimo draws from the, at times nonexistent, past for the instruction of the present. Repeated references to classical writers, to China's unique civilization, to Chinese "virtues" illustrate the narrow and bigoted nationalism of the ruling sect. Mythology is calmly presented as fact. It is held that:

. . . the ethical tenets, of a Chinese citizen are loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, righteousness, peace, and harmony, and that the basic principles on which the Chinese state is founded are propriety, righteousness, modesty, and honor. Under the influence of these eight virtues and four principles, the Chinese nation conducts itself by fully utilizing its own resources without excess, and it benefits other people by extending its blessing without demanding concessions.³⁷

Along with adulation of China's past, actual or asserted, Chiang combines a deep distrust for foreign influences in China. Oppressive and inefficient rule by the foreign Manchus made Western infiltration possible, he argues, for otherwise China "would not have been forced either to suffer the humiliation of the unequal treaties during the past hundred years, or to tolerate the Japanese invasion of the continent of Asia."³⁸ He also castigates the Manchus, and the Chinese warlords of later days, for accepting supinely the dictates of the foreigners. Communism and liberalism are also classed as non-Chinese and hence unapplicable to China. "China's own philosophy of life, developed by Confucius, amplified and propagated by Mencius, and further explained by the Han scholars," Chiang classes as "superior to any other philosophy in the world."³⁹ National humiliations, whether economic, social, or political, were not the result of oppressive economic and administrative conditions, but from having "scorned our own cultural heritage."⁴⁰ Nowhere does he explain the reasons for China's weakness in the face of foreign aggressiveness, or the periodic revolts of the Chinese against the "Confucian" order long before the "barbarians" invaded from the "Eastern" sea.

Designed also for political indoctrination of the youth, Chiang's appeal is based upon the hope that the students will support the Kuomintang in

³⁷ Philip Jaffe (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 40–41; the same passage is similarly, but not identically translated in the official translation, p. 13.

³⁸ Jaffe, p. 48; official translation, p. 21.

³⁹ Jaffe, p. 95; official translation, p. 78.

⁴⁰ Jaffe, p. 101; official translation, p. 83; see the detailed criticism of this and other points by Chen Pai-ta, a Chinese Communist, published in English translation in S. Gelder, *The Chinese Communists* (London, 1946), pp. 256–90.

preference to the federated Democratic parties. "Thought control," therefore, has been used to suppress criticism of this statement of orthodox Kuomintang principles. Schools and training centers have been required to use it for "important collateral reading," and examinations based upon it have frequently been given as tests of orthodoxy. Chiang's desire for student support was evidently based upon his remembrance of the student demonstrations of the prewar years, as well as upon the traditional respect for the scholar.

In addition to his "political Bible," the Generalissimo published, in 1943, a companion-piece called *Chinese Economic Theory*.⁴¹ As the practical counterpart to *China's Destiny*, this second tract for the times outlines China's "own economic laws and principles upon which the country has developed," and deplores the attention paid by professional economists to Western theories based upon "human wants." The Generalissimo lauds China's native economic traditions, if such there be, for seeking "an understanding of human nature over and above mere human wants. . . ." In general, the author is vague concerning his economic program. Extreme nationalism in dealing with foreign powers, retention of the traditional domestic system with minor adjustments, and the encouragement of large industry under government control seem to summarize his basic beliefs. At no point does he approach with either foresight or understanding the need to reform and restrict the traditional economic stratification. Chiang's vision of the future appears to be a harmonizing of the new with the old through combining an industrial revolution with an agrarian society still based on China's traditional system of landlord-peasant relationships.

While a considerable part of China was reading its president's political testament, the turning point came in the world struggle. During the autumn of 1942, victories were won by the Allies in North Africa, and in the islands of the Pacific around Australia. In the first months of 1943, the German wave that had washed over, but not noticeably cleansed, western Russia began to recede after pounding unmercifully and unsuccessfully against Leningrad and Stalingrad. American aid also began to flow more freely into the China-Burma-India theater of operations. At the beginning of the war, General Joseph W. Stilwell, an experienced student of Chinese affairs, was named chief of staff to the Generalissimo, and commander-in-chief of all American forces in China. Stilwell's task was to keep China in the war. As long as Stilwell confined his efforts to the equipping, training, and maneuvering of Chiang's armies, the Generalissimo tolerated him. When Stilwell advocated, however, a thoroughgoing

⁴¹ The official publication of *China's Destiny* does not include the tract on economic theory. It is incorporated in P. Jaffe (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 241-92.

reform in the organization of the Chinese army's hierarchy, Chiang balked and longfelt antipathies came into the open.⁴²

As the number of foreigners in Chungking increased during 1943, the dissatisfaction with China's conduct of the war and with the Kuomintang's policy toward Yen-an mounted among neutral observers. While officials in Washington were putting finishing touches on the United States-Chinese treaty (January 11, 1943) to bring an end to extraterritoriality and other special privileges, observers in Chungking were outraged by the Kuomintang's foreign and domestic policies. *China's Destiny* contributed little to



Chiang Kai-shek being decorated by Stilwell. Wide World Photo

amicable feelings. Establishment of official indoctrination schools for Chinese going abroad, persecution of China's liberal and academic leaders, and the stringent domestic and foreign censorship outraged the representatives of democratic Western governments and newspapers. Reports of the terrible famine in Honan were kept out of most Chinese and Western newspapers.⁴³ By June, 1945, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* suspended publication of its Chungking edition with the announcement that independent journalism had "become clearly impossible in China under wartime censorship restrictions, which go far beyond considerations of military security."⁴⁴

⁴² For details of the "Stilwell episode" see *infra*, pp. 505-07.

⁴³ Description of the "undiscussed" Honan famine in White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-78.

⁴⁴ *New York Herald-Tribune*, June 24, 1945.

Strikingly significant was the fact that repressive measures became tighter in Kuomintang China after the tide of battle had turned against Japan than they had been before. At the same time, nevertheless, pressure from the Federation of Democratic Parties and the Allied governments forced the Kuomintang to reopen constitutional discussions. At the meeting of the Party's Central Executive Committee in September, 1943, it was resolved to call the People's Congress within one year after the conclusion of the war. At the same meeting, President Chiang graciously urged his followers to meet the Communist problem "with sympathy and consideration," and advocated its solution by "political means" only. Thus, while practicing a stringently repressive internal policy, the government outlined its plans for future constitutionalism and eventual agreement with the Communist enemies. These policies were typical of the balancing of forces and pressures which consistently characterized Chiang's policies. Of all things the Chinese ship of state lacked direction most seriously.

In the autumn of 1943, on the twelfth anniversary of the Mukden Incident, Chang Lan (Chang Piao-fang), President of the Federation of Democratic Parties, issued a statement entitled "China Needs True Democracy."⁴⁵ He called for an end to one-party rule, direct democracy in public affairs, and constitutionalism. He also observed that democracy "does not recognize differences of class, sex, or race." Inequalities and oppression were designated as the reasons for China's internal strife. Political tutelage was denounced as a front for despotism and dictatorship. Reference was also made to America's and Britain's displeasure with the Kuomintang's policies.

In answer to such demands, Chiang in October, 1943, named a Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government. Although dominated by its Kuomintang appointees, the committee was designed to investigate the progress in local self-government, to serve as a link between the people and the government, and to deliberate and make proposals for the establishment of a constitutional regime. Although the committee's appointment stimulated discussion of the Draft Constitution, few concrete proposals were forthcoming. By May, 1944, the Federation had once again issued a statement denouncing the failure of the government to grant civil liberties, its reluctance to end one-party rule, and its persistence in maintaining secret police and concentration camps.⁴⁶ The Federation frankly stated:

⁴⁵ Excerpts from this statement in *Asia and the Americas*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5 (May, 1944), pp. 207-08.

⁴⁶ Text of complete statement in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (September, 1944), pp. 330-36.

A truly patriotic revolutionary party cannot remain opposed to its own people. . . . After ten years of Kuomintang tutelage the organization and training of the people has not improved, the morality of the people has not been elevated, corruption and rottenness have increased rather than been reduced, and decay and decadence have become more rather than less widespread.⁴⁷

The democratic parties also called for wider representation on the People's Political Council, unity between Nationalists and Communists through "removal of suspicion and forgiveness," restoration to China of its traditional boundaries, and a comprehensive plan to combat inflation. Most impressive, however, was the Federation's warning "that if democracy is not realized during the war, then what we shall obtain after the war will not be democracy but the division and ruin of the country and suffering ten or a hundred times that of today."⁴⁸

COMMUNIST CHINA

Consequent upon establishing their capital at Yen-an, in December, 1936, the Communists gradually extended their control over large parts of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border area. With the conclusion of the United Front in 1937, the Communist-dominated regions came, nominally, under the control of the central government. The Communist armies of the north likewise were incorporated into the Nationalist army and reorganized as the Eighth Route Army. Later, the Eighth Route Army was incorporated into the Eighteenth Group Army under the command of Marshal Yen Hsi-shan, commander of the Second War Zone. When originally reorganized, the regulars of the Eighth Route Army had numbered around 45,000, or three divisions. In addition, Nanking accepted the allegiance of approximately 12,000 partisans still holding out in Kiangsi and southern Anhwei. These units were detailed to guerrilla activity behind the Japanese lines in the Yangtze valley and were constituted as the New Fourth Army. By April, 1938, after lengthy discussions and arguments, the task of absorbing Red Army units was thought to be completed.

According to its unity statement of September 22, 1937, the Communist Party agreed to subscribe to the principles of Dr. Sun, "to abandon its policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by force," to discontinue its policy of land confiscations and its collectivizing projects, to abolish the separate Soviet regime, and to permit the inclusion of its army into the National forces. On its side, the Kuomintang agreed to forget past differences in the struggle for national existence and to supply Communist

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

troops for the struggle against Japan. Moreover, Nanking tacitly accepted Yen-an's demands for civil liberties, land reform, and movement toward constitutionalism.

Co-operation was on a relatively high level until the Japanese offensives ceased. By the last months of 1938, however, local encounters resumed between the Nationalists and the Communists in northern Honan and on the frontiers of the border region.

Chungking was particularly concerned about the expansion of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies as they moved through the



Caves of Yen-an. Acme Photo

rural districts behind the Japanese lines. At the outset of the war, experts had not envisaged the tremendous role that guerrilla forces would perform in the resistance, since most of them were relatively certain that China would be forced to quick capitulation. Nor was it foreseen how popular the Communist units would become in the rural areas of northern and central China.

Although the Communists abided for the most part by their agreements with the Kuomintang until 1939, they retained a high degree of independence in the management of the border and guerrilla regions and in the administration of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies. Yen-an continued to be the nerve center for the direction of Communist activities,

and Chungking's orders were always cleared through the northwestern headquarters.

As the Eighth Route Army pushed eastward, the Communist political units began organizing anti-Japanese resistance governments in various localities. Early in 1938, Chungking permitted the Reds to organize a government of the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Region to combat the extension in the north of the Japanese-sponsored regimes. Shortly thereafter, however, the Kuomintang became seriously alarmed by the rapid and effective penetration of the Communists in the richest areas of northern China. At least a score of foreign observers reported during the war years that the successes of the Communists in the border areas, and in their guerrilla activities, could be attributed to their real concern for administrative and social reform.⁴⁹ At no time during this period of "united front" did the followers of Mao Tse-tung advocate a strict and uncompromising Marxist line. China's national existence and rural reform appear to have been their two basic doctrines. Lands that had been deserted, confiscated from traitors, or recaptured, were usually redistributed among the peasantry. Co-operatives of all varieties were organized in both the Yen-an and the anti-Japanese resistance units. Elections for local government were held in all Communist areas, and voting was conducted without regard to class, party, religion, property ownership, or sex. Freedom of discussion was much more common than ever before. Social problems and agricultural difficulties were discussed and decided by community groups. Radical reductions in the expenses of local government and the leveling of class lines that had formerly separated officialdom and the military from the rest of the people were among the most impressive of their achievements.⁵⁰ G. Martel Hall, former manager of the National City Bank of Peiping who escaped the Japanese after Pearl Harbor by fleeing to the partisan areas, explained the Communist successes as coming "through their own incorruptibility and honesty, their energetic patriotism, their devotion to practical democracy, their faith in the common people

⁴⁹ Important descriptions of Communist China in order of their appearance are: Edgar Snow, *op. cit.*; on Communist Party organization P. Miff, *Heroic China* (New York, 1937); a highly critical and heavily documented account of Red activities is contained in Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1938). Isaacs followed the Trotsky line. G. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-128; Nym Wales [Mrs. Edgar Snow], *Inside Red China* (New York, 1939); the military observations of Evans F. Carlson, *Twin Stars of China* (New York, 1940); Edgar Snow, *The Battle for Asia* (New York, 1941) contains a discussion of the Red Armies; the humanitarian and social descriptions of life in the Yangtze areas held by the New Fourth Army in Agnes Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China* (New York, 1943); Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (New York, 1945); and Gunther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York, 1945); S. Gelder, *op. cit.*; and for the postwar period Robert Payne, *Journey to Red China* (London, 1947), I. Epstein, *The Unfinished Revolution in China* (Boston, 1947); a more conservative appraisal by Claire and William Band, *Two Years with the Chinese Communists* (New Haven, 1948).

⁵⁰ For elaboration of this point see Francis L. K. Hsü, "A Closer View of China's Problems," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (November, 1946), pp. 50-64.

and the continuous effort they made to arouse them to action and responsibility.”⁵¹

Conflicts developed between the Nationalists and the Communists mainly over the extension of Communist control to some of the richest and most populous areas of the northeast. Particularly disturbing to Chungking was the rapid expansion of the Communist-administered armies. Chungking categorically refused to contribute toward the maintenance of the new regulars and guerrillas enlisted by the Reds. Materials to Yen-an were never more than a trickle, but, as antagonism revived, no goods were dispatched to the Communists. Fear of southward Communist expansion behind the Japanese lines also conditioned Koumintang thought and policy during the remaining years of war. The appeal of the rich Yangtze valley was thought to be too great a temptation for the Communists from barren Shensi to ignore.

From 1939 to 1941 relations between Yen-an and Chungking became increasingly tense. Military incidents became frequent. The government, meanwhile, threw an “iron cordon” of picked troops around the border area. Within “Free China” the censorship was tightened and departures from Kuomintang orthodoxy were viewed with mounting seriousness. Communists and suspects were arrested and detained without trial. Reforms, which the Communists had hoped to see develop, were far from realization. Although the Communists co-operated in the People’s Political Council, they continually reverted to their own devices for inaugurating reform. Discussions were held to no avail. Each party was too absolute in its demands to make compromise easy. Hostilities flared openly and seriously at the end of 1940, when the New Fourth Army allegedly refused to observe Chungking’s orders to move north of the Yangtze and out of Central China. In January, 1941, a sudden attack was made upon the Communists by government troops. The Communist commander of the New Fourth Army, Yeh Ting, was imprisoned in January, 1941, and thereafter relations between Yen-an and Chungking were temporarily severed.

Mutual recriminations resulted. Chiang accused the New Fourth Army of insubordination and formally dissolved it.⁵² On their side, the Communists accused War Minister General Ho Ying-chin of attacking in southern Anhwei with vastly superior forces a unit of the New Fourth Army that was withdrawing in accordance with orders. In the Communist view, Ho’s action was designed “to tell the enemy as well as the whole world that anti-Communist moves have now become the first problem of

⁵¹ Quoted in the Modern Library edition of Snow’s *Red Star over China* (New York, 1944), p. 507.

⁵² Text of Chiang’s statement in *North China Herald*, February 5, 1941; further details in *China Handbook, 1937-43*, pp. 327-32

China.”⁵³ Thereafter, Yen-an refused to co-operate in the People’s Political Council until Chungking should agree to a series of twelve conditions involving reparations, punishment of Ho, and adoption of new democratic policies. Mediation by the Federation of Democratic Parties and pressure from abroad staved off during the war years a permanent break in relations between the two major parties.

Although the appearance of unity was preserved after January, 1941, Chungking not only ceased to send money and supplies to Yen-an but actually inaugurated a rigorous military and economic blockade of the border region. Meanwhile, the Communists extended their hold in the north. Although formally dissolved, the New Fourth Army continued to increase in size until by the end of the war, it numbered around 300,000 men and controlled sizable areas in central China north of the Yangtze, particularly in Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces. By August, 1945, the Eighth Route Army included around 600,000 men.⁵⁴ Both Communist forces continued to fight the Japanese and the puppet forces by guerrilla tactics. They also supplied themselves, at Japan’s expense, with arms and other essentials of war.

Yen-an and the neighboring border region continued to be the central point of organization for the Communists even when their holdings extended far beyond their northern stronghold. By the end of the war, Mao Tse-tung’s government claimed the existence of eighteen semi-autonomous anti-Japanese war bases from Suiyüan to Manchuria and Shantung in the north—and south through the coastal provinces to Hainan and Canton. Throughout these areas, the Japanese controlled the most important cities, strategic junctions, and the railway lines. The Communist power was based upon the villages and the co-operation of from seventy to eighty millions of rural Chinese.

The first clear and detailed description of the Communists around Yen-an came from the pen of Edgar Snow in 1937 in his *Red Star over China*. Although adverse criticism of Snow’s highly favorable account of conditions has been justified in certain details,⁵⁵ it is nevertheless true that later neutral observers have also had little but good to say for the Communist regime. It would be possible to insist that the testimony of journalists and military observers was unrealistic and colored, were it not for the fact that the “New Democracy” of the Chinese Communists has undeniably been popular among China’s rural masses. Chinese agriculturists have no concern about the abstract principles of Marx; their opinions are based upon the practical effectiveness and benevolence of

⁵³ Text of the Communist statement in Rosinger, *China’s Wartime Politics*, pp. 111–14.

⁵⁴ For additional figures see the *New York Times*, August 19, 1945.

⁵⁵ See particularly the criticisms in Hsü, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52, of the problem of tenantry in China. Snow accepted uncritically, and without reference to available data, the Communist estimates of the extent of tenantry, and ownership of farms by large landlords.

government. What then are the reasons for the phenomenal successes of the Communists in organizing the peasantry for resistance and reconstruction?

The most recent detailed accounts of the Red areas date back to the end of 1944. The Chungking government permitted, at its own expense, a press party of six foreign and fifteen Chinese correspondents to spend three months of the summer of 1944 in the Northwest obtaining first-hand information. Two of the most important reports, although severely criticized, emanating from this tour were Harrison Forman's *Report from Red China* and Gunther Stein's *The Challenge of Red China*. A third account, which also includes translations of numerous pertinent documents and observations, is Stuart Gelder, *The Chinese Communists*. The last author was the China correspondent for the London *News Chronicle*, but he was not fortunate enough to be able to visit Yen-an. These, as well as other accounts by neutrals, bear out most of the statements made by Edgar Snow in 1937. Uniformly favorable reports were also given by the American military mission to Yen-an, which, in the words of Colonel Davis Barrett, its first leader, went "to study how these people have been able to keep the superiorly armed Japs in North China at bay for seven years."⁵⁶

Despite Kuomintang claims to the contrary, foreign observers, unofficial and official, agreed that the Communists were effectively harassing the Japanese without benefit of outside aid. Even though the U.S.S.R. had been one of the National government's main sources of foreign supply until the Russians were forced to divert everything to defense of their Western front, no evidence of Russian aid or tangible connections with Yen-an were observed. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues appeared to have little interest in the *immediate* realization of Marx's principles in China. Forcible confiscations of lands (except from those designated "traitors") and collectivizing appear to have ceased after 1937. Although they admire the Soviet Union and the tenets of socialism, the Chinese Communists appeared to see no hope even in the near future for a classless society in China. Their main object appeared to be the severance of the traditional bonds binding Chinese society and the development of rural and provincial reform as the first step toward Communism.

Mild agrarian revolution was continued during the war in order to decrease the power and prestige of the landlord-gentry group by reducing rents, limiting rates of interest, and eliminating corruption in local government. The peaceful policy of the Communists was based upon the requirements of national resistance. Mao Tse-tung himself emphasized, however, that "such [peaceful] solutions depend upon genuine democracy in China. The possible need in the future for outright confiscation and

⁵⁶ As quoted in Rosinger, *China's Crisis*, pp. 255-56.

distribution of land to the tenants can therefore not be ruled out entirely."⁵⁷

One of the most effective aspects of Communist policy was its educational work. Through widespread use of local councils, the Communists started the political education of soldiers, tillers, and workers. In 1941, electoral procedure was established on a "one to three" basis. Elective offices were never to include more than one Communist of every three elected. Since decisions were usually made by majority voting, the Communists could easily be outvoted. The Kuomintang, as well as other parties was permitted legal existence and its member possessed the right to hold office. A greater degree than elsewhere of free expression about political matters was permitted during these years in the Red areas.

Local control extended also to economic and social problems. Taxes were levied upon a graduated scale according to the individual's ability to pay. Support for the Communist armies came from local militias organized to aid the regular forces in foraging for food and in making attacks upon the enemy. When it is recalled how staunchly Chinese farmers had opposed other armies, including those of the Kuomintang National government, the achievements of the Communists in building up local support for their armed forces is even more noteworthy. The ability of the Communist soldier to mingle successfully with the civilian population was probably due to strict discipline, which, in turn, had been developed by political education.

Restrictions upon civil liberties were many, but they were fewer and more lenient than those imposed by the Kuomintang. Students at Yen-an University were permitted to read *China's Destiny* in a Yen-an edition; it is doubtful if students in the universities of "Free China" were permitted to read Mao Tse-tung's *The New Democracy* (1940)⁵⁸ in an abridged, edited, or any other version. Newspapers were all official Communist publications of limited circulation. Yen-an's newspapers, however, printed factual material from all parts of China and from the rest of the world. The Communist censorship was not quite as severe as that of Chungking. Minority problems were also handled with remarkable finesse. Tolerance toward religious groups, whether Christian, Buddhist, or Mohammedan, was a part of the "New Democracy."

Although they did not succeed in creating a "New Jerusalem," the Communists tried to cope with China's basic economic and social problems

⁵⁷ As quoted in Stein, *op. cit.* p. 112. For a critical evaluation of the Communist land program see G. F. Winfield, *China: The Land and the People* (New York, 1948).

⁵⁸ First published in English about 1942 in expurgated form with an introduction by Earl Browder, the American Communist. Appeared thereafter in digest form edited by Lin Yu-tang for the purpose of pointing out the passages expurgated in the Browder edition. See the "official" periodical *The China Magazine*, April and May, 1947, or the separate pamphlet distributed by the Chinese News Service.

in a straightforward and realistic fashion as the Nationalist government did not. Their main attack upon Kuomintang policy concerned its failure to act effectively about "peoples livelihood," and immediate efforts toward democracy. Like the Kuomintang, the Communist Party believes that China's salvation depends upon its ability to become an industrial as well as an agricultural nation. Capitalism, they believe, is a necessary and inevitable step on the road to socialism. In the words of Mao Tse-tung: "We are firmly convinced that private capital, Chinese as well as foreign, must be given liberal opportunities for broad development in postwar China."⁵⁹

In spite of the Communists' repeated assurances that they wished to collaborate fully and sincerely with the Western powers and the Kuomintang, the old enmities were much too alive to be quietly buried. Although the Chinese had fought valiantly and unitedly to halt the Japanese military machine, mutual hatred and suspicion divided the United Front after 1938 despite the best efforts of the other political parties to heal the breach. Repeatedly the government at Chungking was warned, officially and unofficially, by native spokesmen and by foreign envoys that internal co-operation was the first essential to victory. Failing after repeated efforts—both sincere and insincere—to restore unity, the prestige of the Kuomintang government suffered severely. Despite their admiration for China's remarkable endurance, the powers of the United Nations became impatient with, and ultimately discouraged by, the stubborn refusal of the contending groups to resolve their disputes by mediation rather than arms.

⁵⁹ As quoted in Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

CHAPTER XV

DIPLOMACY AND WAR, 1937-1945

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE

By the beginning of 1937, lines of hostility in all parts of the world had been etched out in sharp relief. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (August, 1935), the Communists, as earlier mentioned, had adopted "United Front" tactics for the purpose of combating Fascism wherever it appeared. In response to the Communist challenge, Germany and Japan had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936. Thereafter, instances of Russo-Japanese hostility multiplied in numbers and intensity. Each was determined to prevent the opposing ideology from expanding further into China and into the colonial sectors of eastern Asia. Disputes about the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway and disagreements over the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Manchoukuo were symptoms of the deep and irreconcilable antipathy felt by the Japanese and the Russians for each other.

The Western powers were meanwhile unable to resolve their policies. Isolationist sentiment in America was matched by irresolution and appeasement in Britain and France. Although Fascism and Communism clashed openly in Spain, the democracies adopted and pursued a hesitant policy of "nonintervention." In China, too, the Western powers trod lightly in the fear of antagonizing Japan further. With each failure to act vigorously, the prestige of the white powers declined sharply, and the position of Japan was markedly enhanced. A particularly severe blow to Western prestige and to the naval *status quo* was suffered at the end of 1936 when the Washington (1922) and London (1930) naval treaties were permitted to expire, thus giving Japan a greater opportunity to expand its naval preparations.

Although the Chinese were more determined after the Sian Incident (December, 1936) than ever before to withstand Japanese pressure, the Western powers had neither the predisposition nor the wherewithal to provide them with adequate aid. Even after the outbreak at Marco Polo Bridge and the beginnings of hostilities at Shanghai, neither the democracies nor Soviet Russia acted positively to help in China's resistance. Victory after victory for Japanese arms was accompanied by an increasingly positive disregard for the traditional rights and privileges of third powers in China. Diplomatic protests and moral suasion were powerless before determined military aggression.

Shortly after the renewal of active fighting in July, 1937, between the Japanese and the Chinese, Secretary of State Cordell Hull began to fashion the official American attitude toward open aggression. In statements of July and August, 1937, he emphasized repeatedly the necessity to observe orderly and legal procedures in resolving international disputes. He also stressed the importance of upholding the sanctity of treaty arrangements as vital to the preservation of world peace and order. Official American and British efforts to mediate the "undeclared war" in China were rejected by the Japanese who consistently demanded a settlement through direct negotiations.¹ Tokyo feared that international mediation efforts would prevent Nippon from realizing its objectives in northern China. In the case of Shanghai, however, the joint commission of 1932 was revived at Japan's request.² Its deliberations, however, were in vain, because both contesting parties continued to extend operations without serious regard for its decisions.

With the failure of the first efforts at mediation, China on September 12 appealed for action to the League under Articles X, XI, and XVII of the Covenant. Four days later, the Council referred the Chinese appeal to the Far East Advisory Commission that had been instituted originally by the Assembly resolution of February 24, 1933. In the sessions of the Commission³ (September 21-October 5, 1937) it became immediately apparent that the participating states were not willing to become what Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov termed an "organization of collective repulse to the aggressor." Since the Anti-Comintern powers were not represented on the Committee, it was more than ever significant that the American Minister to Switzerland, Leland Harrison, was asked to participate in the deliberations. As in 1932-33, the Americans in dealing with Japan were inclined to speak sterner words officially than the western Europeans.

Throughout September, the United States had taken the lead in protesting Japan's actions in China. In conversations with Foreign Minister Hirota, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo warned about "the certain repercussions which would occur in the United States if some serious accident involving American interests"⁴ were to happen in China. On September 22, Washington formally protested to Tokyo "any general bombing of an extensive area [such as Nanking] wherein there resides a large populace

¹ For the British effort at mediation see comments of Sir John T. Pratt, *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943). pp. 244-45; for the American effort see *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 340-41.

² Consult William C. Johnstone, *The United States and Japan's New Order* (New York, 1941), p. 233.

³ Complete account of deliberations in League of Nations, *Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 177: Sino-Japanese Conflict* (Geneva, 1937), pp. 8-26.

⁴ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 501.

engaged in peaceful pursuits. . . ."⁵ Five days later, the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations also condemned "the aerial bombardment of open towns in China by Japanese aircraft."⁶ By the following month, the British, and therefore the other interested powers, had "deliberately handed over the lead to America."⁷

On October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt delivered his famous Chicago speech as a trial balloon for testing America's reaction to a more positive foreign policy. In condemning "war as a contagion" and in urging international "quarantining" of the contagion-spreading aggressors, the president was obviously aiming his remarks at the Japanese and their European partners. Although public reaction was anything but enthusiastic, the American statement was closely linked to the report issued the following day by the Advisory Committee. By adopting the Committee's report, the League of Nations thereby "expressed its moral support for China and recommended that Members of the League should refrain . . . from increasing her difficulties in the . . . conflict, and should also consider how far they could individually extend aid to China."⁸ In addition, the Committee recommended that invitations should be sent to the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty for a conference at Brussels to engage in "full and frank communication" as to whether or not Japan had contravened the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922.

While the League signatories of the Washington treaties were holding exploratory conversations prior to the opening of the Brussels meeting, Japan on October 9 replied to the American and League condemnations by attributing the adverse reactions to an "unfortunate lack of understanding of the real circumstances as well as the true intentions of Japan."⁹ Tokyo also let it be known from the outset that Japan would not participate in the projected Brussels Conference, since "the League of Nations had already taken the part of China against Japan. . . ."¹⁰ Germany meanwhile had refused the special invitation of the Belgian government; not a party to the pact either, the U.S.S.R., however, agreed to participate.

The meetings took place in Brussels from November 3-24, 1937. American delegate Norman H. Davis expressed the uncertain sentiments of his own country and the other convening powers by stating that "we have not come with the expectation of working miracles, but with the intention of appealing to reason."¹¹ On the following day, Litvinov voiced Russia's hope of "restoring a just peace, a peace which will not unleash but

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 504-05.

⁶ League of Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷ See discussion of America's role in Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 246; also consult Irving S. Friedman, *British Relations with China* (New York, 1940), pp. 103-04.

⁸ League of Nations, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 35.

⁹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 400.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 402-03.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

will leash aggression. . . ." ¹² While Russia pressed for positive action, the British counseled patience. The Italians, on the other hand, decried "coercive measures" and "moral quarantining" as "irresponsible." After three weeks of discussion, during which Italy pledged formal adherence to the Anti-Comintern powers and finally withdrew from the League, the Brussels Conference adjourned with practically no positive accomplishments to its credit.

The first declaration of the conference had been issued on November 15 with Italy voting against it and the Scandinavian states abstaining.¹³ In this forthright document, the powers responsible for the declaration denounced Japan for maintaining "against the views of all the other parties that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of that treaty [i.e. the Nine Power Pact]. . . ." Japan was also condemned for refusing to negotiate at the international level matters concerning the Far East. Furthermore, the Brussels group reminded the Japanese "that there exists no warrant in law for the use of armed force by any country for the purpose of intervening in the internal regime of another country." They further accused the "Japanese authorities of having decided in substance that it is Japan's objective to destroy the will and the ability of China to resist the will and demands of Japan."

After these formidable words, the final conference report of November 24 was a hollow and half-hearted echo.¹⁴ Purporting to represent the common attitude, the final declaration presented nothing positive. No recommendations of united action, intervention, or economic measures of restraint were made. Neither boycotts nor sanctions were mentioned. It merely repeated the general sentiment that "force can provide no just and lasting solution for disputes between nations," and expressed the belief "that a prompt suspension of hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests . . . of all nations." After urging the participating governments to exchange views and explore all possibilities, the Brussels Conference adjourned with the admission that "the conflict in the Far East remains . . . a matter of concern to all of the powers. . . ."

INTERNATIONAL TENSION IN CHINA

While discussions were going on in Geneva and Brussels, Japan continued to tighten its military and economic grip upon China. With the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai on August 13, 1937, the Sino-Japanese conflict became of more immediate international concern than heretofore. Japanese invasion of the rich Yangtze valley brought immediate protests

¹² As quoted in Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945* (Princeton, 1945), p. 248.

¹³ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 410-12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 417-22.

from the powers having heavy investments in Central China. Even the German concerns began in September to liquidate their financial interests in China and to transfer them to Manchoukuo.¹⁵ On September 10 the Japanese announced that the entire coast of China was blockaded against the entrance or egress of Chinese shipping. Shortly thereafter, the Yangtze was barred to foreign vessels, and the powers began to flood Tokyo with protests charging violation of the principles of the "Open Door." Moreover, the American and British governments used every opportunity to reassert the accepted principles of international procedure in their application to far eastern difficulties and to protest vigorously over incidents or accidents specifically concerning their interests or their nationals.

Of most immediate concern to the American government during the last two months of 1937 were the bombings of Nanking and the sinking of the U.S.S. "Panay." Two days before the adjournment of the Brussels conference, American Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson had been forced to leave Nanking with most of his staff. Heeding Japanese warnings about the imminent bombing of the Chinese capital, the ambassador retreated upriver to Hankow. However, a skeleton diplomatic force remained in Nanking in the charge of the Second Secretary, George Atcheson, Jr. As the Japanese approached the city, the embassy staff on December 7 retired to the U.S.S. "Panay" of the Yangtze Patrol. Two days later the "Panay" began to move upriver in an effort to remain out of the zone of active hostilities and beyond the range of Japanese bombs. By December 12, the vessel had anchored just above Woosung about twenty-seven miles above Nanking.

According to the report of the Second Secretary,¹⁶ the anchored "Panay," and three Standard Oil tankers which it was convoying were attacked and bombed by at least six Japanese airplanes. Flying on a sunny day at an altitude of less than one thousand feet, the planes had little excuse for a mistake in identification. After suffering several direct hits, the American war vessel began to sink. As the crew and passengers abandoned ship, the small boats were strafed by the circling planes, and shortly thereafter Japanese patrol boats machine-gunned the sinking ship. Although the Americans eventually reached shore and safety, two died and the wounded were numerous.

Reactions in Tokyo and Washington were immediate. The Japanese contended that the whole incident was unintentional and a regrettable mistake. Spontaneous gifts in cash poured into the American embassy in Tokyo from Japanese citizens for relief of the victims and their families.¹⁷


¹⁵ For details see Kurt Bloch, *German Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940), pp. 37-38.

¹⁶ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), I, 532-41.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 528, 530.

With all the good will in the world, however, it was impossible for the American Naval Court of Inquiry to believe that the planes "could not be aware of the identity of the ships they were attacking."¹⁸

Although the American press devoted considerable space to the details of the "Panay" incident, the general public reaction was mild. Many were more concerned about withdrawing American forces from areas of danger than about calling the Japanese to task; few could understand or appreciate the reasons for American vessels being stationed on the Yangtze River deep in the interior of China. The whole incident was brought rapidly to



U.S.S. Panay. International News Photo

a conclusion by a Japanese note of December 24 "admitting responsibility, expressing regret, and offering amends."¹⁹ On April 22, 1938, the Japanese paid in full an indemnity amounting to \$2,214,007.36.

Contemporary with the "Panay" sinking, H.M.S. "Ladybird" and several other British war and merchant vessels were attacked while plying the Yangtze near Nanking. In response to his demands for explanations from the local Japanese authorities, the British Consul-General in Nanking was told that orders had been issued to fire upon every ship on the river. Although Tokyo emphatically denied the veracity of this statement, the Japanese Foreign Office made official and perfunctory apologies to London. However, the Nipponese evaded accepting responsibility in the "Ladybird"

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 547.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 551-52.

incident, and the British Foreign Office did not insist upon forthright acknowledgment of it.²⁰

Meanwhile, less spectacular but equally vital problems were under constant discussion in diplomatic channels. The perennial question of the customs and the other Chinese taxes upon which foreign loans were secured constituted a thorny and complex point of international dispute. As the Japanese penetrated more deeply into China, additional customs centers and tax administration units fell into their hands. On November 28, Ambassador Grew made representations to the Japanese Foreign Office protesting the failure of Tokyo to consult interested third powers, such as the United States, about the administration and the distribution of the revenues from the Chinese customs.

The establishment in Peking on December 14, 1937, of the Japanese-sponsored government also added to the international problems regarding customs and taxes. With its assumption of power, the "co-operative" Peking regime revised customs rates in a discriminatory direction. Japanese merchants were regularly permitted to carry and market goods in northern China without payment of duty, or at less duty than their foreign competitors. Representations by the ambassadors at Tokyo regarding foreign interests in the consolidated taxes of China were either ignored or Tokyo advised the interested powers to approach the "independent" Peking regime. On January 31, 1938, Ambassador Grew insisted that "for the creation and the acts of the provisional regime [Japan had] an inescapable responsibility."²¹

Japan's systematic effort to organize northern China as a vital link in the yen bloc also aggravated the third powers. Aiming to issue a new currency pegged to the yen, the provisional regime on March 10, 1938, organized at Peking a Federal Reserve Bank of China. It was hoped by this means that northern China would be tied financially more closely to Tokyo, and that the currency of the Nationalist government would thereby be forced out of the north. Since the new currency could not be exchanged directly for foreign currencies, transactions of third powers in northern China had to be worked out in terms of yen and through the Yokohama Specie Bank. Moreover, the same system was applied to Inner Mongolia in December, 1938, and ultimately to most of occupied China after a Central Reserve Bank was organized at Shanghai in January, 1941.

After the spring and summer of 1938 the Chungking government was deprived almost completely of customs revenues. On May 3, the Japanese, after conversations with the British government, assumed control over the administration of Chinese customs in the areas of occupation. Every element of international control was relinquished, and Britain was

²⁰ For details see Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-14.

²¹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41)*, I, 739.

forced to take its place among the other states whose only interest in the customs was the unimpaired servicing of the foreign loans. Although the Japanese agreed to continue the servicing, China's share of the revenues were entrusted legally to Japanese administration, and were in fact used for the financing of the puppet government. As a matter of record, the foreign obligations were not met. Thus, while their bond-holders were losing investments secured on the customs, the British and Americans had simultaneously to float large additional loans to keep Nationalist China from succumbing completely to Japan.

Throughout the negotiations over the customs, the British were at an embarrassing disadvantage. Having the largest financial stake in China of any foreign power, British private and government interests were wary of antagonizing the Japanese. Hence, attacks upon British subjects and properties were passed over by Japan with perfunctory apologies. Above all, many British enterprisers hoped for the quick capitulation of China, and the resumption of normal industrial and commercial activities. Although government officials were certainly influenced by the interests of British capital, their appeasement of Japan was probably based in the main upon their sense of military inadequacy and their fear of war in Europe. Certainly, Britain's aid to Chungking after 1938 would indicate that Downing Street, at least, was concerned about halting Japan's occupation of China.

As a result of Britain's necessarily weak policy, the Japanese soon realized that the United States was the only power able to act forcefully in Pacific affairs. American economic pressure had been applied as early as July 1, 1938, through the inauguration of the "moral embargo." As first instituted, it regulated only the export of aeronautical equipment. Even this mild rebuke was considered serious by Tokyo. Japan's official response to American pressure was therefore the conclusion on July 5, 1938, of a comprehensive commercial agreement with Italy. By the end of 1938, the Japanese were also hopeful that the "new economic order" in northeastern Asia would be successful in supplementing vital materials normally imported from America or Europe.

Japan became particularly aggressive after the conclusion of the fateful Munich agreement in September, 1938. Southern China was occupied in October, and Hankow was simultaneously taken over. At this juncture the Japanese government issued its proclamation of the "New Order," and systematically organized new agencies to control and exploit the occupied areas. Henceforward, American protests over rights and privileges in China were even more vain than before as Japan began to co-ordinate its conquests and to reinforce its diplomatic ties with Germany and Italy.

On February 8, 1939, Ambassador Grew notified Secretary Hull that "Japan has entered into negotiations with Germany and Italy for a definite

alliance, both military and political. . . ." ²² During March and April, conferences were actually held in Berlin by the Anti-Comintern partners. Japan, however, was hesitant about committing itself to a military pact which could be directed against the democracies rather than the "Communist menace." Tokyo was apparently not yet convinced that full-scale hostilities with America and Britain were necessary to the realization of its "immutable" aims. The Nipponese were also apprehensive of being used as a pawn in Hitler's European plans. Therefore, with Japan's refusal in 1939 to conclude a military alliance, Hitler in August negotiated the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact without regard to her secret commitments to Japan under the Anti-Comintern arrangements. ²³ Although the Japanese were obviously worried by this departure, Tokyo maintained its semi-isolated position until the capitulation of France and the Netherlands in the summer of 1940.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had continued to drive the foreigners from additional cities and markets in China. After the capture of Hankow, as earlier mentioned, the Yangtze had been gradually closed to foreign vessels. Although the United States and England protested that Japanese monopoly of China's main waterways constituted a treaty violation, Japan justified its actions on the ground of "military necessity." After the formal and final closing of the Yangtze in March, 1939, Tokyo periodically promised that normal river traffic would be resumed after the military situation had eased, and after Wang Ching-wei's government had been firmly established at Nanking. At other times Tokyo endeavored to dangle the bait of opening the Yangtze for diplomatic agreements on other matters. In the final analysis, however, the Yangtze was not again legally open to foreign shipping.

With the exclusion of Western traders from central China, the Japanese and Germans rapidly, although illegally, moved civilian materials and consumer's goods into the markets of the great river cities. Simultaneously, Japanese guards and officials made it next to impossible for other Westerners to continue in business. Personal indignities were suffered by commercial and diplomatic agents. National flags were hauled down and otherwise insulted by the wildly victorious Japanese soldiery. Consulates and missionary compounds were also attacked. Although the Japanese government made at times profound, and at other times perfunctory, apologies to the governments concerned, the foreigners in China continued to suffer at their hands.

Intimately related to the closing of the Yangtze and the Pearl rivers was the effort of the Japanese to make life as difficult as possible for the

²² *Ibid.*, II, 161-62.

²³ For discussion of these details see David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* (New Haven, 1944), p. 223. Cf. *supra*, pp. 386-87.

foreigners living in the special foreign residential areas. The main one of these was the International Settlement at Shanghai. With the occupation of Shanghai in November, 1937, the Japanese army completely surrounded the International Settlement and the French Concession. At once, rigid restrictions were placed upon the activities of the foreign population, for the foreigners and Chinese frequently conspired successfully to thwart the policies of the Japanese. Pressure was also severe upon the Shanghai Municipal Council to increase Japanese representation on the Council and in municipal offices. The Western powers protested strongly against the continuation of restrictions after the fall of the Chinese city to Japan; Tokyo, however, insisted that military requirements dictated need for continued supervision. As in the case of the Yangtze, the Japanese increased their control at critical times and promised relaxation if their demands were accepted. It was not, however, until after Pearl Harbor that they actually assumed full control over the Shanghai Settlement.

In retaliation against Great Britain for its failure to co-operate in the "New Order," Japan during 1938 tightened its hold over British interests and concessions in widely scattered parts of China.²⁴ The concessions were frequently used as zones of refuge for Chinese persons and capital, and in numerous other ways to the disadvantage of the Japanese. Irritated particularly by the British-American parallel policies regarding the Yangtze and the foreign residential sites, the Japanese fomented active hostility to the British among the populace of occupied China. Naming the British as the main foreign exploiter of China and the main reason for China's tribulations, the Nipponese astutely turned China's new nationalism and anti-foreignism to their own advantage. Coupled with the anti-British agitation was the action of the Japanese, during June and July, 1939, in blockading the British Concessions at Tientsin and elsewhere. Protests from London accomplished nothing; retaliatory action against Japanese traders at Singapore and Penang also failed to halt Japan's drive to force British investors and traders out of China. Tokyo was determined that London should finally co-operate in the "New Order."

Prompted by the Tientsin blockade and the condition of British interests everywhere in occupied China, Ambassador Craigie and Foreign Minister Arita inaugurated conversations at Tokyo on July 17, 1939. After a week of discussions, the Japanese extorted from the hard-pressed British an "agreement" known as the "Craigie-Arita formula." In an announcement of it on July 24, the United Kingdom agreed to recognize "the actual situation in China" and the "special requirements" of the Japanese military forces. Moreover, the British agreed that they had "no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attain-

²⁴ A fine discussion of foreign interests, especially British, in China is contained in F. C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin* (New York, 1940); see also Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-207.

ment" of Japan's objects. Thus, London virtually agreed, under duress, to act as a silent partner of the "New Order."

To the American State Department the "Craigie-Arita formula" appeared to be another British endeavor at appeasement. Determined to strike back quickly at the Japanese, Secretary Hull on July 26 announced the intention of the United States to abrogate the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911. Acting according to the treaty's terms, the abrogation did not become effective until January 26, 1940. Although suspension of trade relations did not immediately come about, the aim of the precipitous American action was to warn Japan that even stronger economic measures of retaliation would be possible in the future.

A second blow to the Hiranuma cabinet came from another direction, when, on August 21, 1939, Berlin announced the conclusion of the aforementioned Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. Although Japan protested vehemently that such an agreement was incompatible with the Anti-Comintern arrangements, Hitler was determined to insure Soviet neutrality before attacking Poland. However, the setback suffered by Japan was shortly offset by the outbreak of war in Europe in September; thereafter, the United States trimmed its diplomatic sails and pursued a policy of watchful waiting.

On September 5, 1939, Japan advised the belligerent nations of the European war to withdraw their naval vessels and troops from China in order to avoid conflicts that might involve Japan in the European war. Even though no German or Italian armed forces were in China, the Japanese demanded the withdrawal of the heavily interested and deeply involved British and French. Although Washington responded to the Japanese suggestion with alarm and threats of economic retaliation, Tokyo continued to press for evacuation. In reply to Japan's determined refusal to ease its demands, the United States on December 24, 1939, extended the "moral embargo" to include "planes, plants, manufacturing rights, and technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline." With the aid of such American economic pressure, Britain was enabled to keep troops in China until the following summer.

Thus, to the beginning months of 1940, the Japanese had consistently advanced in China and had gradually circumscribed the rights and privileges of the foreigners. Britain's preoccupation with its heavy investments in China and its precarious position in a totalitarian-dominated Europe made it possible for the Japanese to browbeat the British by various coercive measures. Meanwhile, the Japanese sought consistently to mollify the United States, and to lull it in its restless slumber of isolationism. Protests from the world capitals to Tokyo were blithely ignored, while loans from the unaroused Western nations to China were hardly enough to keep the resistance alive. With the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in

western Europe, scheduled for 1940, Japan, began to think in terms of expanding even further its sphere of domination.

JAPAN TURNS SOUTHWARD

While the Western states were on the defensive in China, Japan had simultaneously engaged in diplomatic and military skirmishes with the U.S.S.R. After the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November, 1936, Japan's expansion into Inner Mongolia was viewed in Moscow with increased alarm. Hostile activities of Japan in the borderlands separating Manchuria from Siberia also added to the tenseness of Soviet-Japanese relations. Indeed, at the time of the Changkufeng incident (July, 1938) open warfare blazed near the junction of the Manchurian, Korean, and Siberian borders. Huge concentrations of troops in Manchuria and Siberia also made it appear as if Japan's next move might be northward.

Moreover, Soviet-Japanese relations at the diplomatic level were also strained during 1937-1938. After the failure of the Brussels conference, Russia refused to deal with far eastern problems through the established international agencies. Disgusted particularly with Britain's gestures of appeasement, the U.S.S.R. dealt with Japan but on a rigorous bilateral basis. Negotiations over boundary problems, the fisheries, and the payments owed to Russia for the Chinese Eastern Railway were conducted by joint commissions and were characterized on both sides by sharp bargaining and maneuvering for position. Soviet-Japanese hostilities appeared in the midsummer of 1938 to be imminent and certain.

However, after the conclusion of the Munich agreement in September, 1938, Japan's attention shifted sharply to southeastern Asia. The weakness displayed at Munich indicated to Japan that England and France, unlike Russia, would hesitate long before resisting actively the expansion of Japan at the expense of their Asiatic colonies. The first effort southward was the attack upon Canton in October, 1938, and the elimination thereby of China's last Pacific port of supply. The occupation of Canton was followed by the closure of the Pearl River. Hongkong was thus also isolated from the mainland for the first time in its history as a British Crown Colony. Hereafter, the Japanese moved southward at a speed determined only by the military and naval problems involved in such enterprises.

Beginning in 1939, the Japanese began to take over one by one the strategically-located islands in the South China Sea. Although Tokyo had objected in July, 1938, to the French occupation of the Paracels off the coast of Indo-China, the Japanese did not hesitate to seize the large Chinese island of Hainan off Indo-China on February 10, 1939, without reference to any other power. Occupation of Hainan was followed on March 30

by the annexation of the Sinnan Islands (including Spratly) strategically situated in the South China Sea between Indo-China and the island of Palawan in the Philippines. These additions to Japan's island possessions were placed under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Formosa and were thus integrated directly into the expanding southern empire. Since America was the only power in a position to object emphatically to the southward advance, the wires were kept busy carrying protests from Washington to Tokyo. During January, 1939, the American fleet was transferred hastily from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the fear that Japan was about to associate the advance southward with a declaration announcing the conclusion with Berlin of a military pact directed against the Western nations.

Japan's unwillingness in 1939 to conclude a military alliance with Germany was in part the result of continual fear in Tokyo that Russia would move as soon as Japan became involved with the Western nations. The Munich capitulation had encouraged the Nipponese to hope that their Asiatic objectives could be attained without resort to a dangerous and protracted war. America's abrogation of the commercial treaty (July 26, 1939) followed by the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact (August 21, 1939) left Japan with no choice, however, except to retreat from the "New Order" program or to run the risk of war with the United States. Outbreak of war in Europe during September finally convinced Tokyo that the riches of southeastern Asia were worth the gamble, and that America would hesitate long before becoming involved in an Asiatic struggle while the European war was still seething.

In November, 1939, the imperial Japanese forces struck quickly and deeply into southwestern China with the object of cutting China off from its sources of supply in Indo-China and Burma. Capture of Nanning in Kwangsi province severed the strategic road connections with Indo-China. Thereafter, the Hanoi-Kunming railway and the Burma road (completed in the midsummer of 1938) were "Free China's" only two links with the seas. Even these were hard to maintain against the bombings of Japanese aircraft.

With the opening of Hitler's *Blitzkrieg* on April 9, 1940, it was not long before Holland and France were at Germany's mercy. Simultaneously their colonies in southeastern Asia and the Pacific became easy prey for Japan. Foreign Minister Arita immediately voiced concern over the future status of Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies. In reply, Secretary Hull on April 17 warned that "intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security . . . in the entire Pacific area."²⁵ In no uncertain terms the

²⁵ U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41), II, 281-82.

United States thus established the Indies as one of its front-line defense positions in the southeastern Pacific.

On June 12, 1940, just about one week after the fall of France, Japan signed a Treaty of Friendship with Thailand. Strategically located between the French and English colonies of southeastern Asia, Thailand provided the Japanese with a listening post in the center of the critical area. Although the text of the Thailand treaty was not made public until December, the Japanese began at once to extend their "co-prosperity sphere" into what they named "*Greater East Asia*."

Meanwhile, the Japanese Foreign Minister presented to Ambassador Grew a series of proposals looking toward the improvement of American-Japanese relations.²⁶ Arita urged Washington to negotiate a temporary commercial arrangement to replace the abrogated trade treaty. He suggested that the United States cease sending aid to Chungking and cooperate in the reconstruction of "new China." Finally, he baldly proposed that the United States should "recognize new conditions in East Asia" and that the two powers should divide the control of the Pacific between themselves. Although America was concerned about the colonial possessions of the European belligerents, the world situation was so grave that Washington could not immediately reject Arita's suggestions outright. Subsequent drastic Japanese action might have been fatal to the French, English, and Dutch possessions.

Failing to receive the desired response from Washington, Japan dispatched a commercial mission to Batavia "to assure the export to Japan of those commodities of the Netherlands East Indies which are deemed essential to Japan."²⁷ Japan's needs became especially serious after President Roosevelt's decree of July 2, 1940, prohibiting the export of materials necessary to America's national defense. On July 26, just one year after the abrogation of the commercial treaty, export licenses were also applied in America to petroleum, aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, and No. 1 scrap steel. Although American petroleum products still went to Japan, the President at this juncture possessed the power to halt the vital flow if political considerations required it. Oil, however, was not shut off completely in the fear of forcing a Japanese attack upon the vast resources of the Netherlands Indies.

With the accession of the Konoye cabinet on August, 1940, the new Foreign Minister, Matsuoka Yōsuke, seriously endeavored to round out the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Almost at once, demands were made upon the Vichy government of France for special concessions in Indo-China. By the end of August, the Vichy regime, under pressure

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

from Berlin, had signed an agreement granting the Japanese permission to use ports, cities, and airports for "troop movements." On September 22, Tokyo and Vichy concluded a treaty permitting the Japanese forces to occupy the northern part of Indo-China as far south as Hanoi.²⁸ By this action the Hanoi-Kunming railway line of supply to Nationalist China was severed, and Japan had its first beachhead in continental southeastern Asia. On July 17, Britain was forced by diplomatic pressure to close the Burma road for the summer months. Actually, the heavy rains of this period usually made extensive use of the road almost impossible. Although Washington protested and immediately granted Chungking a new credit of \$25,000,000, the Japanese politely ignored America and continued to work energetically toward the expansion of the beachhead.

Matsuoka also was busy in September negotiating with Germany, Japan being ready to consider joining the military alliance concluded by Italy and Germany the year before. Nippon's concern about Soviet Russia had been allayed in part during August by Molotov's admission that "relations have tended toward normalization to a certain extent."²⁹ Meanwhile, relations with Britain and America had steadily become worse as Japan persisted in its southward drive. Japan's participation in the Axis was therefore based upon a treaty directed mainly against the United States, the only major obstacle to the creation of the "New Order." The European participants recognized Japan as the leading power in the Orient, and all three undertook to aid each other "in case of an attack by a power not already engaged in war." No one could mistake such a straightforward admonition to America to refrain from interfering either in Europe or in the Pacific area.

After repeated alarms, the United States had gradually begun to shake off the drowsiness of its isolationist sleep. Neutrality was less strictly observed as America became a nonbelligerent with definite sympathies. The fleet remained in Pacific waters, and aircraft and submarine reinforcements were dispatched to Manila. Meanwhile, Selective Service was instituted with the proviso that service should be but for one year, and that American soldiers should not be sent abroad. During October, 1940, Washington advised the sixteen thousand Americans in the danger zones of the Far East to return home. The following month President Roosevelt announced a new credit for China to the amount of \$100,000,000. And on December 29, the president demanded resolute and unified action against the totalitarian states, and designated America as the "arsenal of democracy."

²⁸ For further details see H. S. Quigley, *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941* (Boston, 1941), pp. 184-85.

²⁹ Quoted in Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

PRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR

As war clouds gathered in the first months of 1941, occasional and distracting rays of sunshine aroused hopes that the storm would pass over. American and Japanese private citizens endeavored to arrive at a last-minute *modus vivendi*,³⁰ while Grew and other officials warned from Japan that the situation was deteriorating rapidly. It was suggested to Secretary Hull at the end of January that "the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward China."³¹ It was further averred that a satisfactory agreement with the United States would strengthen the hand of the moderate elements in every strata of Japanese society. Japan's alliance with the Axis could be circumvented and Nippon's policies directed along peaceful lines if only America would permit Nippon to retain its preponderant position in China and recognize its right to equality of opportunity elsewhere in the Far East. In return Japan would graciously undertake to guarantee complete recognition of the "Open Door" in China—a legal right already possessed by the United States.

In American diplomatic circles such unofficial proposals were greeted with a high degree of caution and skepticism, while in the reckoning of the military groups war preparations continued to be uppermost. During the first three months of 1941, staff conversations were held in Washington with high-ranking British, American, and Canadian army, navy, and aviation personnel in attendance. In Japan, meanwhile, Matsuoka continued to stress "the intimate and inseparable relationship" between Japan and the Asiatic tropics. In a meeting of January 27 before the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, Matsuoka declared that "there is nothing left but to face America."³² American conditions for a peaceful settlement he considered harsh. He believed that Washington would insist upon "the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and abandonment of [or?] fifty per cent curtailment of Japan's continental and southward advance policies." It would appear therefore that the responsible officials of both governments were not seriously impressed by the initial or later efforts of their private citizens.

On February 14, 1941, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo became Japanese Ambassador to Washington. As a personal friend of President Roosevelt,

³⁰ One of the Americans most influential in these private negotiations was E. Stanley Jones, the eminent missionary and educator. Among the interested Japanese was Tadao Wikawa of the Co-operative Bank of Japan, and Hashimoto Tetsuma a political commentator, who led the futile Japanese Goodwill Mission to America in the early months of 1941. Also interested and influential were Bishop James Edward Walsh, Father Drought, and Postmaster-General Frank C. Walker (see Cordell Hull, "Memoirs," *New York Times*, February 19, 1948).

³¹ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41)*, II, 328-29.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

Nomura's appointment was at first considered indicative of a milder Japanese attitude. However, contemporary events in Thailand and Indo-China belied such a supposition. It appeared that the Japanese might drive toward Singapore at any time. Moreover, Australian troops were concentrated in the Malay peninsula against the possibility of such a surprise attack. In Tokyo, the American representatives warned that action toward Singapore would "raise the question of war with the United States."³³

Matsuoka had meanwhile departed for Europe via Soviet Russia. On his way to Berlin, the Japanese Foreign Minister stopped over in Moscow for conversations with Stalin and Molotov in which he assured them of Japan's ancient adherence to "moral communism" even though Japan had long since rejected economic and social communism. While in the German capital, Matsuoka informed Ribbentrop of his efforts to conclude an accord with Russia. He had proposed a nonaggression pact and Molotov countered with a suggestion of a neutrality pact.³⁴ On the way home from Berlin, Matsuoka again negotiated in Moscow. A result of his visits was the conclusion on April 13, 1941, of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact.³⁵ The only significant provision³⁶ in the treaty committed both parties to neutrality if the other should "become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers." No provisions of friendship or nonaggression were included. The pact did, however, protect the Japanese for a time against the possibility of war breaking out simultaneously in north and south. Not until 1944 did it become known that Japan in her eagerness had agreed in April, 1941, to relinquish her concessions in Soviet Sakhalin.³⁷

Officially, the United States wryly viewed the Russo-Japanese treaty as "descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past." Almost immediately thereafter, Secretary Hull proposed four principles as a basis for negotiation with Japan:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of economic opportunity;

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

³⁴ Text in Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-01.

³⁵ For illuminating details regarding Matsuoka's European visit see R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (eds.), *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington, 1948), pp. 298-324.

³⁶ For details about Russo-Japanese arrangements with regard to Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia see *supra*, p. 422.

³⁷ Additional details in Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

4. Nondisturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.³⁸

These proposals were tantamount to a reiteration of the basic principles already embodied in the Nine Power Pact to which both powers had pledged formal adherence in 1922.

Meanwhile, the United States armed forces and their associates were preparing for the worst. During most of 1941, Washington was relatively well informed about Tokyo's activities for army and navy experts had broken the Japanese code and were deciphering messages from Tokyo to all the world capitals. From April 21-27, 1941, meanwhile, staff conversations were held in Singapore by American, British, Australian, Dutch, and New Zealand military officers. At these discussions the military experts laid down the boundaries beyond which Japan could not move without provoking hostilities. It was agreed that the participants would request their respective governments to authorize defensive action in case of: (1) an attack by Japan on the territory or mandated territory of one of the parties; (2) the movement of the Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° east or to the south of 10° north; (3) any large-scale movement of Japanese forces directed against the Philippine Islands, the east coast of the Kra peninsula, or the east coast of Malaya, or across the parallel of 6° north between Malaya and the Philippines, a line east from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the equator east of Waigeo; (4) the movement of Japanese troops into Portuguese Timor; (5) the movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands. In due course these staff agreements were officially confirmed, and were developed further at the Atlantic Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill on August 10-11, 1941.

The Tokyo press meanwhile denounced bitterly the economic and military "encirclement" by the *ABCD* (American, British, Chinese, and Dutch) powers. The Japanese military, however, continued quietly to co-ordinate and develop its gains. On May 6, an economic treaty was signed between Japan and Indo-China as Japan's price for mediating the hostilities between Indo-China and Thailand. Three days later a truce was concluded by which Thailand received important territorial concessions from the powerless French government of Indo-China. Tokyo's object in these negotiations was to bind the Bangkok government to the "New Order," for Thailand's geographical position with relation to Burma and Malaya made its co-operation the prime necessity in what the world expected to be Japan's next move.

Calculations about the southward drive were upset in both camps by the Nazi attack of June 22 on Soviet Russia. Since Japan had hoped that

³⁸ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), II, 332.

the British would be disposed of first, Germany's surprise move was viewed with apprehension in Tokyo. Matsuoka's policy of liberating the Orient from white capitalism came upon difficult days as fear mounted in Japan that a two-front war had become inevitable. However, Germany's rapid successes in the West prevented the Soviets from launching an eastward attack, even if Moscow had planned it, and made easier Japan's drive toward the south. Nevertheless, the future looked black from Tokyo. On July 2, Japan's top leaders held a momentous conference "in the imperial presence" at which a "grave state of super emergency" was declared. It was also probably decided at this time to continue the southward advance.³⁹

On July 21, Japan concluded an informal agreement with Vichy for the "joint protection" of Indo-China. Tokyo immediately assured Washington that "Japan has no intention at all of making the southern part of French Indo-China a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas."⁴⁰ President Roosevelt countered by proposing that if Japan would refrain from occupying Indo-China he would attempt to obtain an international agreement to regard the peninsula as a neutralized area.⁴¹ The following day (July 25) the President froze Japanese assets within the country, thus virtually ending normal trade relations. By this action almost seventy-five per cent of Nippon's total imports outside the yen-bloc area were shut off. Particularly disastrous to Japan's war effort was the cessation of American cotton and petroleum exports. The American action was followed the next day by the identical freezing orders of the United Kingdom, India, and Burma. On July 28, the Netherlands Indies followed suit and thereby cut off Japan's last important source for the oil vital to its military machine. The following day the aforementioned Tokyo-Vichy arrangement was made public.

By August, the crisis between Japan and the United States had become extreme. Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull continued to negotiate with no success, and with almost no hope of success. Japan's proposal for dividing the spoils in the south Pacific could hardly be reconciled with the four general principles earlier enunciated by the American Secretary. As the economic pressure became almost intolerable, Nomura suggested a personal meeting in the Pacific between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt. The president, however, failed to perceive what value such a meeting could have without prior agreements on basic principles.⁴²

³⁹ Consult Leland M. Goodrich, S. Shepard Jones, and Denys P. Myers (eds.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, IV (1941-42), 481-82.

⁴⁰ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan* (1931-41), II, 318-19.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 341-42.

⁴² On this controversial point see *ibid.*, p. 346. Those who have accused President Roosevelt of refusing to explore all possible avenues of peace emphasize his determination not to meet the Japanese premier as evidence of his "war-mongering" proclivities.

Shortly after the issuance of the freezing order from Washington, the Philippines were virtually placed on a war footing. The Filipino army and navy were placed under the command of the armed forces of the United States. Troops and gunboats were withdrawn from China to Manila. General Douglas MacArthur was delegated to command the forces in the Philippines, and the American army in Hawaii was alerted. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General John Magruder was sent to China to help implement the lend-lease program for the Nationalist government. Additional loans were also granted Chungking as America at the last moment prepared itself for the worst.

During the early fall, Konoye's cabinet made several unsatisfactory overtures at Washington in an effort to clear up America's "misunderstanding" about Japan's "true intentions." None of these efforts was even partially successful. Both powers continued war preparations. On September 9, Japan began to evacuate its nationals from British possessions. On October 17, the American navy ordered the merchant vessels of its nationals out of far eastern waters, particularly those carrying goods to Vladivostok. The crisis became even more intense in November with the fall of the Konoye cabinet and the accession to power of General Tojo Hideki. Although Tojo's elevation was interpreted as a certain harbinger of imminent military action, the Japanese indicated that they wished above all else to continue negotiations. On November 7, Washington realized from the contents of an intercepted Japanese message that war would probably come around the end of the month, and Secretary Hull so warned the cabinet. In an effort to convince America of their "sincerity," the Japanese cabinet on November 15 dispatched Kurusu Saburo to Washington to aid Nomura. Soon, however, it became obvious that Kurusu brought no new plans or proposals. Secretary Hull summarized the situation on November 18 by remarking that ". . . if the Japanese could not now do anything about . . . the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, the adoption of a liberal commercial policy, and the question of the Tripartite Pact, he could only have Japan do what Japan would do."⁴³

Both powers realized that the insurmountable obstacle was the problem of China. Japan's demand that America should recognize its continental conquests was viewed in Washington as impossible. Equally impossible to the Japanese was the American demand that they should withdraw from China. The proposals submitted by Secretary Hull on November 26 as a basis for agreement were viewed by the Japanese as tantamount to an ultimatum.⁴⁴ In addition to Hull's general principles for peace in the Pacific, Japan was asked to enter a multilateral nonaggression pact with the British Empire, China, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 365. See also Hull's "Memoirs," *New York Times*, February 20, '948.

⁴⁴ See report in Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, 1944), pp. 485-86.

the United States. Moreover, Japan was to withdraw its military forces from China and Indo-China, and enter an international agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China. Furthermore, Tokyo was to recognize the Kuomintang government of China, and relinquish along with the United States the traditional treaty rights and privileges enjoyed in China. Finally, the two governments were to resume normal trade relations and conclude a new treaty of commerce.⁴⁵ To Japan, these proposals appeared to turn the calendar back to 1937 without regard for the investments in wealth and manpower that Japan had risked in its continental



Secretary of State Cordell Hull (center) points the way to the White House Gate for Saburo Kurusu (right) special Japanese envoy, as they with Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, called at the White House. Wide World Photo

enterprises. To the United States these final proposals appeared to be the only reasonable method of re-establishing stability in the Far East.

Although formal diplomatic conversations continued until December 7, Secretary Hull stressed repeatedly "that there was no possibility of an agreement . . . and that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquests"⁴⁶ at one or several points. On November 30, President Roosevelt made a trip to Warm Springs, Georgia. After twenty-four hours in the south, the president dramatically dashed back to Washington.⁴⁷ As conversations became even more hopeless, the

⁴⁵ *U. S. For. Rel., Japan (1931-41)*, II, 371-75.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 377-78.

⁴⁷ *Chicago Daily News*, December 2, 1941.

president on December 6 telegraphed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. The following day, while bombs were already raining on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese emissaries presented a detailed reply to Roosevelt's message which stated that further negotiations were useless.

The diplomatic negotiations of 1941 are informative in so far as they depict the rapid deterioration in American-Japanese relations; they do



President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Armistice Day, 1941. Wide World Photo

not, however, reveal anything consequential about the motivating groups and forces at work in both countries. The conclusion that war was inevitable had been arrived at by both sides long before Pearl Harbor. In Japan, the military had begun to press for decisive action in the summer of 1941, as soon as it had become certain that America would resist occupation of the Netherlands Indies. Negotiations were continued in the fall of 1941 mainly to win time and to distract attention from the full-scale military preparations. Contemporaneously, the armed services of America, as well as the State Department, had given up hope of peace

after the freezing of Japanese assets. The War Department had requested Secretary Hull to continue the conversations with Nomura and Kurusu until America could look to its defenses. Pearl Harbor was no more than the delayed, but inevitable, explosion.

JAPAN'S BLITZKRIEG

Nippon's decision to strike on December 7 was the result of numerous and complicated factors. Most groups, civilian and military, were united in the belief that Japan should take advantage of the chaotic international situation to advance its position in Asia and the Pacific. Divisions of opinion were mainly about means rather than ends. Those advocating force believed, even at the risk of merging the war in China with the European war, that Japan should mount a short and decisive war in the *Nanyo* (southern Pacific island area). Some who proposed such a program were afraid that a complete German victory in the summer of 1942 might result in Japan being shut out of southeastern Asia by the victorious Nazis. Still others advocated immediate action before America could recover from its isolationist lethargy. Only a comparatively few voices called for peace, conciliation, and measures short of war.

Military strategy was planned around a short and decisive war. The sons of Nippon were to sweep over southeastern Asia and the south Pacific islands before adequate resistance could be mounted by America. After striking a series of paralyzing blows and investing the most strategic areas, Japan was to halt, entrench itself firmly, and then begin to co-ordinate and unify its new conquests and combine their resources with the economy and productive capacity of the yen-bloc areas.⁴⁸ With a German victory in Europe thought to be a foregone conclusion, it was not likely that America alone would thereafter continue opposing the Axis partners. Left to its own devices, Nippon could then proceed to organize the millions of eastern Asia and the Pacific basin into a closely co-ordinated Japanese protectorate.

Preparations for a short war had been worked out meticulously. For the comparatively small Japanese economy, heavy industry had been developed to gigantic proportions. The limited productive capacity of the island empire was supplemented by natural resources and industrial products drawn from Manchoukuo and northern China. As part of the plan for a short war, huge stockpiles of essential raw materials not available in the "New Order" states had been accumulated. Reserves of oil, iron ore, bauxite, and rubber were especially large. Once Malaya and the Netherlands Indies could be occupied and exploited it was believed that most of Japan's vital economic needs would then be met. With this vision before

⁴⁸ See U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington, 1946), pp. 1-2.

their eyes, the Japanese planners neglected to broaden sufficiently Nippon's own industrial and agricultural foundations. The possibility of a long and difficult war was simply not included in the calculations of the military.⁴⁹

The attack on Pearl Harbor was one of Japan's greatest victories, and one of the most disastrous defeats of American arms recorded in history. Efforts to establish scapegoats for the calamity have been many and frequent. Without a doubt many persons in high official positions were responsible for the state of unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. The country as a whole was also responsible for the general state of laxness of which the Pearl Harbor incident was but a reflection.⁵⁰ Eight serious and semi-serious committees have heard testimony and deliberated at length about the whole question. In general, they have concluded that degrees of responsibility could be ascribed to several individuals ranging from the President down to the local commanders. At no point, however, is it possible for the disinterested observer to place blame definitely and finally.

Although the Pearl Harbor attack has often been designated as "treacherous" or "infamous," it is perhaps more accurate to describe it in the words of the Army Pearl Harbor board "as a bold and considered venture" designed to eliminate America's Pacific fleet as a threat to Japan's southward movement. Nippon's success in destroying a substantial part of the fleet guaranteed Japan homeland safety and freedom of maneuver in the western Pacific. Although the American army and navy had repeatedly been warned to expect such an attack, many persons in official positions were genuinely surprised by Japan's audacity in attacking the seat of American naval strength. The army was looking for an attack against the Philippines, the intermediate islands, or against Panama. General Walter C. Short, the army commandant in Hawaii, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commanding naval officer at Pearl Harbor, were only two of the responsible officials to be surprised by the Japanese attack.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Consult J. B. Cohen, "The Japanese War Economy," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XV, No. 24 (December 4, 1946), pp. 362-63.

⁵⁰ See President Truman's statement of August 30, 1945, issued after the publication of the reports of the Army and Navy boards of investigation.

⁵¹ The Army report placed a substantial degree of responsibility upon the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, as well as upon Lieutenant-General Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department; in the Navy report Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was forced to share the disgrace of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. In both instances, the errors of the military men were mistakes of omission born of the self-same isolationist spirit, complacency, and self-assurance which permeated the thinking of the entire country. The congressional investigation of 1945-46 raised the question of President Roosevelt's and Secretary Hull's activities in "fomenting" war. In this connection consult Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Senate Executive Document*, No. 244, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1946). Includes the details of the seven separate investigations conducted from December 18, 1941, to July 11, 1945, a review of the diplomatic conversations, between the United States and Japan from the Atlantic Conference in August, 1941, through December 8, 1941, and excerpts translated from the Konoye *Memoirs*. The best general account on the immediate background is Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, 1950). For the place of Pearl Harbor

The attack, however, was like an electric flash which shocked the American people, economy, and government into action. The day after Pearl Harbor, Britain, Netherlands, and China committed themselves to war alongside America; Japan's partners meanwhile declared war against the United States. Pearl Harbor not only involved the Western Hemisphere in the Pacific war; it also merged the various wars and divided the world into two hostile camps with but few countries remaining neutral.

After the practical elimination of America's Pacific fleet, the Japanese were free for a time to move at will. The "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse", two British capital ships, were stationed across the Pacific at Singapore. Furthermore, they were not adapted to fight alongside American vessels. Although the United States possessed seven aircraft carriers, none was available for immediate action in the central Pacific. Guam and Wake, America's two island outposts, were therefore left helpless as was the British colony of Hongkong. By the end of December they had all capitulated to the Japanese. Contemporaneously, large and well-equipped Japanese forces occupied Thailand from Indo-China preparatory to an overland invasion of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore. In the endeavor to defend Singapore, the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were both sunk by airplanes based on Indo-China. On February 15, 1942, Singapore, the great naval base, also fell to Japanese land troops.

The first attacks on the Philippines began about ten hours after the strike against Pearl Harbor. American armed forces in the islands were under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, a soldier of long experience in the Orient, and General Jonathan M. Wainwright. The first setback came with the virtual elimination of the American air forces through surprise bombing attacks by Japanese aircraft. United States naval forces were also too weak to provide strong opposition to the Japanese air and naval bombardments. Defense of the Philippines was thus left almost entirely in the hands of a small American land force and a large, but untrained, Filipino army. Reinforcements were impossible after the destruction of the American fleet, and after the capture of Wake and Guam. Forced back little by little, the defenders of the Philippines withdrew to the Bataan peninsula where they held out desperately against overwhelming forces for the next three months. Other Americans held out at Corregidor in Manila Bay. Realizing that the Japanese had struck another Achilles' heel in America's defenses, Washington ordered General

in world affairs, see W. L. Langer and S. E. Cleason, *The Undeclared War* (New York, 1953). The classic attack on Roosevelt's policies is contained in Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (New Haven, 1948). The most comprehensive effort to reply to the "revisionist" attacks is made by Basil Rauch, in his spirited defense of Roosevelt's policies in *Roosevelt, from Munich to Pearl Harbor* (New York, 1950). In all of the polemics over Pearl Harbor, and also in Feis' judicious study, little attention has so far been paid to the steady development of Japanese-American tension from 1905 to 1941.

MacArthur in March to leave his forces and depart for Australia. Thereafter, it was but a question of time until General Wainwright, the second-in-command, was forced to surrender. Bataan fell on April 9, and Corregidor capitulated on May 6, 1942. Japan was thereafter free to use the fine harbor of Manila Bay and to begin co-ordination of the islands into the "New Order."

While the Japanese were forcing the surrender of the Philippines, their compatriots were attacking the Netherlands Indies. Fully aware of the importance of oil to Japan's war machine, the Dutch had organized themselves for resistance long before Pearl Harbor. Immediately after the capitulation of Holland in 1940, the colonial government had busied itself with war plans and preparations. It was not until the first two months of 1942, however, that the Japanese concentrated their full force upon Indonesia. Although the British and Americans volunteered what help they could, the united resistance was not enough. Even though units of the Japanese fleet were badly beaten in attempting to negotiate the Straits of Macassar, Nippon's air and naval power continued to be infinitely superior to anything possessed by the defenders. The islands of Bali and Sumatra were occupied first as bases from which the Japanese could attack the more populous island of Java at the heart of the Dutch empire. By March 9, organized resistance had ended in Java, and the Japanese were thereafter secure in their possession of the "fabulous Indies."

Meanwhile, Japan's war machine had also pushed westward from Thailand and Malaya. When the main Japanese force had moved down the Malay peninsula to the conquest of Singapore, spearheads had been diverted toward Burma. The outcome of the Burma campaign was a foregone conclusion. Resistance was provided by a handful of ill-equipped colonial forces, a few units of the Chinese army, and outmoded planes of the Royal Air Force. As in the Indies, the defensive campaign in Burma was organized and directed by a semi-unified command. It was not until after the fall of Rangoon in March that Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American military adviser of the Chinese government, was called upon to direct operations in China. Stilwell was also granted the opportunity to defend Burma at the request of Chiang Kai-shek, but only after all hope of successful defense had disappeared. Through dint of intense effort, and with the aid of Colonel Claire L. Chennault and his "Flying Tigers," Stilwell managed to keep the Burma road open until most of the supplies already concentrated in Burma could be transported into China. By the end of April, however, the Irawaddy valley had fallen into the hands of the Japanese and the remnants of the defending forces retreated from the vicinity of Mandalay into China and India. In the

words of General Stilwell, the allied forces had taken "a hell of a beating."⁵²

Just five months after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had thus conquered most of "Greater East Asia." Dominating the whole area from India in the west to Wake Island in the east, the Japanese checked their war of movement and settled down to consolidate their gains. On the seas and in the air, Japan was also the unchallenged master of the Pacific basin.

Throughout the new and rich "co-prosperity sphere," the Japanese sought to "Nipponize" the population of about 130,000,000 persons. As in the founding of Manchoukuo, the military organized "independence" movements in Burma and the Philippines. Local collaborators in both areas were numerous and easy for the Japanese to control. In Malaya and Indonesia, native governments were set up with the approval of the occupation forces, and promises of future "independence" were freely given. Meanwhile, in Singapore an Indian Independence League was organized to foment revolt in India and to prepare the native population of India for future Japanese invasion. "Asia for the Asiatics" was a serious and popular slogan throughout the Orient. Playing upon the widespread animosity toward white colonialism, the Japanese came near to substituting their own form of imperialism in eastern Asia for that which they had driven out. Complete eradication of Western social and cultural influences appealed to many groups among the new nationalists of tropical Asia. Had the Japanese guarantees of independence been reliable, the popularity of their cause would have been greatly enhanced. Their effort to establish Buddhism as "East Asia's religion," and as a common bond uniting far eastern peoples, was typical of their efforts in every field to search out common ties of interest and attachment. It would be incorrect to believe that the Japanese program was universally resented. Its success might have been astounding to the West if the Japanese had really implemented by actions the promises of their propaganda agencies.⁵³

ALLIED RECOVERY

Although the American reaction to Pearl Harbor was quite unexpected to the Japanese, it was impossible, even with all the will in the world, to convert to war production, raise a large army, and aid the European allies without the lapse of a considerable length of time. Meanwhile, it was obviously necessary to hold Hawaii at all costs and to endeavor seriously to prevent occupation of Australia and the Aleutians. After the loss of Burma, a south Pacific bastion became of particular importance as a

⁵² For a stirring account of the Burma campaign see Jack Belden, *Retreat with Stilwell* (New York, 1943).

⁵³ Additional details in Joel V. Berreman, "The Japanization of Far Eastern Occupied Areas," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June, 1944), pp. 168-80.

point from which to attack the "co-prosperity sphere." Aid to China had become impossible after Stilwell's retreat had left the Burma route in Japan's hands. At first, therefore, the Allies concentrated their efforts in the direction of rebuilding their fleet and retaining their grip upon Britain's Pacific dominions.

In the planning of the Western democracies, it had been generally agreed that Germany was the more immediate enemy and thus would have to be eliminated first. Even though the planners envisaged initial defensive action as America's necessary role in the Pacific, few realized how quickly and with what minor losses the Japanese would gain control over the vast reaches of the Pacific from Burma to Attu in the Aleutians.⁵⁴ Before May, 1942, the Allied resistance had been helpless, aside from sporadic air and naval raids on Japanese installations. While arms were being produced and men trained, the Americans and their Allies worked feverishly just to stem the tide of the Japanese advance.

Tokyo also was surprised by the ease with which the rich and strategic territories of the Pacific basin had been conquered. By May, 1942, the strategic plans laid down by Nippon's military experts were revised to provide for the invasion of areas not originally slated for occupation. The Solomons, Port Moresby, the Midway Islands, and the Aleutians were added to the list. By extending its control into the central Pacific, Japan hoped to keep Hawaii as America's most advanced position and to prevent the American navy from establishing bases closer to Asia.⁵⁵

It was at this point, however, that the Japanese made the fatal error of underestimating American air and fleet strength and of overextending their own line of advance. The turning of the tide took place in June, 1942, at the Battle of Midway.⁵⁶ Through excellent intelligence, the breaking of the Japanese code, and prompt carrier-air action, the Americans were able to sink the four aircraft carriers accompanying the Japanese fleet and thus eliminate its air cover. Without adequate defense against aircraft, the superior Japanese fleet found itself helpless and was finally forced to flee. Hereafter, the Japanese navy was continually hampered by its lack of airpower, long before American production had really begun to make an irremediable difference.

⁵⁴ See U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁵⁵ Consult *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁶ For a detailed discussion of this and other important naval battles see Gilbert Cant, *The Great Pacific Victory. From the Solomons to Tokyo* (New York, 1946). Also consult the splendid volume published by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Naval Analysis Division), *The Campaigns of the Pacific War* (Washington, 1946). It also includes an analysis of Japanese naval strategy from Pearl Harbor to the end of the war. See also the volumes published by the U. S. Navy entitled *Battle Report, Pacific War*; to date three volumes have been published. Meanwhile, definitive operational histories are being prepared under the direction of Samuel Eliot Morison. To date he has published three volumes of which the last (*The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April, 1942* [Boston, 1948]) is the most pertinent. See bibliography.

Soon after the victory at Midway, American forces began to test the outer defenses of Japan's perimeter. After withstanding the Japanese land advance in New Guinea, a limited counteroffensive was launched in August, 1942, against northern New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The attack at Guadalcanal in the Solomons was a daring and risky venture made possible mainly by increasing American air strength and by the effective night actions of fleet units. Although the position of the American marines was often desperate, the Japanese counterattacks were sporadic and undeveloped. The marines eventually achieved mastery of the air and the navy gradually came to control the surrounding seas. Cut off from reinforcements, the Japanese position at Guadalcanal became hopeless by the end of 1942. American forces had thus made their first successful and permanent penetration of the vast Japanese perimeter. In the battles for the Solomons the stakes had been high and the losses heavy for both sides. The conquest of Guadalcanal, however, marked the passing of the initiative into the hands of America. Air superiority had been the decisive factor as in the Battle of Midway. Replacements also began to increase in volume after the engagements of 1942.


While their counterattack was being developed, the allied forces were striking continuously, if less spectacularly against Japanese shipping.⁵⁷ Uniquely dependent upon shipping facilities to link its maritime empire together, Japanese merchant and supply vessels were the first and immediate target of marauding submarines and aircraft. As the war progressed, the effects of continuous attacks upon shipping facilities, particularly by submarines, became one of Nippon's most serious problems. Oil, bauxite, rubber, coal, iron, and food had to be shipped overwater to the home islands from all parts of the "co-prosperity sphere." Losses could not be replaced fast enough. Hence the Japanese economy was gradually strangled into inaction. Supplies of all kinds became shorter, and key industries were often required thereby to halt production of goods necessary to the war effort.

Beginning in the spring of 1943, the allied powers marshaled their forces for a widespread offensive toward the Japanese homeland. It had become certain in the campaigns of the previous year that the scattered Japanese bases might be by-passed if control of the air could be achieved and maintained in the vicinity of the bases under fire. After a summer breathing space, interrupted only by several experimental attacks on the Japanese perimeter, the allies launched in the fall of 1943 a double-pronged amphibious attack spearheaded toward the Japanese home islands. One route chosen was via New Guinea to the Philippines and thence to the southernmost Japanese islands. The other route was through the island groups of the Central Pacific, from the Gilberts and Marshalls to the Japa-

⁵⁷ See U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*, pp. 378-83.

nese strongholds in the Marianas. Another important reason for capturing these strategic islands was to establish bases from which B-29's could fly toward Nippon's cities.

Using leapfrog tactics, the American armed forces in 1944 and 1945 progressed westward relentlessly. Their sustained offensive in the central Pacific developed a new pattern of conquest by combining operations of air, naval, and land forces. First, the immediate objective and the surrounding Japanese bases were subjected to lengthy and systematic bombardment by air and fleet units. After the target had been softened up



U. S. Marines Land on Iwo Jima. Official U. S. Navy Photograph

sufficiently by naval airpower, marines were landed under a heavy blanket of aircraft and fleet protection. Bombardment alone, however, was insufficient to dislodge the highly trained Japanese troops from prepared positions. Action by ground forces, often involving hand-to-hand combat, was the only possible way to end the Japanese resistance.

To the Japanese the capture of Saipan in the Marianas was the decisive engagement in the central Pacific theater. Beginning on June 15, 1944, the marines and army fought for three weeks against the fierce Japanese defenders and a hostile population. The protecting American fleet also engaged and defeated important units of the Japanese navy. Thereafter, the Americans advanced quickly to the liberation of Guam and the conquest of Tinian. By November, 1944, long-range bomber attacks (B-29's)

from the Marianas were inaugurated. These were directed against surrounding island groups still in Japanese hands as well as against the Nipponese homeland.

While the amphibious advance progressed in the central Pacific, the allied armies crushed the Japanese in northern New Guinea, and on October 17, 1944, American troops began the reconquest of the Philippines. Although the Japanese had been expecting an attack upon Mindanao, General MacArthur struck in the Gulf of Leyte in the Central Philippines. Unwilling to lose these strategic islands without a showdown, the Japanese dispatched to the battle area the remaining important units of their fleet. Having hoped for a long time that the Japanese would commit their fleet to a full-scale engagement, the American navy entered with confidence the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In a gigantic three-pronged attack, the Japanese succeeded in drawing off to the north some of the major units of the American fleet. The execution of the plan thereafter called for decisive action, but the Japanese commander of the central fleet unit wavered and withdrew. Losses to the Japanese fleet units were irreparable. This was the last stand of the organized Japanese navy. Hereafter, the Japanese were forced to concentrate almost exclusively upon the defense of the home islands, and upon sacrificial attacks by suicide ships and aircraft.

THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

After the fall of Burma, the Western allies concentrated their efforts almost entirely upon defeating Japan in the Pacific. The main objective of allied policy toward China was to keep the Chinese resistance alive through diplomatic encouragement and military aid. Neither troops nor supplies in quantity could be taken into western China after the closure of the Burma route. A trickle of supplies arrived in Chungking "over the hump" from India. However, the difficulties of flying across the mountains were almost insurmountable. The Western powers were, however, able to supply necessary aircraft and technical personnel. Ultimately, even the Chinese were able to bomb at will the Japanese means of supply and communication. B-29's were also used for a short time to bomb the industrial centers of Manchuria. Offensive action in China, however, was virtually impossible.

The military problem was never critical in this theater. After the opening of the counteroffensive in the Pacific, the allies, however, were confronted by thorny political problems in China. Difficulties between the Communists and the Kuomintang were the major concern of Chinese and Westerners alike. Outbreak of civil war might well have made it possible for Japan to have expanded beyond its holdings in the central Yangtze area. The major concern of General Stilwell and other Western

military and diplomatic personnel at Chungking was therefore to keep internal peace and perhaps mount a limited offensive timed to correspond with the advance across the Pacific.

As part of the policy to encourage China's resistance, the British and American governments in the summer of 1941 had assured China that "when peace is restored in the Far East," they would then be prepared to negotiate for "the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the rendition of concessions, and the revision of treaties on a basis of reciprocity and equality." By the fall of 1942, the two governments in seeking to give the Chinese more than words and promises announced that they were prepared "promptly to negotiate with the Chinese Government, a treaty providing for the immediate relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China, and for settlement of related questions." After due deliberation the Anglo-Saxon powers had decided to relinquish legally what had already been taken from them in fact. On January 11, 1943, the United States and Britain agreed to terminate their rights under the final protocol of 1901, to transfer the control of the international settlements at Shanghai and Amoy (and in the case of the British also the Concessions at Tientsin and Canton) to the Republic of China, and to relinquish extraterritorial, consular and related privileges. Finally, the contracting powers agreed to negotiate "a comprehensive modern treaty or treaties of friendship, commerce, navigation, and consular rights upon the request of . . . one of them, or in any case within six months after the cessation of the hostilities."⁵⁸ By the end of 1946, similar treaties with China had been signed by Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, France and several smaller countries.

Although the conclusion of the treaties constituted a moral victory for Chungking (particularly since *China's Destiny* was having wide circulation in the summer of 1943), military conditions continued almost hopeless. In the summer of 1944 the Japanese launched large-scale attacks in northern and southern China. In part, this belated offensive was designed to catch the Chinese off balance before Stilwell could begin an offensive of his own. Another objective of the Japanese move was to gain control over the whole length of the Peiping-Hankow-Canton railway, and thus obtain direct rail, road, and trail connections between Korea and Singapore via China, Indo-China, and Thailand. Land connections had become imperative for Japan as submarine and air attacks reduced steadily the amount and effectiveness of its maritime shipping. Contemporary with Japan's greatest and last effort in China, Vice-President Henry A. Wallace was dispatched to Chungking to investigate China's political and economic problems. As negotiations progressed at Chungking, Japanese

⁵⁸ For complete texts of the treaties and the accompanying notes see *China Handbook, 1937–43* (New York, 1943), pp. 183–90. See also W. Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), chap. XI and Appendix II.

spearheads from Canton and Hankow joined forces by capturing Changsha and intermediate cities. Thereafter, the Japanese began a drive toward Indo-China (although many feared it was moving toward Chungking) which was not halted until December. During the course of these operations, relations between Stilwell and the Generalissimo had reached the breaking point. The American general had insisted that co-operation of all elements in China was required to meet the Japanese threat successfully. He also requested thoroughgoing military reforms that would have cut deeply into the Kuomintang's system of patronage and control. To Chiang, Stilwell's demands constituted interference in what he considered China's own affairs. Although Stilwell was granted a number of his demands, he was not permitted to carry out the program for which he had made them. Upon Chiang's request, Washington was forced to relieve Stilwell of his command. At the same time, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned from his post in a protest gesture against Chiang's policies.

American reaction to Stilwell's recall was immediate. Washington began to view Chinese politics with more than casual interest. During August, 1944, President Roosevelt had dispatched a special mission to Chungking under the leadership of Donald M. Nelson and Patrick J. Hurley. Nelson was supposed to survey the Chinese economic scene, while Hurley was to act as mediator between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and incidentally between Chiang and Stilwell. After Stilwell's recall and Gauss's resignation, Hurley became American ambassador and General A. C. Wedemeyer, who had been active in Delhi with Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of the China-India-Burma Theater, succeeded Stilwell as commander-in-chief of the American troops in China. Stilwell commented: "Everything will now be lovely."⁵⁰

Thereafter, Hurley concentrated full attention upon bringing Yanan into Chiang's fold. Although a shrewd lawyer, Hurley had few special qualifications for reconciling the bitter differences separating China's extreme political parties. As time went on, he became a pawn in the hands of the Chungking diplomats, and lost thereby whatever confidence in American mediation the Communists might have had. Chiang meanwhile lulled America's suspicions by restoring T. V. Soong to political office, and by naming Wang Shih-chieh, a progressive Chinese, to the post of Minister of Information. Adroit declarations of intentions to reform and to summon the People's Congress also were accepted as promises of better things to come.

⁵⁰ Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York, 1948), p. 345. For further discussion of the Stilwell episode see Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (New York, 1946), chap. XIV; also see A. Smedley, "The Social Revolution," in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *China* (Berkeley, 1946), p. 194; also L. Rosinger, *China's Crisis* (New York, 1945), pp. 256-57.

Trouble within the ranks of the embassy staff soon made Hurley's position difficult. Most of the professional diplomats agreed in large part with the position taken by Stilwell and Gauss. Criticisms of Chiang's government in the American press were also viewed by Hurley as deprecatory of his policy. In November, 1944, he flew to Yen-an in an effort to establish a *modus vivendi* between Kuomintang and Communist leaders. Although he managed to bring Chou En-lai back to Chungking with him, Hurley was not at all successful in working out a compromise solution for China's greatest problem. In November, 1945, Hurley resigned from his post in a huff, charging the professional diplomats and the State Department with pursuing a "pro-Red" policy.⁶⁰

Long before the bankruptcy of Hurley's policy, the allies had determined to ignore China in the final attack upon Japan. Despite the fact that the Japanese offensive had come to a standstill, no confidence existed in allied circles that the Chinese could break through to the sea and establish contact with the allied forces driving across the Pacific. By the end of January, 1945, however, northern Burma had been reconquered by American and Chinese forces originally organized by Stilwell. Shortly thereafter, the blockade was broken, the Burma road reopened, and its new adjunct, the new Stilwell road, was initiated.⁶¹ This action was too late, however, to be decisive in the final defeat of Japan.

China's main contribution to the war effort of the allied nations was in forcing the Japanese to keep great quantities of much-needed material tied up in China. Japan could much more readily spare manpower than equipment and supplies. Guerrilla operations of the Communists behind the Japanese lines also forced the Japanese to maintain more than skeleton garrisons in China.⁶² Furthermore, the Japanese were unable to exploit their conquests to the full so long as the Chinese refused to co-operate and continued to harass lines of communication and supply. Japan's inability to wind up the "China affair" quickly was in the long run one of Nippon's most disastrous failures. China bled the conquerors from Japan to weakness in much the same way that Napoleon's resources were exhausted by his effort to conquer and hold the Iberian Peninsula. China could not boast of spectacular contributions to the victory, but China could feel justly proud of its persistence and determination in the terrible war of attrition.

⁶⁰ Details of Hurley's allegations in *New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

⁶¹ Stilwell Road was the name given to the Ledo Road by Chiang Kai-shek in honor of Stilwell's accomplishments in southeastern Asia. Hacked from the jungle, the Ledo road ran from a railhead in northeastern India to the vicinity of Lashio, where it joined the older Burma road.

⁶² An interesting feature of Communist policy was the organization of the Japanese People's Emancipation League. Using rehabilitated Japanese war prisoners, the Communists were highly successful in organizing the J. P. E. L. as a special operations unit for activities behind the Japanese lines. Details in Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (New York, 1945), pp. 104-19.

JAPAN'S CAPITULATION

By the beginning of 1945, the Japanese were weary of war. With the inauguration of the "positive policy" in 1931, the tempo of life had been intensified year by year, and living had become difficult at best. By the last months of 1944 the large-scale bombing attacks had also brought home to civilians the real horror of war. Morale in the cities began to decline swiftly as thousands of civilians were killed and their homes burned. Wholesale evacuation from the cities to the countryside also caused disruption of families and confusion to the system of transportation and supply.

A further indication of Japan's terrible plight was the introduction in October, 1944, of *Kamikaze* ("Divine-Wind") missions. Pilots of aircraft volunteered to sacrifice themselves by flying ammunition-loaded planes directly into chosen targets. Militarily, such planes acted as if they had been well-directed and highly explosive rockets. Just as German rockets caused widespread damage in England during the last months of the war, the *Kamikazes* also were highly effective in crippling American naval strength and in undermining morale. Considerable damage was inflicted upon warships of all types, and about forty-five vessels, mostly destroyers, were sunk. Furthermore, it was necessary to divert the heavy bombers away from their strategic bombing of Japan's industries to the tedious task of seeking out the small and widely scattered *Kamikaze* bases. If the Japanese had been able to concentrate their attacks more easily, and if larger loads of ammunition had been used, America might have been forced to withdraw, or, at least, alter its strategic plans significantly.⁶³

Decline in civilian living levels and morale, relentless bombings of cities and industry, gradual destruction of the merchant fleet, and isolation of large segments of the overseas army served finally in 1944-1945 to shake the confidence of some of Japan's staunchest Nationalists. With the collapse of the Tojo government in July, 1944, influential figures had begun to seek ways and means for ending the war. Opponents of Tojo who had gone into "retirement" after Pearl Harbor reappeared on the political scene. Marquis Kido Koichi, Lord Privy Seal and the Emperor's personal political representative, sought conferences with the "moderates" and urged quick cessation of hostilities. Reports from Japanese naval and civilian experts had advocated as early as the first months of 1944 the conclusion of a negotiated peace, or even complete agreement to allied terms.⁶⁴

⁶³ Consult U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report* (Pacific War), (Washington, 1946), p. 10; also Hanson W. Baldwin, "America at War; Victory in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1945-46), 26-29.

⁶⁴ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Japan's Struggle to End the War* (Washington, 1946), pp. 1-3.

Upon succeeding Tojo in July, 1944, General Koiso Kuniaki received an Imperial order to undertake a "fundamental reconsideration" of Japan's war predicament. Since this admonition was given before the beginning of the air assault against the home islands, it resulted in but few practical efforts to obtain peace. The military still insisted Japan could win an "honorable peace" only through increased resistance. Koiso, however, organized a new inner circle called the Supreme War Direction Council with the object of bridging the gap between the Cabinet and the military command and ending the omnipresent problem of divided responsibility. It included as regular members the Premier, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Army Chief of Staff, and Navy Chief of Staff. Although its decisions were subject to approval by the cabinet as a whole, the Council hereafter became the directing force in war and peace efforts. Of most significance was the inclusion of the two chiefs of staff, who had long been instrumental in formulating national policy, but who had never before been forced to assume responsibility for its failure.

In September, 1944, Admiral Yonai Mitsumas'o, Vice-Premier and Navy Minister in the Koiso Cabinet, granted permission to Rear Admiral Takagi Sokichi to continue studies earlier undertaken for the purpose of arriving at a formula by which Japan could get out of the war. Acting as a liaison officer for the peace group, Takagi held exploratory conversations with leading members of the Imperial Household, the cabinet, the army, and the navy. General agreement prevailed on the need for peace, but widespread differences were expressed as to its precise terms and as to the specific steps to be taken in achieving it. Almost all agreed that the Emperor would have to take his stand on the side of capitulation in order to keep the army from revolting against the government. Although the trail toward peace was blazed during the fall of 1944, the Koiso cabinet eventually decided to renew military efforts in order to achieve a more advantageous position from which to secure a compromise peace.⁶⁵

By January, 1945, however, the bombing attacks had made peace more imperative than ever.⁶⁶ In early February, the Emperor called into conference a number of Japan's elder and respected statesmen. Prior to his scheduled conversations with the *tennō*, Prince Konoye submitted a memorandum stating baldly "that there is no longer any doubt about defeat."⁶⁷ In addition, Konoye warned that more was to be feared from an internal revolt of "Communistic elements" than from capitulation to the Western democracies. Preservation of the *tennō* system and the institution of private property appear to have been at the heart of Konoye's

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6. See also Wesley R. Fishel, "A Japanese Peace Maneuver in 1944," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, VIII (1949), 387-97; and T. Kase, *Journey to the Missouri* (New Haven, 1950), chap. VI.

⁶⁶ For details, figures, and careful analysis of the bombing attacks see U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's Economy* (Washington, 1946).

⁶⁷ Text of Konoye's memorandum in U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Japan's Struggle to End the War*, pp. 21-22.

proposal to end the war and thereby avert revolution. It would not be too hazardous to assume that Hirohito received similar warnings from his other advisers; it is certain that most of them counseled the Emperor to inaugurate definite peace overtures.

At the Casablanca conference of January, 1943, the allied nations had stated their peace terms by agreeing that the war should continue until the Axis powers had been forced to unconditional surrender. In November of the same year, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt held a conference at Cairo. Since the Soviet Union had not yet begun to participate in the far eastern war, no Russian representative was present. In the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Cairo deliberations, the three statesmen laid down the following specific conditions for peace with Japan:

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.⁶⁸

By this agreement, the allies committed themselves once again to an unconditional surrender policy and to the reduction of Japan to its territorial status as of 1868.

The month before the Cairo Conference Secretary Hull had met with Marshal Stalin during the festivities of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (October 19–30, 1943). On one occasion the Russian leader astonished Hull by voluntarily "saying clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan."⁶⁹ Although Stalin did not then mention concessions to Hull, the Russians at the Yalta Conference in the Crimea (February 4–11, 1945) exacted concessions from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt who were also apparently under pressure from their own military establishments to obtain Russian participation. In return for a written promise "to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the surrender of Germany," the Russians required (1) preservation of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia; (2) restoration to Russia of the southern part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent thereunto; (3) the internationalization of Dairen and the leasing of Port Arthur by China to

⁶⁸ Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Boston, 1945), VI, 232–33.

⁶⁹ See Hull's "Memoirs," *New York Times*, February 27, 1948.

Russia as a Soviet naval base; (4) Sino-Soviet control over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways through a joint company; (5) concession of the Kurile Islands to the U.S.S.R. The American and British agreed to the Soviet demands even though China, the nation most concerned, was not represented at the Yalta meetings. The Western powers insisted, however, that the agreements should not go into effect without the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang. Thus, as so often in history, China's future was determined in part by foreigners.⁷⁰

Although the Japanese leaders must have surmised what the allied conditions of peace would be long before actual peace maneuvers began, they persisted in the belief that a negotiated, and perhaps compromise, peace would still be possible. The military groups were unalterably opposed to occupation of the home islands. Practically all shades of opinion were united in devotion to the *tennō* system, and to its preservation. Meanwhile, the public had almost no idea of the serious conditions being faced by the country's leaders. It was not until Nippon's cities had endured six months of pounding by B-29's, and the Americans had landed at Okinawa on April 1, 1945, that the rank and file began to accept defeat as inevitable.

On April 8, one week after the Okinawa landings, the Koiso cabinet fell and was succeeded by a cabinet headed by peace-minded Admiral Suzuki Kantaro. His task was to end the war as quickly as possible. Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief cabinet secretary under Suzuki, was charged with making a study to determine whether or not Japan was powerful enough to continue at war. After studying the country's economic plight, the military's inability to protect the population from bombing raids, and the swift decline in morale after Okinawa, Sakomizu concluded in May that Japan must cease fighting. Armed with his secretary's report, Suzuki went immediately to the Emperor and requested that peace overtures be inaugurated.

Serious Japanese efforts toward peace were also accelerated, and perhaps made possible, by the allied victory in Europe and by Moscow's denunciation in April of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.⁷¹ In May, Ambassador Sato in Moscow was instructed by Foreign Minister Togo to begin preliminary conversations looking toward the arrival of Prince Konoye as a peace emissary. Meanwhile, Hirota, the former Premier, was holding conferences with Russian Ambassador Malik in Tokyo. During the course of these conversations, Japan requested Russia's "good offices" as intermediary and on July 10 asked Moscow's permission to send a peace mission.

⁷⁰ Complete text in *New York Times*, March 25, 1947; for further discussion see *infra*, pp. 518-19.


⁷¹ For text of the Soviet denunciation see H. C. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Japan's efforts to work through Moscow were checked in mid-July by the absence of Stalin and Molotov. Both statesmen had gone to the Potsdam Conferences. As the result of these allied conferences, the Potsdam Declaration of the British, American, and Chinese governments was published on July 26 as the final answer to Japan's requests for peace. It demanded the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived the people of Japan into embarking on world conquests. . . . Moreover, it proclaimed that "the terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we shall determine." After providing for disbandment of Japan's armed forces, the Potsdam ultimatum added that "we do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation," but that there shall be a "revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people." Furthermore, the allies promised that Japan would be "permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy . . . but not those industries which will enable her to rearm for war." Occupation of the defeated country was also ordained. Nowhere in the ultimatum was mention made of the Emperor's position or the future of the *tennō* system.

Immediately after its receipt the Supreme War Direction Council began discussions in Tokyo of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. Suzuki, Yonai, and Togo favored acceptance of the allied terms; the War Minister, Anami Korechiku, and the two chiefs of staff rebelled. In an effort to speed the discussions, the American forces dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6. Two days later, Russia handed Ambassador Sato a formal declaration of war. The following day a second atomic bomb was dropped which practically leveled the city of Nagasaki.⁷² Hereafter, even high-placed army officers were forced to admit that, although the Japanese armed forces might repel an allied invasion, they were certainly not able to protect the children of Nippon from wholesale extermination. Under pressure from all sides, a special meeting of the Council was called on August 9–10 to formulate a reply to the Potsdam Declaration. At the meeting the Emperor himself cast the vote which broke the council deadlock. Japan's acceptance was relayed on August 10 to the Allies "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand that prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."⁷³

⁷² Maps, charts, and tables recording the effectiveness of the atomic bombs are in U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (Washington, 1946).

⁷³ For an intimate account of the last days of war in Japan see Kato Masuo, *The Lost War, A Japanese Reporter's Inside Story* (New York, 1946), chaps. XII and XIII.



Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia (left) and General Douglas MacArthur. Wide World Photo

In the American reply of August 11, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes defined the interim position of the Emperor "as subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." With regard to the Emperor's permanent status, the Secretary wrote cryptically: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Decla-

ration, be established . . . by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”⁷⁴

Immediately upon receipt of the American statement, the Council and the Cabinet once again went into session. Again the military officials opposed acceptance so long as no guarantee was included about the preservation of the “national polity” and the *tennō* system. Under pressure from Foreign Minister Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki, the Emperor on August 14, acting on his own initiative, convoked a meeting of the Cabinet and other influential officials. In the presence of the assembled statesmen, the Son of Heaven stated flatly, despite opinions to the contrary, that “the American answer seems to me acceptable.” The government was then ordered to prepare an imperial rescript proclaiming the end of hostilities and resolving “to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.”

Although arguments immediately developed about the “conditional” character of the proposed truce arrangements, statesmen in both countries continued to work out the details necessary to the cessation of hostilities. Stunned by the suddenness of defeat, the Japanese people awaited in fear and uncertainty the inevitable arrival of the occupation forces. Prince Higashikuni was charged with the creation of a cabinet which would conclude the peace negotiations. As a tribute to the allied armed forces and to the discipline of the defeated Japanese, the occupation took place without serious difficulty. On September 2, 1945, the formal surrender terms were signed by the Japanese emissaries aboard the U.S.S. “Missouri” in Tokyo Bay,⁷⁵ the same bay into which Commodore Perry had steered his “black ships” just ninety-two years before.

⁷⁴ Text in *New York Times*, August 12, 1945.

⁷⁵ See vivid description of the surrender scene in Kase, *op. cit.*, chap. I

PART IV

SINCE THE WAR

CHAPTER XVI

CHINA: NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM

For eight years China endured siege. Until 1941, Nationalists and Communists buried their differences while China fought a lone battle for survival against the armed might of Japan. The outbreak of the Pacific war at Pearl Harbor led China to hope that the siege would quickly be lifted. However, aid for the beleaguered Nationalist forces in the remote Western provinces was easier to grant than to deliver. Not until 1943 did American aid begin to have an impact upon events centering about Chungking. Not until the Western powers in 1943 relinquished their extraterritorial rights did diplomacy make a contribution to Chiang's cause. The meeting of Chiang with Roosevelt at Cairo in 1943 helped further to brighten China's prospects for the future. Committed to the unconditional defeat of Japan, the United States prepared after Cairo the international scaffolding for elevating China to the position of dominant power in eastern Asia after the war.

American co-operation with Chungking after 1943 ran into numerous snags. Armed with American aid and assurances, Chiang hardened his attitude toward the Communists. Stimulated to greater independence by their successes in guerrilla warfare, the Communist leaders in Yenan refused to accept Chiang's terms for unity. The concern felt in Washington about Chiang's declining popularity in China was expressed through American suggestions for reform. This unsolicited advice made little impression upon the determined Generalissimo, although it strengthened the hand of the Communists. As tension mounted in China during the closing years of the war, the hope swiftly faded that Nationalist China would be able to preside calmly over the destinies of eastern Asia. In its place loomed the dismal prospect of civil war in China accompanied and aggravated by the power vacuum that would be left with the defeat of Japan. As time would tell, the domestic crisis in China intensified the international problems of the Far East and helped to promote the division of the world into two violently opposed armed camps.

RUSSIA AND NATIONALIST CHINA

Throughout the war years, Chungking had charged that the Communists of the border region were being supported by Russia. No evidence existed, and none is even now available, to substantiate this Nationalist accusation. That the Communists moved to the border

region in 1936 to lodge under Russia's protective wing can hardly be denied. That beleaguered Russia during the war provided the Yen-an Communists with anything more than sympathy and protection of their rear has yet to be proved. Subsequent events have, however, shown that Russia did not dismiss the Chinese Communists as simple agrarian reformers. Stalin's appellation of them as "margarine Communists" appears particularly misleading in the light of what has happened in China since the war. A wide gulf separated Russia's ultimate intentions regarding the Chinese Communists from Russia's wartime ability or willingness to provide them with material aid.

While critical of Chiang's domestic policies, the United States set out after 1943 to obtain promises from the powers that China would have restored to her after the defeat of Japan those territories previously wrenched away.¹ Uppermost in the minds of the diplomats were the regions bordering on Russia, such as Manchuria and Sinkiang. To realize the return of these territories to the unquestioned jurisdiction of the Nationalist government, the American negotiators addressed themselves to Moscow. Since Russia required American aid for the prosecution of the war, the views of Washington on far eastern affairs received respectful attention in the Russian capital. The United States bore the main burden of this diplomatic program, for Churchill viewed skeptically the plans for supporting the Kuomintang and for elevating China to the status of a great nation. The British Prime Minister, while agreeing to co-operate in America's long-range program for China, differed with what he called "the exaggerated ideas" held by Roosevelt with respect to China's relative importance.² The diplomatic pronouncements of 1944 attested to the temporary success of the American effort in winning Russian acquiescence. In general, Russia agreed to refrain from aiding the Communists, to recognize the Nationalist regime, and to consent to the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.

As the war entered its last year, Russia's attitude stiffened in direct proportion to the defeats inflicted upon Germany. While Ambassador Hurley sought to convince Chiang that Russian intentions were honorable, Stalin and Roosevelt met at Yalta.³ Urged on by the Allied military planners, Roosevelt sought a definite commitment from Stalin as to the earliest date when Russia could enter the war against Japan. He

¹ Consult, for details of American policy, Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle. The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, 1953), pp. 95-114; also the "White Paper" of the U. S. Dept. of State, *United States Relations with China* (Washington, 1949), pp. 53-57.

² W. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), p. 785.

³ For details of the Yalta agreement see *supra*, pp. 510-11, and the *Dept. of State Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, No. 347 (February 24, 1946); for interpretations of the proceedings see Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians, The Yalta Conference*, edited by Walter Johnson (New York, 1949), chaps. IV and XV; Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-54; H. W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York, 1950), chap. III.

also sought to obtain definite assurances that China should be guaranteed great-power status in the post-war organization, that China should be granted an opportunity to repossess her lost territories, and that the powers should co-operate to bring internal peace and unity to China. Stalin raised the question of what political guarantees Russia might expect upon entering the Pacific war. Under pressure from the military to obtain Soviet participation in the war at the earliest possible date, Roosevelt agreed to a series of political conditions for Soviet entry that were of utmost concern to China. The urgency for Russian participation relayed to Roosevelt by the military was, as we now know, somewhat exaggerated. Poor intelligence, on both the American and Russian sides, led to an overestimate of the endurance powers of the Japanese, both in Manchuria and in Japan itself. In the conclusion of the Yalta agreement China was not consulted, but Roosevelt agreed to secure Chiang's assent to its terms. The death of Roosevelt two months after the conclusion of the Yalta agreement left the entire problem in the hands of his successors and complicated badly the postwar international relations of the Far East.

In return for the agreement that Russia should enter the Pacific war within two or three months after the surrender of Germany, Stalin, as we have already seen, obtained American acquiescence to the majority of Russia's traditional objectives in the Far East. Only a few safeguard phrases entered the final document agreed to at Yalta. It was decided that on Outer Mongolia and on the ports and railroads of Manchuria the "concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" should be obtained. The United States agreed, moreover, "that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated." For its part the Soviet Union promised "to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance." At best, this was a vague assurance, not a guarantee. It left Russia free to bargain further once the Soviet armies were in action in the Far East. Indeed, it may be suggested that Roosevelt accepted the vaguely worded agreement at Yalta precisely because he felt that political arrangements would undergo amendment and modification once Russia became an active partner in the Pacific war. It was unlikely that Soviet leaders would accept a post-war settlement in eastern Asia, where no other great military power existed after the war, that fell short of Russia's traditional objectives.

Chiang Kai-shek was not officially informed of the Yalta decisions until June 15, 1945, four months after the signing. In this intervening period momentous events had taken place. On April 5 the Soviet Union denounced its five-year nonaggression pact with Japan. A week later President Roosevelt died. Russia created a puppet government in

Poland contrary to the Polish phases of the Yalta discussions. Mussolini and Hitler were both dead by May 1. On May 9 the German surrender document was formally signed at Berlin. Preparations thereafter went rapidly ahead for Soviet entry into the Pacific war, the defeat of Japan, and the convocation of the United Nations conference at San Francisco.

As the world moved toward peace in the West, attention shifted to the unresolved and potentially explosive division of China. Rifts had already developed in the Yalta accord before Chiang received notice of its precise terms.⁴ Secrecy had been imposed on the Chinese aspects of the agreement to make certain that Japan would not close Vladivostok and make other counterpreparations to meet the promised Soviet attack. It was assumed that information always leaked out to the Japanese from Chungking. Immediate announcement of the Yalta decisions could have produced a serious reaction in China that might have influenced or ended the unity discussions being promoted by Hurley and the United States government. Finally, publication of the agreement would certainly have fomented a debate in the United States that could seriously have altered the total picture of peace planning.

The growing concern over Soviet policy in Europe stimulated anxiety in Chungking and Washington about Russia's ultimate intentions in Asia. While Hurley continued to believe in the possibility of an accord in China,⁵ the reports to the State Department from special officers in the Far East stressed the insincerity of the Kuomintang leaders, and raised serious doubts concerning Chiang's ability to master China after the war. Hurley and the Foreign Service Officers,⁶ with whom he violently disagreed on many points, were generally agreed that the Chinese Communists were not closely allied with Moscow. Hurley interpreted this fact to mean that they might eventually be willing to come to terms with Chiang. The Foreign Service Officers believed, on the contrary, that the Communists represented a revolutionary upsurge in China that would never yield and that Chiang would never be able to master. That the Chinese Communists remained tractable to the end of the war was one thing; that the end of the war would bring discord and war was the danger most feared by all observers. With Russia's participation in the Asiatic war the question that became uppermost was the attitude that Russia would assume toward China and the Chinese Communists.

On the military side General Wedemeyer and Chiang sought to prepare the Nationalist forces for the day of Japan's defeat. Like Stilwell

⁴ Joseph C. Grew, then Acting Secretary of State, commented pessimistically on the future prospects of Russo-American relations. See his account in the work edited by Walter Johnson and entitled *Turbulent Era* (Boston, 1952), II, 1444-68.

⁵ Details of Hurley's mission in *U. S. Relations with China*, chap. III.

⁶ The key figures in this group were the diplomats attached to American military headquarters in China. John S. Service was particularly resented by Hurley. See Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-57.

before him, Wedemeyer urged the Generalissimo to reduce the size of his forces and to streamline and equip a small, quick-striking army. American officers were introduced into all branches of the Nationalist armies to help bring about greater efficiency and better training. Debate raged meanwhile as to whether the United States should equip Chinese Communist forces in the common fight against Japan. In Washington there was considerable sentiment in favor of such a move; in Chungking, Chiang, Hurley, and Wedemeyer opposed it. In the final analysis, the Communists failed to receive the aid that they hoped for, and the overhauling of the Nationalist forces fell far short of Wedemeyer's expectations.

Hurley's announcement of the Yalta terms to Chiang on June 15, 1945, produced no violent reaction in Chungking. The Chinese were already well informed generally of the Russian terms.⁷ Chiang sought unsuccessfully to convince Great Britain and the United States to become parties to the proposed Sino-Soviet accord. It was Chiang's intention to enlist the Western powers as bodyguards in China's future negotiations with the Soviet Union. Chiang's anxieties were shared in Washington by those who feared that Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea would be forced into the Soviet orbit after the surrender of Japan. Stalin would never have agreed to the Western powers being parties to a treaty designed to regulate Sino-Soviet relations. The commitment of the Western powers to the Yalta agreement left China to the tender mercies of the Russian dictator.

T. V. Soong flew to Moscow early in July to inaugurate conversations with Molotov and Stalin.⁸ In China, Communists and Nationalists alike anxiously awaited the outcome of these negotiations. Stalin had repeatedly told the Western leaders that Russia would not enter the war against Japan until the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty with China. The United States was meanwhile working to obtain Russia's agreement to China becoming a permanent member of the Security Council in the projected United Nations Organization. The atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima while Stalin and Soong negotiated in Moscow. Two days later Russia entered the war even though the agreement with China had not yet been concluded. The dramatic flashes of the atomic bombs in Japan and the realization that Japan was about to surrender speeded Stalin to compromise on a number of items. Just before Japan's formal capitulation, Soong and Stalin initialed the accords.

The Sino-Soviet agreements were worked out in nine lengthy docu-

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 312-14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-21; see also David Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven, 1948), pp. 203-05.

ments. In the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance⁹ the U.S.S.R. reaffirmed her formal recognition of Chungking, and both powers pledged themselves "to give each other all possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries." In a separate agreement of August 14,¹⁰ reminiscent of Sino-Russian arrangements of the past, the Chinese agreed to join "the main trunk lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway" into a single railway system "under the name of the Chinese-Changchun Railway" which should then become "the joint property of the Soviet Union and Chinese Republic" to be exploited through "a Sino-Soviet Company," with its headquarters in Changchun. Separate agreements¹¹ were also signed with regard to the Manchurian port cities of Port Arthur and Dairen. It was agreed that Port Arthur should be used jointly as a naval base "at the disposal of the battleships and merchant ships of China and the U.S.S.R. alone." Dairen was declared "a free port open to trade and shipping of all countries" and under the administration of China. The U.S.S.R. was to have the right to lease piers and warehouses at Dairen. In a separate exchange of notes¹² of the same date, the U.S.S.R. "again confirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity," and the Soviet government confirmed that with regard to Sinkiang "it has no intention to interfere with China's internal affairs."¹³ In a further exchange of notes¹⁴ the Chinese government agreed "in view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia . . . if a plebiscite . . . confirms this desire . . . it will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia in her existing boundaries." By virtue of these agreements, most of which were concluded for a period of thirty years, a start was made toward the adjustment of disputes of long standing between China and Russia.

Russia's extensive occupation of Manchuria in the last month of the war tempered Chungking's jubilation over the conclusion of the treaty. For their part, the Chinese Communists were clearly disturbed by Russia's agreement with Chiang. They remained hopeful, however, that

⁹ Text in Harold Isaacs (ed.), *New Cycle in Asia* (New York, 1947), pp. 31-33. For background materials and a general discussion of the arrangements surrounding the treaty negotiations see especially chap. IV, *U. S. Relations with China*. For comment see George W. Atkinson, "The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance," *International Affairs*, XXXIII (1947), 357-66; Raymond Dennett, "Sino-Soviet Treaty and Reparations," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 257-60; Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-50; and Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951* (London, 1953), chap. II.

¹⁰ Isaacs, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

the presence of Russian Communist forces in northeastern Asia could be turned to their benefit. Each party in China considered the possession of Manchuria one of its major post-war objectives, and one of the most essential prerequisites to the construction of a sound government and a viable economy. Although Stalin had assured Soong that the Russian forces would be withdrawn from Manchuria three months after the surrender of Japan, fear was expressed in Chungking that the Russian evacuation would have a price attached to it.

The fears of the Nationalists were not fully confirmed. Instead of remaining permanently in Manchuria, or instead of turning the area over to the followers of Mao Tse-tung, the Russians permitted Nationalists and Communist troops to reoccupy a number of cities in the Three Eastern Provinces. As the Chinese forces moved in the Russians withdrew, although not within three months after the end of the war. Upon agreement with Chiang, the Soviet withdrawal was postponed until 1946. Concerned about the future control of the valuable Manchurian area, the Russians inaugurated discussions with China looking toward joint Sino-Soviet control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria. When these failed, the Soviet leaders apparently decided that they could not afford to have Manchuria's industry fall into the hands of potential foes. Machinery, equipment, and construction materials were either removed or destroyed before the Russian forces departed. Although the cities of Manchuria were left as empty shells, the vital natural resources of the land remained. Nor could the Russians change the strategic location of Manchuria at the crossroads of northeastern Asia.

While Russia occupied Manchuria, the Chinese Communists gradually took over strategic cities. Between Russia and the Kuomintang regime, dispute succeeded dispute over the implementation of the agreements relating to Manchuria. The Russians assumed control over the Chinese-Changchun railway and placed themselves in complete charge at the port of Dairen. Even after their formal military withdrawal from Manchuria, the Russians continued to run Dairen to suit themselves, and refused to permit the Nationalists to enter, and would not allow American ships to dock. In part, this prevented the Nationalists from developing the city as a base for the Kuomintang armies operating in Manchuria.¹⁵ In their protests to Moscow the Nanking government was supported by diplomatic pressure from Washington.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Russia continued to maintain exclusive control over the vital Port-

¹⁵ The Soviet regime justified its stand by reference to the clause in the agreement by which Dairen should "become subject to the military regime of the U.S.S.R. . . . in event of war with Japan." The Soviet authorities pointed out that peace with Japan was not yet concluded. See Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-38.

¹⁶ For example, see Isaacs, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48; also *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 123-26.

Arthur-Dairen area, and continued to operate the Chinese-Changchun railway. The Kuomintang was never able to reassume control over Manchuria.

With regard to Outer Mongolia, the years immediately after the war continued to bring that area closer to the U.S.S.R.¹⁷ Nor was this a departure from the past. After 1911, the Mongols claimed independence from China and sought to organize an "autonomous" regime. Even in the days before the downfall of the tsardom, Outer Mongolia was drawn close to Russia. In the years during and immediately after the First World War, as will be recalled, Outer Mongolia was overrun by Russian, Japanese, and Chinese armed forces in a mad scramble to control the area. Meanwhile, the "autonomous" government at Urga was nominally headed by the Living Buddha, the chief of the Lama Church who enjoyed the staunch support of the Mongolian aristocracy. In 1920 the Mongolian revolutionary movement began under the leadership of Sukhe Bator and Choibolsang, an avowed Marxist, and by 1921 this group had taken political control. Until his death in 1924, the Living Buddha presided as the figurehead in the new "Mongol People's Government." The "Mongolian People's Republic" was thereafter established with Choibolsang as premier, and the capital city of Urga was renamed Ulan Bator. In 1924 a republican constitution was promulgated which remained the law of the land until 1940. It was modeled on early Soviet constitutions.

Although Russia in the treaty of 1924 with China recognized officially China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, the U.S.S.R. continued to deal separately with the government at Ulan Bator. In the twenties and thirties, particularly during the years when Japanese pressure toward Outer Mongolia was at its peak of intensity, the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia moved even closer together as exemplified by their Mutual Assistance arrangements of 1934 and 1936. With the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937, Russian military forces moved into Outer Mongolia and were accompanied by experts and technicians who aided the Mongols in the development of industrial, agricultural, and sanitation programs. In 1940 the new constitution of the "Mongolian People's Republic" was enacted. It states that "the aim of the Republic is development along noncapitalistic lines and the transition in the future to socialism."¹⁸

¹⁷ Consult Gerard M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), especially chap. III.

¹⁸ English text first appeared in January, 1948, in the *Soviet Press Translations* published by the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington. In 1945 a member of Henry A. Wallace's mission to Soviet Asia had obtained a copy in the Mongol language which he brought back to the United States. The English here quoted is translated from the Russian version of the constitution. For comment see Eleanor Lattimore, "A Note on the Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 85-86.

Marshal Choibolsang visited Moscow while T. V. Soong was there and helped to work out the details regarding Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945. After the end of the war, on October 20, 1945, a plebiscite was held in Outer Mongolia according to the terms of the treaty. In the presence of a Chinese delegation, the qualified Mongols voted "unanimously" for their independence¹⁹ and in February, 1946, concluded a treaty of friendship with China. On February 27, they entered a ten-year pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. This was accompanied by a Soviet-Mongolian agreement on economic and cultural collaboration.²⁰ The "Mongolian People's Republic" then appealed for admission to the United Nations. Their application was twice refused as a side reaction of the "cold war."²¹ No doubt exists any longer that the "Mongolian People's Republic" has become a satellite of lesser magnitude in the Russian galaxy.

In conjunction with the Mongolian problem it is important to keep in mind that not all Mongols reside in the "Mongolian People's Republic." There are sizable groups of Mongols in Siberia (Buriat Mongols, for instance, just north of Outer Mongolia), eastern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. The small state of Tannu Tuva between Outer Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. numbers slightly less than half of its population (*ca.* 95,000 total) as Mongol. Having declared its independence in 1921, Tannu Tuva was incorporated into the Soviet Union on October 13, 1944, as the Tuvinian People's Republic.²² Although the growth of Pan-Mongolism has long been speculated about with regard to the border area, the example of Tannu Tuva has probably not been lost upon the Russians or the Chinese in their thinking about the other Mongol areas. The U.S.S.R., having within its borders the Mongols of the Buriat area and Tannu Tuva, would hardly welcome, or tolerate, a Pan-Mongol movement unless it could be closely controlled. Russia's success in extending her influence over areas in which the Mongols form a large element in the population has been aided substantially by the Chinese attitude of looking upon the Mongols as insignificant and inferior people.²³

Sinkiang, the area claimed by China as its westernmost province, has also been an important factor in Sino-Russian relations. Although almost twice the size of Texas, Sinkiang is one of the most sparsely

¹⁹ For accounts of the voting procedure see the discussion in Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-55; and Friters, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-15.

²⁰ Texts of these documents reproduced in William Mandel (compiler), *Soviet Source Materials on USSR Relations with East Asia, 1945-50* (New York, 1950), pp. 129-31.

²¹ Consult for details Eleanor Lattimore, "Report on Outer Mongolia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 337-40.

²² Details on the Tuvinian People's Republic in Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-91.

²³ Cf. James Burke, "China's Losing Game in Mongolia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 156-57.

populated of China's provinces, having fewer than four million inhabitants. Located at the point where the frontiers of China, the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan, India, and Tibet approach each other, it is a focal point in the economic and political life of Central Asia. Like Manchuria, it is a province wherein a multitude of peoples meet, merge, and squabble over control of the land and its resources. Unlike Manchuria, the Chinese population of Sinkiang has been relatively uninfluential in molding the province's history.²⁴

The Uighur Turks, who are Moslem by faith, constitute the dominant ethnic element in Sinkiang. After the conquest of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-tang in 1877, the area was incorporated within the Chinese Empire officially in 1882. With the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, a number of frontier warlords ruled the province in virtual independence. Although the Chinese insisted upon recognition of their sovereignty in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin particularly, who dominated the frontier province until his death in 1928, maintained political and trade relations both with China and Russia without putting himself into the hands of either. During Yang's regime construction of the Turk-Sib railway was begun. It was completed in 1930. As a branch of the Trans-Siberian it was designed to connect with the highways running into Ili and Kashgar, two important sections of Sinkiang. After a period of internal upheaval, Sheng Shih-ts'ai emerged in 1932 as the Governor of Sinkiang. Since Sheng's opponents had apparently been aided by supplies and funds from the Japanese, Sheng turned in his struggle for power toward Russia. Thereafter, Russian influence in the life of the province increased rapidly until the Second World War, but with the actual control of provincial affairs clearly in Sheng's hands.

When it appeared that his Russian friends were about to be defeated by the Germans, Sheng in 1942-43 turned toward China and in so doing surrendered to Chungking the highly prized provincial autonomy of Sinkiang. Russian influence was limited severely. Realizing too late what the policy of Kuomintang would be, Sheng looked around desperately but unsuccessfully for aid against the Chungking co-ordinators. In 1944 he was forced from office and a series of Nationalist servants took over the administration. During the war years also, the United States began to display a greater interest in this geographical center of gravity through which run the most important trade routes of Central Asia. In 1943 Washington opened its Sinkiang consulate. Although the U.S.S.R. in 1945 announced in the Sino-Soviet agreements that it had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the province, its influence in Sin-

²⁴ See the Sinkiang survey prepared by the Inner Asian seminar at the Johns Hopkins University and published in *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 53-63; also Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang* (New York, 1944).

kiang rapidly expanded at the end of the war. Repeatedly, the Moslem tribesmen revolted against the Kuomintang administrators after 1945.

The long frontier area between China and Russia, frequently a source of friction in the past, continued to be of primary moment in Sino-Russian affairs after the war. The progress of the U.S.S.R., when contrasted with the chaos of Nationalist China, steadily attracted the peoples of the border regions to the standard of Communism. Not knowing political democracy, they have never been repelled by the absence of it in Russia or China. Close enough to Russia to observe the material improvements of the Soviet regime, they have been and probably will continue to be impressed. To 1949 the example of Russia remained predominant. With the establishment of a Communist government at Peking, the question of the frontier regions became an issue for the two Communist states to work out. Whether the contest for control of Manchuria and Sinkiang will continue to be a divisive force in the relations between Russia and China is a significant issue of the present and the future.

AMERICAN MEDIATION IN CHINA

During the war years the United States worked to make certain China would emerge from the war as the leading power in eastern Asia. By virtue of the "equal" treaties concluded between China and the powers after 1943, it was supposed that "independent" China was about to come into its own. The leaseholds and concessions of the past were either eliminated by the Japanese or were being restored to Chinese jurisdiction. Friends of China contributed generously to the relief of the stricken country and hoped sincerely that the contending factions would resolve their domestic struggles by political action rather than by the arbitration of arms. If only internal peace could be assured, optimistic observers predicted the steady reconstruction of the war-torn country, the expansion of Chinese industry and commerce, and the development of the coveted Chinese market which has traditionally lured Westerners by its illusory promise of 450,000,000 "customers." Few expected that China's comeback, even under the best of conditions, would be smooth or spectacular; on the other hand, few believed that the collapse of the Kuomintang government would be but a matter of a few years. In 1945, China's problems appeared grave but not insuperable.

The capitulation of Japan found China unprepared for peace. Chiang's armies were too widely scattered and poorly organized to accept the Japanese surrender and simultaneously hold the Communists in check. Even before Japan's surrender, Mao had issued orders that the Japanese and puppet troops should surrender to his forces. On August 10, 1945, the Generalissimo ordered all Chinese and puppet troops to retain their weapons and remain at their posts to assure peace and order and to

accept the surrender of the Japanese forces. Unlike the Communists, Chiang meant to use the puppet forces as allies. Although Chu Teh sought international recognition of Yen-an's decision to disarm the Japanese, the four powers in their General Order No. 1 to Japan commanded the Japanese to surrender their persons and arms *only* to the Chinese Nationalists.

Turned down by the powers, Yen-an acted swiftly. A race began for control of the cities, strategic areas, and rail lines previously held by the Japanese. American marines were dispatched to the Peking-Tientsin area to aid the government forces in disarming the Japanese. American planes ferried Kuomintang units to Shanghai, Nanking, and other important Yangtze cities before guerrillas in the area could occupy them. By the end of August, however, the Communists had entered Kalgan and other important cities of northern China and Manchuria. In a war-weary world the prospects of civil hostilities in China were viewed with alarm as a threat to the still unsteady structure of peace.

The United States continued after the fall of Japan to be the major outside force in Chinese affairs, particularly in the first two years after the war. Through Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer the United States in the summer and fall of 1945 continued to support strongly the regime of Chiang Kai-shek while urging an immediate cessation of hostilities between the government and the Communists. Ambassador Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek succeeded finally in arranging a meeting with Mao Tse-tung in Chungking on August 28, 1945, to inaugurate discussions. These lasted until October 11 when Mao returned to Yen-an.²⁵ The Chinese Communist leader probably consented to negotiate, since the signature of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 apparently came as a surprise to the Chinese Communists. During the fall of 1945 both sides appeared to desire a political settlement.

In presenting their terms for peace the Communists insisted upon an immediate end to one-party rule, the establishment of a coalition government, and new elections for the long-promised National Assembly. Delegates who had been elected almost a decade before were thought to be out of touch with the newer trends in Chinese politics. The Generalissimo, although equally desirous at this point of ending the civil strife, insisted that the Communists lay down their arms before demanding concessions. Chiang viewed as intolerable an armed political party of the opposition, but consented to recognize immediately the legal status of all parties. When the conversations were concluded, the conferees had also decided that political tutelage should be brought to an early end and that a Political Consultation Conference of thirty-eight members from all parties and nonpartisan groups should be called in the near future to

²⁵ See *China Handbook, 1937-45* (New York, 1947), pp. 737-40.

decide when and how to convoke the National Assembly. No solution was reached as to the disposition of military forces, as to the future of the Communist-controlled areas, or as to the problem of accepting the surrender of the Japanese army. Indeed, hostilities went on parallel with the negotiations.

Two weeks after Mao's return to Yen-an, the rival armies undertook major operations in Manchuria. Despite advice from Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the Commanding General of the China theater,



Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Wide World Photo

the Generalissimo set his sights upon Manchuria and neglected to consolidate his position in the Yangtze area and in the territories south of the wall. The forces of the Kuomintang, with their modern equipment and American aid, at first recaptured many of China's important cities and rail lines. The Communists continued to draw support from the countryside, and perhaps from the Russians in Manchuria. Fighting a superior *Chinese* enemy employing guerrilla tactics was more difficult, however, than fighting Japan's overextended armies. Japanese troops were finally used by the government to hold strategic points against the Communists until Kuomintang reinforcements could arrive. As the Kuomintang experienced military successes, Chiang became more uncompromising than ever.

In Washington, hope for political compromise in China still ran high in the fall of 1945. Hurley reported optimistically on the course of the Mao-Chiang conversations when he returned to the United States in September. The hopeful statements issued by the two parties to the conversations at their conclusion in mid-October reinforced Hurley's estimate of the progress being made toward reconciliation. However, great perplexity continued to dominate American thinking on China. How far could the United States afford to go in supporting Chiang? Would American aid to the Kuomintang encourage Chiang to concentrate on a military rather than a political solution to China's unity issue? Should the United States make post-war aid to China definitely contingent upon genuine progress in the reform of China's government? Would not the extension of further military support to the Nationalists outrage the Yen'an Communists and provoke Russia openly to take their side? How could the American public, eager to see "the boys come home," be expected to accept America's continued involvement in China's politics and war? Such considerations, domestic and foreign, puzzled American planners and hampered their ability to outline a clear-cut China policy. This bewilderment at the highest levels was soon reflected in the actions of the Congress and in the reactions of the American public.


The furor attending Hurley's unconventional resignation from his ambassadorial post on November 26, 1945, permitted the outside world to observe how divided were the counsels in Washington.²⁶ From the Foreign Service Officers in China and Russia reports kept pouring into Washington warning that the Mao-Chiang conversations were not likely to produce a peaceful solution. It was known that liaison had been established between Yen'an and the Russians. Moscow repeatedly voiced its displeasure with the American decision to handle the occupation of Japan alone (see pp. 590-91). In Washington, the realization dawned in November that war not only continued in China, but that its pace had accelerated after the conclusion of the Mao-Chiang talks. As a new crisis rapidly developed, criticism of Hurley's policies multiplied in foreign service circles. Hurley resigned in a huff. In his letter of resignation²⁷ to President Truman he asserted that ". . . The American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department." Hurley believed that his mission "to prevent the collapse of the Government . . ." was undermined by career men willing to see the Kuomintang go down the drain.

While Hurley's letter resounded, Washington continued to develop a shift in policy. The public indignation stirred by Hurley's denunciation stimulated the planners to quick action. General George C. Marshall was

²⁶ For the Hurley story see Feis, *op. cit.*, chap. XXXVI.

²⁷ Text of his letter in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 581-84.

named on December 15 the Special Representative in China of the President. While China continually asked for greater aid, Washington sought to define the general objectives of American policy and to provide Marshall with specific directions. By mid-December, 1945, the American government had decided to work positively for a united and democratic China and to aid the Chinese government in regaining control over Manchuria. To implement this broad program Marshall was instructed to



George C. Marshall. Wide World Photo

arrange a truce, particularly in northern China, and to urge the convocation immediately of a national political conference that would bring together the representatives of all parties. In the meantime, American marines were to remain in northern China, the Kuomintang forces were to be transported by American ships and planes to Manchuria, and American financial and military aid was lent to the Kuomintang with the understanding that political divisions should be eliminated or arbitrated as soon as possible. Clearly, the American government did not contemplate abandoning the Kuomintang to its own fate.

In a public statement of December 15,²⁸ President Truman called for a cessation of hostilities in China and intimated that American assistance in post-war reconstruction would be dependent upon the willingness of the Central government to negotiate with the Communists and to broaden the base of government. The President also urged the convocation of a national conference to develop a practical solution to China's problems. Marshall inaugurated truce discussions on January 7. In response to the American plea, a Political Consultation Conference (P.C.C.) was called with representation from all parties for January 10, 1946. On this same date a truce was arranged in the hostilities through the good offices of General Marshall. Meanwhile, Marshall urged increased collaboration and sought to make negotiations easier by organizing "truce teams" to work with the local commanders and to bring peace to the widely scattered fronts.

At the meetings of the P.C.C. (January 10-31), eight Kuomintang representatives negotiated with seven Communists, five members of the China Youth Party, nine delegates from the four parties of the Democratic League, and nine independents. Although possessing no legal authority to enforce their decisions, the delegates agreed that a coalition government should be organized immediately. After a transitional period it should be replaced by a constitutional regime. This latter was to be formed through the actions of a National Assembly to be convened on May 5, 1946. The Draft Constitution of 1936 was to be revised meanwhile by the inclusion of numerous and more democratic provisions. The opposing armies were to be reorganized and nationalized. The coalition government was to insure civil liberties for all groups and inaugurate agrarian, industrial, and educational reforms. When a military accord was signed on February 25, 1946, providing for gradual unification of the opposing armies, it appeared as if a rational solution had finally been achieved.²⁹ One month later General Marshall left for Washington to report on the situation in China.

No sooner had the Political Consultation Conference adjourned, however, than strict Communists and die-hard right-wing members of the Kuomintang accused their parties of faithlessly capitulating to the enemy. Protests poured into the government about the failure of the Russian troops to evacuate Manchuria, and of their undercover aid to the Communists. Officially Russia denied that it was furnishing help to the Communists. Molotov, however, was vehement in his denunciation of the American effort to support the Nationalist government. He proposed that the American and Soviet governments should arrange for the

²⁸ *New York Times*, December 16, 1945.

²⁹ Reactions of the Chinese Communists expressed in Agnes Smedley, "The Social Revolution," in H. F. MacNair (ed.), *China* (Berkeley, 1946), p. 199.

simultaneous withdrawal of their forces from China to let the Chinese work out their own problems. Committed to its program of supporting Chiang, the United States refused Molotov's proposal. Thereafter the Russians openly accused the United States of interfering in China's internal affairs for the purpose of maintaining the "reactionaries" in power. As a result of such conflicts, the Soviet forces were not withdrawn from Manchuria until April 15, 1946.³⁰

While Marshall conferred on financial aid in Washington (March 25–April 18), matters went from bad to worse in China. Neither party to the truce agreement would trust the other, and the continued presence of Russian forces in Manchuria contributed nothing to Chiang's peace of mind. Chiang's attitude stiffened as news came from Washington that surplus war materials and monetary aid would soon be flowing to China. The conviction grew among the rightists of the Kuomintang that America could not afford to abandon Chiang. Once deeply involved in China, the United States, it was believed, would continue to back the Nationalist government, even in civil war, rather than permit a Communist victory. The Communists meanwhile accused Chiang of deliberately revising the decisions of the Political Consultation Conference. The Democratic League supported a Communist decision to withdraw from the meetings preparatory to the convocation of the National Assembly. Their attacks were provoked by Chiang's decision to postpone the meeting of the Assembly from May to November. Speaking for the irreconcilable opposition, Madame Sun denounced the "reactionary" policies of the Kuomintang, deplored its decision to achieve a "solution by force," and accused the United States of supporting a government not "truly representative of the Chinese people."³¹

The crisis intensified over the struggle for control of Manchuria. With the formal withdrawal of the Russian forces, Chou En-lai announced on April 15 the beginning of full-scale hostilities. Two days later the Communists took Changchun. General Marshall returned to Chungking on April 18 and immediately proposed that field teams especially organized to implement the cease-fire agreements of January 10 should be sent into Manchuria. The Communists continued to occupy strategic cities, such as Harbin and Tsitsihar, while Marshall talked of cease-fire agreements. The government meanwhile moved officially from Chungking to Nanking on May 1. Delays in dispatching the truce teams also provided the Communists with time to extend the area of their control in Manchuria. Their cause was further aided by the Russian program of turning over to them the stores of weapons and supplies captured from the Japanese.

Continuing delays and mounting distrust increased the tension until

³⁰ See news articles from *Izvestia* reproduced in Mandel (compiler), *op. cit.*, pp. 63–66.

³¹ *New York Times*, July 14, 1946.

the Nationalists determined to launch a full-scale military effort in Manchuria. Despite the warnings of his American military advisers, Chiang continued throughout May to disperse his forces too widely and overextended his lines of communication and supply in his resolve to capture Changchun. The taking of Changchun on May 23 was heralded in Nanking as a great victory for Chiang's forceful policy. Established in the heart of Manchuria, Chiang was once again willing in June to talk of truce. In the negotiations that followed, Mao insisted that the United States should cut off all military aid to Nanking and withdraw its military forces from China. When Washington announced its intention of continuing aid to the Nationalists, the possibility of a permanent truce vanished rapidly. A temporary truce was concluded until August 26 in Manchuria.

As hopes of peace swiftly disappeared, Washington began again to reconsider policy and returned to more normal diplomatic practices. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, a renowned missionary-educator, was appointed American ambassador on July 11, 1946, as Hurley's successor and Marshall's collaborator. On July 23, Edwin Pauley reported that the Russians had incapacitated Manchuria's industrial plant by their confiscations,³² and Washington reaffirmed its determination to keep the marines in China. Stuart and Marshall on August 10 issued a joint statement³³ designed to direct world attention to the gravity of the situation. The American mediators pointed out that China was verging on economic catastrophe and that, although the public wanted a peaceful solution, the fighting "threatens to engulf the country and pass beyond the control of those responsible." On the same day President Truman dispatched a note to Chiang expressing America's concern over the deteriorating situation and over the recalcitrance of the extremists in both parties.³⁴ Explicit in his statement was the suggestion that America might have to redefine its policy toward China unless substantial progress could be observed in the achievement of a peaceful solution. Three days later, Chiang issued a statement blaming the Communists for the breakdown in negotiations and stipulated that for peace the Communists would have to "carry out the truce arrangements, restore communications, respect decisions of executive headquarters, and integrate their army."³⁵ At the end of August, 1946, civil war appeared to be inevitable.

While the Chinese opponents talked frankly of a "total national split" and "war to the death," the United States signed an agreement on August 30, 1946, for the sale to the Nationalists of surplus war property lying in various islands of the South Pacific. At this point the Chinese Com-

³² *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 596-604.

³³ Text in *ibid.*, pp. 648-49.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 652.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 649-51.

munists became vehement in their denunciation of American aid to the Nationalists. They attacked Marshall for presuming to mediate between two Chinese parties while the United States furnished war supplies on a grand scale to one of the parties. Marshall himself recognized how untenable this made his position. Negotiations went on, nevertheless, at Nanking during September. Neither side deigned to make significant concessions to the other, and both sides continued to fight it out in the north. Dismayed by the impasse, Marshall on October 1 addressed a memorandum to Chiang stating "that unless a basis for agreement is found . . . without further delays . . . I will recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the United States Government terminate its efforts of mediation."³⁶

Nationalist pressure against the Communist stronghold at Kalgan continued to mount in September, 1946. In response to Marshall's threat of withdrawal, Chiang immediately advanced a truce proposal relating to the Kalgan area. Almost at once Chou En-lai rejected the new offer. On October 8, Marshall and Stuart issued a second joint statement. In this pronouncement they were emphatically critical of the unyielding attitude taken by the Communists. Two days later the Nationalists captured Kalgan, and Chiang on October 16 issued an eight-point proposal for the cessation of hostilities. To this the Communists also gave a negative reply. In a final effort to bring the opponents together a Third Party group of minority parties took over the mediation burden, but again to no avail.

While Marshall was considering complete withdrawal, the Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was signed on November 4, 1946.³⁷ It had been negotiated in conformity with the provision in the "extraterritoriality treaty" of 1943 that a commercial pact should be worked out after the defeat of Japan. The new treaty was a reciprocal agreement including most-favored-nation treatment for both parties. The rights of Americans in China were strictly defined. Article VIII provided that in case certain American states or territories, independent of the federal government, should place restrictions upon land-holding by Chinese nationals, "the Republic of China shall not be obligated to accord to . . . the residents, corporations, or associations of . . . such state, territory, or possession treatment more favorable than the treatment accorded" the nationals, corporations, or associations of China. In general, however, the commercial treaty of 1946 dealt with few specific problems; it is best described as a statement of ultimate intentions in the

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 662-63.

³⁷ Text in *Dept. of State Press Release*, No. 773 (November 4, 1946). For comment see Charles J. Fox, "The Sino-American Treaty," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 138-42; 178-80; also M. E. Orlean, "The Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1946," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VII (1948), 354-67.

field of commerce. Even so, the Chinese Communists attacked the treaty bitterly as another example of American support for the Kuomintang. Chou En-lai threatened to appeal to the United Nations on the issue of American "intervention." Thus the split in China widened even further.

When the National Assembly convened on November 15, its meetings were boycotted by the Communists and attended by just a handful of representatives from the Democratic League. The only parties besides the Kuomintang represented at the Assembly meetings in Nanking were the China Youth and Social Democratic parties. The latter party was expelled from the Democratic League for participating. The presence of other parties, coupled with Chiang's desire to have the new constitution be more than a single-party document, forced the Kuomintang, despite desperate internal resistance, to adopt the revised version of the Draft Constitution advocated by the Political Consultation Conference. On Christmas day, 1946, the Assembly voted the new constitution into existence as of Christmas day, 1947.³⁸ Five days later, the Young China Party and the Social Democratic Party were invited to join the government in an interim coalition regime.

In the new constitution the five *Yüan* system was radically changed along the lines suggested at the Political Consultation Conference. An elected National Assembly with strictly limited powers was set up as one of the organs of sovereignty. The Legislative *Yüan* was reformed to act as a popularly elected legislature; the Control *Yüan* was also made elective. The Executive *Yüan* (appointive) and the President, who was to be elected by a People's Congress, were to have extensive powers, even to the point of ruling by mandate under emergency conditions. The provinces were to have the right of electing their own governors, making their own laws relative to self-government, and exercising wide powers in local affairs. Despite its numerous merits as a compromise document, the constitution of 1947 was to have only a short trial period.

While the Nationalists were going ahead in the fall of 1946 with their constitutional program, the war against the Communists continued in northern China. As a result of a series of Nationalist victories, the Communist position in Manchuria was seriously endangered and a Kuomintang victory seemed to be in the making. American forces and equipment, although being slowly withdrawn from northern China, continued until the end of 1946 to exercise an important influence upon the course of the civil war. While Chiang sought to obtain a truce with the Communists, the American forces in China were attacked several times. Their very

³⁸ English text published in *China Handbook 1950* (New York, 1950), pp. 144-55. For comment see George W. Mallory, "China's New Constitution," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (1948), 390-92; Joseph P. Chamberlain, "Structure of China's Constitution," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 100-105; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), chaps. XXI and XXII.

presence apparently outraged all but a minority of Chinese, irrespective of their political affiliations. On November 19 Chou En-lai indicated his intention of withdrawing from the truce meetings and requested transportation back to Yen-an. With his departure the discussions inaugurated in January, 1946, ground to a halt. The failure of the truce arrangements brought Marshall to the conclusion that China was headed toward a disastrous civil war. In a talk with Chiang of December 1 he warned that the Communists were too strong and too determined for the Nationalist forces to crush out of existence. No alternative to negotiation existed, he believed, that would not involve a complete collapse of China's staggering economy. A message from Yen-an strengthened Marshall's resolve to withdraw from the negotiations. On December 4, the Communists indicated that before reopening negotiations they would insist that Chiang dissolve the National Assembly and withdraw his forces to the positions held on January 13, 1946.

Meanwhile, President Truman issued another statement on December 18, 1946, regarding American policy toward China.³⁹ He reiterated the determination of the United States to refrain from compromising China's integrity as a sovereign nation and sought to justify the presence of American troops and naval units in China by stressing their role in assisting the Nationalist government in the evacuation of the Japanese. He stated: "while avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country." The president hoped that the Chinese government would yet find a peaceful solution.

The hopelessness of the American effort to sustain the Kuomintang was dramatized by the complete failure of General Marshall's mission. Marshall had remained in China during December to exert whatever influence he could upon the constitutional discussions going on in the National Assembly. After the constitution had been hammered out, Marshall requested his recall. His joint statements with Ambassador Stuart in August and October were extended and amplified in his report to President Truman of January 7, 1947.⁴⁰ Greater authority was lent the report than might otherwise have been the case by the appointment of General Marshall on January 8 to succeed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Not only was his report the statement of a respected and capable American mediator; his report was in fact a statement of America's new official attitude toward the situation in China.

Writing after thirteen months of experience in trying to mediate China's civil crises, General Marshall stated:

³⁹ Text in *New York Times*, December 18, 1946.

⁴⁰ Text in Isaacs, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-68.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type. . . . On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. . . . On the side of the Chinese Communist party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. . . . The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties. . . . Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

Responses to the Marshall report were immediate and frequently they were sharp. Chiang referred to it as "friendly and constructive."⁴¹ But Chen Li-fu, one of the right-wing leaders in the Kuomintang, complained that "if . . . he [Marshall] could have devoted a little more time in contact with members who take a leading part in the Kuomintang his appraisal of the Chinese situation in its proper breadth and depth might have been more enlightening."⁴² In his reply to Marshall's statement, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist representative at the mediation conference, deplored Marshall's failure to "point out that Chiang Kai-shek is the supreme leader of the reactionary clique in the [Kuomintang]," and that "it is too much for General Marshall to think that a bad government will become a good government under the leadership of the same Chiang Kai-shek. . . ." Chou castigated the American mediator for trying to conclude a truce while American goods and troops were being used by the Kuomintang for attacks upon the Communists. According to Chou, "this proves that the American government is intentionally supporting Chiang Kai-shek in the waging of large-scale civil war."⁴³

The Marshall report also produced a sensation in the United States. It was viewed as a particularly important move in the "cold war" going on between the non-Communist and the Communist countries. In certain quarters Marshall's statement was viewed as unduly favorable to the Communists, and arguments were advanced that the United States should

⁴¹ *New York Times*, January 12, 1947.

⁴² Statement quoted in Isaacs, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-81.

support the Kuomintang as a vital bulwark in the world-wide struggle against the advance of Communism. It was asserted that the Chinese Communists were receiving support from the U.S.S.R.,⁴⁴ and that America should increase its aid to the Nationalist Government to prevent China from being reduced to a mere satellite in the Soviet orbit. It was also feared that the defeat of the Kuomintang would break the dikes and release the full flood tide of Communism to spread rapidly to other parts of Asia.

In other quarters in the United States the Marshall report was applauded as a sound and a fair presentation. The exponents of the point of view that America should follow Marshall's lead in permitting the Chinese to work out their own difficulties argued that American aid in any conceivable quantity could not possibly salvage the wrecked and corrupt Kuomintang. They advanced the idea that the Chinese Communist movement enjoyed the support of the rank and file of the Chinese people, and that it had won their support through offering constructive political and economic programs, not by aid from the U.S.S.R. This group pointed out the danger to American security in undertaking a program which would almost certainly produce greater inflation and which might serve to undermine the European Recovery Program (Marshall plan), and would certainly antagonize the Chinese people. Finally, they warned that no amount of bargaining between Moscow and Washington could solve the problems of China. The future of China lay in the hands of the Chinese.⁴⁵

The failure of the American mediation effort was followed in January, 1947, by the final withdrawal of American forces from China. Sentiment against the United States grew rapidly, particularly in northern China. Student demonstrations against American "meddling" were coupled with charges that Chiang had sold the country out to American capitalism by concluding the commercial treaty of November 4. American-Russian relations began quickly to go from bad to worse. The United States on January 6 requested the Soviet Union to turn over control of Dairen to China at once. In remote Sinkiang, revolts again broke out against the Nationalist governor. Political, military, and economic chaos became the order of the day in China. In the United States a bitter battle began on the China question.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE KUOMINTANG

With the withdrawal of Marshall, the Chinese civil war in 1947 became more than ever a fight to the finish. A few efforts at negotiation were

⁴⁴ Details of these allegations in Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp 323-31.

⁴⁵ The best exposition of this viewpoint is in John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge, 1948).

made by both parties in the early months of 1947 but to no avail. Bent upon capturing the strategic areas of Manchuria and Shantung, the Communists moved swiftly eastward from their strongholds in Shensi to concentrate upon the battle for northeastern China. The Nationalists sought to reinforce their contingents in the cities of Tsinan, Peking, Tientsin, Mukden, Changchun, and Kirin. To make life even more difficult for the Nanking regime, the inflation, which had become an increasingly serious threat to the economic stability of the urban centers, got definitely out of hand with the withdrawal of the American forces and the cessation of American aid, or the prospects of it. The Nationalists continued to finance the civil war by the printing press. Although wartime controls on prices and wages continued to be the law, they were observed mainly by those who could not safely engage in blackmarket dealings. Confronted by financial panic, military setback, and diplomatic losses, the Nanking government found it increasingly difficult to retain the confidence and support of the poverty-stricken Chinese people.

While the battle lines in northern China were being drawn more clearly, the Nationalists were faced with a difficult problem in Formosa, the richest of China's rewards from the war. Enjoying living standards higher than those on the Chinese mainland, the "native" population of Formosa resented bitterly the exploitation and deterioration of their economy under Kuomintang rule. Warnings of revolt had been heard in the summer of 1946, and in the fall of that year Chiang Kai-shek made a formal tour of inspection in the island.⁴⁶ In March, 1947, a rebellion against Kuomintang Governor Chen Yi was undertaken as a direct challenge to Nanking's authority. With the aid of the Chinese Communists, the Formosan rebels took the law into their own hands. On March 10 they set up an assembly, demanded an autonomous provincial constitution, called for freedom of press and assembly, and threatened to remove the Chinese garrison on the island by force. Less than two weeks later Governor Chen was censured officially by the Central Executive Committee for his failure to cope with the Formosan rebellion. Thereafter, the Nationalists ruthlessly suppressed and massacred the rebellious elements and set up in Formosa a training station for the elite groups in the Nationalist armies.⁴⁷ On April 22, Dr. Wei Tao-ming took over the administration of the island.

Meanwhile, the Communist and Nationalist forces in Manchuria and Shantung had become locked in furious battle. Despite periods of flurry over "peace negotiations," both sides were preparing systematically—or as systematically as wars have been fought in China—to exterminate the

⁴⁶ For details see especially George Kerr, "Formosa's Return to China," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 205-08.

⁴⁷ Details in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 307-10; 923-39. See especially the comments of General Wedemeyer.

enemy. In Moscow, meanwhile, another international session was in progress. Molotov tried on March 10, 1947, to have China included on the agenda of the conference. The Chinese Communists supported the Russian proposal and requested the right to send their representatives. This effort was rejected by the Western powers. Shortly thereafter, Yen-an, the deserted wartime capital of Communist China, fell to the Nationalists. Militarily the victory was empty; its psychological importance for the bitter Kuomintang was not small. President Truman again contributed to the Nationalist cause by ordering that America's surplus ships and floating drydocks should be turned over to the Chinese government without cost. In the midst of these preparations, it was reported that the Chinese Communists were trading with the U.S.S.R. and that Harbin was the commercial entrepôt.⁴⁸ Contemporaneously, the Chinese Communists changed their official line toward the United States and became steadily more hostile.

Of more than passing interest also as a sidelight to the chaotic picture of the civil war was the story of UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) in China.⁴⁹ The program was in operation for but three years from November, 1944, to November, 1947. Of all the nations receiving UNRRA support, China had the largest single allotment of approximately \$517,800,000 worth of supplies. Although this was relatively small in terms of China's enormous needs, the China program of UNRRA was one of the largest relief and rehabilitation programs ever undertaken in human history. Particularly important was the UNRRA project of changing the course of the Yellow River back to its channel north of the Shantung peninsula. Despite difficulties with Communists and Nationalists, this engineering project was completed in the spring of 1947.⁵⁰

The Nationalists sought in the spring of 1947 to streamline their hierarchy for the military campaigns of the next six months. On April 16, a partial reorganization of the central administration was announced, and a coalition government was organized at Nanking with General Chang Chun, the wartime governor of Szechwan, as the new premier.⁵¹ Although a number of offices were headed by new names from the other parties, the old guard of the Kuomintang still retained control of the government. A leftist coloration became apparent in the new government. Probably out of deference to the demands of the United States, Sun Fo and his cohorts were given more billing than usual. Neverthe-

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, March 7, 1947.

⁴⁹ See official report entitled *UNRRA in China, 1945-1947*, No. 53, Operation Analysis Papers of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Washington, 1948), chap. I and accompanying maps.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, April 20, 1947.

⁵¹ Consult "China's First Multi-Party Government," *The China Magazine*, May, 1947.

less, on May 1, Premier Chang warned the Legislative *Yüan* not to expect a substantial loan from the United States. With the prospect of the summer campaigns ahead, the government continued to be faced by student riots against civil war. Slogans such as "Chinese Must Cease Fighting Chinese" were reminiscent of the National Salvationist sentiments of 1936. Even more disturbing was the uncontrolled inflation.

While the National government confronted recurring crises, the Communists diligently prepared their ideological and military offensives. Using the arms captured from the Japanese and the Nationalists, the Communists laid plans for attacks upon the northern cities. They also revised their "line" and their propaganda. As early as the autumn of 1945, Li Li-san had again appeared in their ranks.⁵² Having left China after the fiascos of 1928, Li apparently went to Russia for "further study." So long as Chinese Communism was based upon the agrarian movement, Li was apparently held in the background. As it became clear that the Chinese Communists were to capture some of the most important of China's urban strongholds, the ideological orientation of the party had gradually to shift to take into account the changing circumstances.

Agitation for coalition government and truce was replaced by demands for the elimination of the Kuomintang and the end of American aid to Nanking. Closer co-operation with the Soviet neighbor was stressed as a counterbalance to "American imperialism." The world struggle between the "anti-democratic" forces of capitalism and the united world front of the Socialist masses became the focal point of the new propaganda line. Neutrality in the world struggle, or the possibility of a third force, was denounced as a smoke screen laid by the "running-dogs" of the imperialist powers. The revolution in China was to proceed in the future under the leadership of the working classes. The united front of workers was to follow in foreign affairs the policy of "leaning to one side," that is, of allying openly with the Soviet Union in the world struggle against capitalism and imperialism.⁵³

The Communists' first important victory in 1947 was the capture of Taian in Shantung province. This was followed by victories in Shansi. The major Red effort, however, was directed against the key cities of Manchuria. As the Nationalists were forced steadily on the defensive, peace feelers were regularly put out by Nanking. They were almost as regularly ignored or denounced as "insincere" by the Communists. Pretenses at compromise became less impressive on both sides. On July 4 the National Government proclaimed that the Communists were in open rebellion and that the full resources of the country would be

⁵² Cf. Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-26, for an interpretation of Li's role.

⁵³ Pertinent documents reproduced in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 706-20.

used to suppress them. Many of the Nationalists continued to stress that the United States must eventually throw its weight into the balance to prevent Asia from becoming Communist. Proclamations and hopes failed to halt the Communists.

As the struggle for Manchuria raged, many Americans demanded a re-evaluation of United States policy respecting the conflict in China. On July 9, 1947, President Truman dispatched Lieutenant-General A. C. Wedemeyer to China and Korea on a fact-finding quest. He was instructed to make "an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological and military situations" and to inform Chinese officials "that the United States Government can consider assistance in a program of rehabilitation only if the Chinese Government presents satisfactory evidence of effective measures looking towards Chinese recovery," and to advise China that "any aid which may be made available shall be subject to the supervision of representatives of the United States Government." Hopes ran high in Nanking that the appointment of Wedemeyer presaged a more openhanded American policy. The Chinese Communists bitterly denounced the mission as another American effort to bolster the Kuomintang.

After four weeks in China, Wedemeyer frankly revealed in preliminary statements of August 22 and 24⁵⁴ the corruption, ineptitudes and lethargy of the Kuomintang and warned Chiang Kai-shek that promises of reform were not enough, for "military force in itself will not eliminate communism." He also declared that the Chinese Communists, if "truly patriotic," would cease voluntarily to use force. The report, however, was not made public until 1949 because of Wedemeyer's recommendation that Manchuria should be placed by the United Nations under the guardianship of a Five-Power commission including the Soviet Union, or under a United Nations trusteeship. It was felt by the State Department that such a recommendation would be "highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and representing the Chinese government as incapable of governing Chinese territory." Apparently, it was felt in Washington in the summer of 1949, when the report was finally published, that Nationalist "susceptibilities" no longer mattered. The other sections of the Wedemeyer report proposed military and economic aid to China over a five-year period, and that China accept American advisers "in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing U. S. aid in the manner for which it is intended." Ambassador Stuart notified Washington that Wedemeyer's frank report came "as a rude shock to the Chinese Government."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Complete text of Wedemeyer's report on China in *ibid.*, pp. 764-814. All references to Korea are deleted from this text as published in 1949.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

With the cessation of the UNRRA program for China in the fall of 1947, the foreign relief program of the United States government was reviewed in the light of Wedemeyer's report. On October 27, at Nanking, an agreement was signed to furnish the Chinese with supplies, food, and other basic essentials of life.⁵⁶ Under pressure from the Congress and influential Republicans, and in an effort to save his European proposals, Secretary Marshall in November, 1947, recommended tentatively an additional loan of \$300,000,000 to China to implement the relief program, and as "a stay of execution in the deterioration of their monetary situation. . .,"⁵⁷ so as to give the Nationalists a chance to restore a degree of order to their financial picture. Requests from Nanking in November stressed the inability of the Chinese government to await congressional action early in 1948. The Chinese also emphasized their need for more than interim aid, and suggested a four-year program. Nanking was nevertheless required to wait until 1948. In Washington, meanwhile, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang strenuously opposed advancing additional funds to Chiang's government.⁵⁸

On Christmas day, 1947, while the battle for Mukden was in its decisive stage, the new Chinese constitution went into effect, and Mao Tse-tung reported to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In Mao's report entitled *Turning Point in China*, the new "line" of Chinese Communism on the offensive was clearly sketched out in uncompromising terms.⁵⁹ Condemning fiercely the "reactionary forces of the Kuomintang" as "running dogs of American imperialism," Mao exulted: "the war is no longer waged mainly in the liberated areas [that is, Communist-controlled areas], but in Kuomintang-controlled areas." The civil war he termed a people's war of "liberation" from "the counter-revolutionary war directed by American imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation." He stated that during "the anti-Japanese" war the Communist party gave up land confiscations; he followed this assertion by clearly announcing that "after the Japanese surrender, the peasants urgently demanded land, and we, therefore, made a timely decision to change the agrarian policy of reducing rents and interests to one of confiscating the lands of the landlord class and distributing them to the peasants." The party's program also included, according to Mao, extermination of the monopoly capital group headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Li-fu. He

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *New York Times*, November 12, 1947; also *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 371-75.

⁵⁸ The famous "Christian General," a figure in progressive Kuomintang circles, appealed to Americans in 1947-48 not to advance funds to the Nationalists to continue the civil war. He died in 1948 en route to the Soviet Union.

⁵⁹ As the fifth important document by Mao Tse-tung to appear in English since 1937, the text quoted here was reprinted in pamphlet form in April, 1948, by the New Century Publishers of New York. For the others see the bibliography.

insisted that the new democratic revolution sought to eliminate only "feudalism and monopoly capitalism. . . . Owing to the backwardness of China's economy it will still be necessary to permit the existence, for a long period, of the capitalist economy represented by the broad petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie even after the nationwide victory of the revolution."

While the Communists anticipated the "victory of the revolution," the Nationalists continued to look to the United States for more extensive support. With the Communists assuming the military initiative throughout northern China,⁶⁰ the American government continued to seek ways and means short of military involvement to prevent the collapse of the Kuomintang and to bring relief to the Chinese people. On February 5, 1948, the U. S. Department of State officially recommended to the National Advisory Council an appropriation of \$570,000,000 for China economic aid, but would go no further toward recommending specific aid for military purposes. Ten days later the American and British governments were warning their nationals to leave northern China. On February 18, President Truman, in a special message to Congress, advocated aid to China in the amount of \$570,000,000 "to assist in retarding the current economic deterioration," and to be available for fifteen months. To the Department of State the China aid program, depending upon the response of the Chinese government, "might become either the first stage of larger and more constructive endeavors or the conclusion of large-scale United States aid to the Chinese government." On April 2, the China Aid Bill was finally approved by the Congress. It included an appropriation of \$338,000,000 to China for "economic aid," and \$125,000,000 which the Chinese government was permitted to use as it saw fit—presumably it would see fit to purchase military supplies. This cut down considerably the appropriation for economic aid requested by the administration. As finally worked out through the Economic Coöperation Administration, and as specified in a bilateral agreement between the United States and China (July 3, 1948), the Nationalist government was to receive \$275,000,000 for nonmilitary supplies and \$125,000,000 for other purchases.⁶¹

While the Nationalists negotiated for new loans, it became startlingly clear that no amount of money would be sufficient to rescue the Chiang regime. Not only was the sum too small; supplies purchased in America were not reaching China. Ships were lacking and the administration for handling the purchases was inadequate. The inflation in China con-

⁶⁰ Even Chang Hsüeh-liang, the "Young Marshal" of Manchuria who had been held incommunicado since Sian (1936), was consulted by the Kuomintang about the situation in Manchuria. See *New York Times*, June 2, 1947.

⁶¹ *New York Times*, July 4, 1948; text of the bilateral agreement in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 994-1001.

tinued to spiral and on July 11, 1948, the Chinese dollar sold at the rate of 6,000,000 for one American dollar. Chinese students continued to riot and plead for peace, while the hungry Chinese people turned their backs upon the Nationalist government and hoped for changes from the Communists. To the desperate every change appears to be for the better.

On the military fronts the Communists began early in 1948 to advance swiftly: by the autumn they were occupying cities almost at will. On September 24, Tsinan in Shantung was taken by the Communists. Mukden, the key to Manchuria, was captured on November 1, and thereafter the other cities of Manchuria quickly fell to the Reds. Less than a week after the occupation of Mukden, the Chinese Communists broadcasted an emphatic statement of their determination to support the U.S.S.R. and other Communist groups throughout the world.⁶²

As the "cold war" waxed hotter in Europe, Chiang Kai-shek on November 18 dispatched a letter directly to President Truman requesting the firm support of the United States and an immediate increase in material aid.⁶³ In his reply to the desperate Generalissimo, the president was frankly noncommittal about increased aid. In another bid, and a pitiful one at best, Madame Chiang was dispatched to Washington to bring the Kuomintang's plight personally to the attention of the United States government. Her mission was also fruitless. No longer was the Democratic government being pressured by the Eightieth Congress. After the Republican defeat in the elections of 1948, Congress was no longer able to exert such a profound influence upon the formation and implementation of China policy.⁶⁴

With victory in northern China in their grasp, the Chinese Communists on December 26, 1948, named forty-five Kuomintang leaders as war criminals and threatened to punish them when captured. On the list were such notables as Chiang Kai-shek, Wellington Koo, Sun Fo, and T. V. Soong. No longer were the Communists willing to entertain peace proposals. Even Chiang's New Year's Day proposal that he would retire if only the Communists would negotiate peace and collaborate in a coalition government was received scornfully by the Reds. The request of Nanking on January 8, 1949, that the American, British, French, and Soviet governments should act as intermediaries in initiating negotiations with the view to restoring peace was politely refused by the powers as not serving any useful purpose.

The failure of Generalissimo Chiang to work out a *modus vivendi* with the Communists left some elements in the Kuomintang free to pursue

⁶² *New York Times*, November 7, 1948.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, November 18, 1948.

⁶⁴ See L. Rosinger, "China Policy and the 1948 Elections," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 233-38.

a policy of "polite insubordination." New peace efforts were undertaken separately by the Kwangsi clique led by Vice-President Li Tsung-jen, who had held office since April, 1948. In inaugurating his program, Li began to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union. Marshal Li Chi-sen, the leftist Kuomintang leader who had earlier taken refuge in Hongkong, also was quite openly hostile to Chiang, but the dissenters' position was basically weak. Divisions within the Kuomintang became even more serious with Mao's pronouncement on January 14, 1949, of his "eight-point program," which virtually called for unconditional surrender.⁶⁵ While Communist troops were pressing hard against Peiping and Tientsin, Mao's eight "peace terms" called for the surrender of the Nationalist government and for the punishment of those designated "war criminals." Seven days later, Chiang "retired" as President of China, leaving his office to Li Tsung-jen as Acting President. The Generalissimo returned for a spell to his native province. In the same week both Tientsin and Peiping capitulated to the Communists.

With the collapse of Kuomintang resistance in the north, and with the determination of the Communists not to negotiate a peace even after the "retirement" of Chiang, the Kuomintang leadership became more divided than ever. Those who were determined to continue the fight until the end left Nanking for Canton in February. As the Communists moved southward toward the Yangtze, the government of Acting President Li indicated its willingness to talk peace on the basis of Mao's eight-point proposal of January 14. While abortive negotiations were carried on in Peiping in March and April, the Communist armies moved to the northern bank of the Yangtze and on April 20 they crossed the river dividing northern from southern China, and began the conquest of China's most industrially developed area.⁶⁶ The government of Acting President Li left immediately for Canton.

While the Communist forces were pushing southward, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened in mid-March near Shihchiachuang in Hopei province for eight days. The members attending the session ratified Mao's resolutions calling for a new Political Consultative Conference and "for establishing a democratic coalition government under the sponsorship of the Chinese Communist Party."⁶⁷ In their discussions the delegates stressed the need "to shift the center of gravity of Party work under the present situation from the rural areas to the cities." The discussions also stressed the importance of winning over intellectuals and the petty bour-

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, January 15, 1949.

⁶⁶ At this time the Communists engaged in a fracas with several British gunboats plying the Yangtze. The British were forced to retreat. *New York Times*, April 22 and 24, 1949.

⁶⁷ Text of the resolutions in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 443-45.

geoisie to a policy of co-operation with the new regime, and stressed*the idea that "no third road of moderation" could exist for them. At every level the Communists appeared to realize that they held a many-headed and cantankerous dragon by the tail. With the fall of Shanghai on May 25, the Communists clearly were being faced by problems as well as triumphs as a result of their victories.

Pressure for aid to the Kuomintang became greater at Washington with each Communist triumph. The Republicans, in particular, charged that the Democratic administration was permitting China to fall into the hands of the Communists and eventually into the waiting arms of Russia. Others warned that it was impossible to fight Communism successfully in Europe alone. In response to numerous demands for a statement of policy, Secretary of State Dean Acheson let it be known in April that the United States would no longer subsidize the Kuomintang.⁶⁸ Thereafter, it was proposed that the United States should take the initiative in sponsoring a defensive Pacific pact following the lines of the North Atlantic pact negotiated in the spring of 1949. Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were particularly concerned about working out security arrangements for the Pacific area to thwart the advance of Communism. Secretary Acheson, however, pointed out that between western Europe and America a relatively high degree of political homogeneity exists which does not obtain between the United States and the non-Communist areas of Asia, or between the areas of Asia themselves. Moreover, he argued that a defense pact "could not take shape until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved."

While the United States waited "for the dust to settle" in the Pacific area, the Communists in China continued to pile victory upon victory. By the autumn of 1949 the Nationalists had been driven into south-western China and Formosa. For a time they tried to believe that the strategy of trading time for space might work against the Communists as it had against the Japanese. There were those who thought even at this late date that the United States could not afford to let China go and would come to the Kuomintang's rescue. Hope faded, however, as city after city and provincial governor after provincial governor deserted the beleaguered Nationalists and pledged their co-operation to the Communists. With the fall of Chungking in December, 1949, effective resistance on the continent ceased. Some of the Nationalists crossed over into Burma while the government moved men, equipment, and gold to Formosa.

Since the end of 1949, the Nationalists have sought to make Formosa into an island fortress.⁶⁹ As Kuomintang fortunes declined on the main-

⁶⁸ *New York Times*, April 15, 1949.

⁶⁹ Systematic discussion in Fred W. Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule* (New York, 1952), especially Part II.

land, refugees had begun early in 1949 to stream to China's insular provinces. Wealthy landlords and businessmen had fled the mainland cities as the Communists approached and had brought their portable valuables with them to Formosa. Swarms of government officials, military personnel, and secret police had followed. The new governor, General Chen Cheng, confronted mountainous problems in providing for the flood of refugees. The transfer of the Nationalist government to the island placed an almost unbearable strain upon Formosa's slender resources. Along with them the mainland refugees brought inflation, factional rivalries, and the prospect of Formosa's becoming a battlefield. To keep the disturbed and dispossessed islanders in check, Chen Cheng restored military rule. On December 21, 1949, K. C. Wu succeeded Chen in the governorship.

As the retreat of the dispossessed Nationalist government became a rout, Formosa emerged again as a highly sensitive topic in international affairs. In early October, 1949, Russia and its satellites had broken off relations with the Nationalist government. Thereafter the question hung fire as to what attitude the Western powers would take toward maintaining diplomatic relations with the ousted Chiang regime. On January 5, 1950, Britain severed relations with the Kuomintang. The United States thus held the fate of the Kuomintang in its grasp. Fortunately for Chiang, Washington continued to recognize him, even though Truman announced on January 5 that the United States would not take military action to help him hold Formosa.

Formosa is separated from the mainland by straits ninety miles wide at the narrowest point. A military campaign against the island from the mainland would clearly require naval support. Such a campaign the Communists were not immediately able to launch. In the interval Chiang prepared the island's fortifications, reformed his forces for protection of his insular refuge, and appealed for American aid. The unwillingness of the United States to grant formal recognition to the Mao government (see pp. 576-82) raised concurrently the question of Formosa's legal status. According to the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the powers pledged that Formosa should be returned to "China" after the defeat of Japan. In 1950, the issue of which "China" should receive and retain title over Formosa stirred international debate, and provoked bitter recriminations from the Communists in Peking. The United States continued to assert that it would not fight to protect Formosa, although Washington softened on the question of aid. On February 14, Washington granted Chiang \$103,000,000 to July 1. Once aid had been guaranteed, Chiang on March 1 reassumed the "presidency of China" from Li Tsung-jen. In exile in New York, Li violently denounced the Generalissimo and pledged himself to fight against him in the future.

Chiang's weak grasp on Formosa was strengthened in the summer

of 1950. The Nationalist remnants had been forced in the spring of 1950 to give up Hainan and Chusan islands. This left Chiang in control of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Quemoy. After the Communist attack on Korea (see pp. 579–80), President Truman on June 27 proclaimed the “neutralization” of Formosa and instructed the Seventh American Fleet to seal the island off from attack. While making plain that the United States had no territorial ambitions with regard to Formosa, Washington recognized the strategic value of the island to Chiang, Japan, and the American position in the Pacific region. The United States denied that it had intentions of interfering in China’s internal affairs, and emphasized that the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn after a settlement in Korea.

Chiang’s hopes received a quick lift in the summer of 1950 when General MacArthur, who had regularly urged aid for Chiang, praised his armies and stressed in a public announcement the strategic importance of Formosa to America’s position in the Far East. After the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean war in November, 1950 (see pp. 635–38), the United States extended further support to Chiang. Military supplies began to flow to Formosa in December, 1950. American military advisers were dispatched to Chiang’s aid early in 1951. Money for “internal security and legitimate self-defense” was placed at Chiang’s disposal under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. It was not long before the Kuomintang leader began to talk of launching a counteroffensive against the mainland, although the United States officially encouraged no such move.

Chiang’s proposal, however, received support by MacArthur, the Republican critics of Truman’s foreign policy, and those who continued to believe that China could be rescued from Communism. Shortly after the Republicans took over control of the national administration, President Eisenhower on February 2, 1953, ordered the Seventh American fleet to stop guarding Red China against attack from Formosa. Three weeks later, Chiang denounced the Russo-Chinese treaty of 1945 because of Russia’s “repeated violations” of it. As the Generalissimo became increasingly certain of America’s commitment to him, he talked in ever more optimistic terms of the day when his forces would return to the mainland. Chiang and his supporters watched for the growth of discontent and disaffection in Red China. They regularly argued that an invasion of the mainland would be favorably greeted by vast numbers of Chinese already disillusioned by Communism. To date this theory has not been tested in the crucible of war. Whether Chiang’s hopes for returning will ever be realized depends not only on his personal readiness but upon a multitude of international factors—primarily whether or not the United States will support such an effort.

The eclipse of Chiang's fortunes in China provoked widespread speculation as to the reasons for the collapse of the Kuomintang. Some observers believe that the Nationalist party lost the confidence of the Chinese people because of its corruption, ineffectiveness, and dictatorial methods. Indeed, the entire American mediation effort, this group has contended, foundered on Chiang's unwillingness to broaden the base of his government and to introduce fundamental social and economic reforms. Another group, including many members of the Nationalist government, places the blame upon America's vacillating policy and upon the efforts of General Marshall to foster a coalition government including the Communists. Had the United States advanced strong and steady support to Chiang, Communism in China, it has been argued, would not have emerged triumphant. While America urged reform on Chiang, Russia, it is contended, energetically supported Mao's program in every way possible. As in most debates after the event, the second-guessers have the advantage of hindsight. Historians will probably be unraveling for many years to come the complex network of circumstances, domestic and foreign, that brought the Kuomintang to its present state.

CHINA UNDER COMMUNISM

As in non-Communist countries, wide variations occur in Communist states between the theory and the practices of government. To understand the practices of Communist governments some knowledge of their ultimate objectives is indispensable. Theoretically they are at all times working, although by various stages, to achieve full socialism. At no time have the Chinese Communists denied that full socialism is their final goal. Such a realization is the first prerequisite to the understanding of what the Communists hope to achieve, and a safeguard against accepting intermediate stages in social planning as the full realization of their objectives. Every advance must be considered but one step on the road to their dream of a classless society.

Awareness of the theory should not, however, make the observer one-eyed. Theory from time to time has to yield to practical considerations. Official pronouncements of a change in party line do not necessarily produce radical and immediate departures from the practices of the past. A survey of the Russian and Chinese experiences will reveal that enforcement of a new line usually requires great preparation, numerous setbacks, and adaptation of the people by coercion, liquidation, or education.

In evaluating the development of Communist China over the five years 1949-54, we shall seek to relate theory to practice. In dealing with Communist China, we are limited by the inadequacy and the untested character of our sources. Although rays of light steal out from

behind the "bamboo curtain," the Western historian of this tumultuous epoch in China's history possesses no satisfactory devices for checking the authenticity of his sources. Indeed, he may be victimized by them. Where sources exist, as in the official publications of the Chinese government, we do not yet have enough specialized analyses of them. Therefore, both facts and conclusions can be little more than tentative.⁷⁰

The victory of the Communists in China in 1949 brought to the top a party well prepared to take over full authority. Probably no revolutionary party in modern history has possessed a comparable organization upon coming to power. In their long struggle against the Kuomintang, the Communists had welded together a disciplined and experienced army of several millions of men and had at their disposal an effective and well indoctrinated party of about three million members. Their troops and cadres (professional workers) had been seasoned in bitter war with the Japanese and Kuomintang armies. Extensive political control over scattered sections of rural China had given them profound experience in governing and organizing. The defection of the intellectuals to Communism during the last stages of the civil war made available to Mao's forces the services of people well acquainted with urban problems. Their help enabled the Communists to make the transition from a rural-centered government to a city-centered government without serious difficulties developing. Mao's theme of *New Democracy*, widely publicized after its appearance in 1940, provided a theoretical point of departure for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country and for starting the country on the road to full socialism. To China's poverty-ridden masses and discontented intellectuals, Communism appeared to provide a way out of what seemed to be a hopeless morass of misery.

In the outside world the revolution in China provoked bitter controversies. Communist writers proclaimed the end of "the era of undisturbed exploitation of the dependent countries."⁷¹ They heralded the successes of the Communists in China as the beginning of the end for capitalism and imperialism in Asia. By gradual stages country after country would, following China's example, recognize the eternal truths of Communism and embrace the creed of Marx and Lenin. Characteristically, Western observers were divided on the meaning of the Chinese revolution. While some contended that Communism was out of harmony with China's traditions, other claimed that Confucianism

⁷⁰ See Mary C. Wright, "How We Learn About Communist China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (hereafter cited as *The Annals* . . .), CCLXXVII (1951), 224-28. See also S. B. Thomas, *Government and Administration in Communist China* (New York, 1955).

⁷¹ The words of P. N. Pospelov, editor of *Pravda*, as translated in Mandel (comp.), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

and Communism were easily reconcilable.⁷² On this question historians will continue to debate for many years to come. To the Chinese the proof of the pudding will be in the eating.

Because of their excellent preparation, the Chinese Communists were quickly able to provide a coherent program of action. While concentrating on urban problems, Mao and his advisers prepared a new line. The new stage in the revolution was set by Mao's pronouncement of July 1, 1949, entitled *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*.⁷³ Throughout the war years the Communists had talked of "democratic dictatorship" and had stressed their deep devotion to democracy. Faulty understanding in the West, and perhaps also in some circles in China, of the Communists' use of the word "democracy" led many to believe that Mao's hopes were not irreconcilable with the ideals of Western democracy. Such beliefs were blasted to bits as the civil war drew to a close by Mao's emphasis on the "dictatorship" aspects of his program.

Announcing that the Communist party had finally achieved power and maturity, Mao on July 1 laid down the line for the future. "Imperialist aggression," he proclaimed, "shattered the Chinese dream of learning from the West."⁷⁴ It was only when China learned "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" that "the face of China was changed." These lessons China learned from the example of Russia. During the Second World War China learned to appreciate the bankruptcy of the bourgeois ideology and its Kuomintang exponent. From the Communist party China learned how to "awaken the masses" by uniting "the working class, the peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie, and national [anti-imperialist] bourgeoisie into a national united front under the leadership of the working class."⁷⁵ In Communist terms this united front is equated with the "people." Such a united front of "people's parties," Mao decreed, should be the spearhead in the establishment of a "democratic-dictatorship." The function of this dictatorship is to abolish "the right of reactionaries to voice their opinions," to suppress "the lackeys of imperialism," and "to strengthen the apparatus of the people's state" for the purpose of protecting the people. The progress from "New Democracy" to full socialism must be led by an "alliance of the working class and the peasant class," but with the leadership of

⁷² For divergent approaches see especially C. P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China* (New York, 1952), who stresses the continuity between the ideals of Confucian and Communist society, and H. G. Creel, *Confucius, The Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), who stresses the differences between the social philosophies of Marx and Confucius and holds that Confucius himself (as opposed to some among his disciples) was intellectually closer to Jefferson than to Lenin. See also George E. Taylor, "The Hegemony of the Chinese Communists," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 14-15.

⁷³ Text in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 449-61.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 451.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

the revolution entrusted to the "far-sighted, just, unselfish, and thorough" working class. In the economic field Mao recognized the need to compromise for a period with the reactionaries, even as Russia did in her NEP era. In foreign affairs, Mao explicitly stated that China should "lean to one side," that is, toward Russia, dismiss all hopes of a third road as "an illusion," and wage unrelenting warfare against the imperialists.

To assess what Maoism has meant in practice requires first an examination of the government and party organizations. The basic directives of the new state appeared in the fall of 1949 and followed Mao's outline of objectives. From September 21-30 the People's Political Consultative Conference, the Communist version of the Kuomintang's PPC, met in Peking. It was attended by 662 delegates representing fourteen co-operating parties, 102 geographical regions, and various "people's" organizations. On September 27, the Conference unanimously adopted the Organic Law of the Central People's Government. This outline of government for Communist China had been in preparation for two years, at least, before ratification. The Conference also ratified a common program of objectives with Mao's "new democratic" program as "the political foundation of the state."⁷⁶ We shall refer back to this document repeatedly. Before its dissolution, the Conference also fixed the capital at Peking (changing the name back to Peking from Peiping), selected a national flag, elected Mao as Chairman of the new government, and picked a number of other high officials. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic was officially proclaimed.

None of the fundamental documents promulgated by the Conference was intended to serve as a final constitution. Taken as a group, the various documents set the stage for the long transitional period through which China would have to pass before achieving socialism. For that reason they were provisional, and the institutions established by them were considered temporary and dynamic in character. The Organic Law of the Central People's Government⁷⁷ outlined the fundamental principles of government, and established the predominance of the Communist Party in administrative affairs. "The People's Republic of China" was defined (Chap. I, Art. 1) as "a state of the People's Democratic Dictatorship, led by the working class, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, and rallying all democratic classes and various nationalities within the country." Founded on the principle of "democratic centralism," the government was called (Chap. I, Art. 2) "a gov-

⁷⁶ The "Common Program" of the CPPCC of 1949 is reproduced in the mimeographed work of H. Arthur Steiner, *Chinese Communism in Action* (Los Angeles, 1953), pp. 35-44. It has been described as "the common platform of the people's democratic united front."

⁷⁷ Text in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-70, and in H. A. Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-29. For a commentary see S. B. Thomas, "Structure and Constitutional Basis of the Chinese People's Republic," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 46-55.

ernment of the people's congress system." The highest executive authority in practice, though nominally responsible to the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, was the Central People's Government Council. The Council, headed by a chairman (Mao Tse-tung), assumed supreme authority in domestic and foreign affairs. Scheduled to meet every two months, the Council possessed legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It also had the power to make war and peace, issue and enforce decrees, pass or reject the state budget, and hire or fire personnel. Below the Council was the State Administrative Council, a body similar to the cabinet in a Western administration. The Premier of this body was Chou En-lai, who also held the portfolio of Foreign Minister. This Administrative Council had primary responsibility for the co-ordination and direction of the work of the various ministries and commissions. Control of the armed forces was vested in the People's Revolutionary Military Council. Unlike Western governments, the Cabinet had no responsibility for military affairs. The army was responsible only to the Government Council. The highest judicial organ was The Supreme People's Court, and legal enforcement was in the hands of a Procurator-General.

Structurally, the Chinese People's Government after 1949 clearly came to resemble the government of the Soviet Union. The People's Liberation Army possessed an existence apart from the civil administration. The civil line of command from the highest to the lowest levels was based on the unquestioned authority of the Government Council. No separation of powers in the Western sense existed within this structure. At all levels legislative and executive powers were combined with the judiciary subordinated to both. Thirty-one ministries, commissions, and departments functioned under the authority of the State Administrative Council. Many of these have been constituted to deal with pressing economic problems or regional organization.

Even before the formal organization of the central authority, the Communists had launched a program for establishing regional governments.⁷⁸ On August 28, 1949, the Communists proclaimed a People's Government for the Northeast. Organization of the Northeast along regional lines was but the first step in the Communist program of overhauling China's administration. The regional organization, particularly with regard to Manchuria, possessed the advantage of permitting areas traditionally semi-autonomous to retain a large measure of local authority. This device was designed to reduce the danger of revolt against

⁷⁸ For discussion of this fundamental innovation see H. A. Steiner, "New Regional Governments in China," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIX (1950), 112-16; and Norton S. Ginsburg, "China's Changing Political Geography," *The Geographical Review*, XLII (1952), 102-17. Later information in the publication of the American Consulate General in Hongkong called *Current Background*, Nos. 170 and 245.

the central government. The determined independence of the border regions was also recognized by the revival of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region following generally, but not in detail, the boundaries worked out by the Japanese in 1937. After the formal inauguration of the People's government, the program of regional organization was extended to the rest of China. In December, 1949, the entire country was divided into six major regions: Northeast China, North China, Northwest China, East China, South-Central China, and Southwest China. Presumably the "administrative area" was in most cases designed to bridge the long gap in lines of authority between Peking and the provinces.

At the lower levels of government the Communists also began a detailed reorganization program of boundaries and lines of authority. Only in the case of the northern regions do the new administrative areas appear to be economic units. Regional development has been limited since 1949 to the two northern regions at the expense of the rest of China. Manchuria has obviously become the focal point in Red China's drive toward industrialization. For the region of North China, comprising the five key provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Pingyuan, Chahar, and Suiyuan, a separate ministry was set up in the Central Government in September, 1950. Northern and Northeast China were clearly marked as the heartland of the new China.

No description of Red China can ignore the unique role played by the Communist Party.⁷⁹ Indeed, viewed realistically, the government of the People's Republic should be considered as little more than the Party's administrative arm. Devised by the Party as its instrument for operating and controlling the state, the government of new China started as a "coalition" based upon a "compromise" made between the Party and the other political groups in the Conference agreements.⁸⁰ From the Party viewpoint the government was the political agency for realizing the Party's "minimum program." At all levels the new government was led and controlled by Party members. While non-Party personnel were employed in the administration at every level, the Party maintained absolute control over all strategic offices.

The constitution of the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed in 1945 describes the Party as "the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class and the highest form of its class organization."⁸¹ It is the function of the party to set and adjust a line that will lead the nation

⁷⁹ See H. A. Steiner, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party," *The Annals . . .*, CCLXXVII (1951), 56-66. The official treatise is by Liu Shao-ch'i and in its English translation is entitled *On the Party* (Peking, 1950).

⁸⁰ For the history of this development see Allan B. Cole, "The United Front in the New China," *The Annals . . .*, CCLXXVII (1951), 35-45.

⁸¹ Extracts from the Party constitution translated in Steiner, *Chinese Communism in Action*, pp. 57-61.

to the realization of full socialism at the earliest possible date. Through its meetings and inner workings, the Party defines a line that is then accepted by its members as their infallible directive. "Self-criticism" occasionally produces a change of line, but the Party relentlessly seeks to stamp out "individualistic deviationism." The workers in the Party unquestionably follow its directives and take their orders from higher ranking members of the Party's hierarchy. The law of the Party is the highest law.

In contemporary China the members of the Party constitute an elite class. Numbering between five and six millions, the Party is an exclusive and hard-working leadership group. Like the government, the Party possesses a complex scheme of organization. At almost every level, as in the Soviet Union, the Party's structure parallels the administrative organization of the government. Indeed, it can be asserted that the governmental structure has increasingly come to be modeled on the Party's organization. Both structures are based on "democratic centralism" and are theoretically responsible to National Congresses. It was the National Party Congress that elected the members of the Central Committee, the Party's major policy-making body and the agency in structural parallel to the Government Council. In the Government Council members from the Central Committee held an absolute majority. The Central Committee elected as its working committee the elite body called the Politburo (Central Political Bureau).⁸² Structurally, the Politburo paralleled the State Administrative Council. These structural relationships with their intermingled membership extended downward to the regional, provincial, and local levels.

The direction of government by a single party is not a new phenomenon in Chinese political life. Organized originally along Communist lines, the Kuomintang until 1946 upheld the ideal of "tutelage." The Nationalist government was in effect the administrative branch of the Kuomintang. To the Chinese people, who have never experienced the Western type of democracy, the monolithic political structure of Communism seemed to revise and intensify rather than to depart from past practices. Nor were secret police, an elite party, and military dictatorship unknown in China before 1949. The "New Democracy" has put a new and apparently more efficient elite group into power. Party functionaries dominate every phase of life and maintain closer supervision over daily affairs than had the Kuomintang. Most noteworthy to date has been the Communists' ability to enforce the Party

⁸² On the Party's top members see Robert C. North, "The Chinese Communist Elite," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 67-75; also Robert S. Elegant, *China's Red Masters* (New York, 1951), and Nym Wales, *Red Dust. Autobiographies of Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1952).

line, and to get things done in a country where procrastination has been the rule.

While following the example of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists have successfully adapted theory to China's peculiar conditions. They frankly assert that Mao Tse-tung has creatively applied Marxist ideas to the Chinese scene and, on the basis of such experiences, has made original contributions to Communist doctrine. The sweeping victories of the revolutionary armies and the evaporation of the Nationalist forces are believed to be the inevitable outcome of their years of careful planning along Marxist lines. Mao's former secretary, Ch'en Po-ta, assessed the meaning of the Communist victory as follows:

It was Comrade Mao Tse-tung who, studying the Chinese Revolution according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, arrived over twenty years ago at the unequivocal conclusion of staging a protracted revolutionary war in the rural areas, and then trying to seize the cities after first holding the surrounding rural areas; and of establishing and maintaining revolutionary state power in numerous small bases, from which the political authority of the entire country would be seized after the gradual extension of our power by means of prolonged struggle. This is the new Marxist conclusion reached in colonial and semicolonial countries.⁸³

Like Stalin, Mao has been celebrated by his cohorts as one of the select few to understand the proper application of Marxist principles.

In carrying into practice the principles of Maoism, the Chinese Communists have so far piled up an impressive record. Since the victory of the "revolution," the Communists have concentrated upon the development of a rational economic and political program. Their major objective is to launch an industrial revolution in China. Before such a radical development can occur, the Communists, benefiting from the experience of the Soviet Union, realized that agriculture must be reorganized, controlled, and production increased. In their struggle for power, the Communists learned to understand the wisdom of Mao's remark of 1936: "Whoever wins the support of the peasants will win China; whoever solves the land question will win the peasants."⁸⁴

The China taken over by the Communists was in chaos. War and neglect had disorganized and debilitated the means of transportation and communication. The industries of Manchuria and North China lay

⁸³ As translated in Steiner, *Chinese Communism in Action*, p. 3; for further documentary material and historical commentary on "Maoism" see B. I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); H. A. Steiner, *Maoism* (Los Angeles, 1953); and Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford, 1951). For the new Communist history of the rise to power see Hu Chiao-mu, "Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China," *People's China* (issues of July 16 through September 16, 1951).

⁸⁴ As reported by Edgar Snow in "Mao Tse-tung as I Know Him," *The Reporter*, II (1950), 14.

in ruins. Agricultural production had fallen off sharply with the spread of civil war. Inflation and insecurity had discouraged domestic and foreign trade. Capital had fled from the country to the United States, Europe, and Formosa. Managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial personnel, always in short supply, had practically disappeared. Sources of foreign economic aid had dried up, and relatively little monetary support could be expected from the Soviet Union.

The very bleakness of this picture helped to make Communist slogans and programs appear extraordinarily bright. With a will the Communists tackled almost hopeless problems and came up with positive proposals for their solution. The cadres of the Party assumed leadership through persuasion and coercion over social, political, and economic organizations. Cells were organized in industry, administration, villages, shops, schools, army units, and on city streets. Functioning under "democratic centralism," Party workers led their groups to co-operate with the Communist program. In the absence of other choices, and frequently subject to force, the Chinese people of all walks of life, particularly the youth, responded readily to the manipulative techniques of the Party.

In the "common program" of September, 1949, agrarian reform had been given top priority. With approximately eighty per cent of the Chinese population engaged in agriculture and related pursuits, the Communists sought to consolidate the revolution by effecting a quick and drastic transformation of the rural scene. On the basis of their previous experiences, the Communists set out to break the power of the gentry and the secret societies, to win peasant support through land redistribution, and to supplant the older political organizations in the localities, such as the *pao-chia* (see pp. 457-58), with agencies of their own devising. This line was not followed in a doctrinaire fashion, for the Communists vigilantly kept their eyes turned toward their ultimate objective of increasing production. Land reform was worked out on timetables, adapted to local requirements, and various approaches were employed to bring general practice into harmony with local conditions.⁸⁵

The first task after "liberating" an area was to establish "revolutionary order." This usually meant the elimination by military means of all resistance groups. While pacification went on, the cadres organized local peasant associations to prepare for future land reform. In the interim the government forced the reduction of rents and interest rates. On August 4, 1950, the State Administrative Council defined class status in rural China for the guidance of the land reformers. The rural classes, according to this official definition, are: the landlords, rich

⁸⁵ Consult for a general survey Chao Kuo-chün, "Current Agrarian Reform Policies in Communist China," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 113-23; and G. William Skinner, "Peasant Organization in Rural China," *ibid.*, pp. 89-100.

peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farm laborers. The Agrarian Reform Law of June 28, 1950, provided that the lands, animals, and surplus stores of landlords should be confiscated. If they agreed to be co-operative, the former landlords could thereafter be allotted an appropriate share of land. The rich and middle peasants, on the other hand, were protected against infringement. Poor peasants and laborers were to receive a portion of confiscated or requisitioned land. Such land reforms were undertaken in the summer of 1950, and by the end of 1952 Peking claimed that ninety per cent of the rural population had been "affected" by land reform.⁸⁶ In the meantime the Communist cadres, in conjunction with peasant "activists," promoted the formation of co-operatives and mutual aid societies in an effort to stimulate production. According to Communist figures, there were at the beginning of 1953 over 4000 agricultural co-operatives, and more than forty per cent of the rural population was said to be working on mutual-aid teams.⁸⁷

While the land reform program ruthlessly went ahead and while People's Tribunals tried "traitors," the question of taxation became of increasing concern both to the government and the peasants. Taxes ranging from thirty to fifty per cent had first been levied upon the landlords. With the elimination of the landlord class, the tax burden had to be passed down the line to the other rural classes. The major tax responsibility then fell on the rich and middle peasants. From the grain tax alone, the government expected each year about forty per cent of its total revenue. Complaints about land taxes are nothing new in Chinese history, and they probably still constitute the major grievance of the peasant. However, he is apparently more satisfied than previously because of the more equitable distribution of the tax burden, because of his greater chance to be heard on local problems, and because of the honest and efficient administration of tax collections. The Communists claim to have reached self-sufficiency in food production. At the end of 1952 they reported great increases in the production of cotton, hemp, tobacco, and unrefined sugar, and in 1954 claimed that wheat production had exceeded all previous records.⁸⁸ Indeed, they have exported rice both to India and Russia.

Agrarian reform, as viewed by the Communists, is but the first step on the road to industrialization. Over the fifteen years after 1950 the Communists hope to raise China's income from industry by thirty per cent. The decision announced in March, 1949, to place the center of gravity of Party work in the cities focused attention on the capture, re-

⁸⁶ Figures quoted in *People's China* (January 1, 1953), p. 28.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; and Chang Nai-chi, "The Unified State Management of Grain Supplies," *ibid.* (June 1, 1954), pp. 3-6.

habilitation, and development of industry and commerce.⁸⁹ Because China possessed no well developed private industry, stress has been placed since 1949 upon the development of new enterprises and the expansion of those already functioning. Lack of capital and trained personnel handicapped the Communists, and forced them for a time to cultivate the National Bourgeoisie, or those middle-class persons willing to work with them.

In the "common program" of 1949, it is asserted (Art. 26):

The State shall co-ordinate and regulate state-owned economy, co-operative economy, individual economy of peasants and handicraftsmen, private capitalist economy, and state capitalist economy in the spheres of operation, supply of raw materials, markets, labor conditions, technical equipment, policies of public finance and taxation, etc., so that all components of the social economy can play their part . . . to promote the development of the social economy.⁹⁰

Such a comprehensive program of state control left no initiative in private hands. At the same time the government was urged (Art. 30), however, to "encourage the active operation of all private economic enterprises beneficial to the national welfare. . . ." ⁹¹ It is stated (Art. 31) that "whenever necessary and possible, private capital shall be encouraged to develop along the direction of state capitalism. . . ." ⁹² With reference to industry, the "common program" ordained (Art. 35) that "work shall be centered on the planned, systematic rehabilitation, and development of heavy industry. . . ." ⁹³ This program envisioned movement toward full socialism at a faster rate than was indicated by Mao's picture of *The New Democracy* in 1940.⁹⁴

Since 1949 the public sector of the economy has widened while the private sector has narrowed. Even in state-owned enterprises, the Communists had to move slowly in eliminating "reactionaries." As in agriculture, success is measured in terms of the restoration and expansion of production. Handicapped by a dearth of trained technicians and industrial cadres, the Communists have necessarily been required to move cautiously while trying to expand production and effect revolution simultaneously. In March, 1950, special agencies were set up to carry out the allocation of labor and resources to public and private producers. Such agencies were also established to allocate and distribute government grain from surplus to deficit areas. State trading corporations were

⁸⁹ See H. A. Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIV (1950), 47-63.

⁹⁰ As quoted in Steiner, *Chinese Communism in Action*, pp. 39-40.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁹⁴ For a detailed comparison see Douglas S. Paauw, "Economic Principles and State Organization," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 101-12.

authorized by the Ministry of Trade to centralize the collection and distribution of certain raw materials and finished products. Increasingly, the Ministry of Trade assumed a prominent place in the system of public planning. With the gradual extension of government control, price-fixing of commodities in short supply has been resorted to more frequently. Pressure on the National Bourgeoisie has mounted as state enterprises have replaced private concerns and as the free market has increasingly been circumscribed by government regulations.

Production figures published by the Communists reveal constantly greater output both in total production and in labor productivity. Such figures, however, may not be accepted without question. It does appear, however, that railway repair and construction have proceeded with remarkable dispatch. By July 1, 1951, all rail lines on the mainland had resumed full service, numerous bridges had been replaced, and three new lines had been completed by the end of 1952.⁹⁵ In this program, the Chinese received considerable technical assistance and aid from the Soviet Union. In their production figures the Communists claimed at the end of 1952 to have surpassed "pre-liberation" levels in all major areas of production except coal.⁹⁶

The Communists also claim smashing success for their ideological campaign.⁹⁷ Through indoctrination, propaganda, and police state methods, they have brought the masses under effective Communist discipline. Education at all levels has become a handmaiden to the new ideology. In the universities nonpolitical education has been restricted mainly to the practical sciences. Mass organizations of youth, peasants, and neighborhoods have been vital cogs in the regimentation process. In general, the directing force in each unit of a mass organization is a party worker. Almost everybody belongs to one group or another. Mere membership, however, is not enough to divert suspicion. The party insists upon "activism." Faith implies good works; failure to participate actively is likely to be regarded as opposition. In handling opposition, the methods of the Communists are effective and quick. Physical coercion, if not actually employed, lurks always in the background. Freedom of thought and discussion have practically been eliminated. Resistance has been limited to sporadic outbreaks and to passive hostility. In the Korean war the morale, discipline, and courage of the Chinese forces attested eloquently to the success of the Communist indoctrination and coercion programs.

⁹⁵ The lines built since 1949 are the Chengtu-Chungking (505 km), Tien-shui-Lanchow (346 km), and Lai-pang-Munankuan (403 km) railways. *People's China* (January 1, 1953), p. 28.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ See A. Doak Barnett, "Social Controls in Communist China," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 45-48.

Fear of counterrevolution has, according to the Communists, necessitated the continuation of violence. To guard against infiltration, laxity, and deviation, the Chinese Communist Party in 1950–51 undertook an “ideological remolding” movement. This was followed by the “3-Anti” movement of 1951–52 directed against corruption, waste, and “bureaucratism.”⁹⁸ The sin of “bureaucratism” is committed by issuing directives from an office without checking to see whether the work is actually accomplished according to plan. A “5-Anti” campaign against other party failures was followed in 1952–53 by a “party reorganization” movement. The object of all these efforts was to purify the party membership and stimulate it to greater efforts. The effect has been to reduce the number of members of peasant background and to increase the proletarian complexion of the membership. Like the individual member himself, the party as a whole regularly subjects itself to “self-criticism.” In China, unlike Russia, no member of the Communist elite has so far been purged. Numerous discredited leaders have been required to recant or apply themselves to further study of doctrine, but no great trial of “traitors” has yet taken place. Warnings have repeatedly stressed, however, that “the easiest way to capture a fortress is from within.”

Paralleling the Party rehabilitation program for 1953 was the opening of the stage of large-scale construction. In Communist annals the first three years of the New China has been concentrated on two major programs: economic rehabilitation and repulsion of “aggression.” At the beginning of 1953, China in emulation of the Soviet Union launched its first Five-Year Program.⁹⁹ Highest priority in this program was given to heavy industry with engineering and machine building as the core. The harnessing of the Huai and Yungting rivers for the production of electric power were projects with high priority ratings. Afforestation and reforestation in the north were also featured prominently in these plans. In the political field an All-China People’s Congress was called for 1953 “to stimulate the enthusiasm and creative initiative of the people”¹⁰⁰ for the new epoch of national construction. It is evidently assumed that industrialization will bring prosperity and happiness to the Chinese people. Almost nothing has been published about the demographic problems that industrialization will probably bring to China. The conclusion of a truce in the Korean war in the summer of 1953 encouraged the Maoists to hope that the first year of the new program would easily be overfulfilled in key areas of the economy.

⁹⁸ Article by Liu Tsun-chi on “The Historic Movement to Eliminate Corruption, Waste, and Bureaucratism,” *People’s China* (March 16, 1952), accuses the “national bourgeoisie” of “reprehensible practices” (p. 9) detrimental to the people’s livelihood.

⁹⁹ Li Chen, “How China Will Industrialize,” *People’s China* (February 1, 1953), pp. 10–12.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Meanwhile, political planning in the drive toward full socialism also moved ahead. The Government Council in November, 1952, set up a Committee to Draft a National Constitution. The Party also began to prepare at this time the draft that was ultimately to become China's latest constitutional document. By the spring of 1954 a preliminary version of the new constitution was being discussed in top government and Party circles. On June 14, the Government Council accepted the Draft Constitution and formally published it for "discussion" at lower levels and in the mass organizations. After some slight changes had been made, it was presented to the First National People's Congress at Peking. On September 20, 1954, this body duly ratified it. On the fifth anniversary of the new regime, on October 1, the new constitution was officially proclaimed at ceremonies held in Peking.¹⁰¹

Aside from its importance as the fundamental law of Red China, the new constitution sets the new line for Communist development. In general, it highlights the role of the Party in bringing about the revolution and de-emphasizes the "united front" as a revolutionary force. The preamble states bluntly that "the Chinese people . . . under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party achieved in 1949 the great victory of the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. . . ." The stress, however, is no longer placed upon combating these evils, but rather upon "socialistic transformation during the transitional stage" on the road to full socialism. In the "Common Program" of 1949 the Soviet Union was not mentioned, but in the new constitution the preamble ends with a paean of devotion to the "unbreakable friendship between China and the great U.S.S.R. as well as the various 'people's democracies.' "

In the economic sphere, the transitional state of China is reflected in the retention of capitalism as a major form of economy, in the legal protection accorded the peasant of his right to own land, and the state protection assured the ownership rights of capitalists. In every case the legal protection afforded landowners and capitalists is carefully hedged in by statements reflecting the intention of the state of liquidate and socialize such holdings as quickly as feasible. At the same time the state deprives "feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists of political rights" and hopefully encourages them "to reform themselves by work into citizens who earn their livelihood by their own labor."¹⁰² The fundamental stress in the economic sections is placed upon the transformation of agriculture

¹⁰¹ Text in S. B. Thomas, *Government and Administration in Communist China*, Appendix IV, pp. 181-96. See also Chao Kuo-chün, "The National Constitution of Communist China," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIII (1954), 145-51. For an example of the "discussions" held on the new constitution see Yu Ming and Hsi Ping, "Our Constitution," *People's China* (September 16, 1954), pp. 17-20.

¹⁰² See Chao Kuo-chün, "The National Constitution . . .," p. 147. Also note his comparisons of the new constitution with the constitution of the U.S.S.R.

and handicrafts to socialism through co-operatives, and the socializing of capitalist industry and commerce through state capitalism.

In the political sphere the new constitution moves toward a higher degree of centralization. The National People's Congress with a membership of over one thousand is theoretically "the supreme organ of state power." It is allegedly "the sole executor of the legislative power of the state" with power to amend the constitution, enact laws, supervise the application of the constitution, and elect the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic as well as other top officials. Since the Congress is scheduled to meet but once every four years, its powers are exercised in the interim by a newly created Standing Committee. This committee is potentially powerful with its numerous appointive, executive, and legislative functions.¹⁰³ On September 29, Liu Shao-ch'i was elected its chairman, thus being elevated to higher rank than any he had previously enjoyed.

The pinnacle of power is, however, the office of Chairman of the People's Republic. The holder of this office, Mao Tse-tung, wields the highest executive authority. He also serves concurrently as Chairman of the National Defense Committee, an office which places the armed forces directly under his command. The Vice-Chairman, Chu Teh, possesses the same general powers as his superior and is designated to succeed the Chairman in case of incapacity or death. The State Council, roughly comparable to a cabinet in the Western system, carries out the executive responsibilities of the Chairman. Its Premier is Chou En-lai, who also acts as Foreign Minister. He has a number of vice-premiers, offices formerly held by several non-Communists but now apparently held by Communists only. From this brief review of the central authority it can readily be observed that the promulgation of the new constitution affected only slightly the top command of the Party and the country. Perhaps the most striking change centers on the elevation of Liu Shao-ch'i to a position of high responsibility.

The Constitution of 1954 divides local administration into provinces, autonomous areas, and Class-A cities. The six large administrative areas created earlier have been abolished, and the twenty-six provinces have been placed directly under the authority of the State Council. The autonomous areas, while having some relationship to the former administrative areas, are designed primarily to give local authority where there are ethnological, linguistic, or economic reasons for divergence from the centralized pattern of control. Politically, this new arrangement may also be designed to attract non-Chinese to closer affiliation with Peking. Korean and Thai autonomous regions have been set up, for example, in those Chinese provinces bordering Korea and Thailand.

¹⁰³ For a list of its functions see *ibid.*, p. 148.

By extension of this doctrine, Liu attacks non-Communist aid to the "independent" countries of southern Asia and claims that the "oppressed nations fighting for their liberation and national independence" should look for help and guidance only from the New Democracies. Co-operation with America Liu condemns as betrayal of the working classes and the first step toward enslavement of the nation. He contends: "it can thus be seen that in the present world situation, in order to win its liberation, every oppressed nation has no alternative but to oppose American imperialism. . . ." The theoretical groundwork was thus laid for a violent anti-American campaign and for the extension of Communist influence to adjacent areas of the Far East.

While the world wondered about Chinese policy, Mao let it be known that foreign nations in the future would have to respect the wishes of Peking if relations were to be maintained at all. Several main objectives were repeatedly reiterated by Chinese spokesmen.¹⁰⁷ In brief, the Communists clearly pointed to the United States as China's most dangerous enemy, and to the Soviet Union as China's closest friend. All remnants of the past symbolizing China's "enslavement" to the "imperialist" powers were to be rooted out without regard to treaties or agreements concluded by previous regimes. In co-operation with the other states of the "international united front," China would resist counterrevolution and mount political, economic, and ideological counterattacks against the "predatory" powers. While struggling without quarter against the "aggressive" policies of the "imperialist nations," the Communists were admonished to keep in view the final victory of the proletariat throughout the world and to formulate their programs with this end in mind.

The actions of the Peking regime in foreign relations can be understood only by reference to these doctrinal pronouncements. This is not to say, however, that Mao has unswervingly followed doctrine. Flexibility and adaptation for everyday affairs are as much a part of Communist doctrine as the formulation of ultimate objectives. Chapter VII of the "Common Program" adopted in September, 1949, is framed with the practical problems of diplomacy in view.¹⁰⁸ It asserts that the principal objective of foreign policy is "the safeguarding of the independence, freedom, and integrity of the territory and sovereignty of the country . . . and the opposing of the imperialist policy of aggression and war (Art. 54)." In so doing the government shall examine the treaties and agreements previously concluded, "and recognize, abrogate, revise or renew

¹⁰⁷ For further discussion see the excellent article by H. A. Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," *The American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (1950), 69-99; O. Edmund Clubb, "Chinese Communist Strategy in Foreign Relations," *The Annals . . .*, CCLXXVII (1951), 156-66; and Werner Levi, *Modern China's Foreign Policy* (Minneapolis, 1953), chaps. XXI and XXII.

¹⁰⁸ Text in Steiner (ed.), *Chinese Communism in Action*, p. 44.

them according to their respective contents (Art. 55)." The government "may negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on the basis of equality . . . with foreign governments which sever relations with the Kuomintang reactionaries and adopt a friendly attitude toward the Central People's Republic (Art. 56)." It "may restore and develop trading and commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit (Art. 57)." The government also pledged itself to do "its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad (Art. 58)." Foreign nationals in China were to receive protection as long as they were law-abiding, and the right of asylum was accorded "oppressed" foreign nationals (Arts. 59 and 60). Quite clearly, the leaders of Communist China intended to conduct foreign affairs on their own terms.

In realizing its program Mao's government pursued an uncompromising policy toward foreigners. Classified as "reactionaries," American consulates in major cities and the embassy in Nanking began to close up during the fall of 1949. American, British, and French officials were arrested on numerous charges and forced to stand trial before People's Courts. In December, 1949, Washington warned American ships to stay away from Shanghai. Missionaries repeatedly reported trouble with the Communists, and many of them gave up their responsibilities in China. Agencies of the United Nations with branches in China were forced to suspend operations under Communist pressure. Diplomatic properties were seized in January, 1950, and the United States thereafter formally recalled all its official personnel. Businessmen began to close up shop as conditions became virtually intolerable for foreigners in China. Western educational institutions were gradually forced to close their doors, though Yenching remained open until April, 1952. By the summer of 1950 the "bamboo curtain" had shut China off from free contact with the non-Communist world. Hongkong became the only major point of connection.¹⁰⁹

At the diplomatic level relations between China and the West deteriorated rapidly in the year (October, 1949, to November, 1950) from the proclamation of the People's Republic to the intervention of China in the Korean war. Uppermost was the key problem of diplomatic recognition for the Peking government. Allied to recognition were the related issues of Kuomintang possession of Formosa and the two-way struggle for China's seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. While the United States and Britain agreed in September, 1949, that China could not be rescued from Communism by further aid to the Kuomintang, the Western powers were not prepared to accept the Communists' terms of

¹⁰⁹ See E. Stuart Kirby, "Hong Kong and the British Position in China," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 193-202

immediate recognition, severance of relations with the Kuomintang, seating of Peking's representatives in the United Nations, and adoption of a "friendly attitude" toward New China. It was clearly understood also that Mao would not tolerate the severance of Formosa from China and would insist upon Peking's claim that the Cairo Declaration entitled Red China to take over administration of the island.

On October 1, 1949, Chou En-lai expressed his belief "that the establishment of normal relations between the People's Republic of China and countries in the world is necessary." For the Western nations the conditions attached to recognition made immediate action difficult. No country denied officially after October 1 that the Communists possessed effective control over most of China. At the legal level objections centered on China's decision to make diplomatic recognition a matter of formal negotiation for which agenda was already prepared, and for Peking's refusal to abide by accepted standards of international conduct. Even if they subscribed to Communist demands for severance of relations with the Kuomintang and the adoption of a "friendly attitude" toward the People's Republic, the Western powers were still confronted by the realization that Peking intended to act unilaterally on the treaties, continued to classify most of them as "reactionaries," and progressively closed down on their establishments and interests in China.

Because of their common ideological front with Red China, the Communist states experienced no difficulty in establishing relations. On October 2, 1949, the Soviet Union granted formal recognition, and the following day the Russian ambassador arrived in Peking. The Soviet satellites were quick to follow suit. Three large groups of Soviet experts arrived in Peking on October 15. In the United Nations, meanwhile, the Chinese Nationalists charged the Soviet Union with violating their Friendship treaty of 1945, of threatening the independence and integrity of China, and of profaning the U. N. Charter. Though they did not obtain a "moral judgment" against Russia in the United Nations the Chinese Nationalists succeeded in stimulating fears already strong in the United States that Communism was on the march in Asia while America concentrated its energies on Europe.

The British policies with regard to Mao's China provoked outraged consternation among some groups in the United States. British Foreign Minister Bevin had agreed with his American and French colleagues on September 17, 1949, to stop aiding Chiang and to oppose Communism by concluding a separate peace with Japan and by strengthening the independence movements of southeastern Asia against a Communist takeover. Since the question of recognition was left undecided, Great Britain, urged on by some of the Commonwealth nations, decided that it was useless to continue recognizing Chiang Kai-shek. The "milder" tone of British

policy toward Peking reflected the Commonwealth's concern over Britain's "direct stake," such as Hongkong and Kowloon, and the Commonwealth's "indirect stake" in the development of profitable trade relations with Red China. While British investments in China had declined sharply even before the victory of Mao's forces, hope for new markets and investments in an area where the British had a lengthy experience provided an incentive for recognition that the United States neither needed nor possessed.¹¹⁰

It was mainly to insure the safety of Hongkong and to sound out seriously the possibilities of trade with Red China that Great Britain, on January 5, 1950, recognized the Peking government. In this move Britain had been preceded by Burma, India, and Pakistan. While British statesmen insisted that recognition was merely an "acknowledgement of fact," critics of the British action, particularly in Washington, viewed it as a "mark of approbation." Republican Senators threatened that Britain's defection would not be forgotten when the budget for the European Recovery Program came up for discussion. Despite such warnings, a number of the other non-Communist countries of Europe followed Britain's lead during the early months of 1950. Like Britain, they hoped by recognition to increase their earnings from foreign trade. Twenty-seven countries, Communist and non-Communist, had officially recognized the Peking government by 1953.¹¹¹ The United States, as in the case of Soviet Russia a generation before, consistently refused to accord legal recognition to Communist China. It was not, however, until the summer of 1954 that trade and diplomatic relations with Great Britain were taken up by Peking.

While the Western nations quarreled over China policy, the "united front" of Communist states closed their ranks even tighter. On December 16, 1949, Mao Tse-tung and his advisers arrived in Moscow for conversations with Stalin. The time had come in the view of the two dictators to formalize Sino-Russian relations for the immediate future. In Mao's words, he had journeyed to Moscow to discuss:

first of all the existing Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. [the treaty of August 14, 1945 concluded with Chiang Kai-shek], the question of Soviet credits for the People's Republic of China, the question of trade and a trade agreement between our countries and other questions.¹¹²

Mao was joined in Moscow on January 20, 1950, by Chou En-lai and other top officials of the Peking government. Present also in the Russian

¹¹⁰ For defense of the Commonwealth view see *ibid.*; also consult W. MacMahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne, 1952), pp. 191-95.

¹¹¹ *New York Times*, July 26, 1953.

¹¹² *People's China*, April 16, 1950.

capital were representatives of the North-Eastern (Manchurian), Outer Mongolian, and Sinkiang governments.

The negotiations were concluded on February 14, 1950, with the signing of a new Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and two subsidiary agreements.¹¹³ Notes were exchanged between the two governments in the course of the negotiations rendering null and void the treaty of 1945, guaranteeing the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic, transferring to China without compensation the properties acquired in Manchuria by Soviet economic organizations, and returning to China without compensation all the buildings in the former Soviet military compound in Peking. A note clarifying the independent status of Outer Mongolia settled definitively an issue that had troubled Sino-Russian relations since 1924.

In certain regards the treaty and agreements concluded in 1950 followed the lines of the arrangements negotiated five years earlier.¹¹⁴ Viewed historically, both post-war treaties between China and Russia granted the Soviet Union a place in far eastern affairs similar to that enjoyed by Tsarist Russia in 1904. As in the beginning years of the century, the Russians in Manchuria and Korea focused their hostility upon Japan. The Japan of 1950 was not likely, however, without outside help to challenge Russian expansion in the Pacific region. The treaty was directed therefore only nominally against Japan. As stated in the introductory paragraph, the treaty of 1950 to be in effect for thirty years was designed to prevent "the revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or *any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression. . .*." Clearly the new treaty was aimed at the United States, the power in charge of occupying Japan and the leader in Communist language of the "international camp of aggression." Article I provides that "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or *any other state allied with her* and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal." Such a military agreement concretized and particularized Mao's earlier declaration that Red China was unqualifiedly committed to support Russia in the event of an international war. Article II commits the parties to the conclusion at the earliest possible date of a peace treaty with Japan "jointly with the other powers which were Allies in the Second World War." The remaining four articles

¹¹³ The official texts were in Russian and Chinese. Translations from the Russian text into English in Mandel (comp.), *op. cit.*, pp 115-21; translation from the Chinese text in the pamphlet published by the Foreign Language Press at Peking in 1950 entitled *The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements*. For comment see Beloff, *op. cit.*, chap. IV.

¹¹⁴ Details on similarities and differences in W. B. Ballis, "The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 170-74. Cf. *supra*, pp. 522-27, for discussion of the 1945 treaty.

are those traditionally included in treaties of alliance, such as guarantees not to conclude alliances directed against each other, to engage in mutual consultation on matters of common interest, and to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties. The treaty was formally ratified in Peking and Moscow on April 11, 1950, amid declarations that it formed the cornerstone of future Sino-Russian relations. Western observers prophesied that the world would one day learn that this treaty had vital secret clauses as well as those published.

The first subsidiary agreement concluded at Moscow referred to the status of the Chinese-Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen. After commenting on the "fundamental changes that have occurred in the situation in the Far East" since 1945, the contracting parties concluded that "this new situation permits a new approach" to Sino-Russian affairs in Manchuria. As part of the "new approach," the Soviet Union agreed to "transfer to China without compensation . . . all its rights to the joint administration of the Chinese-Changchun Railway . . . immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952." In the interim the joint administrative machinery continued to function. Russia also agreed that Soviet troops should be withdrawn "from the jointly-utilized naval base [Port Arthur] . . . immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952." For the interim a joint Chinese-Soviet Military Commission was set up to take charge of military affairs "in the area of Port Arthur." It was further provided that in the event of war Russia might on the invitation of China "jointly use" the naval base. With respect to the commercial port of Dairen, they agreed to consider the question further on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. It also provided, however, that a joint commission should be set up to supervise the transfer to China of "all the property in Dairen now temporarily administered or leased to the Soviet Union." Such renditions of property were to be "fully carried out in the course of 1950," and apparently they were. The Russian evacuation of Port Arthur was postponed at the end of 1952 until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan,¹¹⁵ but in October, 1954 the U.S.S.R. announced its decision to withdraw in June, 1955. The Chinese-Changchun Railway was formally transferred to Chinese administration on December 31, 1952—at a ceremony held at Harbin. It has since been renamed the Harbin Railway Administration and is presumably under the direct control of the Ministry of Railways in Peking.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Text of this Sino-Soviet exchange of notes in *People's China* (October 1, 1952), pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁶ See Chao Ching-lun, "The Transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway," *People's China* (January 16, 1953), pp. 8-9.

The second subsidiary agreement concluded at Moscow on February 14, 1950, provided for a Russian credit to China of \$300,000,000 with interest at one per cent annually. Beginning with January 1, 1950, the Soviet credit was to be divided into equal payments over a five-year period. According to the agreement, it was to be "used in payment for deliveries from the U.S.S.R. of equipment and materials . . . for the restoration and development of the national economy of China." The loan is scheduled to be repaid by the end of 1963 in deliveries to Russia of raw materials, tea, gold, and American dollars. In terms of China's vast requirements, the Soviet loan was little more than a token of good will and intentions. It was less, for example, than the Russian loan granted to Poland, and its real value was diminished by twenty per cent when Moscow revalued the ruble less than two weeks after signing the credit agreement with Peking. In October, 1954, Russia promised China a new credit of \$230,000,000 to help the industrial program along.

In the agreements of February, 1950, Sinkiang's status went unmentioned. Delegates from this westernmost of China's provinces appeared in Moscow, however, on January 30, and stayed on in the Russian capital after the departure of the Chinese. As a result of their negotiations, two mixed, joint stock companies were agreed to on March 27, 1950, by China and Russia.¹¹⁷ The task of the first group "is to conduct prospecting for and to produce and refine oil and gas" in Sinkiang province. The other concern "is to prospect for and to produce non-ferrous metals" in the same area. The expenses and profits are to be divided equally—the assumption presumably being that China furnishes the territory and Russia the equipment for exploiting Sinkiang. At about the same time the two powers signed a ten-year agreement for joint aeronautical development. Two of the projected lines from Peking to Moscow are to run via Outer Mongolia, while the third will fly via Sinkiang. Plans for new railway developments in Central Asia were also agreed to in 1954 by both powers. While China still possesses legal control over Sinkiang, Russia clearly has an important part in the economic development and exploitation of this border territory.

As in the other border regions of China, the Communists acted quickly to resolve the question of Tibet's relation to the revolution. This country on "the roof of the world" between China and India claimed in 1949 to be an independent country theoretically under the theological and political jurisdiction of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas.¹¹⁸ China had never fully accepted Tibet's assertions of independence and after 1913 continued to claim Tibet as a "special territory." Fearful that Tibet might be used

¹¹⁷ Texts of the agreements reprinted in Mandel (comp.), *op. cit.*, pp. 121–22.

¹¹⁸ For excellent background on Tibet see Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Liu, *Tibet and the Tibetans* (Stanford, 1953).

by their enemies as a base for attack upon China proper, the Chinese Communists shortly after coming to power let the world know that the Tibetan plateau with its four million inhabitants would be "liberated from imperialism." Peking first spoke through the voice of the exiled Panchen Lama (twelve years old) who issued a call on November 24, 1949, for a revolt against "imperialism, feudalism, and the Dalai Lama."¹¹⁹ On January 31, 1950, the Dalai Lama called for world support against a threatened invasion from China. While the Chinese gathered their forces, India increasingly evinced concern about the elimination of Tibet as a buffer between the two greatest Asian nations.¹²⁰ Despite objections from New Delhi, the Chinese began their invasion of Tibet on October 25, 1950, and warned that Peking would tolerate no "foreign interference" in what they proclaimed "entirely the domestic problem of China." This invasion, it should be observed, coincided with China's intervention in the Korean war.

General Liu Po-cheng's army met unexpected resistance from natural obstacles, but little fighting occurred. On November 17, the government at Lhasa appealed to the United Nations against Chinese aggression, and India warned Peking that the attack on Tibet had damaged the "friendly relations" of the two countries. On November 24 the Assembly's Political and Security Committee shelved Tibet's request for aid on the grounds that action would increase the danger of general war in the Far East.¹²¹ On December 11 the Communists established an "autonomous people's government" in western Sikang province, a territory claimed by Tibet. A week later the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and established a provisional capital at Yatung near the Indian border. Left to fight the unequal battle alone, the Dalai Lama in January, 1951, decided to negotiate with the Chinese. It was reported in India during February that General Ngabu, a Tibetan cabinet minister, had begun negotiations in Peking. The Chinese forces arrived at Lhasa during April. On May 23, 1951 a treaty was signed in Peking that definitely placed Tibet as a part of China and heralded its "peaceful liberation."¹²² The Dalai Lama was recognized as the spiritual and temporal ruler, and his government was promised autonomy in local affairs. Following a traditional "imperialist" formula, the Chinese insisted upon their right to send military forces into Tibet, to manage its defense and foreign affairs, and to bring the Panchen Lama back from exile. On August 23, the Dalai Lama returned to his capital. The "liberation" of Tibet was completed with the formal entry to Lhasa of the Chinese army on September 9. The Panchen Lama "returned"

¹¹⁹ *New York Times*, November 27, 1949.

¹²⁰ For India's reactions see especially the *Indian Press Digests*, Vol. I (1952), Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

¹²¹ *New York Times*, November 25, 1950.

¹²² Text as broadcast from Peking, *ibid.*, May 24, 1951


to Lhasa in April, 1952, and has since become a useful tool of the Chinese Communists. Economic ties between China and Tibet have been cemented by China's exchanges of tea for Tibetan wool. Joint trading companies have also begun to make purchases in India and Pakistan. The Chinese Communists proclaim that "Tibet is no longer isolated" and that "understanding and support . . . of the Soviet Union is growing in Tibet."¹²³

While the new Chinese regime secured its inner Asian frontiers, the future of China was being violently debated in world councils. On November 15, 1949, Peking had sent word to the United Nations that the Nationalist delegation had no right to speak for the Chinese people. Russia began in the late months of 1949 to propose the unseating of the Nationalists and the admission of Red China to the United Nations. Since China possessed a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, Moscow made strenuous efforts to have the Communists seated as quickly as possible. No longer would Russia be the only Communist state permanently represented on the Security Council. The attacks on Russia by the Nationalist Chinese produced on December 8, 1949, an equivocal resolution by the General Assembly to the effect that all countries should refrain from interfering in China's affairs. In the United States the Republican faction in Congress, spurred on by General MacArthur, called upon the administration to take positive measures to preserve the Nationalist foothold on Formosa. On January 5, 1950, the day that Britain recognized Communist China, President Truman announced that the United States would take no direct or indirect military action to help the Nationalists hold Formosa.¹²⁴ The Washington leaders feared that drastic steps to aid Chiang might involve the United States in war with Red China, and would certainly arouse hostility in Asia. The United States, on the other hand, continued in its refusal to recognize Peking and in its support of the Nationalists in the United Nations. Secretary of State Acheson pursued in these months a policy of watchful waiting, while criticism of his "weak China policy" rapidly mounted. Acheson held the view that the actions of the Communists in confiscating consular properties and in mistreating American citizens would make immediate recognition impossible. Should the Communists adopt a normal line of behavior in international affairs, the United States might consider recognition.

In response to this American policy and to a UN decision refusing to oust the Chinese delegation immediately, the Soviet representative, Jakob Malik, walked out of the Security Council meeting of January

¹²³ Chinese official view of Tibetan affairs presented by the Commander of the Tibetan Military Area, Chang Kuo-hua in "A New Tibet Is Arising," *People's China* (May 16, 1953), pp. 7-11.

¹²⁴ *New York Times*, January 6, 1950.



China in 1950

Courtesy of "Report on China." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1951, adapted from a map in *People's China*, Vol. 2, No. 7, October 1, 1950

10, 1950. Two days later, Secretary Acheson declared in a public address to the National Press Club that the United States would take military action only to defend the perimeter running from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippine Islands.¹²⁵ His omission of Formosa and Korea from this list of areas vital to American safety in the Pacific region became a fiery controversial point when the Korean war broke out. Critics of Acheson asserted that he had invited the Communists in his speech to take action against Korea. Meanwhile, Russia continued to boycott the Security Council and to walk out of other UN agencies. As international tension mounted, the congressional critics of Acheson called for his resignation and the adoption of a policy more favorable to Nationalist China. In connection with the Russian effort on behalf of Communist China, it should be recalled that in January–February, 1950, the highly important conversations on future Sino-Russian relations were taking place in Moscow. In the American Congress the debate on China policy centered on the amount of economic aid that should be lent South Korea and Formosa. At both poles of the bipolar world, fundamental decisions were being taken on far eastern questions in the early months of 1950.

The focus in the China debate shifted to the United Nations again on March 8, 1950. In a memorandum of that date, the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, implied that the Communists should be permitted to take China's seat at Lake Success.¹²⁶ He argued that the UN policy should be to deal with whatever government exercised "effective authority" in a country and was "habitually obeyed by the bulk of its population." He also asked the countries concerned, and presumably the United States and Russia first and foremost, to separate the question of national recognition from the question as to whether or not a particular government should be represented in the United Nations. The Americans would clearly not sit with the Communists; the Russians by their boycott made patent their refusal to sit with the Nationalists. Lie's objective was to raise the question of UN membership above the arena of nationalistic rivalries. His effort to break the impasse failed. Russia continued its boycott, and the United States continued its policy of recognizing the Nationalists. Acheson did declare, however, that the United States would accept a majority decision to seat the Chinese Communists. And again the Secretary of State was violently criticized in the American Congress and press. Thereafter, Lie sought to convince the powers to hold a Foreign Ministers' conference to settle the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

¹²⁵ Text of his address entitled "Crisis in Asia" published in *U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin* (January 23, 1950), pp. 111–18.

¹²⁶ *New York Times*, March 9, 1950.

Such efforts at peaceful solution of the issue were discarded when the Communists of North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950 (see pp. 632–33). This aggression stiffened the American determination to support Chiang, although the United States rejected the Nationalist offer of military support in Korea. As mentioned earlier (p. 550), the United States on June 27 “neutralized” Formosa by sending the Seventh Fleet to protect Chiang’s insular bastion. The United States also decided to act swiftly in Korea. Peking thereupon accused the United States of aggression, attacked Britain for not supporting Red China’s bid for admission to the United Nations, and provided limited aid to North Korea. On July 15, Stalin informed Nehru that Russia would return to the United Nations to help negotiate peace in Korea providing the Communists should be given China’s seat.¹²⁷ This suggestion stimulated a general reaction against Red China’s candidacy. Three days after Stalin’s declaration, Britain banned oil shipments to China. Met by such determination, Malik on August 1 returned to the Security Council (pp. 634–35) without having obtained Red China’s admission to the United Nations. Russia continued, however, to work for the expulsion of the Nationalists. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek met with MacArthur to plan for the defense of Formosa in case of a Communist attempt to take the island. In the United States tempers reached the boiling point as the Communists pushed ahead in Korea and as the Russians and Chinese proclaimed the eventual capitulation of Asia to Communism.

In Peking, meanwhile, Mao conferred with Molotov during the first two weeks of August on their far eastern plans. No information on the decisions taken at these conversations is available. Subsequent events, however, make surmises possible. Communist China stepped up its attacks on American “aggression” and demanded that the United States withdraw its “armed invading forces” (Seventh Fleet) from Formosa. American planes operating in Korea were charged with attacking Manchurian targets. MacArthur’s proposal of August 27 (repudiated by Truman) that the United States should take over Formosa brought bitter responses from Peking. On September 2, Russia formally asked the Security Council to pass a resolution condemning United States “aggression” in Formosa and urging the United States to withdraw its forces from all “territories belonging to China.” Meanwhile an American proposal to dispatch a commission to Manchuria to investigate China’s charges of bombings was vetoed by Russia in the Security Council on September 12. One week later the General Assembly convened. Russian and Indian efforts to have the Nationalists ousted and Communist China seated were voted down. A Canadian resolution was accepted to constitute a special committee of the Assembly to study the Chinese

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, July 16, 1950.

question. On September 29, the Security Council voted to invite the Chinese Communists to send representatives to the first Council session held after November 15 to discuss their complaints against American "aggression" in Formosa. It was specifically understood that their claim to China's seat in the United Nations was not involved in this invitation. They were asked to appear simply as "persons" who could aid the Council in studying their complaint. On October 24, while preparing for intervention in Tibet and Korea, Peking accepted the UN invitation and Chou En-lai requested the Assembly to turn down an American proposal to discuss the future of Formosa.

Truman met MacArthur on Wake Island on October 15 to discuss the far eastern situation. In discussing the chances of Chinese or Soviet intervention in the Korean war, MacArthur said: "Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention."¹²⁸ The General also predicted that "formal resistance" would end in Korea "by Thanksgiving." As will be seen later (pp.), MacArthur's forecast was incorrect. Confusion reigned supreme in the Western camp when the Chinese began their intervention in Korea at the end of October and the beginning of November. It was at this critical moment that Tibet's appeal for help reached the United Nations. Nationalist China meanwhile continued to charge Russia with indirectly subjugating China through Moscow's employment and support of the Chinese Communists.

In the midst of this tense period, the delegation from Communist China arrived in New York at the end of November to discuss American "aggression" against Formosa. Led by Wu Hsieu-chüan, chief of Russian and East European affairs in the Peking Foreign Ministry, the Chinese delegation let it be known immediately that they would discuss only American "aggression" and would not talk about a truce in Korea. In their speeches at Lake Success, the Chinese Reds on November 28 maintained the fiction that their troops in Korea were "volunteers," and clearly stated that they intended to drive the UN forces out of Korea. On December 4, while MacArthur's troops retreated in Korea, Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington to discuss Asiatic problems with President Truman. In their conversations Attlee advised recognition and the seating of Peking in the United Nations as the first steps toward a peaceful solution. Charges of "appeasement" were hurled at Attlee. On December 6, the General Assembly voted to debate the American demand that Communist China halt its intervention in Korea. Unable to obtain decisive victories either in the United Nations or on the battlefields of Korea, the United States on December 16 retaliated against

¹²⁸ Text of the conversations at Wake included as an appendix to Richard H. Rovere and A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The General and the President* (New York, 1950), pp. 253-62.

Peking by freezing all Chinese Communist assets in the United States and by placing an embargo on trade with China. Truman proclaimed at the same time "the existence of a national emergency."¹²⁹ These steps just short of war were not followed by the other Western countries of the United Nations.

After rejecting a UN proposal for an immediate cease-fire in Korea, the Red Chinese delegation left New York on December 19. Chou En-lai indicated that China would not consider a cease-fire in Korea until all UN troops were withdrawn from Korea, all American forces withdrawn from Formosa, and China's seat in the United Nations handed over to Peking. Broadcasts from China also indicated that Peking wanted a part in the negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty, then being independently arranged by the United States (see pp. 609-12). On December 28, Peking replied to Truman's freezing order by seizing all American assets in China. Trade between the two nations, except for contraband activities, ceased and so far has not been resumed. At the beginning of 1951 the crisis in Sino-American relations had reached a stage where full-scale war appeared as a distinct possibility.

American policy in January, 1951, was directed toward having Communist China declared an "aggressor" by the United Nations. Evidence was marshalled to show that units of China's Red Army made up of personnel of Korean origin comprised the nucleus of North Korea's army even before the attack on South Korea. Russian planes, tanks, and field equipment captured in Korea also reinforced the American argument that China had plotted the subversion of Korea. Throughout the Western world no serious doubt existed among non-Communists that the war in Korea had been promoted as part of the Communist program for Asia. While Peking protested such an interpretation, little credence was attached in the United Nations to the charges continuously emanating from Peking that the United States had plotted "aggression" and that the United States was using the United Nations to camouflage its "imperialist" designs in Asia. On February 1, despite the protests of India and Burma, the Assembly passed a resolution branding Red China an "aggressor."¹³⁰ A committee was also set up to study the possibility of applying sanctions to Communist China. On February 7 the charge of American "aggression" in Formosa was indefinitely tabled. In Peking, the Assembly resolution was denounced as another step in the American drive to enslave Asia.

The other Western powers refused to follow the American suggestion, repeatedly advanced, that they should withdraw their national recognitions of Communist China. Indeed, Britain in the spring of 1951

¹²⁹ *New York Times*, December 17, 1950.

¹³⁰ *Yearbook of the United Nations* (1951), pp. 223-25.

continued to urge Washington to reconsider its stiff stand on recognition and suggested that the United States work for Moscow's and Peking's co-operation in formulating a peace treaty for Japan (see pp. 609-16). Agreeing that Mao had been guilty of aggression in Korea, Britain took the view that he would ultimately be forced to make a truce and that the major objective of diplomacy should be to make such a truce possible and viable. Fearful that MacArthur was bent upon spreading the war in his frustration over Korea, Britain directed its efforts toward urging Washington to a policy of moderation. For a period, moderation was to be impossible in Washington. Additional support for Formosa occupied the attention of American planners at the beginning of April. The ambivalence in American policy was highlighted at the end of April by the hot controversy provoked with the dismissal of MacArthur (see pp. 640-41).¹³¹ For a period more heat than light was generated by the General's dramatic return, his public appearances, and his clear denunciation of the administration's "weak policy." MacArthur's proposal for extending the war to a limited action against China was directly turned down by the administration as too dangerous to Pacific and world peace.¹³² The total effect of the MacArthur controversy has still to be assessed. It appears, however, that it clearly stiffened the administration's policy in Asia, made recognition of Red China or its admission under existing conditions to the United Nations practically impossible to consider, and led Britain to a clearer understanding of the gravity with which the American public viewed far eastern questions.

It was during the MacArthur explosion that Britain decided to stop pressing for the transfer of Formosa to Red China and to follow America's lead in negotiating a separate peace with Japan. Joint plans for the defense of South Asia against Communist expansion also began to take more definite shape in May, 1951. The United States on May 18 won a moral victory in the United Nations when the Assembly voted an arms embargo of Red China. This followed various embargo measures taken by the UN countries individually. Economic pressure on Red China was more readily acceptable to the European nations than MacArthur's suggestion for extending the war. In June, 1951, the United Nations once again set its sights upon a truce in Korea and the eventual convocation of a far eastern conference.

To Communist China, despite claims to the contrary, the Korean war constituted a severe drain. Materials, equipment, and credits badly needed for reconstruction of the country were being eaten up in the maw of war. The Chinese people may have been genuinely concerned

¹³¹ Complete documentation on this episode in the Hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations entitled *Military Situation in the Far East* (Washington, 1951).

¹³² *New York Times*, May 13, 1951.

by the presence of UN forces at their Yalu River boundary in the fall of 1950. The possibility of a foreign threat to Manchuria, the heartland of China's industrial program, could hardly fail to arouse fear about the ultimate intentions of the UN forces. Historically viewed, the Japanese invaders of China had used Korea as an invasion route before. By playing on such misgivings, the Communists were able to sell their war as a struggle "for protection of the fatherland." No expressions of doubt or vacillation were permitted by the monolithic state after the war had been launched. Perhaps most impressive to the Chinese, however, were the achievements of the "liberation army" in throwing back and then holding the UN forces. For over a century China had been defeated by one foreign power after the other. Even a stalemate could be and was celebrated as a victory in China.

While the embargoes prevented arms from flowing to China, limited trade continued between China and the Western countries. Shipments from Hongkong to China in 1950 had amounted to more than double the dollar value of those going to China in 1949.¹³³ On June 19, 1951, Britain embargoed strategic shipments to China, but permitted non-strategic shipments to pass freely through Hongkong. Sino-British trade, nevertheless, declined sharply. Meanwhile, China worked out an independent customs administration along Marxist lines.¹³⁴ Trade regulations, as is usual in Communist countries, were designed "to develop home production and construction." For example, an import duty of twenty per cent was imposed on rice, because, it was asserted, "China is growing sufficient rice for her needs and is in fact exporting it." The highest duties were placed on the importation of nonessential and luxury goods. Discriminatory rates were applied to imports from countries not having treaty relations with Peking.

Peking asserts that trade must be carried on "under conditions of equality and for mutual benefit" and boasts that since 1950 China, for the first time in seventy years, has enjoyed a favorable trade balance.¹³⁵ Trade agreements have been concluded annually since 1950 with the Soviet Union and its satellites in Europe, and by 1952 about seventy per cent of China's foreign trade was with the Soviet bloc. In return for agricultural products and by-products, China has received materials and equipment for economic reconstruction. Special barter agreements have been concluded from time to time with North Korea, Outer Mongolia, India, and Ceylon. India was supplied in 1951 with more than 66,000 tons of rice and 450,000 tons of *kaoliang*.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ See Moh Ju-chien, "New China's Customs Administration," *People's China* (July 11, 1951), pp. 13-14.

¹³⁵ Chi Chao-ting, "China's Foreign Trade," *People's China* (October 16, 1953), pp. 16-17.

In an effort to co-ordinate trading activities within the Communist world and to promote outside trade, Russia held an International Economic Conference at Moscow in April, 1952.¹³⁶ During the period of this conference, Red China concluded a series of trading agreements with European and Asian countries. A Japanese delegation of businessmen also concluded a trade agreement with China signed in Peking on June 1, 1952, providing for the bartering of about \$200,000,000 worth of commodities. By its terms China¹³⁷ agreed to export agricultural commodities (specified in categories) for industrial products. Agreements with Indonesia have made it possible for China to obtain shipments of oil. A five-year agreement between China and Ceylon concluded on December 18, 1952, arranged for the barter of Ceylon's rubber for China's rice. On July 6, 1953, Peking announced a trade agreement with a private British syndicate.¹³⁸ In 1954 a British Socialist mission under Clement Attlee visited China, and talks on increasing trade were held. Such arrangements appear to indicate that Peking may be able to bargain for a place in the foreign trade picture of the capitalist world despite the hostility of the United States.

How Communist China has managed to export rice since 1951 is still an unexplained phenomenon. Peking attributes it to the success of Communist agricultural policy. It is more likely that the rice for Ceylon and India has been taken out of China's own rice bowls. As Russia has done, Red China appears to be sacrificing the standard of living to her programs for industrialization, reconstruction, and imperialistic activity. So long as China is able to tighten the belt around its meager waist, limited trade will probably be possible, and economic blockade by the Western powers could therefore have little total effect upon the economy. On March 7, 1953, Great Britain agreed to clamp tighter controls on shipments of war-valuable materials to China and to co-operate more fully with the United States in halting the flow of strategic materials to China.¹³⁹ Trade across the land routes meanwhile has been stepped up. For the present it would appear that the Peking government has successfully weathered China's highly changeable economic climate, even though American pressure has forced many Western states to halt shipments of strategic goods to China.

After the stabilization of the Korean war in 1951, the powers made active propaganda war in the United Nations and elsewhere. Western attacks were directed to the division of Red China from Soviet Russia.

¹³⁶ For a thorough presentation of China's economic position in the Communist bloc see the speech made at Moscow on April 4 by Nan Han-chen, the leader of the Chinese delegation, as translated in *People's China* (May 1, 1952), 27-31.

¹³⁷ Text in *People's China* (June 16, 1952), p. 10.

¹³⁸ *New York Times*, July 8, 1953.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, March 8, 1953.

It was claimed with some justice that Chinese labor was being exported to Siberia, that Mao's regime was blackmailing overseas Chinese, that Chinese treatment of war prisoners was inhumane, that Christianity was being crushed out of existence in China. Some observers argued that Mao acted exclusively on orders from Moscow; while others, like the Indian ambassador to Peking, stressed his independence and his strength among the Chinese people. The official line of the American State Department emphasized Russia's policy of quietly taking over economic control in China's frontier provinces of Manchuria and Sinkiang. Others speculated that Moscow was being dragged into far eastern embroilments at China's behest. Irrespective of the validity of such ideas, the fact remains that to the present (Spring, 1955) no serious division between the two great Communist powers has so far developed.

Communist strategy has been to divide the United States from the other powers of the Western bloc. Peking sought to widen the division among the Western powers by exploiting the recognition issue. They charged that America by its superior economic strength had taken over direction of the United Nations, had forced the other powers to participate in "aggression" in Korea, had reduced Japan to "colonial" status, and sought to force the other nations contrary to their own interests to refrain from trading with the Communist world. The United States was regularly accused of plotting a full-scale war with the object of returning China to "colonial" status. The UN command was charged with inhumane treatment of prisoners, indiscriminate bombing of civilians, and the employment of germ warfare. The charge of germ warfare was widely circulated by all Red periodicals and agencies, but the Communists refused categorically to permit an investigation of their "evidence" by the International Red Cross.¹⁴⁰

Such accusations, while aired openly in the Western states, did not effectively block Western co-operation. They did highlight, however, the genuine differences between the United States and the nations of the Commonwealth. Leftist and neutralist groups in Europe regularly warned their countrymen against letting America "drag" them into a huge international war. India meanwhile sought to maintain neutrality on the question of China. As one of the first to recognize Mao, Nehru's regime pursued an unwavering policy of trying to live in peace with its Communist neighbors. Peking's unilateral action in Tibet stimulated fears in India that the New China might menace India's security. Contrariwise, the positive achievements of the Communist regime were

¹⁴⁰ "Confessions" that the United States was waging bacteriological warfare in Korea were extracted from American prisoners and widely circulated in Communist publications. "International" committees of Communist scientists were provided with "evidence" of germ bombing in Korea, but all efforts of the United Nations to get an impartial evaluation of the "evidence" were turned down.

heralded by sympathetic observers as a model for India to follow. Faced by many problems similar to those of China, Indians have been greatly impressed by the speed and efficiency with which the Chinese have carried on their agrarian revolution, by the elimination of striking economic differences, and by Peking's strength in foreign affairs.¹⁴¹ Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia have usually followed India's middle course in their evaluation of far eastern problems.

While propaganda blasts stole the headlines, Communist activities in southeast Asia became a problem of fundamental moment to the Western powers (see pp. 703-04). Unlike the Kuomintang, the Communist government of China took an active interest in the future of the southern countries. The main agency for carrying through this Communist program is the Asian Cominform. Like other Communist agencies, the Cominform set up in Peking in April, 1950, operates under the principle of "democratic centralism." Although specific information on its operation is scarce, it appears that the Peking branch is responsible to Moscow and in charge of co-ordinating Communist activities in eastern Asia. The Chinese of the southern regions constitute from the Communist viewpoint a potential spearhead for Chinese expansion. The non-Chinese Communists of southeast Asia clearly look to Moscow and Peking for direction. The Communists in the strategically and economically valuable regions of tropical Asia have directed their activities toward sabotaging America's Point 4 program, interfering with aid shipments, paralyzing communications, and organizing paramilitary units to create disorders and undermine the authority of the unsteady new regimes. The presence of Communist China to the north has been one of the stark and ominous realities of political and economic planning in southeast Asia.

It has consistently been apparent that Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China has received aid from China. After the Korean war had settled down to a stalemate, Britain and France warned Russia and Red China that new aggression in southeast Asia would be met by "effective action" from the United Nations. The United States continued to help the French maintain themselves against Ho's forces by supplying military aid. The Communists in China, nevertheless, continued to talk of Peking's "special responsibility toward the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Australia."¹⁴² The ability of Ho Chi Minh to hold his own and the threat of Indo-China becoming another Korea have evidently deterred the Chinese Communists from dispatching "volunteers" or sizable units of the People's Army to Indo-China. It was

¹⁴¹ For an evaluation of the varying currents of Indian opinion, see *Indian Press Digests*, Vol. I (1952), No. 3, pp. 27-55.

¹⁴² As quoted in Claude A. Buss, "Overseas Chinese and Communist Policy," *The Annals* . . . , CCLXXVII (1951), 211.

not until the summer of 1954 that a truce was arranged in the Indo-Chinese war (see pp. 706–07).

Peking has sought also to become a center for Asian labor, cultural, and peace activities. Trade Union conferences with representation from the Asian states have been held in Peking on several occasions since 1949. Cultural meetings have sought to link educators, youth organizations, and the press to the Asian objectives of Communist China. From October 1–12, 1952, representatives from thirty-seven countries held a Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions in Peking.¹⁴³ Fourteen per cent of the participants were women, and the conference was led by Soong Ching-ling, the wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and recipient of the Stalin Peace Prize. Allegedly speaking for over a billion and one-half people, the delegates affirmed their "conviction that countries with different social systems and ways of life can co-exist in peace and co-operate in a mutually beneficial manner." They called for immediate peace in Korea, Viet-Nam, and Malaya and "withdrawal of all foreign troops from these regions." Peace in Asia demanded, according to the Peking declaration, the conclusion of a "genuine peace treaty" with Japan, and an end to the "revival of Japanese militarism." The "speedy conclusion of a Five-Power Peace Pact" was listed as imperative to the maintenance of peace. In this connection the declaration called upon the people of the United States to put an end to "the acts of war and preparations for war now being carried out by the Government of the United States." At the conference the United States was "represented" by three delegates. These delegates affirmed by their declarations the major propositions of Russian and Chinese foreign policy.

The role of Communist China in foreign relations has been of key moment since 1949 in the bipolar struggle. With the largest population of any country in the world, China, Communist or non-Communist, cannot be overlooked in world or regional plans of the future. Communist control of the Chinese mainland has grown tighter with each passing year, and apparently Peking exercises a degree of discipline and control over the Chinese people far beyond anything that the Kuomintang could muster. Possessing the largest and most powerful armed force in Asia, China will figure prominently in future settlements of Asiatic questions. While faced with mountainous domestic problems, Mao derives strength from his alliance with the Soviet Union that cannot accurately be estimated in terms of trade figures. Almost every speech made in Peking stresses the benefits of the Soviet pact to China and identifies China's aims with those of the U.S.S.R.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Complete reports in the supplements to *People's China* for October 16 and November 1, 1952.

¹⁴⁴ Penetrating analysis of the problem of China in recent international affairs in H. A. Steiner, "The United States and the Two Chinas," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 57–61.

The government of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa still claims to be the legal authority of China, enjoys the benefits of American recognition and aid, and occupies China's seat in the United Nations. On August 22, 1954, Peking announced to the world: "Formosa is China's territory. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Formosa."¹⁴⁵ Such a threat to take action had not previously been made. In the event of a military effort by Red China, Chiang is absolutely dependent upon America's support. He is reinforced in his position by the fact that he controls an island vital to America's defense perimeter in the Pacific. President Eisenhower's order of February 2, 1953, requiring the Seventh Fleet to stop guarding Red China from Kuomintang attack could be counted little more than a gesture. Of greater moment is the Mutual Security Pact concluded in November, 1954, between Chiang and the United States. While determined to thwart Red China from shooting its way into the United Nations, the United States would certainly not commit to Chiang the forces and equipment he would absolutely require for an attack upon the Chinese mainland. An economic embargo on Red China would also be likely to prove something less than decisive. The conclusion of a truce in the Korean war in August, 1953 (pp. 646-47), and in the Indo-Chinese war in 1954 (pp. 706-07) were important steps toward the achievement of a new balance of power in eastern Asia. At this time (spring, 1955) the question of Formosa's future is of utmost concern to the world—whether it will fall to Communism or become the focal point in a wider conflagration involving the major powers of the world!

CHAPTER XVII

JAPAN AND KOREA

In the nine years since 1945, Japan and Korea have been buffeted by external storms while being rocked at the same time by the violence of internal upheavals and readjustments. The occupation of defeated Japan was carried out with but relatively few hitches, and today Japan again possesses independence and hopes of future recovery. The peoples of "liberated" Korea barely emerged from the holocaust of international war before being plunged into an inferno of domestic unrest, internal hostilities, and international war. The powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, have interfered frequently, but not always equally, in the affairs of Korea. Today, the old "Land of Morning Calm" stands divided into northern and southern sectors, its future undetermined, and its people suffering from the ravages of war.

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

The surrender of Japan in 1945 inaugurated one of the most momentous and revolutionary eras in Japanese history. Bowed by the physical ravages of prolonged war, bitter defeats, and disillusionment, the proud Japanese were forced to accept an army of occupation. It was the objective of this army to demilitarize, democratize, and set Japan on a new road to economic and political well-being. In its program of destroying the armed might of Nippon the occupation succeeded without difficulty. In its effort to win the co-operation and respect of the Japanese, the occupation performed splendidly. In the more complex problems of setting Japan on the way to democracy, social reform, and economic rehabilitation, the occupation scored numerous initial successes. The conclusion of the occupation in April, 1952, nevertheless left the Japanese with numerous domestic and international problems still unsolved. Whether the more than six years of occupation were enough to redirect permanently the processes previously at work in Japan is a question that time and circumstances alone will decide.

As we have already seen, the objectives of the victorious powers with regard to Japan were clearly formulated during the war in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and in the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945. On August 14, 1945, the Japanese requested peace on the Potsdam terms. At the end of August, General Douglas MacArthur landed in Japan with

an advance guard of American troops delegated to inaugurate the occupation. He brought with him the initial presidential directive which spelled out in more precise terms the objectives of American policy in Japan. Since the United States was to assume primary responsibility for the occupation, the directives of the American president and the policy decisions of General MacArthur were generally accepted by the other co-operating powers as descriptive of Allied policy.¹ The predominant role assumed by the United States in the occupation was justified by reference to the part played by American forces and weapons in the defeat of Japan, by the complicated network of American security interests in the Pacific area, and by the unique ability of the American economy to bear the immediate financial burden of occupation costs.

The initial Presidential Policy Statement of August, 1945, stated that the purposes of the occupation were first to insure that Japan "never again will threaten the United States or the peace and security of the world," and secondly "to effect the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government in Japan."² On the relation of the occupation to the Japanese government the directive read:

The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or governments in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.³

Following the presidential directive, MacArthur received in November, 1945, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy from Washington as issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although this document disavowed all intentions of purporting "to formulate long-term policies concerning the treatment of Japan in the post-war world," it nevertheless spelled out in detail the authority of the occupation forces, the direction that political and administrative reorganization of the country should

¹ For complete texts of these documents see U. S. Dept. of State, *Occupation of Japan* (Washington, 1946), and for the text of the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan see *The Department of State Bulletin*, XVII (1947), 216-21. For more detailed discussion of their implementation see Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford, 1948); Hugh S. Borton, "American Occupation Policies in Japan," *Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science*, XXII (1948), 37-45; E. O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 229-34; and E. J. Leve van Aduard, *Japan from Surrender to Peace* (New York, 1954), chaps. I and II.

² Complete text was in the hands of the Far Eastern Commission for review but was not published in full until the spring of 1948 when presumably most of its directives had been implemented. Complete text published in U. S. Dept. of State, *Documents and State Papers*, Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1948), pp. 32-45.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

follow, the categories of Japanese who should be arrested and interned, the degree to which educational, artistic, and political activity should be permitted, and included a thoroughgoing appraisal of the economic and financial objectives of the occupation.

Since no Allied machinery had been set up at the end of August, 1945, the American government through General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (*SCAP*), assumed executive authority with the consent of the other powers. By a decision taken at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, an eleven-power Far Eastern Commission with headquarters in Washington was established as the supreme policy-making body for Japan. In addition, a four-power (United States, U.S.S.R., China, and United Kingdom) Allied Council for Japan was also organized with headquarters in Tokyo to act in an advisory capacity to *SCAP*. In practice neither of these international bodies possessed a decisive voice in setting occupation policies. As a rule, fundamental decisions were made either by Washington or *SCAP*.⁴

The supreme executive authority in Japan was held almost absolutely by *SCAP*, who was subject only to the directives of the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since MacArthur was considered a Theater Commander, no government agency except the armed forces had jurisdiction over him. Before directives from Washington were issued, *SCAP* and the State Department were usually consulted. For the implementation of directives MacArthur was solely responsible. Fundamental reforms in the Japanese constitution and in the regime of control were usually referred to the Far Eastern Commission for review. The Allied Council in Tokyo acted mainly as a ring for Russian and American sparring on Japanese issues.

At headquarters in Tokyo an elaborate administration rapidly came into being after 1945.⁵ It was also referred to as *SCAP*. Composed of various Staff Sections, the strategic posts in the *SCAP* organization were originally held by military officers. Although functioning as a military organization, it was staffed at the lower levels by American civilians. As time went on the number of civilian officials increased, although the "Bataan boys," as MacArthur's favorites were called, continued to hold the important posts. The Eighth Army with the help of

⁴ Consult particularly Werner Levi, "International Control of Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 299-302; also see Merle Fainsod, "Military Government and the Occupation of Japan," in Douglas G. Haring (ed.), *Japan's Prospect* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), pp. 287-304.

⁵ For materials relating to the activities of *SCAP* see especially *Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea*, a series published from 1945 to 1948 in 35 volumes. See also the two volumes published in *SCAP* on the *Political Reorientation of Japan*, and the one-volume summary by *SCAP* of *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan* (Tokyo, 1950).

small units from the Commonwealth acted as the police agent for the occupation. The armed forces in Japan were also under the direct control of SCAP. At no time was it necessary for the armed forces of SCAP to cope with extensive resistance.

Since the surrender terms provided that the Japanese might retain their own government, the problems relative to the composition, structure, and powers of the native government presented some of the most serious technical problems faced by the occupation authorities. Long before the Japanese expressed their willingness to accept the Potsdam terms, controversy had raged in the camp of the United Nations as to the future of the Japanese Emperor and the oligarchy dominating the imperial government. Denounced in some quarters as a "war criminal," and upheld in other quarters as the innocent victim of unscrupulous militarists and imperialists, Hirohito's future, and the future of his dynasty, were hotly debated by the victorious powers. Of the Japanese political parties the Communists were the only group to advocate the elimination of the throne. In the terms of surrender and in the war trials that followed occupation, the Japanese sought by all possible means to protect the divine imperial institution and the living heir of the Sun-Goddess. Meanwhile, Western military and diplomatic experts rapidly came to the conclusion that the Emperor, if properly guided, could facilitate immeasurably the tasks of occupation by lending his prestige and authority to SCAP.⁶ His value to the occupation, his willingness to co-operate, and his formal disavowal of divinity on January 1, 1946, placed the Emperor in a better light, and allayed many of the fears that had previously been felt.


The occupation superintended the Japanese government closely after August, 1945. In an effort to reassure the Japanese people about the future of the nation and the dynasty, Premier Suzuki Kantaro, the cabinet leader who had accepted the Allied terms of "unconditional surrender," stepped down in favor of Prince Higashi-kuni Naruhiko of the Imperial Household. After seeing the nation through the first shocks of occupation,⁷ Higashi-kuni resigned on October 5 and turned over his office to Baron Shidehara Kijuro. Well known in diplomatic circles for his part in Japanese foreign policy down to the end of 1931, Shidehara was looked upon as one of the few of Japan's outstanding leaders reasonably acceptable to the occupation authorities. Until April 22, 1946, Shidehara bore the brunt of seeing his defeated country through the trying days when most Japanese were living without policy or purpose.

As part of the program laid down for the guided government, the

⁶ One of the most serious critics of the policy of retaining the emperor was T. A. Bisson. See especially his *Prospects for Democracy in Japan* (New York, 1949), pp. 22-27.

⁷ For a vivid description of the occupation, see chaps. I-IV of Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan* (Philadelphia, 1948); also see Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York, 1948).

occupation authorities proceeded to emasculate or liquidate the power elements of the old regime. The prestige of the military cliques had been seriously damaged by the failure of Japan's war effort. Perhaps the ease with which demobilization was carried out indicates somewhat how discredited were the military and naval leaders.⁸ The problem of reabsorbing ex-servicemen and civilian repatriates from overseas into the Japanese economy was left to the Japanese government. By 1947 almost six million Japanese were returned to their homeland.



Emperor Hirohito Opening the First Postwar Session of the Diet.
Courtesy of The Cresset Press, Ltd.

Beginning in the autumn of 1945, SCAP directed its attention to the entrenched industrial, financial, agrarian, bureaucratic, and political groups which had not suffered irreparable losses as a result of the war and which were still displaying openly the strength of their hold upon the Japanese people. In dealing with these groups the Allied leaders were forced to formulate in more precise terms the objectives of the occupation. After the demobilizing and disarming of the armed forces

⁸ The Japanese reaction to its wartime military leaders can be observed in the book of Uyebara Yetsujiro, the title of which is translated as *Why the War and Why the Defeat* (Tokyo, 1946). He concludes that the existence in Japan of a powerful military clique was mainly responsible for the launching of aggressive war, and the defeat was in large measure to be accounted for by the miscalculations of the military. Another discussion following the same line is Mori Shozo, *Twenty Years of Whirlwind* (Tokyo, 1946). For further examples see the book review sections of *Contemporary Japan. A Review of East Asiatic Affairs*.

had been completed, SCAP began to develop a program for eventual demilitarization of the economy with the object of making disarmament effective and permanent.

In 1946, Edwin W. Pauley was sent to Japan as the United States Reparations Commissioner. The report of the Pauley commission advocated the elimination of Japanese war-potential by destroying and removing the heavy-goods industry of the country.⁹ Such removals would, it was argued, perform the dual function of effectively disarming Japan and of helping Japan's neighbors to recover from the damages inflicted on them by Japan's military machine. It was also held that the industrial development of other Asiatic areas would be speeded by industrial transfers and that they would thereby be better able in the future to resist the extension of Japanese economic influence and control. The Pauley report asserted that "in the overall comparison of needs Japan should have the last priority." Although the Allied powers subsequently considered the question of reparations in the Far Eastern Commission, they were never able to arrive at a satisfactory division of spoils. Their disagreements revolved mainly around Russia's refusal to consider the confiscations of the Red Army in Manchuria and Sakhalin as part-payment of the Soviet reparations bill. Eventually, as we shall see, the matter was removed entirely from their jurisdiction.

The Pauley report was never implemented. SCAP increasingly thought it unwise to dismantle and destroy Japan's means of production and distribution, or to purge ruthlessly the trained personnel necessary to the smooth functioning of its economy. The United States, since it bore the costs of occupation, became increasingly concerned about the rehabilitation rather than the dismantling of Japanese industry, commerce, and population. As in Germany, the occupying powers were confronted by the problem of how to restore the defeated to a relatively self-sufficient status while guaranteeing at the same time that they would be unable to become once again a menace to world peace. Unlike the situation in Germany, Japan continued to function as a united nation under the supreme authority of an American Commander vitally concerned to advance the recovery of Japan as quickly as possible.

The reform era in the occupation of Japan which began in the last months of 1945 continued at an erratic pace and with varying degrees of success until the spring of 1948. In this period of slightly more than two years great strides toward democratization were taken. Many of the old agencies of authoritarian government were either radically changed or swept away, and a new constitution was promulgated that provided for popular sovereignty. Economic institutions were reorganized with

⁹ An excellent discussion of the Pauley report is contained in Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis, 1949), pp. 419-27.

the intention of reducing the power of the *Zaibatsu* and of encouraging the growth of labor organizations. The state cult of Shinto was disestablished, deprived of state support, and placed on a plane of equality with other religions.¹⁰ Although many of the reforms were going on simultaneously, the political and administrative reforms were perhaps the most successful and profound and were certainly the first to be completed.

From the beginning of the occupation until the promulgation of the new constitution on May 3, 1947, the former agencies of government continued to function under the supervision of *SCAP*. The War, Navy, and Home ministries, however, were radically transformed in functions and personnel, and the secret police and censorship bureaus underwent dissolution. The powers of the Cabinet as a whole were carefully curtailed, and all members were required to be civilians. The Privy Council and the House of Peers steadily declined in power while the elected House of Representatives rapidly assumed greater powers and responsibilities with the encouragement and aid of *SCAP*. The Emperor aided the reform program by appearing in public contrary to ancient custom and by supporting tacitly many of the administrative changes.

While the administrative framework was undergoing reconstruction, the Japanese population was being forewarned about its future political responsibilities. At this point the occupation was again faced with a series of paradoxical problems. How was it possible to purge the political leadership of the country effectively and at the same time increase the degree of political responsibility to be borne by the people? How was it possible to encourage free political expression and at the same time prevent damaging criticism of the occupation? How was it possible to purge the political parties of the right (those who had supported the pre-war government) without permitting the parties of the left (the least moderate and presumably the most unstable groups) from assuming control of the legislative branch of the government? In other words, how would it be possible to combine reform with stability and rehabilitation?

The first election under the occupation was held on April 10, 1946. In preparation for it, *SCAP* sought to purge the highest political leaders of the former authoritarian regime and to encourage the other elements of the population to express themselves more freely. Civil rights were accorded, including the right to organize new political groups and trade unions. The electoral law was revised to enfranchise women, lower the legal voting age, and modify the old system of constituencies. Even with these radical measures, the strongholds of the old order were still left relatively intact. The entrenched economic groups, the political

¹⁰ For details see Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York, 1949), pp. 629-30.

bosses at the neighborhood level, and many of the economic agencies of the past continued to exercise a powerful and baneful influence upon the uncertain and unorganized Japanese electorate. Moreover, the Shidehara cabinet reflected the influence of the old party machines (the Seiyukai and Minseito) and did little to protect the independent voter or the genuinely new political parties and groupings that were emerging.¹¹

As in pre-war election campaigns, the election of 1946 was dominated by the parties whose organizations were intact and whose financial connections were the best. Rooted in the Minseito and Seikuyai respectively, the "Progressive" and "Liberal" parties were so named in response to the demands of the time. The SCAP purge of January 4, 1946, eliminated about 240 Diet members who had been on Tojo's approved list and caused thereby the weakening of the "Liberal" party. Shortly after the election, a second purge knocked out of the political arena the leading spirits in the "Progressive" party. These actions simultaneously strengthened the Social Democrats and the Communists who, along with a few minor parties, constituted the major opposition to the old line groups.

None of the opposition was well enough organized, however, to contest seriously the supremacy of the "Liberal" and "Progressive" parties. Of the 466 seats in the House of Representatives, the election of 1946 returned over 300 members whose affiliations with the old parties were relatively well known. Although the Social Democrats were strongly supported, internal friction and their struggle with the Communists for control of the opposition weakened them considerably. The Communists also enjoyed a fair degree of popular support, but their party organization had not yet recovered in 1946 from the intense pressure previously placed upon it.

From April to June, 1946, the newly elected Diet members were screened by SCAP. This second purge was particularly serious to the "Liberal" party, since its leader, Hatoyama Ichiro, was ruled out of office on May 3, 1946, just as he was about to become Prime Minister. Although he was succeeded by Yoshida Shigeru, the party thereafter began to display internal divisions, thus illustrating once again how dependent Japanese parties usually are upon the leadership of an individual or a tightly knit group at the top.

Yoshida's appointment as Prince Minister stirred particularly the animosity of the leftist parties.¹² Like Shidehara, he was well known

¹¹ For details on the purges of 1946 see Harold S. Quigley, "The Great Purge in Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (September, 1947), 300-01. For the history of political parties see Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), especially chap. IX.

¹² See Yamaura Kan-Ichi, "Yoshida Cabinet and Some of Its Men," *Contemporary Japan*, XV (1946), 159-74.

in diplomatic circles, had traveled extensively, and had resided for long terms in Western countries. Like Shidehara also he was thought by the Communists and Social Democrats to be in league with the entrenched financial, bureaucratic, and agrarian interests. It was during Yoshida's first term of office (May 22, 1946–May 23, 1947) that many of *SCAP*'s most fundamental measures were begun. Although Yoshida's reluctance to carry through the reforms was notable, *SCAP* supported him strongly, particularly against criticism from the Communists. Hereafter, the friction between the United States and the Soviet Union in the world at large came to have an increasingly important influence upon the course of events in Japan.

In the first two years of the occupation the Allied powers also endeavored to attack the problem of national re-education for Japan. From the beginning of the occupation the authorities removed many of the old devices for thought control and simultaneously sought to construct new schools and other educational means more in harmony with the objectives of the occupation. Texts were revised, radio programs were carefully worked up, the old news agencies were dissolved and new ones set up to replace them, and careful control over the production of movies was exercised by *SCAP*. Militaristic teachers and obligatory military training were eliminated from the schools at all levels. The teaching of Japanese "morals" was forbidden.¹³ Through careful use of the media of communication and education, *SCAP* hoped to begin seriously the democratic re-education of Japan.

In March, 1946, concrete proposals for educational reform were worked out by the educational mission headed by Dr. George D. Stoddard. In its report the Stoddard mission pointed to centralization as the fundamental evil in Japanese educational organization and proposed the gradual decentralization of the school system.¹⁴ The Stoddard report also advocated the substitution of training in democracy and world citizenship for the courses previously devoted to Japanese "morals." This program was implemented by the promulgation of a Basic Education Law and the creation of an Education Renovation Commission. Such measures were but the first steps on the road to fundamental reform. The Japanese responded to these educational changes without enthusiasm, and *SCAP* came to realize that the democratizing of Japanese education would be a long and painful process. Japanese edu-

¹³ Consult for details chap. XVII of Harold Wakefield, *New Paths for Japan* (London, 1948); also Morito Tatsuo, "The Task of Youth in Rebuilding Japan," *Contemporary Japan*, XVI (1947), 260–65.

¹⁴ For further discussion consult U. S. Dept. of State, *Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan* (Washington, 1946); cf. George D. Stoddard, "The Education Mission to Japan—A Summary," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (October, 1946), 347–54.

cation, like American education, was badly handicapped by insufficient funds and too few capable teachers.

During Yoshida's first year of office, *SCAP* and the Japanese government were faced with serious economic dislocations, especially inflation. To halt the price spiral it was necessary for the government, so it believed, to have the co-operation of the very interests whom *SCAP* was bent upon purging. While the cabinet sought, perhaps not always sincerely, to win the co-operation of the bureaucrats and economic royalists, the new Diet was going ahead with a reform program urged on it by *SCAP* which called for revision of the constitution, changes in land-holding practices, rearrangement of the tax program, and reform of local government. The acute economic situation was further complicated by the increasing tension between Russia and the United States. The Soviet member on the Allied Council called for more radical reform, such as land redistribution and greater freedom for the labor unions.¹⁵

One of the most fundamental changes inaugurated by the Yoshida government under pressure from the occupation was incorporated in the Basic Land Reform Act of December 29, 1946.¹⁶ In a nation where almost half the population tills the soil, agricultural problems of land tenure and landlord-tenant relationships were of primary moment. The objective of the *SCAP* program of 1946 was to reduce the number of Japan's tenants from 2,600,000 to 600,000. In order to effect this revolutionary change it was ordered that landholdings should be restricted to certain maximums depending upon the location and productivity of the land in question. Surplus lands were to be sold to the government for resale to tenants or other prospective buyers. The government's purchasing program was completed on December 31, 1948, but even with subsidies for tenant purchasers the government was unable to dispose of all of its holdings to small farmers. The act also provided that those who remained tenants should no longer pay rents in rice, as they previously had, but in exchange. While land reform shifted ownership away from many of the absentee landlords and great landholders, the farmers' problems still remained numerous and potentially serious. Inflation and high prices combined throughout the war years and the six years of occupation to benefit the farmers and to make their lot relatively better than it had been. Land reform, however, did not alter Japan's basic agricultural problem of too many people living from too little land. With the steady growth of the Japanese population at the rate of one

¹⁵ Wakefield, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-04.

¹⁶ Consult Bisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93; for somewhat more optimistic accounts see *New York Times*, January 26, 1948, and W. M. Gilmartin and W. I. Ladejinsky, "The Promise of Agrarian Reform in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (1948), 312-24; for a general appraisal see Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-47.

million annually, the problem of total production in relation to total need remained unsolved.

The deconcentration of landholding was paralleled by the occupation's efforts to dissolve the industrial combines of the *Zaibatsu*.¹⁷ The organization in November, 1945, of a Holding Company Liquidation Commission was but the first step toward breaking up the cartels. Taxes on war profits and a universal capital levy on a graduated scale also struck at the economic roots of the *Zaibatsu*. SCAP in 1946 directed the Japanese government to dissolve all control groups and hit hardest at the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Fuji industrial combines. To implement this program key officials were purged to the number of over two thousand. Although most prominent names had either been purged or forced into retirement, it was quite clear by the end of 1947 that the same groups by undercover means were still trying to control the great cartels. On December 9, 1947, SCAP required the Katayama cabinet to enact the Economic Deconcentration Bill by which the great enterprises were to be bought out and their holdings sold to smaller interests. Almost immediately the government was confronted by the overwhelming fact of not being financially able to purchase the shares of the great interests without at the same time having persons to whom the interests could readily be sold. Nor would SCAP permit outright confiscation, or national control, of *Zaibatsu* holdings. Insisting upon respect for private property, the American authorities refused categorically to permit socialization to be fostered by the Japanese government. On April 12, 1947, an Anti-Trust Law, modeled on America's Clayton Act, was issued to define and prohibit restraints on trade, unfair methods of competition, and excessive concentrations of economic power. To enforce these measures a Fair Trade Commission, modeled on America's Federal Trade Commission, was set up in Tokyo. Efforts to stimulate small business were also designed to undermine the interests and prevent the rebirth of the *Zaibatsu*.

The failure of the government to check the inflation successfully led to widespread unrest, particularly among the urban working classes. The Communists, the Social Democrats, and the trade unions called for greater attention by the government to urban economic reform. Wage-price relationships had become intolerable, while food and the production of consumers' goods still lagged far behind the needs of the people. With the promulgation of the Labor Union Law in December, 1945, the

¹⁷ For a general statement of some of the basic problems involved in *Zaibatsu* control see Corwin D. Edwards, "The Dissolution of the Japanese Combines," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 227-40; see also Wakefield, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200; for specific details see *U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin*, XVII (1947), 55 ff.; also Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 431-36; and T. A. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley, 1954).

workers had been granted the right to organize and strike.¹⁸ As the unions quickly grew in numbers and effectiveness, government workers were forbidden to strike by orders of SCAP. Meanwhile the leaders of the opposition blamed the Yoshida government for its unwillingness and ineffectiveness in attacking the problems of inflation. The Communists, particularly but not exclusively, sought to take advantage of the popular antagonism toward the Yoshida government by organizing for a General Strike. Although the strike was set for February 1, 1947, it never came off. Fearing the repercussions of such a strike for the conduct of the occupation and for the public welfare, General MacArthur used his authority to ban it.¹⁹ In response to the general ferment for change, he ordered subsequently, however, that the Yoshida cabinet should call for a general election in April, 1947.

In preparing for the new elections, SCAP extended the purge more deeply into financial and government circles and sought at the same time to encourage more independence on the part of the individual voter.²⁰ Realizing that its position was precarious in the extreme, the party of Yoshida reorganized itself in March, 1947, under the new name of the Japan Democratic Party. These efforts on the part of the controlling authorities yielded but few practical results. The purges were so long delayed that they had but little effect upon the course of the elections; the effort of Yoshida's group to erase their record by a change in name was equally fruitless, although SCAP threw its weight behind the older parties in fear of a swing to the left or perhaps even a victory for the severest critics of occupation policy.

The elections of 1947 were far more comprehensive than the elections of 1946.²¹ Whereas in the earlier year the voting had been exclusively for membership in the lower house of the Diet, the elections of 1947 were for both houses, prefectural governors, and local government posts. In the elections for the Diet the Social Democrats (*Shakaito*) for the first time in Japanese history established themselves in the leading position.²² This did not mean, however, that they could easily control the Diet or carry out their campaign promises to weed out "speculators" and begin the nationalization of basic industries. In both houses the old-line parties could combine easily to defeat a program designed to limit their common interests. While the conservative forces could without great difficulty form a united front, the Social Democrats were uncompromisingly opposed by the other parties of the left, and

¹⁸ See Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-37.

¹⁹ Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-87.

²⁰ See Quigley, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-08.

²¹ Consult Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, chap. IV.

²² See especially John Saffell, "Japan's Post-War Socialist Party," *The American Political Science Review*, XLII (1948), 957-69; also the numerous articles published in *Contemporary Japan* by or about Katayama.

especially by the Communists. At the prefectural and local levels the strength of the conservatives was even greater. The governorships, mayoralties, and seats in the local assembly were generally won by outright conservatives or by "independents" of conservative leanings. Thus, what limited victories the Socialists enjoyed were confined almost exclusively to the elections for the Diet.

While the election returns were still coming in, the Yoshida cabinet was required on May 3, 1947, to perform one of the last of its tasks. On that date the Meiji Constitution, which had been the supreme law of Japan for over fifty-six years, was replaced by a new fundamental document.²³ Mainly the work of the "Government Section" of SCAP, the new constitution was euphemistically described by the emperor as having "been decided upon by the freely expressed will of the people." Although it has been officially called a "revision" of the old constitution in an effort to preserve and emphasize the idea of continuity, the constitution of the Showa era is essentially a new document in word and spirit.

Instead of the new constitution being described as a "free gift" of a sovereign emperor, the preamble of the constitution of 1947 credits the Japanese people with establishing it and proclaims that "government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people." While the doctrine of popular sovereignty is one of the more striking innovations for the Japanese, the new constitution contains a provision for the renunciation of war, an item that is absolutely unique. The Japanese were not required to relinquish the right of self-defense except in so far as they were required *never* to maintain military forces.

The new constitution also includes a bill of rights copied mainly from the American model. Parliamentary government, as outlined in it, is patterned after the British model, and the Diet is described as "the highest organ of state power." The premier is elected by the Diet and a majority of the cabinet must be Diet members. The cabinet follows the principle of collective responsibility and must resign or "go to the country" in case it loses the confidence of the House of Representatives. All members of the cabinet must be civilians.²⁴

²³ For the complete text of the constitution of 1947 see *Official Gazette*, extra, November 3, 1946. Cf. Harold S. Quigley, "Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947," *The American Political Science Review*, XLI (1947), 865-74; see also in the same publication, Justin Williams, "The Japanese Diet under the New Constitution," XLII (1948), 927-39; for further discussion see Yokata Kisaburo, "Sovereignty under the New Constitution," *Contemporary Japan*, XVI (1947), 134-47; D. N. Rowe, "The New Japanese Constitution," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 13-17; 30-34; Reischauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-62.

²⁴ This is one of the most controversial issues with regard to contemporary Japan. See Charles N. Spinks, "Postwar Political Parties in Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 250-59; and the following articles in the *American Political Science Review*: Kenneth E. Colton, "Pre-War Political Influences in Post-War Conservative Parties," XLII (1948), 940-57; H. E. Wildes, "Underground Politics in Post-War Japan," XLII (1948), 1149-62; Justin Williams, "Party Politics in the New Japanese Diet," XLII (1948), 1163-80; and

Shortly after the promulgation of the constitution, a new coalition cabinet took office on June 1, 1947, under the premiership of the Social Democrat, Katayama Tetsu. Although he had sat in the Diet until 1942, Katayama was far from being a dynamic political leader. During most of his life before the occupation, he had been a legal consultant in Tokyo, specializing in labor cases. He was particularly acceptable to the occupation authorities, however, not only because of his unaggressive attitude and mild manners, but also because of his Christian background and his right-wing tendencies. Other groups in the Social Democratic Party looked for guidance to Katayama's colleague and adviser, Nishio Suehiro. Left-wing members of the Social Democratic Party were at first practically unrepresented in Katayama's coalition cabinet.²⁵

Enjoying widespread popular support, but forced by the superior organization and tactics of the other parties to embark upon a program of compromise, the Social Democrats were required to accept responsibility for the actions of a government which they were unable to direct or control. Divided internally by right-wingers dedicated to practical success and by zealous left-wingers crusading uncompromisingly for the political ideals of Socialism, the *Shakaito* was handicapped from almost every direction. *SCAP* helped to make things even worse by its benign but genuinely skeptical attitude toward the Katayama government. Inflation and food shortages also plagued the Socialists. Even labor, the strongest element behind the Social Democratic coalition, became critical of the ineffectiveness of their compromise program. The left-wingers within the party protested vehemently against the failures of the Katayama government to proceed with the nationalization of strategic industries. In the confusion of political wrangling, the leftists at the beginning of 1948 emerged as the leaders within the party. Thereupon they called off the policy of compromise and determined to go ahead with a more strictly Socialist policy.²⁶ In the tests of strength which followed, the left-wingers antagonized and frightened the conservatives and brought about thereby the collapse of the coalition. On February 9, 1948, the first Socialist-led cabinet in Japanese history was forced to resign.

With the downfall of the Katayama cabinet a new Socialist coalition was organized. Leadership, however, passed into the hands of the more conservative Ashida Hitoshi by a slim margin. A career diplomat who had served at diplomatic posts in several European countries, Ashida had also been prominent as a publisher of the *Japan Times* and as an

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government in Japan at the Prefectural Level," XLIII (1949), 250-74.

²⁵ See Saffell, *op cit.*, pp. 965-66.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 968-69.

eminent member of the imperial Diet.²⁷ Like Katayama, he enjoyed general respect but was unable to muster a strong following. The attacks upon his government came mainly from Baron Shidehara, and from the conservatives of the so-called Liberal Party. In an effort to combine their activities against the Ashida government, the forces led by Shidehara and Yoshida merged in March, 1948, to form what came to be called the Democratic-Liberal Party, in reality a coalition of the most conservative elements still permitted to engage in political activity.²⁸ Most important, however, was the fact that the combined forces of the Democratic-Liberals commanded control over the lower house in the Diet, thus making Ashida's position virtually impossible from the beginning.

One of the most notable developments during Ashida's tenure of office was the conclusion of the war trials in July, 1948. Although a number of the accused had successfully committed suicide or had been condemned by other tribunals (such as the court martial of Generals Yamashita and Homma in the Philippines), the International Military Tribunal began holding trials in April, 1946, for twenty-eight of Japan's war leaders.²⁹ Charged upon five different counts (for example, conspiracy to wage aggressive war), the defendants were prosecuted and permitted to present evidence for over two years. Meanwhile controversy raged in the Western world over the legality of the proceedings and over their desirability from the viewpoint of maintaining international law and order in the future. The trials, nevertheless, went on and in November, 1948, the decisions of the eleven judges were handed down. Tojo was sentenced to death by hanging—a disgrace for a Japanese soldier. Six others were also given death sentences including General Doihara, the "Lawrence of Manchuria." Sixteen others drew sentences of life imprisonment, including Marquis Kido, the emperor's closest adviser of the war years, and Araki Sadao, the aggressive militarist. The remaining defendants drew shorter sentences. Like the Nazis at Nuremberg the Japanese ex-leaders were condemned as common criminals for their public actions.³⁰ The Japanese public accepted the decisions with equanimity marked by pity. The trials of lesser war criminals were not con-

²⁷ *New York Times*, February 22, 1948; consult also Kermit G. Stewart, "Japanese Politics: 1947-1948," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 154-55.

²⁸ Bisson, *Prospects for Democracy in Japan*, p. 125.

²⁹ See especially chap. XIX in Wakefield, *op. cit.*

³⁰ For certain documents relevant to the Japanese trials, a summary of the testimony, and the details of the verdicts, see the seven fascicles of the *Judgment. International Military Tribunal for the Far East* (Washington, 1948). It is not planned to publish the full account. The complete record of the Tribunal is in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army, in Alexandria, Va. For a description of the different groups of documents and relevant finding aids, see Delmer M. Brown, "Recent Japanese Political and Historical Materials," *American Political Science Review*, XLXXX (1949), 1010-17.

cluded until October, 1949. A total of 4200 Japanese were convicted of war crimes.

Ashida and his coalition were suffered to remain in charge of the government until October, 1948. In the seven months of his tenure, Ashida sought to retain power by a program of what was termed "revised capitalism." The swing to the right in America was reflected in Japan very clearly both in the policies of the occupation authorities and their Japanese colleagues. After a hectic term of office, Ashida was charged with accepting a bribe and was forced to resign in October, 1948. At this juncture the Democratic-Liberal group elected Yoshida to the premiership and inaugurated a regime fully dedicated to free enterprise. Yoshida held the reins of power securely. His position was immeasurably strengthened by the smashing victory credited to the Democratic-Liberals (conservatives) in the general election of January 29, 1949.³¹ For the first time in the history of post-war Japan a single political party was able to command a working majority in the lower house of the Diet. For the first time since surrender, Japan possessed a strong and unified government. Moreover, the Yoshida program of free enterprise was supported firmly and consistently by SCAP. Yoshida remained in power throughout the remaining years of the occupation.

One of the most striking political developments in occupied Japan was the growth of the Communist Party.³² Throughout the war years Japanese Communism had declined in influence while its leadership languished in prison or sought refuge in exile. Nozaka Sanzo, the Japanese representative to the Comintern after 1935, left Moscow for Yenan in 1940. In the wartime capital of the Chinese Communists, Nozaka inaugurated a re-education program for Japanese prisoners of war in anticipation of the day when the Communists would return to Japan. On October 4, 1945, a SCAP directive ordered the Japanese to release all political prisoners. Among those freed were a number of leading Communists, such as Tokuda Kyuichi, who had been imprisoned for a decade or more. With the return of Nozaka to Japan at the beginning of 1946, the Communists took advantage of their new freedom in Japan to reorganize their forces and begin activity. For the first time in Japanese history its Communists were legally permitted to engage in politics.

During the first five years of the occupation, the Japanese Communist Party busied itself with organization, education, and infiltration programs. Known before the war by its disrespect for the Emperor and its violent revolutionary program, the party of Tokuda and Nozaka

³¹ John M. Maki, "Japan," in L. K. Rosinger (ed.), *The State of Asia* (New York, 1951), p. 197.

³² For discussions of this movement see especially Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, 1952), and Evelyn S. Colbert, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (New York, 1952).

sought to win friends and influence by "peaceful revolution." Several of its leaders took seats in the Diet, and for a period they sought to establish working relations with the Social Democrats. In recruiting membership the party enjoyed particular success, swelling its ranks one hundred fold by 1950. The elections of 1949 brought ten per cent of the total vote to Communist candidates. Just when the policy of a "lovable Communist party" seemed to be paying off, the heightening of world tensions and the victory of Maoism in China forced the Japanese Communists to adopt a sudden shift in tactics. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the Cominform condemned Nozaka's policy as a "deviation." This elicited, but not easily, a confession of error from the Japanese party and an abrupt change in program and tactics. When it became clear in the summer of 1950 that the Japanese party had switched back to an obstructionist and "anti-imperialist" program, SCAP and the Japanese government took action. MacArthur ordered the purging of Communist leaders and the outlawing of their inflammatory publications. As the forces in power closed in, the Japanese Communist Party in 1950 began once again to go underground.

While political maneuvers continued, the struggle on the economic front occupied increasingly the attention of SCAP. Industrial production continued to lag far behind capacity. The material and human destruction of war, the inadequate supply of food, and the uncertain prospects for investors combined to handicap the recovery of industry. The failure of the Allies to define concretely their program of reparations and to agree upon an industrial program for Japan contributed to the unsettled conditions on the economic front, to scarcities, and to inflation. Food collection from the farms and distribution of it in urban areas was also ineffectively organized. Nor was the collection of taxes performed efficiently. Finally, the economic plight of Japan was even further complicated by the dissolution of the *Zaibatsu* combines and the inability of other groups to take over economic leadership.

As suggested earlier, Japan's plight was made more difficult by the international struggle being waged by non-Communist and Communist countries. Determined to prevent Communism from spreading to Japan, the occupation authorities had become more forthright than ever in their policy of encouraging free enterprise and in their determination to prevent Marxism from taking root in Japan.³³ As the United States continued to supply the Japanese with food, Washington became correspondingly more intent upon making Japan self-sufficient as quickly as possible. SCAP concentrated therefore upon encouraging those industries which

³³ Consult particularly Jerome B. Cohen, "Japan: Reform vs. Recovery," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 137-42; also see Sir George Sansom, "Conflicting Purposes in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI (1948), 302-11.

produced for export, such as the textile industry.³⁴ All sight was quickly lost of the recommendations of the Pauley report. As General MacArthur remarked in March, 1947: "We do not wish to remove from Japan what the United States will have to pay for in two or three years time."³⁵

The original directives governing the occupation had left the problems of economic rehabilitation to the Japanese government. The world circumstances, the disproportions between needs and resources in Japan, and the incompetent efforts of the Japanese authorities produced a situation by the beginning of 1948 that saw Japan suffering severely from inflation, shortages, and high prices. If Japan were to recover and not become prey to internal and foreign Communist subversion, it had become apparent that America would have to participate positively in the rehabilitation program. On January 21, 1948, the American representative on the Far Eastern Commission advised his colleagues that the United States proposed to "bring about the early revival of the Japanese economy on a peaceful, self-supporting basis."³⁶ The dispatch of Major-General William H. Draper, Under-Secretary of the Army, and a commission of American businessmen to Japan and Korea in 1948 produced the conclusion that "the American government in the national interest should support a reasonable recovery program."³⁷ Japan was again with American help to be outfitted as "the workshop of Asia." In May, 1949, the United States brought further discussions about the reparations and removals recommended by the Pauley report to a halt by directing that additional reparations would impair the program of Japanese economic recovery.

From 1949 to the end of the occupation in April, 1952, the major objectives of SCAP were to aid the economic recovery of Japan as an essential step on the road to independent development and stability. At the beginning of 1949, Joseph R. Dodge, a prominent Detroit banker, was sent to Tokyo to direct the Economic Stabilization Program. He was assigned to advise MacArthur and to guide economic recovery.³⁸ His major objective was to get the Japanese to attack directly the balancing of the budget through reducing government expenditures and increasing revenue. In his role as economic co-ordinator, Dodge insisted that government personnel be reduced in number, that anti-inflationary measures be passed by the Diet, and that government subsidies and loans to private concerns be reduced to a minimum. Fundamental to the

³⁴ Stanley Nehmer and Marguerite C. Crimmins, "Significance of Textiles in the Japanese Economy," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XVIII (1948), 527-33.

³⁵ Quoted in Wakefield, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

³⁶ As quoted in Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*, p. 422.

³⁷ Quoted from the report of the Johnston Committee, *ibid.*, p. 424.

³⁸ See Maki, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-14.

American program was the understanding that future aid for Japan would hinge upon Japan's willingness to help herself as far as possible. As a result of such stimulus, Japanese industrial production mounted perceptibly in 1949–50. The outbreak of the Korean war with its demands for goods and services in June, 1950, also helped industrial revival.

Stabilization and disinflation, although essential to Japan's revival, were not sufficient alone to provide a healthy economy. The fundamental reason for stabilization was to prepare Japan to enter once again into foreign trade. With a population at mid-century of about eighty-five millions and the prospect of it becoming at least one hundred millions before leveling off, the Japanese have had to expand their foreign commerce to attain self-support and a minimum standard of living. The development of resources on the islands left to post-war Japan can probably never supply her teeming population. Nor can the introduction of birth-control measures prevent the natural increase from becoming an overwhelming economic problem. It is only through re-establishing trade connections with the peoples of Asia that Japan can find the food and raw materials necessary to the subsistence of her population as well as a ready market for her manufactures. Such trade ties, however, have been difficult to revive because of the widespread dislike and suspicion of Japan in southeastern Asia and because of the barrier that international events have placed between China and Japan.

While encouraging industrial revival, *SCAP* permitted the Japanese after 1949 to attend international conferences and to enter into a limited number of international agreements.³⁹ For example, on November 22, 1949, Japan and Britain signed a trade agreement providing for the exchange of certain specified goods. On February 9, 1950, MacArthur permitted the Japanese to establish trade missions in the United States. This was followed by the signing of a barter agreement between Japan and the Philippines in April, 1950. In the following month the UN Economic Commission meeting in Bangkok agreed that Japan might revive trade relations with other Asiatic countries. Japan's gradual return to international affairs was highlighted by MacArthur's statement on September 1, 1950, that Japan was ready "to assume membership in good standing in the family of free nations."

Although unquestionably popular with the Japanese, MacArthur was not to see the occupation to its end. As we have already seen, he was removed from his office as Supreme Commander on April 11, 1951. By this time, however, his successor, General Matthew B. Ridgway, had but little need to concern himself with the functioning of Japan. The discipline displayed by the Japanese at the outbreak of the Korean war,

³⁹ For further details see Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan. Second Phase: 1948–50* (New York, 1950), pp. 192–94.

their indirect support of the American forces in the field, and their eagerness to reassume their place in the world stimulated the United States to work diligently for the conclusion of a peace treaty and for an end to the occupation.

In retrospect, the occupation of Japan which ended legally on April 28, 1952, formed one of the most controversial and remarkable aspects of America's post-war policy.⁴⁰ Never before in history had a victorious country undertaken systematically to occupy, demilitarize, reform, and rehabilitate the defeated nation. Although a number of its policies were revolutionary, the program of the occupation was enacted gradually and with forbearance. Negative phases, such as demilitarization and disarmament, were accomplished swiftly and effectively. The long-term programs of democratization, re-education, and rehabilitation moved at varying degrees of speed but generally produced fundamental changes. The question can be legitimately raised, however, as to whether democratic ends were best served by the authoritarian means employed by the occupation authorities. On this point, too, it should be observed that all of the reform programs were launched on the initiative of the occupation and not by the Japanese. Equally noteworthy was the failure of the Japanese under the occupation to develop new and progressive leadership. Yoshida and Shidehara, the two most influential statesmen of post-war Japan, represented the conservative interests of pre-war Japan, although they had been classed as liberals before Pearl Harbor. Perhaps such failures can be accounted for by the disillusionment, insecurity, and resentment felt by a defeated and occupied nation. On the other hand, one of the most astonishing features of the occupation was the co-operativeness of the Japanese and the genuine benevolence of the conquerors. That disagreements and hard feelings arose cannot be denied. That no occupation of one nation by another has ever proceeded so smoothly is perhaps an even more pertinent observation. In the final analysis, the place of the occupation in history will be deter-

⁴⁰ For critical views of the occupation see W. MacMahon Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* (New York, 1949). The representative on the Allied Council in Tokyo for the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in 1946-47, Professor Ball, an Australian, criticizes the occupation for permitting the same people who held power before the war to rule Japan under the occupation. He goes on to point out also that during the course of the occupation "the hated enemy has become the coveted ally (p. 181)." Fearful of Japan's conservative political leadership and America's determination since 1948 to rehabilitate Japan as its outpost in Asia, Ball clearly fears the revival of Japanese economic and military imperialism in Asia. Another work critical of the occupation is Robert B. Textor, *Failure in Japan* (New York, 1951). His argument centers around the sacrifices that MacArthur made in democratic reform to the rehabilitation of Japan. Textor deplores also military domination over occupation policies, stating (p. 186) that it was obvious from the outset "that an inappropriately trained, nondemocratic institution like the U. S. Army could not effectively promote democratic growth in Japan." For Japanese estimates see N. Ito, *New Japan: Six Years of Democratization* (Tokyo, 1951), and "Japan Looks Back on the Occupation," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 26-32.

mined by the degree to which it managed to cut new and permanent channels for the development of the Japanese nation.

NEW JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

The occupation authorities apparently hoped to complete their task in Japan within two years. Although this may have been an unduly optimistic estimate of the time required to carry out even the original objectives, the occupation was prolonged to six and one-half years mainly because of international events. The growing hostility between the Communist and non-Communist sectors of the world was reflected clearly in the deliberations of the Far Eastern Commission, in the propaganda tirades delivered in the Allied Council, in the decisions of SCAP in 1950 to purge the Communists, and in the failure of the victorious powers to agree on a peace treaty for Japan. Such divisions among the victorious powers forced the question of peace and independence for Japan onto the stage where the struggle for world control was being played.

After just eighteen months of occupation, General MacArthur in March, 1947, announced that he felt Japan was ready for a peace treaty. Four months later, the United States government proposed to the Far Eastern Commission that a conference of Allied experts should be held to draft a preliminary treaty.⁴¹ The American proposal, coming just a few months after the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), met immediate opposition from the Soviet Union. Difficulties between the United States and Russia over Korea also contributed to Soviet hostility to the American proposal. It was nevertheless viewed favorably by the other powers of the Far Eastern Commission. From the outset the Soviet Union argued that the Japanese peace treaty should be decided upon at a Council of Foreign Ministers where the U.S.S.R. would enjoy veto rights. The United States unequivocally took the position that the eleven powers represented on the Far Eastern Commission had participated in the determination of occupation policies and that their interests in the Japanese settlement could best be protected and assured at a conference of the eleven powers. Such a procedural impasse, although not an insurmountable obstacle in itself, served to highlight the division within the camp of the victors.

For the next two years little more was heard of the Japanese peace treaty. While MacArthur reassured the Japanese that the delay was no fault of theirs, the United States concentrated upon the European recovery program and the economic rehabilitation of Japan. The victory of the Communists in China in 1949, the growing threat of Communism

⁴¹ Fearey, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-83.

to Indo-China, and the mounting hostility between the northern and southern sectors of Korea reinforced the United States in its determination to contain Communism in Japan and to give increased support to the co-operative Yoshida regime. As it became increasingly clear that the United States would conclude a peace treaty with or without the adherence of the Communist countries, opinion in Japan divided on the desirability of such a treaty. Yoshida's conservatives took the position that any treaty was better than no treaty. The Japanese Socialists, however, insisted that a one-sided treaty would involve Japan on the side of the United States in the world struggle and would perhaps make Japan a battleground in a future war. Arguing that Japan could not afford to take sides in the cold war, the Socialists advocated a policy of neutralism.⁴²

Protests about the conclusion of a treaty without Russia and Communist China as parties multiplied in the early months of 1950. The question of American military bases within independent Japan also provoked hot controversy. On April 26, the parties in opposition to the Yoshida government, except the Communists, organized a Joint Council on Foreign Policy to oppose a separate treaty and to work for a policy of neutralism. In their attacks the Communists pointed to the treaty as another example of American imperialism, and Moscow sought to revive the question of the Emperor's status by accusing Hirohito of having planned germ warfare and of being a war criminal.

Such attacks went unheeded in official quarters in Washington and Tokyo. Early in 1950, profiting from its experiences with the Soviet Union on the German and Austrian treaties, the United States abandoned the conference method entirely and decided to seek peace for Japan through diplomatic conversations and written exchanges with the interested powers.⁴³ On May 18, the State Department announced the appointment of John Foster Dulles, the Republican adviser to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, as the person to take charge of negotiating a peace settlement with Japan by the new method. On June 1, the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo requested a peace treaty as early as possible with whatever Allied powers were willing to accept the independence and equality of Japan.⁴⁴ By such a pronouncement the Yoshida government let the world know that it was willing to conclude peace with the non-Communist nations.

The elections for the House of Councillors (the upper house of the Diet) of June 4 favored Yoshida's party, thus reinforcing his stand on

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 186-90.

⁴³ See John M. Allison, "A New Approach to Treaty Making," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI (1952), 689-93.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, June 2, 1950.

the peace treaty.⁴⁵ More convincing, however, than Yoshida's arguments was the invasion of South Korea by the Communists on June 25, 1950. The Japanese, traditionally fearing the presence of hostile powers in Korea, became immediately aware of their own unprotected condition. The Yoshida regime quickly indorsed the UN action in Korea and pledged co-operation to the anti-Communist states as a primary measure of self-defense. The hopes of those who preferred Japan to follow a policy of unarmed neutrality were thus shattered by the explosion in Korea.

While many Japanese feared that the Korean war would deflect attention away from the peace treaty, their fears were unfounded. In the fall of 1950, Dulles inaugurated informal conversations with Jacob Malik of Russia on the peace treaty. On November 24, the United States submitted a memorandum to the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission containing "suggestive and tentative" principles for the settlement with Japan.⁴⁶ The Communist states, meanwhile, demanded that Mao's regime should be a party to the treaty and that American troops should be barred from Japan at the conclusion of the occupation. Such arrangements were not acceptable to the United States and had become increasingly unacceptable in Japan.

In February, 1951, Dulles talked to MacArthur and the Japanese in Tokyo about the problems involved in a separate treaty. In March, the first draft of a treaty was prepared by the United States for submission to the other interested powers. The dismissal of MacArthur on April 11 disturbed the Japanese and focused American attention for a period on other Far Eastern issues. The British took this opportunity to let the United States know officially that the Foreign Office in London, after interviewing the Commonwealth governments, felt that Communist China should be included in the negotiations.⁴⁷ Washington rejected this British advice. The Soviet Union took advantage of the division between the Western allies to propose on May 7, as in 1947, that a Council of Foreign Ministers, including the representatives of Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and Communist China, should hold a conference within two months on the Japanese treaty.⁴⁸ Washington also rejected this demand. In Peking, meanwhile, the Communist leaders voiced approval of Russia's proposal, accused the United States of reviving Japanese militarism, and called the attention of the world to the provisions in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 guaranteeing joint action "to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation on the part of

⁴⁵ Fearey, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-13.

⁴⁶ Text in U. S. Dept. of State, *In Quest of Peace and Security* (Washington, 1951), pp. 70-71.

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, April 12, 1951.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, May 8, 1951.

Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression.”⁴⁹

The new nations of south Asia also voiced their concern in the summer of 1950 over the decision to exclude Communist China from the treaty. India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia, like Great Britain, expressed their disapproval of Washington's intention to have the Chiang regime represent China at the peace table. Prime Minister Nehru stated categorically on May 28 that India would not sign a peace treaty to which Nationalist China was also a party. Burma and Indonesia, meanwhile, planned joint conversations on the Japanese peace treaty. In a memorandum to Washington of June 10, the U.S.S.R. once again reiterated its hostility to the methods being employed and accused the American government of dictating peace terms to a Japan held helpless by the occupation.⁵⁰

While the Soviet note was being digested in Washington, Dulles was en route to Paris. From the French capital he went on to London with a revised draft of the treaty. At the British Foreign Office the American draft was correlated with a similar draft independently prepared by Great Britain after consultation with the members of the Commonwealth. On July 3 the United Kingdom and the United States sponsored the issuance of a joint draft that had the approval of France. The question of China's participation in the pact was resolved by excluding both the Mao and the Chiang regimes from the peace conference. The way was also left open for the conclusion of bilateral peace treaties between Japan and nations not adhering to the American-British draft. Following the conclusion of this agreement with the United Kingdom, Washington on July 9 replied to Soviet protests by asserting that the draft treaty was in reality a multilateral instrument even though concluded through diplomatic channels rather than through a peace conference. The United States also formally invited Russia to participation in the conference scheduled to meet in San Francisco during early September. On July 20, formal invitations for the treaty signing were sent to fifty nations.

In south Asia the response to the joint draft of the treaty was mixed. Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines were dissatisfied with the provisions on reparations. India objected to the retention of foreign troops in Japan, to the failure of the treaty to provide for the turning over of Formosa to Communist China, and the decision not to return the Ryukyu and Bonin islands to Japan.⁵¹ In the Philippines, concern was also

⁴⁹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 571-74.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, June 15, 1950.

⁵¹ For an excellent chronological account of India's position see the publications of the Bureau of International Relations (University of California), *Indian Press Digests* (Berkeley, 1952), Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 19-29; Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 75-87; see also *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXV (1951), 385-88.

expressed over the possibility of Japan's revival as a military power. In Indonesia it was pointed out that the treaty failed to provide for future plebiscites in the former Japanese territories in line with the principle of self-determination. On July 23, Burma announced that it would not sign the treaty. A final revision of the treaty was issued on August 13 in an effort to meet India's objections.⁵² Nehru, however, announced on August 26 that India's major objections to the treaty had not been met, and that India would therefore not attend the meetings. The other Asian nations accepted the American invitation, although Indonesia's delegation remained uncertain to the last about signing the treaty.

The U.S.S.R. notified the United States on August 12 that it would send a delegation to San Francisco. In its reply to this announcement the United States on August 16 warned Russia that it was "not a conference to reopen negotiations on the terms of peace."⁵³ Dulles maintained that a conference of eleven months had already been held through diplomatic channels, that ten revised drafts of the treaty had been prepared as a result of his conversations with other nations, and that the meeting at San Francisco was to be the formal dedication of a treaty structure already agreed upon.

The peace conference met from September 4 to 8, 1951, in San Francisco's Memorial Opera House. In the opening address President Truman asserted: "We believe this treaty will have the support of all those nations that honestly desire to reduce the tensions which now grip the world."⁵⁴ On the following day it became clear in the discussion of procedural matters that the Western nations had no intention of permitting Russia to turn the conference into a forum. Over Russia's vehement protests the conference decided to limit formal comments on the treaty to one hour for each delegate. The Communists were permitted to get their protests on the record. Andrei Gromyko asserted on September 8⁵⁵ that the Soviet Union could not sign a treaty that failed to provide "against the revival of Japanese militarism" and that "provides for a conversion of Japan into an American military base." Gromyko also condemned "the drawing of Japan into aggressive military coalitions set up under the sponsorship of the United States." He asserted further that "every reasonable person understands that without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic . . . and the Soviet Union, no genuine peace settlement in the Far East can be achieved." The treaty also,

⁵² Text of the treaty in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXV (1951), 349-56. See also the *Record of Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), published as No. 4392 of the Dept. of State series on international organizations and conferences.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁵⁵ For the complete text of Gromyko's speech see *New York Times*, September 9, 1951.

according to Gromyko, "lacks any provisions that would guarantee basic democratic rights and freedoms to the Japanese people. . . ." The Russians also contended that the United States "is flagrantly violating the indisputable rights of China to Taiwan [Formosa], the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands. . . ," and that the treaty seeks "to legalize these seizures." Like India, Russia deplored "the severance from Japan in favor of the United States of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and other islands." The Soviet delegate also drew the attention of the conference "to the inadmissibility of a situation . . . which fails to state that Japan should recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands." After blasting the treaty in this fashion, the Russian delegation left before the signing took place.

The comments of the non-Communist delegates brought out other dissatisfactions with the treaty. New Zealand and Australia shared the fear of other Pacific states that Japan might, even without violating the treaty terms, rearm herself and become a menace again in the Far East.⁵⁶ Aside from being displeased with the reparations provisions, the fear was expressed by Asian and European delegates that the revival of the Japanese economy with American aid might place Japan in an unduly favorable competitive position. Despite these adverse comments, the United States was gratified that Indonesia decided at the last minute to sign the treaty. Toward the Japanese, the representatives generally displayed good feeling and heartily applauded Yoshida's assertion that "the Japan of today is no longer the Japan of yesterday. We will not fail your expectations of us as a new nation. . . ." ⁵⁷

On September 8, 1951, the delegates of forty-nine nations affixed their signatures to the treaty. Including twenty-seven articles and a protocol, the treaty formally brought an end to the state of war that had existed between Japan and a number of the signatories since 1941. Acknowledging "the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters," the powers required Japan to recognize the independence of Korea and to renounce all rights, title, and claim to Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kuriles, South Sakhalin, the former mandated islands, the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. Japan was also required to "concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system . . ." the Ryukyu, Bonin and adjacent islands. In the section on "security" Japan agreed "to settle its international disputes by peaceful means," and "to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take

⁵⁶ A summary of the Australian position is presented concisely in Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁷ *New York Times*, September 9, 1951; for a more detailed exposition of Japan's position see Tatsuji Takeuchi, "Basic Issues in Japan's Foreign Policy," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 161-62.

preventive or enforcement action." On their side, the Allied powers recognized that "Japan as a sovereign nation . . . may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements." The Japanese were also guaranteed that the occupation would end within ninety days after the treaty should come into force, and that the powers "will notify Japan within one year which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive." Japan was required to renounce "all special rights and interests in China" and to accept "the judgments of the International Military Tribunal." After agreeing to conclude maritime, trading, and other commercial treaties on a friendly basis, Japan accorded most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied powers. It was recognized that "Japan should pay reparations . . . for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war"; at the same time the powers also recognized the impossibility of Japan's making complete reparation while striving to maintain a viable economy. To settle reparation claims Japan agreed to "enter into negotiations" and make "available the services of the Japanese people." Finally, Japan was also required for three years to conclude bilateral treaties of peace, "on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present treaty," with nations not signing the San Francisco document.

Five hours after the signing of the peace settlement, Japan and the United States on September 8 concluded a security treaty.⁵⁸ In his speech Yoshida regretted that Japan was "utterly unprepared for self-defense" and expressed his appreciation for the decision of the United States "to provide us the necessary protection by retaining her armed forces in and around Japan temporarily after peace . . . to ward off the menace of Communist aggression. . . ." The preamble of the treaty expressed the belief that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense. . . ." By the treaty's first article, the United States received the right "to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan." The second article required Japan not to grant without American consent "any bases or any rights, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver . . . to any third power." It was further decided that "the disposition of armed forces" should be determined by administrative agreements between the two governments and that the treaty should expire whenever the two governments felt that "international peace and security in the Japan area" had been guaranteed by other means.

It was not until April 28, 1952, that the peace treaty and the security arrangements actually went into effect. In the interim of more than seven months, further steps were taken to bring Japan into the family of

⁵⁸ Text and accompanying documents in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXV (1951), 463-66

nations. Burma and India, disappointed by Indonesia's decision to sign the San Francisco treaty, held joint conversations in October, 1951, on future relations with Japan. Talk of a "solidarity plan" and an Asian conference on Japan evaporated as India and Burma decided to conclude bilateral peace arrangements with Japan after the ratifications of the multilateral peace treaty had been exchanged.

Although confronted by vehement Socialist opposition, it did not take long for Japan to ratify the San Francisco pact. On October 11, Emperor Hirohito opened an extraordinary session of the Japanese Diet with a speech in which he remarked that he was "overwhelmed with joy that the Peace Treaty we have all earnestly desired these six years has been signed."⁵⁹ In his speech to the House of Councillors on October 15, Yoshida announced that Japan would not take the initiative in opening negotiations with Moscow or Peking, although he hoped it would be possible to negotiate settlements with other Asian countries.⁶⁰ Yoshida's political opponents dwelt in their attacks on the treaty on the rearmament question, on the future status of the Ryukyus, and on the post-treaty position of American troops in Japan. On October 26, the Japanese House of Representatives ratified both the peace treaty and the security pact, although the latter with notably less enthusiasm. The House of Councillors ratified the treaties on November 20, and two days later the Emperor signed them.

Ratification by the American Senate, divided sharply as it was on the proper approach to far eastern questions, proceeded more slowly and painfully. Republican critics of the Truman policies attacked particularly the decision to permit Japan to make the choice of whether to negotiate with Chiang or Mao. As early as September 11, 1951, the Chinese Nationalists had indicated their willingness to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Japan. Japan's vital need for trade with China led many Americans to believe that Chiang's regime, which they favored supporting, would not receive due consideration by independent Japan. To appease this American group somewhat, Yoshida on December 24, 1951, addressed a letter to Dulles on the subject of China.⁶¹ Reminding Dulles that the Sino-Soviet pact of 1950 "is virtually a military alliance aimed at Japan," Yoshida indicated Japan's desire "to conclude with the National Government of China . . . a treaty . . . in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace." Such a bilateral treaty, Yoshida asserted, would apply "to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National Gov-

⁵⁹ *New York Times*, October 12, 1951.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, October 16, 1951.

⁶¹ Text of this letter reprinted in *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 38-39.

ernment of China." Such a treaty was signed concurrent with the exchange of ratifications on April 28, 1952.

In the American Senate, meanwhile, debate centered on the Soviet annexations of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Since the Soviet occupation of these territories was carried out under terms of the Yalta agreement of 1945, the Senators concentrated their attack upon this already highly controversial document. Finally, on March 20, 1952, the Senate ratified the peace treaty but with the proviso "that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan" in South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and adjacent islands. The Senate definitely wanted to record that ratification of the treaty should not imply "recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favor of the Soviet Union" in the Yalta agreement. With the exchange of ratifications on April 28, 1952, the occupation ended⁶² and India, Nationalist China, and Burma ended their states of war with Japan by bilateral agreements.

Although at peace with the non-Communist world, new Japan viewed uneasily her Communist neighbors on the Asiatic mainland. Stalin contributed to this feeling of insecurity by dispatching a New Year's message to Japan at the beginning of 1952.⁶³ In this letter of "friendship," Stalin evoked the "horrors of occupation" and wished the Japanese "success in their gallant struggle for the independence of their homeland." In Peking, reaction to Japan's negotiations with Chiang took the form of denouncing Yoshida as a "running-dog of the American imperialists" and charged Japan with plotting aggression. Chou En-lai made ominous references, as before, to the terms of the Sino-Soviet pact and warned the Japanese that the Americans planned to use them as cannon fodder in the next war. In May, 1952, Japan suffered from a rash of Communist riots. Great Britain and India also viewed suspiciously the Japanese treaty with Nationalist China.

While making peace with Japan, the United States continued to aid the economic recovery of the insular state. Officially, direct American economic aid ended on June 30, 1951. Three weeks thereafter a Japanese trade agency was permitted to set up shop in Washington, and the Japanese government received full title to almost \$400,000,000 of Japanese funds impounded in the United States.⁶⁴ In Tokyo, meanwhile, Japanese business interests prepared for the resumption of foreign trade and even tried to begin negotiations with Russia. On October 1, 1951, the UN Security Council, fully aware of Japan's pressing need for trade with China, exempted Japan from the ban on trade with Communist

⁶² See the official proclamation of President Truman in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXVI (1952), 688.

⁶³ Text in *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 39.

⁶⁴ *New York Times*, July 21, 1951.

China. Taking advantage of Japan's exemption, the Soviet Union and Red China sought to woo new Japan for a time with attractive trade proposals.

With American encouragement, Japan filed application for membership in the United Nations on June 23, 1952.⁶⁵ Although almost no hope existed that Russia would permit the application to pass, the Yoshida government needed to get Russia's veto on the record to justify at home its collaboration with the non-Communist countries. Accepted as a member of most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the International Labor Organization, Japan sought full membership with American endorsement. On September 18, 1952, the Soviet representative vetoed Japan's application, reiterated most of the charges made by Gromyko at the San Francisco conference, and asserted that Russia would block Japan's entrance until the conclusion of a peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.

In Japan, meanwhile, the onset of independence brought no startling reversion to the ways of the past. On May 1, 1951, a process of reviewing the reforms inaugurated by the occupation had been undertaken with the permission of Ridgway. Many of the persons who had previously been barred from office as "militarists" were depurged beginning in 1951. The localized police system introduced by SCAP was gradually given up as impractical for Japan, and in 1953 a new police system was instituted. The land reforms seemed about to be watered down, and the *Zaibatsu* organizations of the past began to reappear on the economic scene.⁶⁶ Considerable discontent over the decentralization of education and its costs to the nation foreshadowed modifications in the program set up by SCAP.⁶⁷

The free expression of opinion introduced by the occupation has been preserved in all fields. In politics, especially, the world watched with interest the first general election after the occupation held on October 1, 1952.⁶⁸ Yoshida's Liberal Party received a working majority in the House of Representatives and polled forty-eight per cent of the thirty-five million ballots cast. The Communists obtained no seats at all. The Progressive Party, just slightly less conservative than the Liberals, polled almost as many votes as both branches of the Socialist Party combined. That the election was a definite affirmation of Yoshida's policies can

⁶⁵ For details see *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXVII (1952), 524-28.

⁶⁶ On this point see T. A. Bisson, "The Economic Purge in Japan," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, XII (1953), 296, and the same author's *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley, 1954).

⁶⁷ Jane M. Alden, "Japanese Education in Review," *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXVII (1952), 654-58; see also K. Tanaka, "The Crisis of Japanese Education," *Contemporary Japan*, XX (1951), 5-14.

⁶⁸ Consult Robert A. Scalapino, "Japan and the General Elections," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 149-54.

hardly be denied. That it was a clear-cut victory for Yoshida is somewhat more of a question. Within the Liberal Party definite signs were revealed of a split between the forces of Yoshida and Hatoyama Ichiro, the founder of the Liberal Party depurged in 1951. Shidehara had died on March 10, 1951, thus removing his conciliating and stabilizing influence from among the Liberals. Although political parties and groups enjoyed freedom of expression in the election of 1952, the campaign, as in the past, concentrated upon personalities rather than issues. Among the prominent personalities it was possible to discern an increase in the number of conservative nationalists.

In foreign affairs, the problems of new Japan revolve about making her economy viable and maintaining her security in a bipolarized world. Japan's economic recovery continued to be closely linked to the development of foreign trade.⁶⁹ Although trade with Communist China has been legalized by the UN action of 1951, political divergences have prevented the renewal of Japan's pre-war economic ties with China. The economic relations of Peking with the other Communist nations have also deflected attention in China away from Japan. China's mistrust of Japan in terms of the past as well as with regard to Japan's new orientation in politics makes unlikely the quick development of mutually profitable economic relationships. Some of Japan's business leaders, however, persist in their contention that geographical propinquity and need for each others' products will bring China and Japan closer together.

The renewal and extension of Japan's trade with southeastern Asia and India has been hampered by the memory of Japan's exploitations and by the immediate question of reparations. In her bilateral treaty with Japan, India renounced her claims for reparations. Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines have been determined, however, to recover as much as possible from Japan. The Yoshida government, at first, showed some reluctance to negotiate with the Asian countries on the reparations issue. Fear was openly expressed in Japan that their demands would hamper the recovery program. Under pressure from the United States, Japan in November, 1952, began negotiating reparations agreements. In these settlements with her Asian neighbors, Japan has insisted upon amnesty for Japanese prisoners still in their hands. In return, Japan has agreed to pay reparations in cash and services.

Japan might have much to gain by trade with free Asia, but Great Britain, Holland, and France view with skepticism the desirability of encouraging Japanese trade with their former colonies. Australia and New Zealand have also asserted that Japan's position has not been

⁶⁹ Full discussion in Jerome B. Cohen, *Economic Problems of Free Japan* (Princeton, 1952); see also the address of John M. Allison, "U. S. Views on the Japanese Economy," *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXIX (1953), 35-38.

changed by the war and occupation, and that economic and political power still remains with the vested interests of the past. American support of the Japanese conservatives has heightened fears in Asia that Japan with American aid will become not only a dangerous competitor but also a potential exploiter. The conclusion of a ninety-year treaty of friendship, navigation, and commerce between Japan and the United States on April 2, 1953, served to reassure Japan, however, that the United States for the time being had every intention of continuing to encourage the revival of Japan's foreign trade. Less than one year later, on March 8, 1954, Japan signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States.⁷⁰

The problem of security in a divided world continues to be foremost among Japan's problems. Uncomfortably close to the hostile Communist states of the mainland, new Japan, jealous of its independence, has tried to steer a course of co-operation with the Western democracies without sacrificing her newly gained sovereignty. Like most people the world over, the Japanese would prefer to stay out of the tense bipolar struggle.⁷¹ Like the rest of the world, neutrality for Japan has been impossible. With the outbreak of the Korean war the Japanese recognized that a Japan without defenses would be forced to succumb to Communist pressures. The conclusion of the security pact with the United States was accepted as necessary. With the establishment of American bases in independent Japan, efforts were made to keep discontent at a minimum by America relinquishing as many of the occupation privileges as possible out of deference to Japan's nationalist sensibilities and by working rapidly toward the establishment of an independent Japanese defense force.

Related to the security problem is the question of the future status of the Ryukyus.⁷² Because the islands have strategic military value to the United States, they have remained under the jurisdiction of American military government. The air bases on the islands are within easy striking range of the mainland of Asia. Okinawa has been developed as the center of America's air defenses in the Western Pacific. The Japanese, although recognizing the strategic value of the islands, have agitated for return of political jurisdiction over the Ryukyus to Japan. The Ryukyans themselves have petitioned that their homeland should be restored to Japan. Tied economically to Japan, the islanders have suffered financial losses by their separation. Although the peace treaty seemed to indicate a disposition on America's part to establish a trustee-

⁷⁰ For text see *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXX (April 5, 1954), 520-25.

⁷¹ An American criticism of Japanese neutralism is contained in W. H. Chamberlin, "Bases of American-Japanese Coöperation," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 193-96.

⁷² A general review of this problem in Joseph W. Ballantine, "The Future of the Ryukyus," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (1953), 663-74.

ship over the islands, no such proposal has yet been made to the United Nations. It has been decided, however, to return a number of the small islands between Kyushu and Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction.⁷³

Over the question of Japan's rearmament, division of opinion has developed most acutely. Weary of war and hopeful of a better standard of living, the Japanese have been willing to talk of rearmament only out of necessity. Yoshida has taken the position that reconstruction should precede rearmament. Nevertheless, the Japanese home guard has regularly been augmented and has benefited by American advice and aid. By the end of 1954 it was estimated that Japan had a defense force of 163,000, and it is expected that this will be regularly augmented. Warnings have repeatedly been issued by the opposition to Yoshida that Japan is in danger again of being turned away from democracy and returning to totalitarianism. While primarily concerned at present with economic problems, Japan for security reasons seems to have relinquished dreams of neutralism, is gradually rearming, is hoping to cultivate trade with the nations of Asia and the world, and is retaining with modifications many of the reforms instituted by the occupation.

THE "LIBERATION" AND DIVISION OF KOREA

To the end of the nineteenth century, China and Japan struggled to control the Korean peninsula. With the decline of China, Russia became Japan's greatest competitor for supremacy in Korea. In 1882, the United States had established treaty relations with the ancient "Land of the Morning Calm" and, by so doing, had become the first Western power to penetrate Korea's isolation. Americans thereafter sought and obtained economic and political preferences at the court of Seoul. After driving China and Russia out of the peninsula, Japan erected a key pillar in her imperial structure by the annexation of the peninsula in 1910. Japan reinforced this hold upon Korea by a program of systematically altering the framework of Korea's economy and government to conform to her own blueprints for Asia. Fundamental to this program was the gradual liquidation of Western interests in Korea.⁷⁴

As a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945, Korea was systematically denationalized and assimilated at a constantly accelerated pace.⁷⁵ The

⁷³ *New York Times*, August 9, 1953.

⁷⁴ For further discussion of the international developments in Korea at the turn of the century see M. Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge, La., 1945).

⁷⁵ The best discussions of this relatively unexplored subject are found in Tadao Yanaihara, "Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea," *Pacific Affairs*, XI (1938), 198-207; Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944), chaps. XIII and XVI; George M. McCune and A. L. Grey, Jr., *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), chaps. I-II; Cornelius Osgood, *The Koreans and Their Culture* (New York, 1951), chap. XV. For pertinent documents see Donald G. Tewksbury (ed.), *Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies* (New York, 1950), Pt. II.

first decade of Japanese control was devoted primarily to the creation of effective administrative machinery in which Koreans were permitted to occupy only the petty offices. From 1920 to 1930, the Japanese concentrated upon merging the Korean economy with their own. This was accomplished by creating a community of interest between themselves and the upper classes of Korea. Once enough of the wealthier Koreans had committed themselves to Japan, the process of economic exploitation and political surveillance was stepped up. New requirements were regularly imposed upon Korea after 1930 as it became the advanced base for Japan's continental conquests. A huge superstructure of government dominated the life of the peninsula through a tightly organized bureaucracy under a Governor-General responsible to the Overseas Ministry in Tokyo. Although the post of Governor-General after 1919 was technically open to all, the office in fact was always occupied by a Japanese military officer. In 1942, Korea was assimilated completely to Japan and placed under the authority of the Home Ministry.

During the thirty-five years of Japanese rule, the fires of Korean nationalism were successfully checked but never extinguished. With a population roughly as great as that of Spain and with material resources enough for the sustenance of her population, the Koreans never accepted with equanimity their subjection to Japanese rule. Nevertheless, the methods of the Japanese dictatorship prevented the nationalists from developing a set of native leaders experienced in administration. The Korean rank and file were prevented by the Japanese from acquiring the political education essential to self-government. The industrial economy of the peninsula was made increasingly dependent upon its relationship to the Japanese economy and to Japanese technical skill. Agriculture was dedicated to the production of rice for Japan. Even though certain nationalists stressed the capacity of the Koreans to govern themselves, the lack of leadership and political education, as well as the dependence of the economy upon Japan, was responsible in part for the qualification set forth in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 that Korea "*in due course* shall become free and independent."⁷⁶

When Russia in February, 1945, at the Yalta conference indicated her willingness to participate in the war against Japan, the military staffs of Russia and the United States decided that the Japanese in Korea should surrender in the north to Russian forces and in the south to American forces. In July, at the Potsdam conference, the military planners formalized the earlier arrangements by dividing Korea into two almost equal halves at the 38th parallel. This decision was taken clearly for purposes of military occupation only. In no way did the division conform to

⁷⁶ Italics by the authors. For complete text of the Cairo Declaration see Harold Isaacs (ed.), *New Cycle in Asia* (New York, 1947), p. 29.

natural boundaries, economic frontiers, or cultural lines of demarcation.⁷⁷ The division of the peninsula was generally supposed to be temporary.

Although Korea had not suffered directly from aerial attacks or invasion, its economy had suffered heavily from the exploitation of a desperate Japan. At the end of the war in the summer of 1945, Korean production ceased, inflation swept the land, and unemployment engulfed the workers. Thinking to entrench themselves quickly, Korean nationalists of all parties sought to take control away from the defeated Japanese. Into this chaotic situation the Russian and American forces of "liberation" injected themselves. Even before the surrender of Japan on August 14, Russian forces had landed in northeastern Korea. The first American forces disembarked at the southern tip of the peninsula on September 8. The demobilization of the Japanese armed forces proceeded quickly in both zones. The liquidation of the Japanese administration presented greater difficulty. The powers not only had to remove the Japanese officials; they had also to provide replacements. It was on the question of the new regime for Korea that the wartime collaboration of Russia and America broke down.

Nor did the Korean nationalists make the tasks of the "liberating" forces lighter. Since 1919, the Korean Provisional Government had prepared in exile for the day when Korea should be freed. Led by Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, this group of Korean nationalists operated in the war years from Chungking and Washington. Both China and the United States had avoided Rhee's requests for official recognition as the government of Korea until the people of Korea should have a chance to make their wishes known. Korean Communists led by Kim Il-sung had operated in Manchuria throughout the war and were quick to join with the Russian forces that entered Korea near the war's end. A large group of Korean Communists had also been preparing in Siberia for the day of "liberation." Many Korean leaders of moderate leanings were released from prison by the occupying forces, and they also set about organizing their supporters for the political scramble. Every political group sought outside aid to advance its aspirations.⁷⁸ The powers, meanwhile, marked time in international negotiations as they looked for a rational solution to the Korean enigma.

Under the direction of General MacArthur in Tokyo, Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge commanded the American forces in Korea. At Seoul and other centers south of the 38th parallel the Americans set up an interim military government. The Koreans busily organized them-

⁷⁷ See especially the two articles by Shannon McCune, "Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, V (1946), 272-88, and "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea," *World Politics*, I (1949), 223-32.

⁷⁸ See E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York, 1951), chap. V.

selves meanwhile to make ready for the transfer of the administration from the Japanese into their own hands. They expected that the American forces would withdraw as soon as the Japanese were disarmed and removed from office. Their hopes were dashed, however, when many Japanese were retained in strategic administrative posts and when General Hodge announced in October, 1945: "Military Government is the only government in southern Korea."⁷⁹ Hodge's proclamation was particularly difficult for Rhee's group to accept.

At the meetings of the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers of December, 1945, a system of trusteeship for Korea was finally decided upon, and to this arrangement China gave its approval. In reporting the conclusions of the conference, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes remarked:

Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a joint Soviet-American commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations . . . for the formation of a Korean provisional democratic government. They will also make proposals . . . regarding a four-power [United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China] trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.⁸⁰

This decision of the powers was denounced by most Korean nationalists as in violation of the Atlantic Charter.


In the months that followed the Moscow decision, the efforts of the joint Soviet-American commission during 1946 and 1947 to work out a satisfactory arrangement for Korean independence ran into a series of snarls. The main conflict revolved around the Russian determination that the trustees should declare "ineligible for consultation in forming the proposed Korean provisional government" all those Koreans who had criticized the trusteeship arrangement as outlined in the Moscow Declaration. The Russian decision was understood particularly to ban from the discussions the anti-Soviet Koreans, such as Dr. Syngman Rhee, and those who had been leaders in the Korean government-in-exile. The American trusteeship group, on the contrary, demanded rights of free speech for all and upheld the right of the conservative Koreans to participate in the consultations. A stalemate resulted, and the military commands in each zone went ahead with their respective programs for "Korean independence."⁸¹

While the fruitless trusteeship discussions of 1946 were taking place, the military governments in both areas were steering native unrest and

⁷⁹ As quoted in McCune and Grey, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸⁰ *U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin* (December 30, 1945), pp. 1030 and 1035.

⁸¹ Further details in George M. McCune, "Korea: The First Year of Liberation," *Pacific Affairs*, XX (1947), 14-15.



Korea. (The U. S. Dept. of State, *Korea 1945 to 1948. A Report on Political Developments and Economic Resources with Selected Documents*, Publication No. 3305, Washington, 1948)

according to plan, the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was elected by the nineteen million inhabitants of the sector south of the 38th parallel. Thereafter, in May, 1947, a nominally autonomous South Korean Interim Government was established with headquarters at Seoul. Very little was meanwhile being done in the American sector toward the social and economic rehabilitation of the peninsula.

In southern Korea, particularly, the Japanese had left a bitter heritage. Early in the present century the Nipponese had begun to move into the peninsula as landowners. By 1942 sixty per cent of the entire Korean population was landless. In the rice producing areas of the south, the Japanese had held rigid economic control and had employed the Koreans either as tenants or as farm laborers. In 1945 more than three-fourths of the cultivated land was being farmed by tenants. Unlike the north, the south had never become an industrial or commercial region. When the Americans occupied the southern sector, the peasants were land hungry and determined to confiscate properties previously held by Japanese landlords and native gentry. As in Japan, the Americans insisted upon preserving the rights of private property and providing for gradual change of the land tenure pattern.

General Hodge at Seoul was frequently confronted with the fact that the Koreans were not only angered by the gradual American policy, but, outspokenly wrathful, they accused the Americans of supporting the landlords, capitalists, and reactionaries. American shipments of food and agricultural surpluses (amounting in value to \$250,000,000 by July, 1948) to southern Korea were sometimes looked upon as necessary only because of the inefficiency of the occupation forces and their failure to regulate distribution, prices, and wages. The long-term program envisaged by the American administration in its plans of 1946 and 1948 for the transfer of ownership, and payment for lands, stimulated many Koreans to more than impatience.⁸⁴

The Russian policy of permitting the Koreans to confiscate the lands of Japanese and "collaborationists" clearly met with wider approval. According to the Soviet program, the individual peasant does not own his land but holds it under the village council. Control of the land is actually vested in the village council which is in turn dominated by the Communists. The peasant's continued use of land allotted to him apparently depends upon his willingness to work along with the village council and its Communist leaders. It is probable that the land program in northern Korea met some opposition from the individualistic peasants. Unfavorable reactions to the heavy tax program imposed by the Communist regime have echoed loudly enough to be heard through the

⁸⁴ Excellent historical discussion of land problems as well as contemporary agrarian conflicts in Shannon McCune, "Land Redistribution in Korea," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 13-18.

"bamboo curtain." Nevertheless, the Communists were apparently able to preserve the feeling that land redistribution favored the peasant. The impression that the Soviet regime meant to act decisively on behalf of the Korean peasants gave the northern administration a decided edge over its southern rival.⁸⁵

Although the Russians succeeded in working out quickly the comprehensive economic and political programs for their zone, the failure of the powers to unite Korea remained the major international issue. After the fruitless efforts of 1946 and 1947 to establish an autonomous Korean government by conference, the United States in September, 1947, requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to exert its influence in behalf of a settlement in Korea.⁸⁶ The Russians maintained that the question of Korean unity and independence, like other problems related to the conclusion of the peace treaties, was outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations.⁸⁷ In November, 1947, the United Nations nevertheless voted, with the Soviet bloc abstaining, to dispatch a Temporary Commission to Korea. Its task was to conduct elections for leaders who would then take the initiative in organizing a united Korean provisional government representative of all elements of Korean opinion. Once organized, the main task of such a provisional government was to bring a quick end to the joint occupation and to proceed with the establishment of an independent and permanent government.

After arriving at Seoul in January, 1948, the UN Commission received no recognition from the Soviet command and was refused permission to proceed north of the 38th parallel. Although seriously at odds about what steps to take in view of the Soviet position, the "Little Assembly" voted in February, 1948, to follow through with the elections as the American command was strongly urging. In the accompanying discussions the position of the United States in supporting Dr. Syngman Rhee and other anti-Soviet conservatives was roundly criticized. The United Nations urged the American command before the elections of May 10 in Korea to liberalize the election laws and to limit somewhat the restrictions placed upon nonrightist political groups. Little was achieved, however, for moderate and radical parties throughout the peninsula violently opposed the elections of 1948 on the grounds that an election in the southern zone only would serve to effect a permanent division of the country. The only Korean groups supporting the United Nations and the idea of "separate elections" were the extreme conservatives.

⁸⁵ McCune and Grey, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-09.

⁸⁶ See documents 11 and 12 as reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 299-302.

⁸⁷ For the Russian position on Korea see the speech of A. A. Gromyko of November 13, 1947, delivered before the UN General Assembly as translated in U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Soviet Union and the Korean Question* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 55-56.

Although the elections of May 10 were held under inauspicious international circumstances and in a strong undertow of internal discontent, the UN Commission ultimately certified the rightist victors as the duly elected representatives of the Korean people.⁸⁸ In the Soviet press the elections were referred to as fraudulent. In moderate circles in Korea the validity of the elections as a free expression of the will of the Korean people was strongly questioned. Nevertheless, the new government was quickly organized and on May 13, 1948, the Korean Assembly convened with Rhee as its chairman. Enjoying the military support of the United States and the blessings of the United Nations, Rhee went ahead with the task of forming a permanent government despite vigorous protests from numerous levels of Korean society.

By July 12, the new Korean constitution⁸⁹ went into effect, and eight days later Rhee had been chosen as the first president of the Korean Democratic Republic. Modeled upon the constitution of the United States, the Korean document is characterized particularly by the separation of government into three branches and by the strength reserved to the executive authority. The president is elected by the unicameral National Assembly and possesses broad powers that may be extended in times of "crisis." The president chooses his own cabinet, and it is primarily responsible to him. Without question final authority remains in the hands of the president, even though the constitution has subsequently been amended in other regards. On August 15, 1948, General MacArthur proclaimed on the third anniversary of the victory over Japan the formal inauguration of the "Republic of Korea," and the transfer of sovereignty to the Rhee government at Seoul.

In the Soviet zone events also moved rapidly in 1947-1948. Continuing to work through native committees, the Soviet command permitted the organization of political parties but only within the framework of the National Democratic Front, a unitary party organization closely linked to the Soviet forces. Other parties were outlawed. In February, 1948, a constitution for the Korean People's Democratic Republic committee was being drafted as the Russians groomed northern Korea to contest for leadership in the peninsula.

Before proclaiming a separate regime, the Soviet leadership sought to unite discontented elements through a Coalition Conference called at Pyongyang in April, 1948.⁹⁰ Present at this meeting were the representatives of certain of the nonrightist elements of southern Korea as well as the leaders in the National Democratic Front of northern Korea. Dr. Rhee and his colleagues were conspicuous by their absence. Kim Koo

⁸⁸ McCune and Grey, *op. cit.*, document no. 16, pp. 308-10.

⁸⁹ For text see U. S. Department of State, *Korea, 1945 to 1948* (Washington, 1948), pp. 78-95.

⁹⁰ Further details in McCune and Grey, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-64.

and Kim Kiu [*sic*], two of South Korea's political leaders, stated on their return from Pyongyang that the conference had unanimously declared its opposition to the "separate elections" planned for May 10. After two days of discussion, the Coalition Conference issued a declaration which (1) stressed the need for forming quickly a unified Korean government, (2) rejected totalitarian processes and "monopolistic capitalism," (3) called for immediate withdrawal of Russian and American occupation forces, and (4) opposed the establishment of foreign military bases on Korean soil. In a speech to the conference Kim Ilsung denounced the UN commission as "a tool whereby individual actions of the U. S. government in Southern Korea and the U. S. policy to split our fatherland can be legalized. . . ." ⁹¹ These efforts failed, however, to prevent the elections of May 10 from being held. By the summer of 1948 the division of Korea had to be accepted even by the most unrelenting nationalists.

Soviet moves thereafter paralleled the actions in the south. On May 1, 1948, the North Korea People's Committee promulgated its constitution with the object of making it apply to the whole of Korea. ⁹² Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. repeatedly proposed that the forces of both occupying powers should be withdrawn simultaneously. In Washington this was viewed as a poorly disguised Soviet effort to get American troops out of Korea so that "unofficial" Communist agitators could take over in Korea, and so that the northern Korea militia might move against a southern government divested of virtually all military support. In their zone the Americans had been slower about organizing a militia, and hence were slower to withdraw their occupying units. On September 9, the North Koreans proclaimed the establishment of a "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and called it the only legitimate government of the peninsula. The Soviet Union extended official recognition to the northern regime on October 13, and the other Communist countries quickly followed suit. On March 17, 1949, Russia agreed to advance a small loan to the new Soviet regime of Korea as part of a general agreement on economic and cultural co-operation. ⁹³

After the proclamation of the two opposing "permanent" governments, the Rhee government continued to rely heavily upon the United States for support in the struggle to extend its authority to the rest of the peninsula. In September, 1948, a financial and property pact was concluded between Washington and Seoul. This treaty settled accounts covering the three years of military occupation during which the American

⁹¹ Text of Kim's speech reproduced in Tewksbury (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 98-114.

⁹² Commentary and textual extracts in V. Kudryavtsev, "The Constitution of a Renascent People," *Izvestia*, September 23, 1948, in *Soviet Press Translations* (Seattle), for November 15, 1948. Cf. the newspaper, *Korean Independence* (Los Angeles), for May 11, 18, and 25, 1949.

⁹³ Text of the treaty in Tewksbury (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 127-28.

authorities imported vitally needed materials for Korea from the United States and Japan. It also involved nearly \$400,000,000 in additional grants and loans to the new Korean government. An agreement for aid under the Economic Coöperation Administration was signed on December 10, 1948, providing for help in launching a long-term program of economic rehabilitation.

Despite repeated uprisings against its authority, the Seoul government managed with American aid to extend the area of its authority and to "pacify" sections of the country previously under strong Communist influence. Its authority was further strengthened on December 12, 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the elections of May 10, and declared in part

that there has been established a lawful Government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the temporary commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the temporary commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.⁹⁴

The United Nations also established a new commission to aid "the lawful government of Korea to achieve the goal of a free and united Korea." Following closely upon the UN resolution, the United States on January 1, 1949, formally recognized "the Government of the Republic of Korea" and shortly dispatched an embassy to Seoul.

The majority of the Korean people were manifestly dissatisfied with the partition of their country and were vitally concerned about territorial unity and national independence. It was clearly impossible for either area to be self-sufficient and independent without the other. The economic division of the peninsula hampered recovery north and south of the 38th parallel. The withdrawal of the Russian forces on December 30, 1948, and of the American troops six months later, also failed to contribute to the stability of the divided nation. Communist victories in China meanwhile encouraged the Communists of Korea to push ahead with their program in the north and to agitate secretly and openly in the south. In both sectors of the peninsula, preparations—political, economic, and military—went ahead for a final test of strength.

In its report of July 28, 1949, the UN Commission on Korea concluded:

⁹⁴ *New York Times*, January 2, 1949.

The embittered propaganda and hostile activities which now mark the relations between the two parts of Korea render the prospect of unification more and more remote.⁹⁵

Even though the Republic of Korea (ROK) took stringent measures against Communist infiltration, the Workers' Party of South Korea openly continued to accuse Rhee's regime of selling out the country to "American imperialism." Their attacks were given substance by the deterioration of the South Korean economy even with American aid.⁹⁶

After considerable discussion of the administration's aid policies, the Congress in Washington passed on February 14, 1950, a bill providing further aid to Korea of \$60,000,000. In a note of April 7, 1950, to the Korean ambassador, Secretary of State Acheson expressed "the deep concern" of the United States "over the mounting inflation in Korea." Acheson further observed that the Seoul government seemed unwilling "to take the drastic measures required to curb the growing inflation," and specifically expressed American dissatisfaction over Rhee's proposed intention to postpone the general elections scheduled for May, 1950. To reinforce his protests, Acheson informed the Seoul government that unless it took "satisfactory and effective measures" the United States might find it necessary "to re-examine, and perhaps make adjustments, in the Economic Cooperation Administration's assistance program in Korea."⁹⁷ To June 25, 1950, the United States had put \$1,100,000,000 into South Korea. With such an investment at stake and with such a strategic portion of its Pacific system in danger, Washington could not afford to forget about the Republic of Korea. Threats to halt economic assistance were therefore not notably effective in forcing Rhee to adopt a more moderate policy.

In northern Korea the Soviet regime also experienced economic difficulties. Communist emphasis, however, was placed upon solving their dilemma by infiltration and military action in the south. It had long been known that the armed forces of North Korea were steadily increasing in number and that their armament and training came from the Soviet Union. The victory of the Communists in China in 1949 stimulated hope in North Korea that the Western powers would not rush to support the widely criticized Rhee government. In the spring of 1950 the propaganda emanating from Pyongyang called upon loyal Koreans to boycott the "separate elections" scheduled for May 30 in the Republic of Korea. Despite Rhee's hesitation and the threats of North Korea, the elections were held under the supervision of the UN Commission

⁹⁵ See Tewksbury, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁹⁶ *New York Times*, January 13, 1950.

⁹⁷ U. S. Dept. of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1950, p. 602.

for Korea. Again Rhee's group managed to retain control over the Assembly, although many Independents were elected.

The elections were accompanied and followed by a steady stream of invective from Pyongyang against Rhee, the United Nations, and the United States. While publishing these attacks, the government of Kim Ilsung proclaimed a merger of all political organizations of North and South Korea under the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland.⁹⁸ On June 19, the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea proposed to the newly elected National Assembly in Seoul that the two bodies should merge "as a single Korean legislative organ" in order to execute "the peaceful unification of the Fatherland."⁹⁹ According to this resolution, Syngman Rhee and others should be arrested as national traitors and the United Nations Commission requested to withdraw as the first steps toward removing obstacles to unity. After the Assembly at Seoul failed to respond to this drastic proposal, the leaders at Pyongyang sought to produce unity by force.

CIVIL AND INTERNATIONAL WAR IN KOREA

Armed forces from North Korea launched a general attack against the Republic of Korea at 4:00 A.M. on June 25, 1950.¹⁰⁰ Thirteen hours after the North Koreans began pouring south of the 38th parallel, the Security Council of the United Nations, in the absence of the Soviet delegate, passed an unanimous resolution branding the attack a breach of the peace and calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Washington, for its part, directed General MacArthur to dispatch equipment to Korea from the Mutual Defense stocks in Japan. The UN Commission in Korea sent word to Lake Success on June 26 that pleas and efforts for mediation would certainly go unheeded by the determined North Koreans. The Commissioners asserted that the North Korean attack was a well planned and concerted invasion that had caught the Republic by surprise. On June 27, President Truman ordered American air and sea forces to give cover and support to the retreating ROK forces. At the same time the American navy was ordered to defend Formosa against possible attack from the Chinese mainland. While the Rhee government was evacuating Seoul, the Security Council on June 27 invoked military sanctions against North Korea and requested all member-states to give assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the attack.

The dramatic UN decisions were taken at a time when Russia had

⁹⁸ The appeal of June 7 is included in Tewksbury (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 146-51.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-58.

¹⁰⁰ For details on the outbreak and course of the civil war see especially the publications of the U. S. Dept. of State, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Washington, 1950), and *United States Policy in the Korean Conflict* (Washington, 1951). See also the *Official Records of the UN General Assembly*.

withdrawn her delegates in protest over the Chinese recognition issue (see pp. 576–78). Soviet publications immediately branded the military sanctions as illegal because neither Russia nor Communist China had participated in the discussions.¹⁰¹ They termed the actions of the United States “provocative” and “interventionist.” From the Communist viewpoint, the attack on the Republic of Korea was a spontaneous action of the Korean people against the “Fascist dictatorship” of Syngman Rhee. The Communists protested that the Korean people should be permitted to decide for themselves what government should hold power. To the argument of aggression the Soviet spokesmen replied that no international frontier had been transgressed and that the Korean “people” were merely seeking to drive out of the peninsula the “illegal” government of Syngman Rhee. If the United Nations under pressure from the United States insisted upon maintaining the legal fiction of the Republic of Korea, the Communists argued that the United Nations would be intervening unwarrantedly in a war only of concern to Korea.

In the war itself, the North Korean forces won a series of quick successes. American personnel, technical and diplomatic, were evacuated to Japan. American air and naval support were not enough to stem the tide of onrushing North Koreans. On June 30, President Truman authorized MacArthur to put American ground forces into the battle. Meanwhile British and Australian fleet and air units were being rushed to Korea from the south. Though these actions helped the morale of the South Koreans, they had no immediate effect on the course of the war. The capture of Seoul on June 28 was followed by the capitulation of other strategic points south of the capital in the last days of June and the first days of July. Under orders from Kim Il-sung, their Commander-in-Chief, the North Koreans confiscated lands in the “liberated areas” and began the organization of village councils. There can be no doubt that the North Koreans planned to drive the opposition into the sea and quickly assume control over the entire peninsula. The invasion of the south, it was obvious, had been carefully planned in advance.

In the United States the Congress unanimously voted arms aid to Korea on June 30 and supported Truman’s decision to send American forces into the Korean war. While the North Koreans charged that the Western powers were guilty of aggression, plans went ahead for the establishment of a unified United Nations Command under General MacArthur. Even the Indian delegation conceded by July 1 that the time was no longer ripe for mediation. Although the other UN nations committed units to MacArthur, the major share of the burden in the early months of

¹⁰¹ English translations of pertinent Russian articles can be found in *Soviet Press Translations*, published by the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington (Seattle).

the war was borne by American forces. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, after several fruitless attempts to force the recognition of Communist China, decided on August 1 to return to the United Nations.

Russia's decision to end her boycott of the international organization was motivated partly by a desire to delay its actions. According to the established system of rotation, Jakob Malik, the Russian representative, became president of the UN Security Council for the month of August, 1950. After almost seven months' absence, the Soviet delegate took over his place on August 1. Malik sought to use the presidential chair as a rostrum from which to attack the UN program in Korea. He also sought to delay action on Korea by proposing that the question of recognition for Communist China should take precedence over the Korean problem. Although he failed to change the fundamental decisions on Korea already taken by the Security Council, he succeeded in confusing the issues and in limiting the actions of the Security Council during a critical period in the Korean war.

While Malik fought his delaying action, the North Koreans pushed ahead in southern Korea. On August 15, the North Korean capital was moved from Pyongyang to Seoul. The area held by General MacArthur's forces was gradually reduced to a small perimeter around the southern seaport city of Pusan. Little more was left to the United Nations than a beachhead. It was to this shaky toehold, however, that supplies, equipment, and men streamed from Japan, the United States, England, and Australia. In the United Nations, and in the American Congress, debates and accusations meanwhile brought the international cauldron to a boil.

It was from the staging area at Pusan that MacArthur's forces launched a major offensive on September 15. The land attack against the Communist forces was timed to coincide with the landing of a large amphibious force at Inchon near Seoul. The seizure of the strategic Seoul area cut off the distributing and communicating system of the Communists and, coupled with pressure from the south, brought about the quick disintegration of their military position. At the end of September, after suffering severe losses in men and equipment, the North Koreans retired north of the 38th parallel. The United Nations command was then faced with the decision as to whether its forces should pursue the Communists, or whether they should be held in check at the 38th parallel. It was thought to be clear that the North Koreans would not heed UN appeals for cessation of hostilities.

In the United States the general belief prevailed that the forces of MacArthur should be unleashed, and a decisive blow struck against the aggressors. Irked by defeats in China, the United States, in official and unofficial circles, took the view that the menace of North Korea should be eradicated completely. Syngman Rhee announced that his troops would

pursue the defeated Reds, irrespective of what the United Nations decided upon. Under fire from many quarters, President Truman insisted that the United States, no matter what pressure should be exerted upon his administration, would abide by the decision of the United Nations. The government of India took the view that negotiation should succeed military action at this point in the battle for Korea. The world was warned on October 1, 1950, by Chou En-lai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Communist China, that his government would not stand aside if "the imperialists wantonly invade the territory of North Korea."¹⁰² Faced by a wide variety of unpleasant and dangerous prospects, the General Assembly of the United Nations, with only the Soviet bloc and India objecting, voted on October 7 to permit MacArthur to take "all appropriate steps" to re-establish stability and unity in Korea. The resolution also provided for new elections in both parts of Korea under UN supervision, the withdrawal of UN armed forces after the achievement of United Nations aims, and the creation of a new UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

Upon receiving what he interpreted as permission for action against North Korea, MacArthur unleashed the UN forces. On October 19 they took Pyongyang. A week later the first South Korean troops reached the Yalu boundary line between Korea and China. Debate raged in Washington and New York as to whether American troops should proceed to the frontier. In Tokyo, MacArthur asserted that such a decision would have to be made in the light of tactical considerations. The repeated warnings from Peking that the Korean war had just begun and that it would become a long war of attrition had aroused fear in the capitals of the world that China intended coming to the aid of North Korea. MacArthur, however, in his conference with Truman at Wake Island thought it unlikely that the Chinese would strike.

At the end of October the Chinese gradually began entering the war in force, although no formal declaration of war or intervention came from Peking. On November 1, the North Koreans declared that Chinese "volunteers" had joined their forces to help protect the Yalu electrical plants from which Manchuria receives power. Several days later, MacArthur reported to the Security Council that a "new war" had begun with Chinese intervention on a large scale. The Security Council on November 8 invited Mao's government to send representatives to New York to discuss the Korean problem. Peking answered that Korea was but one phase of the entire problem and that representatives would be sent only if they were to discuss United States aggression in Asia. After lengthy deliberations, the General Assembly invited Red China to participate in general discussions of the Korean problem, including United States

¹⁰² *New York Times*, October 2, 1950.

aggression in Asia. On November 25 a nine-member delegation from Communist China arrived at Lake Success.

Speculation spread like wildfire regarding China's motives for entering the Korean war. Was it that the Mao regime genuinely feared for the safety of Manchuria? Did the new Chinese government perhaps need a war to reinforce its hold upon the Chinese people? Was this a new move inspired by Russia to drain America of strength by forcing her to embark upon dangerous enterprises far removed from her fundamental national interests? At every level of opinion, official and unofficial, counsels were divided in an effort to account for and deal with the Chinese intervention. It was no state secret that military and civilian official in all countries were surprised by China's attack upon the UN forces.

That the Chinese were playing for high stakes soon became clear. Unit after unit moved south of the Yalu during the month of November. The UN spearheads in North Korea were rudely blunted, and MacArthur's forces soon found that the "new foe" was tough. At the end of November, the UN troops were forced on the defensive and were soon in slow retreat. Faced by overwhelming numbers in Korea, MacArthur sought permission to strike directly at Chinese bases in Manchuria. By this time, however, it was believed by many responsible officials that the extension of the war to Manchuria might bring general war dangerously close. The supporters of MacArthur argued that limitations in fighting a war of this scope were unprecedented and seriously endangered the entire UN position in Korea and Asia. More cautious voices warned that air attacks on Manchuria would almost certainly bring retaliatory attacks on American bases in Japan. Others warned that the Soviet Union might even come into the war if direct attacks on the Chinese mainland were undertaken. Despite such limitations, MacArthur undertook a counteroffensive in mid-November that was touted as a drive to "win-the-war" by Christmas. He was rudely checked.

As the bitter international war waxed hotter in Korea, Mao's motives for entering it began to take shape. United Nations' promises not to violate the Chinese frontier had no marked effect either before or after the Chinese attack. Repeatedly the Peking radio charged that the United States was using the UN action as a cover for attacking China. The Communist mission to Lake Success was in a particularly strong position after the collapse of MacArthur's "win-the-war" offensive at the end of November. In the Security Council Russia vetoed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea. Peking let it be known that the only conditions for halting the war were immediate withdrawal of UN troops from Korea, withdrawal of American naval units from Formosa, and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations. In the language of the day this was referred

to as the Chinese policy of "shooting its way into the UN." From such demands it became reasonably clear that China would refuse to negotiate a separate settlement on Korea and intended to use the Korean war as a weapon for forcing a general far eastern settlement.

The recapture of Pyongyang by the Communists on December 4 precipitated a general attack upon MacArthur. His "win-the-war" campaign of the end of November was derided. He was accused of sabotaging peace efforts by his determination to remain on the offensive and by his insistent demands that he be freed to attack the Manchurian bases. In the European and Indian press the attacks on MacArthur were particularly bitter. His associations with Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee were denounced, especially by the Indians.

In a new effort to solve the Korean riddle by peaceful means, Nehru organized a bloc of thirteen Asian and Arab nations to appeal to the Communists not to advance farther than the 38th parallel pending peace negotiations. This same group proposed a three-member commission to arrange a cease-fire in Korea. On December 14 such a commission was created by the General Assembly. Two days later, Washington, as we have seen, seized all Chinese Communist assets in the United States and imposed an embargo on trade with China. Shortly thereafter, Peking retaliated in kind. In New York, meanwhile, the Chinese delegation from Peking rejected the UN proposal for an immediate cease-fire in Korea. The Communists argued that the Asian-Arab proposal was a "trap" designed to furnish the United States with time to recover from its losses. On December 19, the Chinese representatives left for Peking.

Christmas in Korea in 1950 was a bleak affair. The United Nations had failed to get Communist agreement to a cease-fire. Economic war between China and the United States had been proclaimed by both sides. The Chinese Communists were about to cross the 38th parallel, and Rhee's government was evacuating Seoul for the second time in six months. At the same time, Peking was demanding a voice in the peace settlement with Japan. The aggressive Red regime of China was solidly backed in its demands by the Soviet Union. A solution in Korea favorable to the non-Communist world appeared exceedingly unlikely within the near future. A war of attrition loomed grimly in the offing.

Their failure to negotiate peace in 1950 forced the United Nations to take more positive steps at the beginning of 1951. On January 20, the United States introduced a resolution before the UN Political Committee asking the world to brand Communist China as an aggressor in Korea. The ROK assembly also went on record as favoring such a step. The Arab-Asian bloc led by India sought to forestall such an action by proposing a compromise. On January 24, India called for a

seven-power conference on far eastern questions at which China would presumably agree to a cease-fire in Korea. This proposal was defeated, and on February 1 the General Assembly declared Communist China an aggressor. In the vote on this measure nine of the Arab-Asian nations abstained, while the Soviet group voted solidly against it. Forty-four nations favored the branding of Mao's regime as an aggressor.

While the United Nations debated Chinese aggression, the non-Communist forces in Korea recoiled from the new Communist attacks and began counterattacking on January 14. The weary soldiers once more set their sights on Seoul and Kaesong. In Peking, Chou En-lai continued to demand the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues in the Far East and the seating of Red China in the United Nations. The declaration branding China an aggressor brought an outburst of concentrated indignation from Peking. The *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Mao government, asserted:

Since American imperialism has decided to continue aggression, the duty of the Chinese people is to intensify and spread the 'resist America and aid Korea' movement, unite more generally with our international friends in order thoroughly to smash American aggression against Korea and China and struggle to the end.¹⁰³

In Moscow, too, the UN action was declared "illegal" and illustrative of America's power to coerce the United Nations and make the international body an "accomplice" to an "imperialistic conspiracy."¹⁰⁴

The renewal of the United Nations offensive in February raised again the question of objectives. Warnings were repeated about the danger of spreading the war. Equally loud were the demands that the war should not be allowed to settle down to a long and bloody stalemate. On March 14 the reoccupation of Seoul by UN forces and the retreat of the Communists to the 38th parallel brought the issue to a showdown. While the United Nations continued to work for a negotiated settlement, MacArthur in Tokyo urged military action in North Korea and against China proper. In the United States MacArthur's determined view of the situation elicited broad public support, particularly among critics of the Democratic administration. In the United Nations, fears were openly expressed that MacArthur's determination to end the stalemate would bring general war.

On March 23, MacArthur seized the initiative.¹⁰⁵ Without consulting the United Nations or the military chiefs in Washington, the

¹⁰³ As quoted in the *New York Times*, February 4, 1951.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, February 18, 1951.

¹⁰⁵ For the details of the MacArthur controversy and America's "great debate" on far eastern policy see the volumes of documents and testimony published by the U. S. Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations under the title, *Military Situation in the Far East*.

commander of the UN forces stated that the Chinese had no chance of winning the war, that if the United Nations should decide to attack China directly the Peking government would be in danger of "imminent collapse," that the Korean problem should be divorced from "extraneous" issues such as the Formosa question, and that the Chinese commander, General Liu Piao, should be sent to meet him on the field of battle to arrange a cease-fire. While Peking dismissed MacArthur's offer as "a bluff," controversy raged in Washington and New York over the meaning of MacArthur's declaration.

At the time of MacArthur's offer, a clear decision on the battlefield was virtually impossible without one side or the other committing larger forces to the war. Impatient with the seesaw battle, the UN commander sought a quick end to the stalemate. In many quarters his proposal was greeted with enthusiasm as a positive effort to end the useless war of attrition. His superiors, however, felt MacArthur had exceeded his authority by proposing diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese and had come too close to committing the United Nations to an extension of the war. That MacArthur disagreed with his superiors was clear from the events that followed. That he was acting within the limits of his orders was hotly debated. In October (see p. 635) the General Assembly had authorized the UN commander to take "all appropriate steps" to insure the stability of the peninsula. The question facing the United Nations and the Pentagon in Washington was whether MacArthur's overture to the Chinese was "appropriate" or not.

It soon became clear that MacArthur's superiors did not intend to have the initiative on political questions taken from their control. The United States denied officially that it had intentions of asking the United Nations for permission to carry the war to the Chinese mainland in the event that Peking turned down MacArthur's offer. The State Department rebuked MacArthur for dealing with political issues "beyond his responsibilities as field commander." In Tokyo, MacArthur meanwhile ordered his forces to recross the parallel if necessary to defeat the Chinese Communists.¹⁰⁶ While Secretary of Defense Marshall agreed that MacArthur possessed authority to cross the parallel in order to safeguard the security of his forces, he decreed that a general offensive into North Korea should be a "matter for political consideration." The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur to clear with his superiors in Washington any future pronouncements of a political nature.

While jurisdictional battles raged, the Chinese continued to strengthen their forces in northern Korea. The political battle continued, however, to take the headlines away from the military action. In a letter released on April 5 to Joseph W. Martin, the minority leader of the House of

¹⁰⁶ *New York Times*, March 25, 1951.

Representatives, MacArthur advocated the opening of a second front in Asia by employing the troops of Chiang Kai-shek for an attack upon the mainland. This new pronouncement caused the impending storm to break. Those who felt that the main effort to contain Communism should be directed toward Europe deplored the continuing war in Korea and feared that further involvement in Asia would undermine the strength of the free world. This faction hoped for a negotiated but honorable truce in Korea. The opposing faction believed that the Communists were concentrating on Asia and that the challenge of China would have to be met fully and squarely to convince the Communists of the UN's determination. In MacArthur's words:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms, while the diplomats there still fight it with words. . . .

A fertile imagination is not required to picture the European reaction to this assertion.

The climax to the "great debate" on American policy came on April 11, 1951, with the dismissal of MacArthur from his UN, Allied, and US commands in the Far East. Such a dramatic ending to MacArthur's professional career brought the basic conflict within the UN and American policies toward China and Korea clearly into the open. President Truman announced in dismissing MacArthur: "I have concluded that [General MacArthur] is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties." In the Congressional investigations that followed MacArthur's return to the United States, Secretary Marshall once again expressed the administration's view that MacArthur, a theatre commander, by publicly expressing his displeasure with the foreign and military policies of the government, had created a "wholly unprecedented situation." The entire problem was further beclouded by political hostilities. The critics of the Truman-Acheson policy in Asia lined up solidly behind MacArthur.

The dismissal of MacArthur achieved nothing positive toward breaking the stalemate in Korea. MacArthur charged that "there is no policy." He also proposed that the Communist bases in Korea should be destroyed, that the "neutralized" Chinese forces on Formosa should be employed, and that an economic and naval blockade should be thrown around the coast of China. On the question of economic blockade the administration pointed out that this was already in effect. To MacArthur's other proposals the administration replied in the nega-

tive. The naval blockade was considered impractical, and the opening of a "second-front" through attacks on Manchuria or by the employment of Kuomintang troops was thought too grave a risk. The general effect of the MacArthur controversy was to bring the serious far eastern situation to world attention and to harden America's resolution in thwarting Mao's effort to shoot his way into the United Nations.

In the midst of the controversy, the Chinese Communists on April 22 launched a new mass offensive. General Matthew B. Ridgway, MacArthur's successor, first rolled with the new Chinese punch and then gradually began counterattacking. Ridgway's program of rebuilding the UN forces paid quick dividends. On May 2 the Chinese tide had begun to retreat. It had become apparent that the Chinese were either unable or unwilling to mount a sustained offensive in Korea. At this juncture the diplomats quietly set to work again in an effort to bring the war to a halt.

While American policy hardened with respect to China, the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations continued to work through the Indian and Swedish representatives at Peking for the resumption of negotiations. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee on June 2, Secretary of State Acheson summarized American policy, and presumably UN policy, as follows:

If the time comes when the Chinese have thoroughly convinced themselves by repeated failures that they cannot accomplish their purpose of driving the United Nations troops out of Korea, then it seems to me that the way is open for some sort of a settlement in Korea which can be accepted on the basis of mutually known strengths.

It was not long before the Communists had become convinced. On June 23, 1951, Malik let the United Nations know that Russia would like to see the negotiation of a cease-fire in Korea based on the 38th parallel.¹⁰⁷ In explaining the Soviet peace-feeler, Malik stated that political and territorial questions should not be a subject of the truce agreement and that these matters could be taken up at a later time. After Malik's "clarifications" had been considered, the United Nations instructed General Ridgway to broadcast a suggestion to Pyongyang and Peking for the commencement of talks. On July 1 the Communists agreed to Ridgway's proposal and asked that the talks be held at Kaesong on the 38th parallel.

On July 10, 1951, the truce talks began between five-men delegations representing the two opposed camps. Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy and Lieutenant-General Nam Il were the chief negotiators. Like the war itself, each step in the negotiations was bitterly contested. Efforts of

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1951.

the Communists to introduce "political matters" into the discussions, such as withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea within the shortest possible time, were sharply rejected by the UN team. The neutralization of the Kaesong truce zone also required time and struggle. The truce negotiations were further delayed in the summer of 1951 by the rapid progress being made by the United States in the negotiation of a separate peace treaty with Japan. The Communists likewise reacted sharply at Kaesong to the declaration by the United Nations on July 16 stating that thirty-five countries had reported compliance with the UN request of May 18 to embargo the shipment of strategic goods to China.

In spite of repeated deadlocks, the negotiators at Kaesong on July 26 finally agreed on an agenda. The most important matters to be taken up in subsequent meetings it was agreed were: (1) a military demarcation line and the establishment of a demilitarized zone; (2) the composition, organization, and function of an organization to supervise the implementation of the truce; (3) exchange of prisoners; (4) recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides. It was also clearly understood that the negotiators were not only trying to achieve a cease-fire agreement, but that they were also negotiating an armistice. No provision was made for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The end of the shooting had to await the conclusion of the talking.

Conversations on the military demarcation line were continually interrupted by military and diplomatic maneuvering for position. At the outset the Communists held that the 38th parallel should constitute the line of demarcation. The United Nations took the view that a line along the parallel could not be defended from possible future attacks. In the view of the non-Communists, the line, it was thought, should follow the existing battle lines—or presumably the best available defensive positions. The United Nations also took the position that the Communists wanted to make the parallel into a permanent political boundary, and that political matters lay beyond the competence of the Kaesong conferences. Unable to arrive at an agreement on the first step in the truce agenda, the conferees decided on August 16 to empower a subcommittee to work out a proposal. Talks were suspended by both sides from time to time on charges of neutrality violations or bad faith. On August 23 the conversations were finally broken off not to resume until October. The war continued.

The new phase in the truce negotiations commencing in October involved moving the scene of the conversations from Kaesong to the small village of Panmunjom, six miles southeast of Kaesong. It was hoped that fewer incidents would occur to mar the proceedings at this remote spot. The first full-dress meeting of the negotiating teams at Panmunjom was held on October 26 after a lapse of sixty-three days. In the

new conversations the Communists abandoned their insistence upon the 38th parallel. After five months of negotiations, the two teams agreed on November 27 to establish a provisional cease-fire line along the existing battle positions, to make the provisional line permanent should a full armistice be concluded within thirty days, and to let the provisional cease-fire line lapse if a general agreement could not be reached by December 27. The fighting was to continue.

In the following thirty days the negotiators worked ahead at a feverish pace. Discussions were begun on how to enforce an armistice and how to exchange prisoners. In both of these areas conflict on specific measures quickly developed. The Communists opposed the UN proposal for inspection teams and for a ban on military build-ups. On December 7 the head negotiators began discussing the exchange of prisoners. In these conversations the Communists insisted upon a general exchange of prisoners while the United Nations proposed a man-for-man exchange. On December 18, the lists of prisoners were exchanged. The failure to arrive at satisfactory compromises on the policing and prisoner issues by December 27 automatically nullified the agreement on the cease-fire line. At the close of 1951 the conferences and the war continued. Little prospect for the end of either seemed in view.

The failure of the conversations at Panmunjom to produce an armistice caused Russia to propose at the UN General Assembly on January 8, 1952, that the truce negotiations should be shifted to the Security Council. This proposal was swiftly rejected as a Russian effort to gain control over the proceedings. In Korea meanwhile the conferences on inspection and prisoners went wearily ahead. On January 24, General Ridgway in Tokyo stated that the truce talks had reached a "complete state of paralysis."

In Korea the picture was confused further in the spring of 1952 by accusations from both sides on the maltreatment of prisoners. Riots in the prison camps of South Korea strengthened the Communist assertion that the UN overseers were brutal and inhumane. No such riots occurred in Communist prisons. At Panmunjom meanwhile the negotiators began discussing the last point on their agenda. They sought agreement on the type of far eastern political conference that should be recommended to the powers on both sides. Charges that the UN forces were waging germ warfare served to delay discussions on all truce questions. These were countered by UN charges that the Communists were withholding the names of UN prisoners, that they were impressing South Koreans into their army, and that they sought the permanent division of Korea.

In the conversations of 1952 the prisoner-exchange quickly took the center of the stage. The UN argument that repatriation should not be compulsory evoked sharp protests from the Communists. On both sides

it was recognized that in the prisoner question lay a wealth of propaganda material. The United Nations held more Communist prisoners than the Communists held UN prisoners. Large numbers of the Communist prisoners, particularly the North Koreans, had early made it plain that they had no wish to return to Communist territory. The Communist negotiators declared voluntary repatriation unacceptable and proposed that Russia should be a member of the "neutral" commission that would eventually be entrusted with supervising the exchange of prisoners. On these matters the truce talks again reached an impasse in the spring of 1952.

On May 22, Vice-Admiral Joy was replaced as Chief UN negotiator by Major-General William K. Harrison Jr. Threats to resume full-scale war were meanwhile being hurled by both sides should the prisoner question not be quickly resolved. Riots at the Koje prison and the severe disciplinary measures taken by the UN guards focused world attention on the underground war that was being waged by the Communists in the prisoner-of-war camps. Tension was heightened still more by the resumption of large-scale aerial bombardments of North Korea and by the ruthless measures employed by the Rhee government in dealing with opposition elements. In London, criticism of the American air attacks on the Yalu area weakened the unity of the major UN powers.

The truce talks entered their second year still deadlocked on the prisoner issue. On July 1, 1952, the United Nations advanced a compromise proposal. It provided that all prisoners should be returned after it had been determined whether or not they would agree to go back. At first the compromise proposal failed to break the deadlock. In an effort to iron out some of the uncompromised differences, President Aleman of Mexico submitted on September 9 several alternative proposals. The Communists refused, however, to consider anything short of forced repatriation of all prisoners. On October 8, the talks were recessed for an indefinite period, but with both sides avowing that they would willingly consider new proposals.

Once again the center of gravity in the negotiations shifted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. On October 22 the Korean question was given first place on the Assembly's agenda. The following day on the proposal of the United States a representative of South Korea was admitted to the debate on Korea. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky sought to transfer the armistice talks from Panmunjom to the Assembly by a proposal of October 29. Vishinsky asked for the creation of a new commission composed of "parties directly concerned" but "not participating" in the Korean war to take "immediate measures" for ending the war and unifying Korea.¹⁰⁸ This proposal evoked no general backing. Under pressure from Russia, the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie on

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, October 30, 1952.

November 10 resigned his post on the grounds that the Soviet hostility toward him prevented his working effectively for a Korean peace.

In the UN discussions that followed, India again came forward with a concrete proposal for breaking the deadlock. On November 17 the Indian delegation with British support made a tentative compromise proposal designed to save face for both sides. After lengthy and acrimonious debate, the Assembly adopted India's plan, although it had been rejected in advance both in Peking and Moscow. It proposed the establishment of a "neutral" commission, differing from the one being worked on at Panmunjom, and suggested that force should not be employed either "to prevent or effect" the return of prisoners to their homeland.

In the United States, meanwhile, a presidential election had been held. As a result of this election, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Republicans had come to power. In the course of the campaign, Eisenhower had promised to visit Korea to see what could be done about the military and political stalemate. His determination to produce a solution evoked a warm response from the vast majority of the American people. Weary of pouring blood and treasure into what many called a "useless" war, the United States clearly expressed its determination in the elections of 1952 to wind up the Korean situation at the earliest possible moment. Although Eisenhower's visit to Korea in early December produced no panacea for settling the war, it clearly brought out the new president's determination to see a quick end to the stalemate.

Shortly after Eisenhower took office on January 1, 1953, the Communists began advancing new proposals. In the United Nations, meanwhile, the new administration on February 25 attacked the Soviet Union directly for its actions in the Korean war.¹⁰⁹ The Soviet Union continued to press its charges of germ warfare against the United States. The harder policy of the new Republican administration seemed at first to make the deadlock even tighter. Hopes for a break in the negotiations came, however, from an unexpected quarter. On March 5, the world learned of the death of Stalin. While no one could accurately estimate what might happen in the Soviet Union, the possibility that a new Soviet regime might adopt a milder policy raised hopes for a new approach to a settlement in Korea.

The first break in the deadlock came on March 29, 1953. The Communists on that date accepted a long-standing UN proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Communist China also began at the end of March to relax its demands for forced repatriation. On April 9, North Korea released at Russia's request a group of British civilians held in custody since 1950. Two days later the Communists

¹⁰⁹ Ten-count indictment in *ibid*, February 26, 1953.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOUTHEASTERN ASIA AND OCEANIA

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

Along the edges of eastern Asia and in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean, the opposing armies and navies of the Second World War fought most of their major far eastern engagements. From the bloody shores of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands to the entanglements of the Burmese jungle the forces of the United Nations waged war against the Japanese military machine. Whether island hopping (and sometimes skipping) in the Pacific basin or etching roads painfully out of the precipitous mountainsides of southeastern Asia, the Western armed forces disturbed and disrupted people as well as landscape and opened to world influences many areas that had been only semi-conscious of the flurry and complexity of life in the non-Asiatic world.

This is not to say that Westerners had failed in earlier times to force the yoke of imperialism upon the undeveloped populations of southern Asia. Far from it. Colonial administration, in process of development since the sixteenth century, had rested heavily, and not always securely, upon tropical Asia and Oceania. Nationalistic and other disturbances had troubled the calm of colonial life for a generation before the Second World War, but without serious consequences for the European and American overlords. Their prestige as conquerors, governors, and exploiters remained at a high level until they were forced, ignominiously in some cases, to desert their colonies in the face of Japan's aggression and ultimately to win back their former supremacy with the aid of other Western, and sometimes Asiatic, forces.

United under British rule before 1941, but periodically in a state of upheaval and disturbance, the states of British Asia (India and Burma particularly) emerged from the Second World War more determined than ever before to follow their independent ways. Astonished by the rapid successes of the Japanese—another Asiatic people—and the swift exodus of the British from positions that were obviously untenable in the face of large-scale Asiatic opposition, the groups advocating independence were easily able to win widespread support for "nativist" movements. The Japanese had also helped to promote the cause of tropical nationalism through their propaganda of "Asia for the Asiatics." Many Asiatics looked upon the Japanese as their liberators from Western colonialism, and numerous young nationalists journeyed to Nippon during the

war for military and technical training. The Japanese were not able, however, to win the unqualified co-operation of their fellow-Asiatics for their program of a "New Order in Greater East Asia." On the contrary, their efforts to profit by the decline of Western prestige and the removal of Western armies failed miserably. On the road to independence, the peoples of colonial Asia were not inclined to take the detour—or dead end—that Japan offered.

Nationalist sentiments were powerfully stimulated by the war in Indo-China, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines. Siam, the only independent state in tropical Asia, for a time co-operated with, but later worked against, the establishment of Japan's co-prosperity sphere. Having no hope of outright resistance, the peoples of Pacific Asia staunchly organized underground resistance movements that compared favorably with those of western Europe. From such beginnings came the powerful upsurge of sentiment for the end of colonial control that has become since the war one of the most intricate of international problems.

It is incorrect, however, to think of the independence movements as exclusively outgrowths of the Second World War. Necessarily, the sentiment for native autonomy developed slowly in lands where the level of living was low and the lack of education abysmal. As early as 1905 with the victory of Japan over Russia, native political seers prophesied the end of the white man's dominance in eastern Asia. These early victories were greeted as harbingers of the end of white "superiority," and those of Japan over the Western powers thirty-five years later, a certain sign that rule by Europeans and Americans could never again be re-imposed in the Asiatic tropics.

Nor was nationalism the only powerful force generated in Pacific Asia during the twentieth century. After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had successfully established itself in Russia, many of the peoples of Asia looked to the Communists for leadership in their struggle against colonialism and "capitalist imperialism." The decision of the Soviet government to relinquish its inherited right of extraterritoriality in China inspired hope among numerous groups of Asiatics that Soviet Russia might prove to be a powerful ally in their drive for freedom from alien rule. Communist groups thereafter appeared throughout Pacific Asia as important elements in the struggle against Western imperialism. Providing in some instances dynamic leadership for the backward peoples, the Communists became increasingly prominent in the decade before the Second World War. Since 1945, the threat of Communist control being extended to tropical Asia has plagued the leaders of the new states as well as their Western colleagues.

The danger to continental southeastern Asia has become particularly acute since the victory of the Communists in China in 1949. Of the

total population of one hundred sixty millions in this area, approximately ten million persons consider themselves ethnic Chinese. Although accounting for only five to six per cent of the total population of tropical Asia, the Chinese possess an importance, actual and potential, to the economic and political life of the region that is far more impressive than their numbers.¹ In several of the Pacific countries the Chinese have traditionally controlled economic life with but weak competition from Japanese, Westerners, and the indigenous peoples. So long as colonial control continued, they refrained from active participation in politics. In the independence agitation that accompanied and followed the war, however, they appeared to assume a more active political role. Although not united in their allegiance to Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese of southeast Asia have increasingly become a factor for the new regimes and the Western nations to reckon with. Whether they are a potential fifth column for the Communists or whether they become loyal citizens of the new states depends, as do practically all questions in the area, upon the ability of the new governments to maintain their independence, to establish effective, honest regimes, and to improve the standard of living.

THE UNION OF BURMA

Cut off from India, China, and Thailand by high mountains and twisted jungles, Burma's economy has perforce been closely tied to the rivers and seas, and hence to the maritime nations. Unlike many of her Asiatic neighbors, Burma, once the greatest exporter of rice in the world, has generally had no difficulty in feeding her comparatively small population of an estimated sixteen to seventeen millions. Indeed, her exports of food have been vital to the welfare of her less fortunate Indian and Chinese neighbors, and rice has regularly played an important role in the political life of southeastern Asia.² Because of her economic importance, control of Burma has for centuries been an outstanding feature of the international struggle for power. The white man has joined the contest only in its most recent phases.

Full-scale British control over all of Burma began in 1886. It met no serious native resistance until the early years of the twentieth century. Thereafter, however, the question of independence became pressing as Burma was caught up by the flood tide of nationalism that has swept over southeastern Asia in recent years. The British, however,

¹ Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London and New York, 1950), pp. 1, 694; see also Part III of C. H. G. Dobby, *Southeast Asia* (London, 1950), and A. Vandenbosch, "Our Friends and Antagonists in Southeast Asia," in P. W. Thayer (ed.), *Southeast Asia in the Coming World* (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 49-50.

² For details about Burma's economic history see John L. Christian, *Modern Burma, A Survey of Political and Economic Development* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), pp. 104-43; also consult J. Russell Andrus, *Burmese Economic Life* (Stanford, 1947).

managed Burma as a part of India until 1935–37. Thereafter the Burmans³ were permitted qualified dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations and were granted a constitution of their own. Although the constitution of 1937 provided for ministerial responsibility to an elected legislature, the British Governor and Civil Service retained almost full control over matters of defense, finance, and foreign affairs. The governor possessed the power of vetoing legislative acts and could take over the reins of government in case of emergency.

Nor was political independence the only issue between Burma and Britain. Even though British rule had brought with it definite benefits in increased rice and teakwood production, it had also sadly disrupted the traditional social pattern. Increase in production and export benefited primarily the alien British, Indians, and Chinese who controlled the economic life of the country. At the same time social discipline in the villages was upset as the hereditary chiefs lost their authority and as the farmers turned away from subsistence agriculture to the production of cash crops. As the economy of the country came increasingly to depend upon the vagaries of the world markets for rice and teakwood, the producers in lean years fell deeply into debt. This breakdown at local levels helped to stimulate banditry and the division of the people into disjointed and leaderless groups. Thus, while British rule contributed strikingly to the economic development of the country, it also laid the foundations for a deep-seated economic and social revolt.⁴

Sentiment for "Free Burma" had been developing rapidly ever since 1930 among the upper-class natives. The *Dobama* (We Burmans) Association, supported mainly by students and political malcontents, advocated full freedom from Britain as well as the introduction of radical social changes and fundamental economic reforms. The most active political partisans were U Saw, the leader of the *Myochit* (Patriotic) Party, a strongly anti-British and rightist group, which advocated Dominion status immediately, and Dr. Baw Maw, the advocate of gradual autonomy, and complete independence, and the leader of the *Sinyetha* (Poor Man's) Party. During the early phases of the Japanese occupation, the young nationalists of the *Dobama* (now called Thakins) co-operated with the Nipponese. Their leader, U Aung San, and his associates went to Japan for military training and became the hard core of the Burman Independence Army which aided the Japanese until 1943. Although Burma had been granted a spurious "independence" by the Japanese, the Burman leaders gravitated toward co-operation with the

³ The word "Burmese" refers to the majority linguistic and cultural group in Burma; the word "Burmans" is applied to nationals of the political unit of Burma irrespective of their linguistic and cultural heritage.

⁴ W. MacMahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne, 1952), pp. 127–28.

United Nations as signs of Japan's eventual defeat became increasingly clear.⁵ In fact, once the Japanese were forced on the defensive, units of the Burman army of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.) helped the troops of the United Nations to liberate their homeland. At the same time the A.F.P.F.L., a coalition of leftist parties, became Burma's leading political group.

Like other war-torn areas, Burma has been confronted since 1945 with a mammoth task of rehabilitation and readjustment. About two-thirds of its productive capacity was destroyed. Mandalay and Rangoon were severely damaged and many smaller towns and villages completely destroyed. Internal tranquillity was disturbed seriously and constantly by bands of armed robbers who roamed the countryside. Loss of trade and the disruptions of the war forced millions of acres out of cultivation. No matter who ruled the country eventually, the task of reconstruction would be long and arduous.

Throughout the war years, the Burman patriots continued to work toward independence. Angered by the British White Paper of 1945, which provided for the re-establishment of the pre-war political regime by 1948, and stimulated by the success of independence activities in India, the Burmans demanded that the British evacuate their country and turn over the government to native rulers. Finally, after bloodshed was imminent, the British agreed on December 20, 1946, to meet with a Burman delegation to discuss the granting of "self-government by the quickest and most convenient way possible."⁶ The Burman delegation was led by U Aung San, chairman of the A.F.P.F.L. and the most promising young statesman in Burma. Representatives of the rightist groups were also members of the Burman delegation.

At the London meetings of January, 1947, the British agreed to launch Burma on the road to full independence with the option of resigning from the Commonwealth or of becoming a full-fledged dominion. The Labor government of Great Britain also permitted the immediate establishment of an interim government to function until a constituent assembly should be elected.⁷ In the elections of the following April the party of U Aung San won control of the new government and gradually began to construct the new machinery of administration.

⁵ See S. B. Thomas, "Burma," in *The State of Asia*, ed. by L. K. Rosinger *et al.* (New York, 1951), pp. 298-99.

⁶ *New York Times*, January 19, 1947. For details see Clarence Hendershot, "Burma Compromise," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 133-38. Also G. Appleton, "Burma, Two Years After Liberation," *International Affairs*, October, 1947; H. Duncan Hall, "Postwar Government and Politics of British Southeast Asia," *The Journal of Politics*, IX (1947), 704-13. For the text of Prime Minister Attlee's welcome to the Burman delegation see Harold R. Isaacs (ed.), *New Cycle in Asia* (New York, 1947), p. 145.

⁷ *New York Times*, January 29, 1947. For complete text of the White Paper on Burma (January 27, 1947), see Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 150-55.

U Aung San was not permitted, however, to complete the work of independence. His program was definitely socialist and looked toward nationalization measures. It was vehemently opposed by the great landowners. Meanwhile U Saw, a violent anti-Socialist, sought to act for the landholding interests by plotting the death of U Aung San and other political enemies. On July 19, 1947, at the conclusion of an Executive Council session in Rangoon, U Aung San and six of his ministers were assassinated by agents of their political enemies.*



The Burma Road. International News Photo

Upon the death of the martyred premier, the British Governor, Sir Hubert Rance, named Thakin Nu as his successor. Of the same political persuasion as his predecessor, Nu continued his reform and independence policies. His support continued to come mainly from the urban workers and the peasants. In October, 1947, the British accorded the Rangoon government recognition by agreeing to the conclusion of treaty relations. Responding to the wishes of practically all groups in

* *New York Times*, July 20, 1947.

the country, Nu's government finally decided with British sanction to chart an entirely new and independent course. On January 4, 1948, Burma proclaimed its complete independence as a nation.⁹ Sao Shive Thaik became president of the new state, and Thakin Nu continued as premier. Thus, Burma, through negotiation, won the privilege of being the first state of colonial Asia to launch itself upon an independent course. On April 19, 1948, the Union of Burma became the fifty-eighth member of the United Nations.

Although opposition to the dominant A.F.P.F.L. came from both right and left, the extreme conservatives have been numerically few and in disrepute since the assassination of U Aung San. Communist opposition meanwhile intensified, particularly after extreme Communist elements were read out of the League in 1947, and subsequently outlawed as an independent political party. Outraged by the compromise of the A.F.P.F.L. with the British, the members of Thakin Soe's Communist groups worked among minority and other discontented elements in their effort to dislodge the "betrayers of the revolution." The Karens, a minority Christian group of southeastern Burma, who had opposed the withdrawal of the British, also resisted the new government and demanded local autonomy. In 1948, the Karens also took up arms against Nu's regime. For two years thereafter Burma was torn by war that was only suppressed in 1950 by the government because its opponents were unable to sustain their unity, and because the British furnished Nu with arms.

While civil war raged, the government went ahead with its plans for nationalization of the economy. A "Two-Year-Plan" for economic development launched in 1948 proclaimed Nu's determination "to start the country on a path to evolving a socialist economy."¹⁰ Basic industries were to be nationalized and landlordism eliminated in an effort to turn the rewards of productivity over to the Burmans. The unsettled condition of the country, the lack of capital, and the shortage of trained personnel combined, however, to frustrate these plans. Rice production decreased instead of meeting the goals planned for 1949 and 1950. Meanwhile, expenditures for defense forced the problem-plagued government to slash domestic expenditures and to begin looking abroad for aid. Since 1951, the production and export of rice have increased noticeably.

As if their cup had not already overflowed with troubles, the leaders in Rangoon viewed with trepidation the victory of Communism in neighboring China in 1949. At this juncture Burma tightened her economic ties with the Commonwealth nations and appealed for financial aid. In

⁹ *Ibid.*, January 5, 1948. See also Virginia Thompson, "The New Nation of Burma," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 81-84.

¹⁰ As quoted in Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 316

domestic policies, meanwhile, the government moved away from the immediate objectives of the "Two-Year Plan" and permitted greater freedom of enterprise both for Burmans and aliens. In March, 1950, Nu announced:

The Union Government considers that greater advantage lies in closer relations with the Western democracies and it will be our endeavor to obtain aid of various kinds from the West, that is, the United States and Britain.¹¹

In Burma's negotiations with the Commonwealth, India has played an increasingly important role. At the Colombo Conference of Commonwealth leaders in January, 1950, the ministers agreed to permit Burma to draw against the sterling fund of £6,000,000 set up to aid underdeveloped areas. Shortly thereafter, Washington sent a mission to south-east Asia to survey the economic and military needs of those countries requesting assistance. By the end of 1950 the Economic Coöperation Administration (E.C.A.) had sent technical and economic missions to Burma preparatory to the signing of an aid agreement. Even though hard-pressed, the Burmans have insisted that they will ask for no aid that involves the acceptance of special conditions or limitations on Rangoon's freedom of action.

Although looking for assistance from the Western powers, the government of Burma has tried to walk the tightrope of neutrality in the "Cold War." The first of the non-Communist countries to recognize the Communist government of China, Burma has maintained diplomatic relations since 1950 with the Peking regime and has supported Mao's demand for China's seat in the United Nations. Burma has not recognized the Viet Minh in Indo-China, but Rangoon clearly appears to look upon Ho Chi Minh's movement with sympathy. On the other hand, when war broke out in Korea in June, 1950, Burma supported the UN actions against North Korea. While Burma strives to maintain a precarious neutrality in the international conflict, economic ties may eventually bring Rangoon to closer co-operation with the West. Meanwhile, however, the country has still to satisfy the real demands for economic and social reform. Whether such reforms can be accomplished with Western aid, or whether the Communists will succeed in winning enough support to overturn the regime, are problems still facing the Rangoon government.

THE RECOVERY OF THAILAND (SIAM)

Situated in the heart of southeastern Asia, Thailand has managed since the sixteenth century to maintain a precarious independence while

¹¹ *New York Times*, March 5, 1950.

surrounded by dependent or semi-dependent areas. Subject to the encroachments of the ambitious Western powers and bordered by a sometimes aggressive China, the Thais have almost constantly been surrounded by international intrigue and strife. Thailand's most pressing problems, therefore, since the advent of the white man in tropical Asia, have been of a foreign rather than of a domestic nature and have repeatedly threatened to compromise the independence of the small nation. Nature and man have conspired, however, to place Thailand strategically at the point where divergent interests have regularly met. It has been by playing the dangerous game of diplomatic balance, and by working one power off against the other, that the Thai government has so far managed to retain a fair degree of political freedom.¹² The Thais were also fortunate in having rulers who realized at an early date that the introduction of modern institutions would enable the kingdom to take its place more readily in a world dominated by the industrial powers.

Thailand has been astute enough to retain her political independence, but it should not be assumed that other facets of life are equally free. For instance, the economy of the peninsular state has been controlled and developed to a large extent by foreign interests, particularly by the British and Chinese. To the middle of the nineteenth century, the Thai economy was based almost exclusively upon rice production. The Thai natives produced rice in the countryside. It was then carried by Chinese merchants to Bangkok, the only urban center in the country, where much of it was then loaded onto vessels bound for China, India, or Japan. Traders from Europe and America soon realized, however, that the Thai economy was capable of contributing more than rice. Tin, rubber, and wood became in the twentieth century items of major importance in the country's exports and provided the small Asiatic nation with the means for buying in European and American markets the commodities necessary to its modernization.

In the years between the two World Wars, events in Thailand were carefully watched from the capitals of all countries with a stake, or a potential stake, in its future. Having participated in the First World War on the side of the victorious nations, Thailand became a participant in the Peace Conference at Paris, a signatory of the Versailles treaty, and, in consequence, a member of the League of Nations. As a result of the treaties of 1919-20, Germany, Austria, and Hungary were required to relinquish their extraordinary treaty rights, including extraterritoriality, in Thailand. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik government of Russia lost its inherited rights in Thailand. Moreover, President Wilson agreed while

¹² For details of Thai history see W. A. Graham, *Siam* (London, 1924); K. P. Landon, *Siam in Transition* (Shanghai, 1939); and Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: The New Siam* (New York, 1941).

at Paris to the relinquishment by the United States of her extraterritorial rights "as an act of justice, freely and without price."¹³ The promise of the American president was essentially carried out in the Siamese-American treaty of December 16, 1920.

After the signature of the American treaty, there yet remained ten European powers and Japan which had not relinquished their special rights and privileges in Siam and which showed no intention of doing so. Japan was the first power to follow the lead of the United States by signing a treaty on March 10, 1924. After the negotiation of the American treaty, another appeal for equal treatment was made to England and France. After receiving several adverse replies, the Thai government dispatched a mission to Europe under the leadership of the American adviser, Francis B. Sayre. The result of his mission was the signing of semi-equal treaties, including a few special provisions, with France, Holland, and England. With the capitulation of England, Thailand's victory was won. The other European nations fell into line as a matter of course.¹⁴

Accompanying and following the first period of treaty revision (1919–25), modernization of Thailand's administrative, judicial, and legal agencies was undertaken. The reign of King Rama VI (1910–1925) was dedicated to reform designed to prepare Siam for her new role as an almost completely sovereign state. Unfortunately for the peninsular state, the reform movement was temporarily checked by the corruption and extravagance of the new bureaucracy. With the accession of King Prajadhipok in 1925, however, rigid economies in administration were ordered, the bureaucracy was thoroughly overhauled, and fiscal autonomy was gradually established. This last was perhaps the most important accomplishment of Prajadhipok's reign.

World depression in the early thirties forced further retrenchment measures on the royal government. These took the form of salary cuts for most of the civil servants and the army personnel. As the only articulate group in Thai society outside of the members of the peerage, the educated commoners dominating the bureaucracy and the armed services resented Prajadhipok's retrenchment measures as an attack upon the salaried classes. Their discontent was given practical form in 1932–33 when they revolted against the king and forced the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. In no sense was this a mass movement. The agricultural laborers who constitute the majority of Thailand's population were unaware of the turmoil going on in Bangkok and of the implications of the revolution.¹⁵

¹³ F. B. Sayre, "Siam's Fight for Sovereignty," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXL (1927), 678.

¹⁴ Further details on abolition of extraterritoriality in H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), pp. 638–42. Consult also F. B. Sayre, "The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam," *American Journal of International Law*, XXII (1928), 70–88.

¹⁵ An excellent account of the revolution in Landon, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–42.

Led by Luang Pradist Manudharm, the revolutionaries set to work to abolish the remnants of the old absolutism. At first, the king did not resist their efforts, because both the royalists and the commoners sincerely hoped to prevent bloodshed and thus keep the foreign powers from using internal turmoil as a pretext for intervention. Since the masses remained relatively apathetic, it was possible for the commoners to usurp the royal authority without provoking civil war and without endangering the independence of the country. So long as the revolutionaries remained united, it was possible for them to carry out their policies with as much dispatch and absolutism as if they had been acting on behalf of the king.

The revolution of 1932-33 also released the pent-up drive of nationalism that had been growing rapidly since the First World War. Encouraged by the recognition accorded by the powers, Thai nationalists worked incessantly for complete elimination of unequal provisions and for complete sovereignty. In their zeal they angered the king. In 1935 Prajadhipok abdicated and took up residence in England, the traditional refuge for departed royalty. Luang Pradist became regent in his stead and retained control of the country for the next two years.

Beginning in 1937, under the leadership of Luang Pibul, the strong man of Thailand, the military began to take over. The following year Luang Pradist was forced out of office. No longer was it deemed sufficient for Thailand to play England off against France. The rising sun of Nippon had begun to shine even in southeastern Asia. Upon coming to power, Pibul turned toward the new sun and sought to win concessions from the Western powers by threatening to co-operate with Japan. In 1937, Thailand concluded new treaties with the Western powers from which all clauses were stricken that appeared to infringe upon her sovereignty.¹⁶

The Siamese-Japanese treaty of 1938 was quite different from the other treaties. It reflected clearly the determination of Thailand to play off Japan against the West. The marked increase in trade between Japan and Thailand was viewed also with particular seriousness by the Western nations. The new government of Thailand hoped to replenish its funds by adopting tactics, similar to those used by Japan in Manchuria, designed to force foreign enterprises out of the country, or to frighten foreign investors into selling out their interests cheaply.

To emphasize the trend toward belligerently sovereign nationalism, the Thai government in 1939 officially changed the English name of the country from Siam to Thailand. Thinking to profit by the preoccupation of the Western nations in Europe and China, the Thai also demanded from Burma and Indo-China certain frontier and boundary concessions

¹⁶ Cf. H. M. Spitzer, "Siam's Political Problems," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 106-07.

that had long been in dispute. Having thus estranged the Western powers, the government of Luang Pibul was forced to rely more than ever upon Japan. His political opponents of the civilian bureaucracy split with Pibul sharply on this decision.

Nippon's rapid conquests in southeastern Asia and in the Pacific left the opportunistic Pibul no alternative but co-operation. In 1941, Pibul declared war on the Western democracies and entered into full alliance with Japan. Thai extremists hopefully argued that a Japanese victory would leave Thailand with hegemony in southeastern Asia and the opportunity to build up a great southern empire. They were encouraged in this belief by the government's determination to annex as much of the surrounding territory as possible and to keep under surveillance all non-Thai elements. As the Japanese forces moved into the country in preparation for attacks upon Burma and the Malay peninsula, it became clear, however, to many Thais that the alliance with Japan had done little more than increase the power of Pibul and the militarists. The civilians in the Siamese government were jailed or threatened with imprisonment if they refused to co-operate with Pibul's government. Thus, early in the war, an opposition to the totalitarian regime and to the Japanese began to develop among the educated classes of Siamese society.

The resistance elements had no trouble attracting large numbers of the official class to their "Free-Thai" movement. Trade, the vital element in the Thai economy, had virtually ceased, and Siamese products were callously being confiscated by the Japanese for use in their war machine. While Thailand's stocks of tin and rubber were being depleted, the Japanese failed because of shortages of transportation to supply the Thais with promised textiles and machinery.¹⁷ With the setting of the Japanese sun, Pibul's government was placed increasingly upon the defensive and was forced to resign in July, 1944, shortly after Tojo's regime had collapsed in Japan. The reins of government were thereafter returned to the hands of the civilians and to Luang Pradist.

It was shortly before the collapse of Pibul's regime that the leaders of the resistance opened secret communications with the American Office of Strategic Services and arranged for American agents to obtain direct intelligence regarding Japanese activities. Secreted in the heart of Bangkok, the American agents reported by radio on Japanese activities to listening-posts in Ceylon and India. Guerrilla forces were also organized in the hinterland against the day when Thailand would revolt openly against the Japanese occupation. The end of war arrived, however, while the Japanese were still masters in Thailand.¹⁸

¹⁷ H. M. Spitzer, "Siam's Economic Problems," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 140.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, September 9, 1945.

The civilian government sought in numerous other ways also to redeem the actions of Pibul's regime. They denounced the declarations of war and volunteered to return to their former owners the territories that Thailand had annexed in the early days of the war. Luang Pradist also suggested that outstanding disputes between Thailand and France over Cambodia's boundaries should be referred to the United Nations. Restrictions on minorities were relaxed. The official name of the country was changed back to Siam. Thus, when the war finally ended, Siam again was on the winning side. Her international policy of opportunism again paid dividends.

Convinced that the government of Luang Pibul had been acting unconstitutionally and out of accord with Thai sentiments, the United States had refused in 1941 to dignify the Siamese declaration of war by issuing a counterdeclaration. Since American investments were small, Washington was also free after the war to act more benignly than its wartime allies. Great Britain and France had recognized the existence of a state of war between themselves and Thailand and were inclined, in the post-war years, to view the change of heart with skepticism. In the conclusion of the final post-war agreements between Siam and Great Britain (January 1, 1946), the government of the United States exerted unofficial pressure upon its wartime ally to relax its attitude.¹⁹ On January 5, 1946, after nearly four years of interruption, the United States also resumed diplomatic relations with Siam.

French-Siamese rapprochement was slightly more difficult to achieve even with American pressure. Hostile feelings of long standing over disputed frontier areas were not easily dispelled even in the halcyon days just at the end of the war. After a year of dispute and discussion in the United Nations and elsewhere, Thailand was ultimately required in the fall of 1946 to return four disputed frontier areas to Indo-China.²⁰ Totalling around 20,000 square miles, the territories retroceded to Indo-China were in Laos and Cambodia. A pact signed on November 18, 1946, formally annulled the treaty agreed to by the Vichy government (May 9, 1941) and provided for the establishment of a boundary commission to submit recommendations for settlement of other outstanding frontier disputes.²¹

After lengthy discussion, and with American help, Siam became a member of the United Nations on April 29, 1947. In the negotiations with the Western powers it was generally agreed that Siam should participate in proposed regional security measures. Siam, however, has been notable for its unwillingness to co-operate with the Asian unity

program sponsored by Nehru and has charted a strictly independent course in foreign affairs.

The return of Siam to the family of nations at the end of the war was facilitated by the contributions that her economy could make to the recovery and rehabilitation of herself and her neighbors.²² Since Siam possessed exportable surpluses of rice, rubber, tin, and teakwood, the Western nations fully appreciated the measure to which the Siamese as friends might aid in providing food for Asia and raw materials for the industries of the West. For Siam these surpluses produced quick recovery, hard currencies for purchases abroad, and a high degree of economic and political stability. Unlike the rest of southeastern Asia, the Siamese escaped serious disorders and starvation.

The relative prosperity of Siam and the absence of strong anti-colonial sentiments have permitted the Siamese to remain politically passive in an area seething with hostility and intrigue. Their primary efforts since the war have been directed to the production of rice and to the management of their rice exports. On this problem the group of Luang Pradist failed to provide intelligent management and leadership.²³ It was with a break in the rice market that Luang Pibul reappeared on the political scene in Bangkok. Supported by the military and other conservatives, Pibul in November, 1947, engineered a coup by which he turned his political opponents out of office. Fully aware of the importance of rice and other exportable commodities to his political longevity, Pibul built up thereafter a state-controlled economic organization that has so far efficiently managed foreign trade. In 1949, the official name of the country again became Thailand.

In international affairs Pibul assumed an anti-Communist position and played ever closer to the Western powers. Determined to maintain Thailand as the first rice producer of the world, he cut his pattern of foreign affairs to fit his economic program. Although warnings have been voiced about making the economy too heavily dependent upon rice, Pibul's program has not yet been successfully attacked. Indeed, the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 stimulated the demand and raised the prices for rubber, tin, and other defense items exported by Thailand. Grants to Thailand from the United States and the International Bank testified in 1950 to the strength of Pibul's regime and correspondingly permitted him to carry forward programs of railway and highway rehabilitation.²⁴ The immediate objective of these projects is to facilitate the movement of rice from the farms of the interior to Bangkok.

²² V. Thompson and P. Adloff, "Thailand (Siam)," in Rosinger (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 268-69.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-77.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 287-90.

Although the Communists have not been under ban in Thailand since 1946, the Thai branch of the party is relatively weak.²⁵ The Thais have been almost totally undisturbed by the revolutionary wave sweeping the other countries of the area and have been uniquely free of anti-colonial sentiment. Indeed, the conservative regime has encouraged the revival of royalism, especially during 1950 when Phumiphon Adundet ascended the throne as King Rama IX. Since 1949, the fear that the Chinese, who constitute one-fifth of the total population, may be potential fifth columnists has resulted in discriminatory legislation against the Chinese community. The possibility also exists that the disgruntled group headed by Luang Pradist may have joined forces with the Communists after their unsuccessful uprising in February, 1949. Thailand's position was further strengthened by the signing of agreements with the United States on October 17, 1950, providing for arms aid and technical advice. An acute break in the price of rice and other exports or active intervention by the Chinese or Indo-Chinese Communists constitute the most serious problems that Pibul may have to face in the near future.

THE STRUGGLE IN INDO-CHINA

Like other dependent areas of southeastern Asia, Indo-China became particularly resentful of European control during the first decade of the twentieth century. Fundamentally, the difficulty was that a European state, highly centralized in its government, subject to constant change of its party direction, and extremely conscious of its civilizing mission, attempted to rule a far distant people who, while backward in many respects, were satisfied with their own culture and resentful of alien interference. They were particularly perturbed by the French policy of cultural assimilation, a process which involved the destruction of native cultures and institutions and the substitution and imposition of those of France.²⁶

Under the policy of assimilation, the administration of the peninsula developed rapidly and the financial structure was placed on a sound basis. The French administrators found disorganization and left organization. It soon became apparent, however, even to the French, that physical conquest was insufficient and that moral conquest would eventually be necessary. Both natives and Chinese settlers were disgruntled and discontented. After the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese

²⁵ Ball, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17.

²⁶ The standard accounts of the French in Indo-China are S. H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy (1870-1925)*, 2 vols. (London, 1929); T. E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (Chicago, 1936); Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China* (New York, 1937); R. Levy, G. Lacam, and A. Roth, *French Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1941); and C. Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (Oxford, 1944).

war, in Indo-China as in other parts of Asia, a new self-evaluation by the native peoples of their history and culture was rapidly undertaken. By 1911, it had become clear to the French that a policy of collaboration, or co-operation, with their Asiatic subjects was imperative. The strain of the First World War also brought forth definite and insistent demands for native control of administrative, judicial, and legislative functions.

In the era between the two World Wars native culture and political responsibility were encouraged in Indo-China through the more benign French policy of association. In 1927, at about the time when the Kuomintang was establishing its control over China, further concessions were made to native influence when the Government Council of Indo-China was reorganized in the direction of increased native participation. Thereafter, attention was diverted for a time from political to economic problems, particularly to agricultural and land questions but also to the adjustments attending industrialization and modernization.

Comprising an area one-third larger than France itself and a population of twenty-five millions, Indo-China provided France with excellent opportunities for investment and a ready market for industrial products. Before the war it was third in the export of rice and important in the trade of rubber and maize. Although the Chinese (numbering around 400,000) usually controlled rice production and milling, the French retained a privileged position for themselves in land ownership and mining. In Cochin-China, especially, French investors dominated economic life. Throughout the peninsula the French Bank of Indo-China held the reins of economic power.

Government in Indo-China until the Second World War was designed to draw the peninsular peoples ever closer to the mother country rather than to prepare them for independence. Native intellectuals trained in French schools and universities were accepted as equals by their colleagues. Racial discrimination played but little part in the difficulties dividing France from Indo-China. Their divisions developed rather in the failure of the French to appreciate the growth of native nationalism, to comprehend the intense desire for independence, and to understand the increased resentment toward the economic exploitation of the land and its people by either European or Asiatic foreigners.

As one of the most valuable of France's overseas possessions, the machinery of government in Indo-China was designed by Paris to mesh closely with the whole French colonial program. To the end of the war, the peninsula was divided for administrative purposes into six units: the direct French colony of Cochin-China; the four protectorates of Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos; and the territory of Kwangchowen leased from China (returned in 1945). At the head, with very full powers, civil and military, executive and legislative, was the governor-general,

who was himself responsible directly to the colonial minister in France. Over Cochin-China a governor ruled, and over each of the four protectorates a Resident-Superior held sway. In Cochin-China the judiciary was French; in the protectorates there were both French and native courts. With the fall of France in 1940 the general features of administration were not materially altered either by the Vichy government or by the occupying Japanese militarists.

As elsewhere in colonial Asia, the nationalism of Indo-China took the form of repeated attacks upon influential minorities such as the Chinese merchantmen of the coastal cities and the entrenched French hierarchy of business and administration. Nationalism in Indo-China also represented the dynamic element in a society otherwise static; it symbolized the hope of the future and the trend toward modernity.²⁷ It also represented the ambitions of the Indo-Chinese to profit themselves from the wealth of their own land. To 1945, the nationalists of Indo-China scored but few successes. Agitation against the French, fulminations against the commercial monopolies of the Chinese, resentment against the Japanese mercantile and military invaders constituted their major outlets of activity. Nationalist groups also co-operated with the growing Communist movement, and such able "patriots" as Ho Chi Minh, "the man with twenty names," sought refuge and instruction in the Soviet Union and lived for a time with the Yen-an community in northern China. The more conservative nationalists fought diligently before and during the Second World War to limit the spread of Communism. Their efforts were practically futile and served mainly to divide the nationalist movement into an even greater number of divergent and conflicting groups.²⁸

For numerous reasons, nationalist unity has been almost impossible to achieve. Divided geographically by the mountain barriers that break the peninsula into coastal and hinterland areas, the peoples of Laos and Cambodia are sharply separated from the Annamese-speaking peoples of Cochin-China, Annam, and Tonkin who inhabit the coastal areas and constitute about eighty-five per cent of the peninsula's population. Since such divisions reach back into the dim past, the peoples of the peninsula are today divided linguistically, culturally, economically, and politically, and have but little opportunity to know or understand each other. The Annamese nationalists are often as superior about the backward Laotians as the jingoists of Paris are about the civilizing mission of France. In the nineteenth century and more recently the rulers of Cambodia and

²⁷ Consult R. Emerson, L. A. Mills, and V. Thompson, *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1942), pp. 198-210. Cf. L. Sharp, "Colonial Regimes in Southeast Asia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 49-53.

²⁸ The most complete account of recent history is Philippe Devillers, *Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952* (Paris, 1952).

Laos have looked to the French for protection against the encroachments of their Annamese and Thai neighbors.

The rise of independent Japan to great nation status also impressed the nationalists of Indo-China with the idea that Asia, to progress, must be freed of non-Asiatic control. They were likewise startled by the turn-coat policy of the Vichy regime under pressure from Germany and Japan and were more than ever convinced that the white man could be dispossessed. During the years of Japanese occupation, native officials became ever more prominent in the established governmental system, and the movement for independence became correspondingly stronger. Urged on by its Communist members, the predominant Annamese party—the Viet Minh (League for Independence)—organized its forces after 1942 to take over the administration of the country at the end of the war. In China, meanwhile, the Kuomintang helped to organize the non-Communist Indo-Chinese into anti-French and nationalist parties. Even Ho Chi Minh worked with the Kuomintang in the war years. Angered by the French collaboration with Japan, the Chinese sought to anticipate and direct the struggle in Indo-China against the return of France.²⁹

The Japanese permitted the French, legally at least, to retain control of Indo-China until March 9, 1945. Under the terms of the Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement (July 21, 1941), the two signatory powers had agreed to co-operate in the common defense of Indo-China. Japan had been permitted to use strategic air fields, to station war vessels at Camranh Bay and Saigon, and to garrison southern Indo-China; in return for recognition of French sovereignty, the expenses of the occupation forces had been charged to the government of Indo-China. It was these terms, prevailing until the collapse of the Vichy government, that gave Japan in the spring of 1945 an excuse to assume full control over the peninsula and to place the French officials under "protective custody."

Since Nippon's fortunes were at a dangerously low ebb in 1945, the occupying forces encouraged the Annamese nationalists to take over the direction of the peninsula's affairs, provided them with arms, and appointed Bao Dai as Emperor of "Free Annam." On March 23, 1945, the DeGaullist government of France took note of the nationalist and independence activity in Indo-China by issuing a plan for the organization of an Indo-Chinese federation within the French Union (a new federal organization consisting of France *and* the remaining parts of its colonial empire).³⁰ Promises of a better future failed to bring native plans to a halt. When the French—preceded by British forces—arrived in Indo-China in August, 1945, the sponsored government of Bao Dai had

²⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. XI; also Ellen Hammer, "Indochina," in Rosinger (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 231-32.

³⁰ Details discussed in L. Sharp, "French Plan for Indo-China," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 193-97. Complete text in Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 159-61.

been replaced by the Viet-Nam (the ancient name for the Annamese empire, meaning literally "Southern Country") Republic. In this new government the Viet Minh forces of Ho Chi Minh were well entrenched and determined to protect their newly won position by arms, if necessary.⁸¹

Meanwhile, the Potsdam conference (July, 1945) had proclaimed that the occupation of Indo-China should be carried out co-operatively by British and Chinese troops with the line of division between the occupying forces at the 16th parallel. In the southern sector the British forces proceeded with dispatch to disarm the Japanese and the natives and to establish law and order, and as quickly as possible they turned over the southern half of the peninsula to the French. Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities in Laos and Tongking permitted the Vietnamese to assume control and placed numerous obstacles in the way of the French. After lengthy discussions, the Chinese on February 28, 1946, finally agreed to withdraw from Indo-China in return for special concessions.⁸² Thus, France once again formally became the supreme authority in Indo-China.

After a few initial, but indecisive, skirmishes between French and native forces, the Paris government sought to conciliate the native rulers of the peninsula and to negotiate settlements with them. Ho's government, confronted by famine and fearful of China's intentions, willingly entered into the proposed conversations with France. The rulers in the south also were quick to make peace with France. The first agreement was signed with the friendly kingdom of Cambodia on January 7, 1946. Three months later France recognized the Viet-Nam Republic. In the agreement, Viet-Nam was recognized as a free state in the Indo-Chinese federation, but its precise boundaries were not fixed. The major issue was whether or not Cochin-China should be included within Viet-Nam and this was supposed to be decided by popular referendum.⁸³ Laos was reoccupied by French forces, and a French administration was installed with some native support but also with widespread disapproval.

It was over the question of Cochin-China that France's program of Indochinese Federation came to grief. Shielded by British arms, the French without popular referendum proclaimed on June 1, 1946, the creation of the Autonomous Republic of Cochin-China. This produced a violent reaction. The Vietnamese, who had long considered that Cochin-China ought to be within their frontiers, believed France's action was in violation of the March agreement. Agitation and uprisings swept the coastal cities, and preparations for hostilities were openly undertaken. "Unity and Independence" became the slogan of the disappointed Na-

⁸¹ For the texts of Bao Dai's abdication and the Republic's declaration of independence see Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 161-65.

⁸² See *New York Times*, October 14, 1945, and February 29, 1946; complete text in Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 166-68.

⁸³ Text in Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 169.

tionalists. By separating Cochinchina from Viet-Nam, France sought to weaken Ho's regime. Although numerous meetings were held in Indo-China and France, matters went from bad to worse. In November, 1946, Dr. Nguyen van Thieu, the French puppet ruler of Cochinchina, committed suicide in protest against the "unpatriotic" role he had been required to play. On December 19, 1946, full-scale war began at Hanoi, the Viet-Nam capital, between the French and the Vietnamese.⁸⁴

As mentioned earlier, Cochinchina had always been more closely linked administratively to France than had the other Indo-Chinese provinces. Cochinchina was also a rich field of investment for French capital, and one of France's most important economic assets in a world where French assets had been disappearing rapidly. Strategically, Cochinchina commands the entrance to Cambodia where French investments are also significant. To the new "republic," the wealth of Cochinchina is also vitally important.⁸⁵ The rice of the southern state is needed to prevent famine from spreading through the overcrowded coastal and delta areas of Annam and Tonkin, and its surpluses are badly needed to provide the new state with export commodities, such as rice and rubber. It was specifically against French colonialism and exploitation rather than the institution of capitalism that the Viet Minh originally directed their attack.

The French nevertheless warned the world about the growing strength of Communism in Indo-China. Technically, the Communist Party was affiliated with the Viet Minh since its founding in 1942 and participated in the Viet-Nam government, even though it was officially dissolved in November, 1945. Fearful of the aggressive political tactics of the Communists, the French consistently refused Viet-Nam demands for political control over Cochinchina and endeavored to circumscribe Communist activity in Indo-China. For example, in October, 1947, the French cut communications between Indo-China and Kwangtung province in China to prevent overland communication between Indo-Chinese and Chinese Communists. France's difficulties with the Communists of Indo-China also created a serious problem for the Communist Party of France. Even their cautious support of the Viet-Nam Republic before 1949 lost the French Communist Party many supporters in France.⁸⁶

The outbreak of hostilities at Hanoi and Saigon in the last month of 1946 and the beginning months of 1947 ushered in full-scale civil war.

⁸⁴ George Sheldon, "Status of the Viet Nam," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (1946), 374; see also Charles A. Micaud, "Post-War Government and Politics of French Indo-China," *The Journal of Politics*, IX (1947), 731-32.

⁸⁵ Cf. Micaud, *loc. cit.*, pp. 737-38.

⁸⁶ The French Communists frequently urged the government to negotiate with, and to adopt, a more conciliatory attitude toward the Viet-Nam government. See especially chap. VI of David Hinners, "Post-War French Colonial Policy in North Africa and Indo-China" (M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1948).

The Vietnamese were set upon ending the life of the "puppet government" of Cochin-China, organizing the coastal states into a national union, and ending the reign of colonialism. The French were equally determined to work out the destinies of Indo-China in their own way and with due regard for the legal and moral rights of Cambodia, Laos, and the non-Vietnamese groups of the coastal provinces. Although the French reaffirmed the legal existence of the Viet-Nam Republic, they continued to treat Cochin-China separately until a native referendum *under peaceful conditions* could be held.

Meanwhile, guerrilla activity spread through the country, and disorders broke out in the cities. The Indo-Chinese revolts became especially acute when Leon Blum, the French Socialist and advocate of a liberal colonial policy, was presiding over a weak interim government—a government lacking the will and support necessary to vigorous prosecution of the colonial war. Major-General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc, Marius Moutet, the Socialist Minister of Overseas Territories, and Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, the DeGaulлист High Commissioner for Indo-China, were entrusted by Paris with the pacification of Indo-China. Handicapped by the weakness of the home government, Leclerc and Moutet had but little opportunity to pacify or conciliate the determined Vietnamese, and d'Argenlieu was not even so inclined. Policies set in Paris were often implemented in Saigon in traditional fashion and without regard for the sensibilities of the Vietnamese.³⁷

In March, 1947, Emile Bollaert, a Socialist, replaced Admiral d'Argenlieu as High Commissioner. His appointment indicated that Paris was ready to take a more conciliatory tack; but it did not imply, as many believed, that France was preparing to withdraw from the peninsula. No French government could have held office for long in 1947 by advocating the dissolution of the overseas empire. In fact, any government that advocated even a loose, decentralized imperial organization following the British model seriously endangered its political future in France at this time. Even the French Communists opposed withdrawal until 1948. All French political groups were convinced that Indo-China was the keystone of France's prestige in the overseas world and that retreat would certainly bring about the collapse of the French Union.

Numerous efforts were made after the spring of 1947 to end the war.³⁸ On September 10, 1947, France issued a "last appeal" to the Vietnamese. The French terms were that Indo-China should remain within the French Union, but with an increased degree of native control over administration and domestic affairs. France, however, insisted upon controlling military

³⁷ See Devillers, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–65.

³⁸ Consult particularly George Sheldon, "The Unity of Vietnam," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 125–28.

installations in the peninsula and in directing foreign policy. Moreover, the French agreed that an amnesty should be proclaimed and prisoners exchanged. The French government carefully avoided, however, all references to the question of recognizing the government of Ho Chi Minh or of negotiating with it.

It was not long before the Viet-Nam government rejected the French "appeal" in its entirety. On September 12, 1947, the Annamese government appealed for intervention to the United Nations. Deploing the military-political stalemate and the terrible devastation of the land, the Viet-Nam spokesmen recorded their objectives as independence and unity for all three Annamese-speaking provinces, and co-operation within the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union. Blocked by French action, the Viet-Nam appeal could not be seriously taken up in the United Nations (August, 1948). Meanwhile, France sought to break the stalemate by launching a political offensive with Bao Dai as its spearhead.

Bao Dai, the ex-emperor of Annam, had left Indo-China in 1946. Few of his countrymen lamented his departure. On the suggestion of d'Argenlieu, the French in 1947 sought to win the co-operation of the self-exiled monarch. They hoped that Bao Dai might attract non-Communist Vietnamese away from Ho's standard. The ex-Emperor proved to be less tractable than expected. He clearly understood that he could not rally support in Indo-China without taking a nationalist stand, and that he could not afford to antagonize the French by being too rigidly nationalist.³⁹ Before returning to take over his government, Bao Dai received assurances from France that he should have legal jurisdiction over Cochin-China, that the Vietnamese should be permitted to decide on their own regime after the re-establishment of peace and order, and that Viet-Nam would be brought into the French Union as an associated, rather than as a federated, state. It was only in 1949, as the Communists emerged victorious in China, that Bao Dai returned to Viet-Nam and assumed leadership over the new government. At the same time, Ho Chi Minh moved toward closer association with the new Communist government of China.

Bao Dai's return to Indo-China stimulated no general enthusiasm and failed to attract sizable numbers away from Ho's forces. Ho's government continued to collect taxes from Vietnamese and Chinese, sometimes by terror and threats. Although the French forces maintained a precarious hold on the major cities, the rail lines, and main highways, the guerrillas dominated the countryside and descended upon the French in city and country by lightning raids. With the end of 1949 it had become clear that the creation of the Bao Dai regime had not produced a civil war, that the Vietnamese had not deserted Ho, and that the French were

³⁹ Hammer, *loc. cit.*, p. 246.

still faced by hostile forces soon to receive considerable aid from neighboring China. Hereafter, Bao Dai's regime is spoken of as Viet-Nam, and Ho's government is referred to as Viet Minh.

It was at this point that the Indo-China problem provoked serious international concern. Although the French had around 150,000 men under arms and had allocated more than half their military budget to meet the crisis in Indo-China, Ho's forces at mid-century still dominated northern Annam and prevented the establishment of security throughout the rest of the country. The prospect of Ho receiving increased support from China aroused the French to seek counterbalancing aid from the United States. Anxiety increased when Russia on January 31, 1950, announced diplomatic recognition of Ho Chi Minh. The other Communist countries soon followed Russia's lead. While possessing but few economic interests in Viet-Nam, Washington had committed itself to the support of France as the key country in western Europe. The drain upon France's limited resources of men and money at a time when the United States was pouring aid into France caused Washington to turn its attention to the conflict in Indo-China. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and the subsequent Chinese intervention, aroused fears in the United States that Indo-China might become another Korea. Not disposed to sympathize with the colonial aims of France, the United States, nevertheless, feared that the loss of Indo-China would endanger the security of other vital areas in southeastern Asia. The British, too, shared the anxiety of France and the United States, particularly since her position in Malaya would be seriously threatened by a Communist victory in Indo-China.

Convinced that the French were performing notable service in the containment of Communism, the United States and Great Britain recognized the Bao Dai regime as the government of Viet-Nam on February 7, 1950, as well as the pro-French governments of Cambodia and Laos. Thailand shortly followed suit. In Washington, meanwhile, the decision was taken to grant economic and military aid to the Associated States directly and to the beleaguered French. On December 8, 1950, Bao Dai proclaimed the creation of an independent Viet-Nam army. On the insistence of Washington, aid was to be supplied directly to the forces of the Associated States. The delivery of materials to Indo-China was speeded up after the outbreak of the Korean war. The French, meanwhile, began to lose their enthusiasm for the venture in Indo-China, even though American aid increased from a trickle to a flow after the signing of agreements in 1951. At the beginning of 1952 military leaders of France, England, and the United States held conversations in Washington on the situation in Indo-China. Shortly thereafter the United States raised its legations in Cambodia and Viet-Nam to embassy level. In

the summer of 1952, John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, remarked:

. . . it is not often realized that France has spent more in Indo-China than she received through Marshall aid, that for the last seven years one-third of France's professional armed forces have been engaged in Indo-China, and that France is now spending more than a billion dollars a year defending that area. For our part the United States is contributing approximately one-third of the cost of the Indo-China operation. In addition, we maintain there a Military Advisory Mission to assist in equipping the National Armies of the three Associated states [Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos] and the French Union Army.⁴⁰

In the international struggle for power, the Indo-China problem after 1950 increasingly demanded the attention of both sides. Russia repeatedly charged that the Western powers were preparing it as a base for an attack against China.⁴¹ With the passage of time, Ho leaned with greater weight upon the Chinese Communists, although he still possessed widespread support at home.⁴² Mao's regime certainly furnished Ho with both military and psychological aid. While the war in Korea kept the Chinese involved, the amount of aid diverted to the Viet Minh was necessarily limited. The conclusion of a truce in Korea in 1953 had the effect of intensifying the international conflict in Indo-China. However, with American aid, France continued until 1954 to dominate the major strategic centers of the peninsula. But time worked against the French and with their enemies. Finally in the summer of 1954 a truce in the seven and one-half year war was accepted by both sides.⁴³ To the people of Indo-China, however, internal peace and stability still remained hopes of the future.

FEDERATION OF MALAYA

Since the sixteenth century, the Malay peninsula has been viewed from the West as one of the most coveted prizes in the colonial world. Strategically located at a key point for far eastern trade, Singapore and the peninsular states behind it command the sea lanes between Europe and eastern Asia. Singapore, as the seat of Britain's seapower in the Far East, has sheltered one of the largest naval establishments in the world. Besides its strategic and trade advantages, British Malaya also possesses great resources of tin and natural rubber. Truly the heartland of Britain's empire east of India, its strategic location and its great natural wealth force Malaya into the center of the international struggle at present going on for control of tropical Asia.

⁴⁰ See his "United States Policy in Southeast Asia," in Thayer (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴¹ *Pravda*, January 10, 1951.

⁴² Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴³ For discussion of the Geneva Conference of 1954 see *infra*, pp. 705-07.

Unlike their neighbors in Burma, the peoples of Malaya in no wise were so resentful of their British overlords before the Second World War.⁴⁴ If not unconscious of the nationalist and revolutionary movements sweeping surrounding areas, the diverse population of the peninsula at least accepted with comparative equanimity the "benevolent despotism" of their English governors. The failure of a strong nationalism to develop in Malaya before 1940 can be attributed partly to the heterogeneous character of the population. In 1939, for example, the native Malays and the Chinese were about equal in numbers, each group occasionally enjoying the support of an influential minority of Indians. Although the Europeans were few in number, their economic stake and their backing from overseas made it possible for them to dominate the political life of the peninsula. Unity was also hampered by the prevalence of various religious faiths, the Malays being Moslem, the Indians being Moslem and Hindu, the Europeans being Christian, and the Chinese being Buddhist and Taoist. Furthermore, economic differences also prevented the growth of national consciousness. The Europeans and Chinese owned and operated the rubber plantations, the tin mines, and the commercial establishments, and both groups funneled the wealth of Malaya back to their respective homelands. Meanwhile, Malays, Indians, and Chinese worked as laborers on the great plantations, in the mines, and in urban enterprises.

Linked closely to the system of colonial economy was the governmental structure. After the initial endeavors of Sir Stamford Raffles to construct a great empire in southeastern Asia, the British confined their activities to the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Malacca, and Penang) until the second half of the nineteenth century. Frightened that either Siam or France would establish control over the native sultanates of the peninsula, the British sufficiently overcame their aversion to territorial expansion to establish in the late nineteenth century a protectorate over the rich peninsular area. Moving slowly, the British gradually cemented treaty relations with the native sultans that required them to accept the presence of a British resident and to heed his advice on all matters except religion and native customs. By the outbreak of the First World War, the British system of protectorates by treaty had enveloped the whole of the peninsula.

Until 1942, British Malaya was divided into ten separate governments which fell under three different categories of colonial administration.⁴⁵ The Straits Settlements were officially designated a Crown Colony while

⁴⁴ Consult particularly the account by Virginia Thompson in R. Emerson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-81.

⁴⁵ For details see Rupert Emerson, *Malayasia. A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937), pp. 135-93; also consult Lennox A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (Minneapolis, 1942), and R. O. Winstedt, *Malaya and Its History* (London, 1948).

the native states were divided into Federated and Unfederated groups. Essentially the Unfederated states were supposed to enjoy the greatest degree of freedom from British control, but for practical purposes the whole of the peninsula, irrespective of technical differences, was governed as a possession of the British crown.

In Malaya the British omitted the forms as well as the practices of representative government. Officially the British policy was designated as "pro-Malay." To the depression years of the early thirties, the protection of the "politically untutored" resulted in the centralization of political control in the hands of the British hierarchy without serious regard for the aspirations of the large Chinese and Indian groups. During the thirties, a British policy of slow decentralization was inaugurated with the idea of restoring numerous powers to the sultans. In part, decentralization was designed to remove from the central authority the blame for the problems of depression and in part to prepare the Malay population for greater participation in government.⁴⁶ Critics of British policy have frequently denounced its "pro-Malay" character as a British device to maintain authority through encouraging and perpetuating racial (and necessarily economic) animosities.

During the crises of the depression era, the first organized protests were raised in Malaya. Educated Malays blamed the severity of the depression upon the colonial policy of gearing the whole of the area's economy to rubber and tin and not paying sufficient attention to the cultivation of rice. Common poverty in the pre-war decade helped to reduce racial, religious, and economic barriers which had hitherto prevented co-operation. In the face of dire necessity, nationalism thus came into its infancy through the well-nigh universal criticism of what was termed a short-sighted and self-centered colonial economic system.⁴⁷

Nor did the British performance in the Second World War aid the cause of empire among the awakening masses. The failure to provide adequately against a land attack upon the peninsula and Singapore, and the poor performance of the highly touted British navy, erased definitively the legend of "white superiority." The peoples of Malaya, however, found the Japanese taskmaster even more severe, and they resented him correspondingly more than the British. At no time did the Japanese propose the creation of an "independent" Malaya. Like the British, the sons of Nippon treated Malaya strictly as a colony. Thus, when the British returned to Malaya in the final months of the war, they returned almost unaware of what had meanwhile been taking place. They returned to a people determined to free themselves as far as possible from foreign exploitation of every kind.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 312-57.

⁴⁷ See "Britain Faces a New Malaya," *Amerasia*, XI (1947), 11-12.

During the war the British had proposed the organization of a Malayan union and the institution of a common Malayan citizenship. In part, this policy was designed to make the machinery of government less cumbersome and more efficient, and to prepare the way in Malaya for self-government.⁴⁸ The British proposal failed to win approval either in Britain or in Malaya.⁴⁹ Common citizenship was not equated with common nationality, for aliens were not to be required upon taking Malayan citizenship to renounce their former status. Particularly resented was the stipulation that commercial Singapore should remain a crown colony excluded from political union with the producing areas. Moreover, the last vestiges of local sovereignty were to be removed by a forthright declaration of British sovereignty over the nine sultanates that had hitherto been nominally sovereign and independent states. Liberal groups also objected to the failure of the proposal to include provisions for voting and elections. On their side, the Malays objected to common citizenship as weakening their position. Apparently the British proposal was designed to encourage "democratic progress" through a centralized government dominated by British colonial officials. Almost no support could be stimulated for this initial program of Malayan union.

With the withdrawal of the British military government in April, 1946, the critics of British policy became more outspoken. The powerful United Malay Nationalist Organization dominated by middle-class intellectuals and officials fought against the Union and for restoration of the old order, and particularly for the "pro-Malay" policy of former days. Their leader was Dato Onu Bin Jafaar, the premier of Johore. Meanwhile, the small Malay Nationalist Party advocated co-operation among the ethnic groups and proposed a more democratic government than existed before 1941. Simultaneously, the Malayan Communist Party, although numerically small, proposed a program of independence and democratic government. Drawing support from the guerrillas of the Second World War and from the expanding labor unions, the Communists rapidly became more popular among the working classes.⁵⁰

Taking alarm at the widespread nationalist opposition, and particularly concerned about the expansion of Communism in eastern Asia, the British agreed in December, 1946, to scrap their proposal of Union and to permit a committee representing the British and the conservative

⁴⁸ Complete proposal reviewed in Raymond Kennedy, "Status Quo for Malaya," *Far Eastern Survey*, XV (May 8, 1946), 134-37. For the British point of view and quotations from the *White Paper* see Victor Purcell, "A Malayan Union: the Proposed New Constitution," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 20-40. Also see Max Seitelman, "Malaya in Transition," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 109-11.

⁴⁹ Gerald Hawkins, "Reactions to the Malayan Union," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 270-85. Also D. R. Rees-Williams, *ibid.*, XX (1947), 174-78.

⁵⁰ Max Seitelman, "Political Thought in Malaya," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 128-30; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1950), pp. 123-62.

Malay groups to draft a new scheme of federation. On the basis of these proposals, the Federation of Malaya came into being on February 1, 1948. Including an area of about fifty-one thousand square miles and a population of slightly under six millions, the Federation consists of nine states, Penang, and Malacca. These possess close treaty relations with the British crown. The traditional (largely fictional) authority of the sultans is preserved, and qualifications of citizenship for non-Malays are made more rigid. Although a federal regime exists, with headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, it is more representative, but no more responsible, than previous governments. Real authority remains vested in the High Commissioner (the post-war term for Governor-General), but the British promise "that progress should be made towards eventual self-government."⁵¹ In Singapore, technically a crown colony still, responsible government has taken genuine strides forward.

The problems of a plural society continue to plague the rulers of Malaya.⁵² Particularly alarming to the British and Malays has been the steady increase in the numbers of Chinese.⁵³ Although many of the Chinese are wealthy, Malaya inherited from the war the problem of the Chinese squatters. These were Chinese who fled Singapore and elsewhere to escape the Japanese occupation forces. They went into the hinterland and took up subsistence farming. Since they took land illegally and paid no taxes, the Chinese aroused widespread antagonism among the Malays.

The Communists had failed by 1948 in their effort to control the trade unions of Singapore and other cities. Like the Chinese Communists of an earlier date, they then took refuge in the country and began to organize rural revolts. Recruits were not too difficult to find in a land where the wealth was being siphoned off by aliens, and where the shortages and high prices of rice made starvation an unwelcome neighbor.⁵⁴ Although the government statisticians could show that the standard of living had risen steadily since the war, the level of pre-war consumption had not yet been reached by mid-century. General dissatisfaction with the high cost of living played directly into the hands of the Communist minority. The unprotected squatters of the back country also supplied them with converts and supplies, even though both had frequently to be extorted by force. Believing the British to be too weak to root them out, the Communist insurgents boldly attacked plantations, settlements, and towns. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 stimulated them to ever bolder actions. Hoping by terror

⁵¹ As quoted in Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁵² For an interesting commentary on plural societies see Maurice Zinkin, *Asia and the West* (London, 1951), chaps. XII and XIII.

⁵³ Between 1931 and 1947 the Malay population in the Federation increased by 35 per cent while the Chinese advanced by 46.7 per cent (Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 143).

⁵⁴ See V. Thompson and R. Adloff, "Malaya," in Rosinger (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 341-43.

to force the British out, the Communists ambushed constables and other officials and in October, 1951, murdered the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney.

The initial successes of the Communists in Malaya cannot be attributed to widespread resentment of British rule or frustrated nationalism. With the end of the war the British had set about in a deliberate and enlightened fashion to increase production of food, restore tin and rubber output to pre-war levels, revive foreign trade, fight inflation, and pacify the countryside.⁵⁵ These were lengthy and arduous tasks, but the planners were aided by a steady demand for tin and rubber at satisfactory prices. The fundamental complaint against the British was that Malaya's contribution to the Commonwealth's fund of hard American dollars had brought few benefits to Malaya. In response to such demands the government of Malaya in 1950 laid out a Draft Development Plan of comprehensive proportions.⁵⁶ The economic, educational, and social objectives of this plan, if implemented, may have the effect of removing whatever remains of widespread hostility to British rule.

In the meantime the British have dealt vigorously with the Chinese squatters and the insurgents. In the summer of 1950 the government launched a program to resettle the squatters in compounds where they would be protected from the insurgents, and where they could carry on their subsistence farming legitimately. At the beginning of 1952 almost 400,000 squatters had been relocated. While handling this complex of problems, the Federation systematically drove the insurgents deeper into the jungle or wiped them out group by group. Although few in number, the Communists have fought without quarter and in 1955 still constitute a potential menace to Malaya.

Communists outside the peninsula have evidently watched events in Malaya closely. The insurgents have received moral support, if not arms and supplies, from Russia and China. Since 1948, the Soviet Union has become a major buyer of Malayan rubber and has simultaneously urged the Malaysians to boycott and resist the Federation as "a merciless weapon for immortalizing the colonial system."⁵⁷ In March, 1951, the Peking government demanded that Britain should permit a mission from China to examine "the sufferings of overseas Chinese" in Malaya.⁵⁸ In the following month Malaya restricted shipments of rubber to Communist China, although probably without much more than nominal effect.⁵⁹ Even the Communists appear unconvinced,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁵⁶ See Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 142, for details.

⁵⁷ As quoted in Thompson and Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia*, p. 158.

⁵⁸ *New York Times*, March 10, 1951.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, April 12, 1951.

however, that the Malayan revolt has wide popular support or deep roots.

Even though a measure of stability has been achieved in Malaya, agitation for greater unity and freedom continues. Determined to attack the unity problem directly, Dato Onu Bin Jaafar in September, 1951, relinquished his post in the United Malay Nationalist Organization and joined with Chinese leaders to form the Independence for Malaya Party. Upon assuming office on February 7, 1952, Sir Gerald Templer, the new British High Commissioner, promised that Malaya should in due course become a self-governing nation. It seems unlikely that Britain will ever permit Malaya, even if independence is achieved, to secede from the Commonwealth, or that the United States would favor such a move. So long as tin and natural rubber remain essential to the industrial nations, they will certainly seek by all possible means to retain a hold over one of their greatest suppliers.

INDONESIA

South of the Malay peninsula are the islands that were once referred to as the "fabulous Indies." Today more than seventy-five million people live on these thousands of islands, some of which are little more than pin points in the ocean, whereas others, like Borneo, are larger in area than France. Superimposed upon a map of the United States, this huge island group would stretch more than the distance from California to North Carolina, and at its north-south extremes would extend from North Dakota to Texas.⁶⁰ As the world's largest and most profitable island empire, the Indies have for centuries been a coveted economic prize and have been highly valued as well for their proximity to, while being independent of, the Asiatic mainland.

The government of the Indies created by the Dutch in the nineteenth century was highly centralized and under the direct control of a governor-general. Not only were the islands governed closely from Holland, but their economic life was also geared to Dutch needs. The welfare of the native population was largely neglected or ignored. By the end of the century, however, the policy of unmitigated exploitation for the benefit of the mother country gave way to a policy of enlightened self-interest which substituted free enterprise for economic regulation, stressed humanitarian reform, and inaugurated a program of popular education. By 1918 the native population was permitted its own legislative body and was promised an increasingly important voice in government.⁶¹

⁶⁰ For a map of this kind and an excellent general discussion see A. Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies. Its Government, Problems and Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942); also J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India* (Cambridge, 1944).


⁶¹ Consult for details Rupert Emerson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-106; chap. VII of A. Hyma, *The Dutch in the Far East* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1942).

A nationalist movement of strong, but highly divergent, native groups appeared in Java in the early years of the twentieth century. As was the case elsewhere in tropical Asia, the nationalist movement in the East Indies represented many things to many people. Some hoped by education of the natives to stimulate the Dutch government to reform and perhaps to grant an increasingly greater degree of local autonomy; others organized against economic exploitation by all foreigners and sought to awaken national consciousness through boycotts and riots; others concentrated their efforts upon organization of the Moslem population against Christian overlords and infidel exploiters (such as the Chinese). Despite almost continuous agitation, the various nationalist groups were unable before the First World War to challenge effectively the rule of the Dutch or to bestir the patriotic sentiments of the rural population. Moreover, the residents of the other islands suspected that the nationalist movements centered mainly in Java would bring little but ill to the Outer Territories (such as Sumatra and Borneo).

It was in 1920 that the Communists became active in the trade unions and other nativist groups of the Indies. Not many years passed thereafter before Communists were also active in the native legislative assembly. Their efforts at disruption were successful in 1926 and 1927 in stimulating strikes and riots in the urban areas of Java. Such activities evoked a quick and harsh response from the Dutch rulers. The government in Batavia was able to crush the Communist-inspired activities with greater ruthlessness than simpler nativist movements, because the rural population had almost no understanding of, or sympathy for, Marxist theories of revolution and world order. Moreover, the Dutch government, always of necessity conscious of its precarious hold upon the valuable Indies, sensed that neither the native population nor world opinion would react violently to stringent handling of the Communists and their collaborators. The Communists of the Indies were thus forced in 1927 to go underground at about the same time as their compatriots in China.⁶²

As the shadows of world depression lengthened over the wealthy Indies, the reactions of the Dutch and many natives against the nationalist agitators became increasingly more severe and vituperative. Alarm over the "red menace" was particularly acute among those whose economic losses were grave. Suspicion of reform and liberal legislation was widespread. As action usually produces counteraction, so the tightened official policy produced a more determined and less compromising attitude among nationalists of all creeds.

⁶² R. Emerson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-90. Also G. H. Bousquet, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies* (London, 1940), pp. 22-44; and George M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952), chaps. I and II.



Unitary Indonesia

Courtesy of George McT. Kahin. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press

This is not to say that Dutch government of the Indies was as unenlightened as it was uncompromising. Efficient with regard to life's material aspects, the Dutch raised the level of living, laid down roads, railways, and harbors, improved communications, and introduced Western methods of engineering and organization.⁶³ Unlike the English and the French enterprises, however, the colonialism of the Dutch was much closer to the paternalism of the nineteenth century. Although local autonomy was being granted, it was to be at a rate determined by the Dutch rather than by native pressure. Believing firmly that the islands were not ready for self-government, the Dutch refused to bow before popular demand. Those Indonesians who hoped for gradual evolution toward independence were bitterly disappointed by Holland's refusal before the war to entertain their proposals.⁶⁴

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the Netherlands government, having anticipated a Pacific war for five years, declared war on Japan. Although the military program for the Indies was not scheduled for completion until 1944, the Dutch after the fall of Singapore and the Philippines fought sturdily on the seas but unavailingly on land against the superior forces of Nippon. In an effort to win native co-operation, serious discussion of the establishment of an East Indian dominion had been inaugurated even before the Japanese onslaught. During the war the Queen from London promised that the relationship between the motherland and the Indies would be revised. Such indefinite assurances from the exiled ruler were received in Indonesia with skepticism.⁶⁵

As elsewhere in southeastern Asia, the defeat of the Europeans and the occupation of the land by the Japanese had a profound and stimulating effect upon native activity. The responses were particularly dramatic in Java, where the Japanese imprisoned many of the influential Dutch and Eurasians. Such actions impressed upon many of the hitherto apathetic natives that the era of unchallenged white supremacy was over. Although the Japanese were welcomed at first as liberators, it was not long before the Indonesians learned that Japanese overlords were less compromising than the Dutch. The native political leaders used the years of Japanese occupation to prepare the populace for the return of the white man and for independence.⁶⁶

Before the victorious Allied troops could accept the Japanese surrender in Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia had been formally created

⁶³ See J. H. Boeckx, "Economic Conditions for Indonesian Independence," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 394-402; see also the same author's *The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy* (New York, 1946); also J. O. M. Broek, "Man and Resources in the Netherlands Indies," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VI (1945-46), 121-32.

⁶⁴ For details see Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-98.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁶⁶ V. Thompson, "Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, V (1945-46), 200-08.

and had declared its independence on August 17, 1945. Although the Japanese sought to check the revolution, they were not sufficiently certain of their duties to proceed militarily against the Republic. Left to its own devices, the Republic Soekarno and Mohammed Hatta began the establishment of an administration, prepared a constitution, and organized an army. The Republican leaders were heartened by the quick response that greeted their efforts and by the increase in popular determination to remain independent.

The British and Australian soldiers who landed in Indonesia in October, 1945, had been ordered "to maintain law and order until the time that the lawful government of the Netherlands East Indies is once again functioning."⁶⁷ Not prepared to cope with this new Republic, the Allied forces found themselves caught between the Dutch and the native regime. Although the Allies urged negotiation, the returned Dutch were determined to eliminate the Republic by force. In November, 1946, the British withdrew and left the Dutch to work it out alone.

Under considerable pressure from abroad, especially British, the opposing parties initialed on November 15, 1946, the Linggadjati (Cheribon) agreement.⁶⁸ Indicating their common desire to inaugurate "new forms of voluntary co-operation," the Dutch and the Indonesians agreed to this basic document of seventeen articles. The Dutch government specifically agreed to "recognize the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising the *de facto* authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra." Moreover, both signers agreed "to co-operate to ensure the early establishment of a sovereign, democratic state on a federal basis, to be known as the United States of Indonesia." The new federal state was to "comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies" with the safeguard clause added "that, in case the population of any territory . . . should notify . . . that they are not or not yet willing to join the United States of Indonesia, a special relationship to the states and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands can be established for such a territory." In the newly created federal union the component states were designated as "the Republic, Borneo, and the Great East [the islands east of Borneo and Java]." The agreement also provided for the convocation of a democratically chosen assembly charged with the responsibility of drawing up a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.

In an effort to link the various parts of the empire more closely together, the signers proclaimed their desire to establish a Netherlands-

⁶⁷ As quoted in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁶⁸ Complete text and commentary in "U.N. Good Offices Commission in Indonesia," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), pp. 323-36; see H. Isaacs (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 193-97. Commentary in Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story* (New York, 1948).

Indonesian Union "consisting on the one hand of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands West Indies, Surinam, and Curaçao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia." The Union was supposed to have its own administrative organs, and the joint interests of its members were to be guaranteed by the Queen of the Netherlands as the head of the Union. The statutes of the projected Union were to contain mutual guarantees and obligations applying equally to the co-operating parties. It was stated also that the contracting parties "shall endeavor to establish the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union before January 1, 1949." The Dutch also agreed to "take steps . . . after formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization." On their side the government of the Republic undertook to restore to all non-Indonesians within its territories "their rights and their property." Both parties agreed to reduce their armed forces after the conclusion of the agreement, and both agreed to co-operate in the organization of an arbitration committee composed of delegates from the states privy to the agreement.

From the beginning, the Linggadjati agreement was observed mainly in the breach. Ratifications were ultimately exchanged in March, 1947, but implementation of the specific provisions in the agreement failed almost completely. Each side accused the other of bad faith. Instead of the armed forces being gradually reduced, they were augmented as rapidly as possible. The organization of the Indies along federal lines was particularly resented by the Republic, as it provided for an equality between Java and the other states which were not equal either in numbers or wealth. The Republicans looked upon the federal organization as a Dutch device for emasculating the independence movement and for channeling it in directions agreeable to the Netherlands' interests.⁶⁹ As successive efforts at negotiation failed, the Dutch proceeded in July, 1947, without further ado to "restore order" by "police action."⁷⁰ Significantly, their activities centered in the strategically and economically important areas of Java, Madura, and Sumatra; and it was not long before the Republican forces on those islands were cut into small isolated segments. They were unable, however, to crush the Republican army or to cope with the increasing hostility of the native population. Around the Republican areas they drew a tight economic blockade. To the outside world the Dutch minimized the Republican resistance and rejected British and American offers of mediation.

⁶⁹ Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-12.

⁷⁰ *New York Times*, August 31, 1947.

The reaction of the new Asian nations was immediate. Prime Minister Nehru of India declared on July 24, 1947:

What has become of the United Nations Charter? The spirit of new Asia will not tolerate such things. No European country, whatever it may be, has any business to set its army in Asia against the peoples of Asia. When it does so, Asia will not tolerate it.⁷¹

Ultimately, the Indonesian conflict was brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by letters from India and Australia. On August 1, 1947, the Security Council issued a cease-fire order and called upon the disputants to settle their difficulties by peaceful means. Later in the month the Council offered its good offices and the opposing parties accepted. Belgium, Australia, and the United States were designated as arbitrating powers. No arrangements were made by the Security Council to superintend or enforce its cease-fire order. Meanwhile, a report from consular officials at Batavia indicated that military hostilities were still in progress despite the Council's order and despite the official agreement of both parties to truce arrangements.

Negotiations of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations in Indonesia did not commence until the end of October. Talks were held with the disputants on the neutral territory provided by the deck of the U.S.S. "Renville." Consisting of three parts, the Renville agreement was ultimately accepted by the conflicting parties on January 17, 1948.⁷² Truce arrangements provided for the establishment of a demilitarized zone and *status quo* lines. The principles for political discussion and settlement differed considerably from those incorporated in the Linggadjati agreement. They provided for the establishment of a sovereign, democratic, federal United States of Indonesia with sovereignty in the hands of the Dutch "until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia." It was also planned to conduct plebiscites to determine whether the various groups on the main islands wanted to become a part of the Republic or of some other state within the projected federation.

Accusations of bad faith and of violations of truce arrangements again became the order of the day. The Indonesians accused the Dutch of establishing a blockade—military and economic—around the Republic to cut off the new state from access to the outside world and to force it to accept Dutch sovereignty permanently. In July, 1948, the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations, which had remained in the Indies to aid in the implementation of the Renville agreements, published

⁷¹ As quoted in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁷² Complete text and commentary in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, March 14, 1948.

a report substantially confirming the accusations of the Indonesian Republic.⁷³ Since the United States had played a vital role in concluding the Renville agreements, Indonesian hostility toward America mounted, particularly as Marshall Plan aid continued to bolster the Dutch economy in Europe.⁷⁴

The Dutch reply to these serious accusations brought the whole question of Indonesia into the center of the world struggle going on between Communist and non-Communist areas. In their official statements the Dutch insisted after August, 1948, that the Indonesian Republic had been taken over by native Communists determined never to co-operate or compromise.⁷⁵ That the prolongation and intensification of the independence struggle had strengthened the Communists of Indonesia could not be denied. The belief was widely held that the Western powers were not prepared to meet Indonesian demands for independence and that the Communists were. In the internal power struggle that ensued in 1948, the Communists were too weak and divided to challenge effectively the Soekarno leadership. After serious internal disputes, the Indonesian Republic undertook a purge of its Communist elements. The Dutch meanwhile pointed out repeatedly to the Western powers that their military actions in Indonesia should be seen in connection with the kind of tactics being employed by the Communists in Burma, Malaya, and Siam. Conditions in Indonesia were such, however, that the Communists even in the Republic's darkest hour failed to remove the moderate leaders.

In Washington, a policy of waiting for the dust to settle in Indonesia, as in China, dominated the planning of the Truman administration. Fearful of the Communist uprising in Indonesia, Washington inclined toward inaction. Thinking to profit by the dilemma of the great powers, the Dutch on December 11, 1948, announced that "negotiations under the auspices of the Committee [of Good Offices] at this stage are futile."⁷⁶ This unilateral declaration abrogating the Renville agreement was followed by the second Dutch attempt to resolve the Indonesian problem by military means. Using blitz tactics, the Dutch quickly captured the Republican capital of Jogjakarta, took Soekarno, Hatta, and numerous other Republican officials into custody, and proceeded to wipe out elements of the Republican army wherever they could be found.

Thinking to present the United Nations with a *fait accompli*, the Dutch leadership hardly anticipated the immediate adverse reaction of

⁷³ *New York Times*, August 1, 1948.

⁷⁴ Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-50.

⁷⁵ See *News from Indonesia*, a propaganda pamphlet issued periodically by the Netherlands Information Bureau, and particularly the issue for September, 1948. Consult also Virginia Thompson *et al.*, "The Communist Revolt in Java," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (1948), 257-64; also Kahin, *op. cit.*, chap. IX.

⁷⁶ As quoted in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

the world. In all quarters, Communist and non-Communist, the Dutch action contravening the Renville agreements provoked outrage. The Indonesians meanwhile suffered from disillusionment with the United Nations as well as from Dutch arms. While world sympathy for Indonesia grew rapidly, the Dutch took advantage of the time lapse between reaction and action to carry out their program. They evidently hoped that, once Republican resistance had been crushed and a federal state organized, the powers far from the scene of action would accept the Dutch plan as the most viable and would eventually give it sanction.⁷⁷ Indonesia would then receive independence, but on *Dutch terms*. These terms involved the creation of a federal state over which the Dutch would continue to possess an important degree of economic and political control.

The Dutch program failed, however, because of continued and growing Indonesian resistance to the "police action," and because of the determination of the United Nations to have its decisions respected. At the beginning of 1949 the tide began to turn against the Dutch in Indonesia and in world councils. Stimulated by the Asian nations meeting at New Delhi, the Security Council announced the creation of a United Nations Commission for Indonesia with greater powers than those formerly possessed by the Good Offices Committee. It was not, however, until the United States, under pressure from public opinion and interested senators, threatened to halt Marshall Plan aid to Holland that the Dutch abandoned their defiance and agreed to resume negotiations with the Indonesian Republic.⁷⁸

In the spring of 1949 another truce was accepted by both parties, and a Round-Table conference at The Hague was decided upon "with a view to accelerating the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia."⁷⁹ The Dutch, thereafter, withdrew their troops from Republican territory and released the Republican leaders. In liberated Jogjakarta feverish preparations went ahead among the Indonesians to reconcile their internal differences, re-establish contacts with the other Asian nations and the West, and decide upon the strategy to be followed at the projected Round-Table conference.

The meetings at The Hague took place from August 23 to November 2, 1949. Representatives of the Indonesian Republic, the Netherlands, and the Federalist Indonesians laboriously worked out three basic documents. The Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty provided for unconditional, irrevocable, and complete sovereignty for the United States of Indonesia over the entire territory formerly belonging to the Netherlands East Indies except for Western New Guinea. The new government

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 403-07.

⁷⁹ As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 423.

was to be organized along federal lines, including the Republic of Indonesia and fifteen other political units originally established by the Dutch. The second document, a Union Statute, created the Dutch Union with the Queen of the Netherlands its titular head, with a proviso for "the spirit of voluntary and lasting co-operation between the partners," and with a permanent secretariat and a court of arbitration. It was also agreed that conferences should be held at least twice each year between the two governments, particularly on matters of defense, foreign relations, economics, and finance. The third document, an Agreement on Transitional Measures, related mainly to trade relations and debts and provided that the new state should take into account "the special interests of Netherlands nationals and corporate bodies within Indonesia." The Hague documents went into effect on December 27, 1949, and Soekarno became the first president of the new Republic with Hatta as premier. By the end of the following year, the powers had recognized the Republic and admitted it to the United Nations.

After the achievement of independence, Indonesia continued to change rapidly. Feeling ran high that the federal state agreed to at The Hague did not meet Indonesia's requirements. Although the Dutch objected that this contravened the agreements of 1949, the federal system was gradually replaced by a unitary state.⁸⁰ Such an organization, it was felt, would make for greater unity, more efficient use of the few qualified civil servants, and a complete break with the Dutch past. A unitary constitution was promulgated on May 19, 1950, "as a materialization of the concept of the Republic of Indonesia [of 1945]." ⁸¹ On August 15, the present Republic of Indonesia formally came into being with Soekarno continuing as president and with Jakarta remaining the national capital. By this action the political revolution reached completion.

Indonesia has busied itself since independence with striving to gain control over Western New Guinea (Irian to the Indonesians). According to the Hague agreements, this issue was scheduled for solution by the end of 1950. Both claimants continuously insisted until 1952 upon having full sovereignty over Irian. Hence their discussions of the area's future failed. In February, 1952, however, Indonesia proposed studying the possibility of joint administration. Soekarno stated on August 17, 1952, that Indonesia cannot feel secure or "free so long as West Irian remains under foreign occupation." While discussion continues, the Dutch rule in New Guinea. Whether New Guinea would profit more

⁸⁰ Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁸¹ As quoted in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

by association with Holland or Indonesia, or with joint administration, is a complex and highly debatable problem.⁸²

Since 1949, sentiment in Indonesia for abrogation of the Union Statute has mounted steadily. Sensitive to limitations of any kind, the new Republic has felt particularly straitened by the proviso relating to co-operation with the Netherlands in foreign relations. The Irian question has complicated relations between the two states. Holland's clear alignment with the Western powers has also aroused fears in Indonesia that association with the Dutch in foreign affairs would suck Indonesia "into the whirlpool of international disputes."⁸³ Arguing that Indonesia is not in a position to choose sides in the world struggle, Soekarno has committed the new Republic to a policy of strong anti-colonialism in Asia and neutrality in the East-West conflict. Fearing commitment to America's policies, Indonesia refused Mutual Security aid. In recent years, too, Indonesia has moved ever closer to association with India and Burma. This new orientation has practically made impossible the co-operation envisaged in the Union Statute, and in 1952 the Netherlands agreed to consider eliminating it.

Like most of the new states of Asia, Indonesia has been faced since independence with problems of rehabilitation, internal security, administrative reorganization, and economic development. Because the economic status of the peasants improved rapidly during the revolution, the Communists failed to attract large numbers to their program. Scattered revolts, particularly in South Molucca, challenged the new government in 1950. The main political parties have been and remain opposed to Communism. The Mosjumi (Confederation of Moslem groups), organized during the Japanese occupation, favors the establishment of Indonesia as a Moslem state. The issue of religious neutrality may become an issue of major importance whenever elections are held in the future. The government has so far been able to provide stability, civil liberties, and a minimum number of social benefits, although major problems still remain. The Republic has so far managed well, primarily because of the continuous world demand for Indonesia's oil, rubber, and tin.⁸⁴ The success of the government in maintaining advantageous trade relations, in reducing the discrepancies between Indonesia's natural wealth and her human poverty, and in formulating a new set of social and moral values combining the traditional and modern will help to determine Indonesia's future.

⁸² See Bruno Lasker, "Western New Guinea, Past and Future," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 53-59.

⁸³ Quoted from Soekarno's speech of August 17, 1952, as quoted in "Indonesia Takes Stock," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 142.

⁸⁴ Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 160.


THE INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINES

One of the brightest spots in the history of the Pacific area has been the story of American relations with the Philippines.⁸⁵ Having established its control over the archipelago in 1899, the American government prepared the islands systematically for independence even though at an irregular pace. At the outset of the great American experiment in colonialism, the Washington government possessed almost no experience for the sensitive task of ruling other peoples. Profits, strategic military and naval bases, and the need to prove its political maturity to a skeptical world stimulated the United States to adopt for a time a policy of paternalism that was thought by many to run counter to the spirit and teachings of American traditions. Nevertheless, the goal of eventual independence and self-government for the islands was never lost completely from sight, and on July 4, 1946, the Philippines actually became an independent nation.

Numbering over seven thousand islands, the Philippine archipelago is potentially one of the richest areas in the Pacific region. Its population, estimated at 19,500,000 in 1950, is concentrated in eleven of the islands. Of these, Luzon and Mindanao are the most populous and highly developed. Under Spanish and American influence, more than ninety per cent of the islanders adopted Christianity as their faith. In the period of Spanish control, the landholding system of large estates and rural tenancy was imposed on the islands; in the years since 1899 the agricultural system has not altered materially. Like the other peoples of tropical Asia, the Filipinos to 1946 had almost no control over the rich resources of their islands or their own political destiny.

To understand the problems of American-Philippine relations of the post-war years, it is necessary first to examine the tensions that have characterized their relations since 1899. Many of these can be traced to conflicts in the nationalistic ambitions of the two peoples. Long hostile to foreign rule, nationalist sentiment in the islands had taken the form of periodic revolts against Spain. The Filipino leadership had believed that the overthrow of Spanish control would result in immediate independence, and the forces of General Aguinaldo fought against imposition of American control until 1902. With Aguinaldo's capitulation the Americans were able to go ahead unimpeded with their self-imposed task of administering the islands and preparing them for eventual independence. After the first years of settling down had passed, the question of Philippine independence became a hot issue in American domestic

⁸⁵ The standard account is by J. R. Hayden, *The Philippines. A Study in National Development* (New York, 1942); see also the work of a participant, W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1945); a more critical study by David Bernstein, *The Philippine Story* (New York, 1947).



Sergio Osmeña. From Hayden's *The Philippines*, copyright 1942 by
The Macmillan Company

politics. At first, the group who opposed American sovereignty in the islands was relatively small and uninfluential. By the outbreak of the First World War, however, considerable sentiment, idealistic and practical, had developed favoring the establishment of an independent Filipino state. For the most part, the Democratic administrations in Washington favored applying immediately the Wilsonian principle of self-determination to the Philippines. The Republicans, on the other hand, generally favored a longer period of preparation and the strengthening of economic and financial ties before granting independence.

The greatest center of agitation for independence was in the Filipino elective assembly. After considerable delay, the first popularly elected legislative body had convened in Manila in 1907. Most articulate in the new assembly was Sergio Osmeña, the leader of the Nationalist Party. Standing strongly for independence as soon as possible, the Nationalist Party represented the thought and opinion of the leading economic and social groups in the islands. Nor were these leaders of Philippine independence inclined to view with equanimity the oft-repeated intentions of eventual benevolence. They agitated in the islands and in Washington for greater immediate participation by natives in government and in business.

Some of the Filipino demands were met in 1909 by the opening of the American market to their products, such as sugar, abacá (Manila hemp), copra, and tobacco. While such commodities entered America without tariff duties, manufactured goods from the United States were equally duty-free on the Filipino market. Such an arrangement had the effect of transforming the simple subsistence economy of the islanders into an economy producing cash crops for consumption in America. With the passage of years the insular economy became increasingly dependent on the vagaries of the American market, and less able to meet financial problems by local action. The reliance upon the American economy also helped to sustain the old system of land tenure and prevented the diversification of the economy through the development of secondary industries.

The leading Filipino representative in Washington during these early years was Manuel Quezon, the Filipino delegate in Congress. It was due in part to his tireless agitation and in part to the liberalism of Woodrow Wilson's regime that the Jones Act was approved by the Congress in 1916. Promising independence, but without a definite date, this revolutionary act abolished the Philippine Commission that had hitherto managed the affairs of the archipelago and provided for the opening of governmental offices to natives in an effort "to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without impairing the sovereignty of the United

States." Throughout the remaining years of the Wilson administration, posts in the insular government were transferred as fast as possible to Filipinos.

With the turning of the political tide in America after the First World War, the progress toward self-government was checked in the belief that the Filipinos were not yet ready for independence. In 1924, Governor-General Leonard Wood expressed the following opinion:

I sympathize deeply with the desire of the Filipino people for independence but know that they are not yet prepared to assume its responsibility, either from the standpoint of instructed public opinion, preparedness for defense, common language, or economic resources.⁸⁶

Despite the reluctance of the Republican governments to expand the area of self-government, material progress continued apace as the Philippine economy became increasingly tied to America. It is also important to observe that independence was not favored in the Philippines by all of the great landowning and business interests. They feared the lowering of the American flag would be taken by the masses as a signal for revolutionary uprisings.

Despite opposition in the islands and in America, an Independence Mission was dispatched to Washington in 1931 headed by Osmena and Manuel Roxas. After two years of labor with congressional committees, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act finally became law early in 1933 over the veto of President Hoover. Meanwhile, the dissatisfaction of Filipino business and political interests with the economic provisions of the new bill had become violent. Led by Quezon, the interests opposing the terms of the act garnered enough strength in the Philippine legislature to turn it down in spite of the fact that it set a definite date for independence.⁸⁷

With the victory over the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, Quezon hurried back to Washington to continue negotiations for independence on terms not so disadvantageous to the Philippine economy. The result of these negotiations with the new Roosevelt administration in Washington was the Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law (Tydings-McDuffie Act).⁸⁸ Despite Quezon's efforts the economic restrictions of the earlier congressional act were perpetuated in the new act of 1934. Free trade, but on a quota basis, was continued until 1940 for Filipino exports to the United States. American products were to enter the islands duty-free for the same period. After 1940 a graduated tariff system was designed to go into effect until the achievement of independence in 1946. Filipino fears about such a program were mitigated somewhat by formal assur-

⁸⁶ As quoted by Forbes, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

⁸⁷ For details see Hayden, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-65.

⁸⁸ Text in *ibid.*, Appendix I.

ances from President Roosevelt that "imperfections and inequalities" could be ironed out, if necessary, at a later date. Six weeks after the Philippine legislature accepted the new law (May 1, 1934) Quezon and his supporters were confirmed in their action by winning a sweeping victory in the general elections.

The new law also provided for the establishment of a constitutional government to be "republican in form." Until 1946 the interim government should recognize among other requirements that allegiance was still owed to the United States, that the foreign relations of the islands should still be conducted from Washington, and that American military installations and reservations should continue their activities in the islands. The new constitution had to be approved by the President of the United States before being submitted to electoral ratification by the islanders.

The new constitution became the supreme law of the new Commonwealth in February, 1935.⁸⁹ With certain relatively minor differences it was an adaptation of the American constitution. The major emphasis, however, was upon a centralized rather than a federal government. This made it possible for the reunited Nationalist Party, under the vigorous guidance of Quezon and Osmeña, to dominate affairs. Plagued by agrarian and commercial problems of constantly increasing seriousness, the Nationalist regime nevertheless enjoyed broad popular support.

The new Commonwealth was shortly faced by the renewal of war in China, and by the concomitant prospect of a possible Japanese drive southward. Under the able direction of General Douglas MacArthur the new Filipino army was meanwhile in process of being organized and co-ordinated into what tentative Pacific defense plans the United States possessed. When the attacks came in 1941, many of the Filipinos fought as vigorously and patriotically as their American compatriots. Filipino political leaders took refuge in the United States after the capitulation and established a government-in-exile in Washington. Moreover, during the long years of Japanese occupation after Bataan and Corregidor, the remnants of the Filipino army continued to resist the Nipponese by guerrilla activity and by sabotage. It was during these years that the People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army (the Hukbalahap in Tagalog) was organized. Although the Japanese endeavored to win the support of the people, the collaborators were limited to a relatively few political opportunists and profiteers. The masses, despite bitter disappointments and heavy losses, retained their faith in the ultimate triumph of America.⁹⁰

During the war years, President Quezon died and his mantle in the government-in-exile fell upon Osmeña. With the liberation of the archi-

⁸⁹ Text in *ibid.*, Appendix II.

⁹⁰ Maxim M. Kalaw, "Filipino Opposition to the Japanese," *Pacific Affairs*, XVIII (1945), 340-45.

pelago Osmeña returned to his damaged country and began the extremely difficult task of dealing with the victorious American army, of seeking out and endeavoring to punish the collaborators, and of getting the long and tedious program of rehabilitation under way. As elsewhere, the Japanese had sponsored a native regime in the Philippines. The main figures in this puppet regime were José Laurel and Manuel Roxas. Upon Osmeña's return, a struggle for power began. Particularly difficult for Osmeña and his group to comprehend was the determination of General MacArthur to support Roxas. Not impressed by Osmeña as a leader, MacArthur cleared Roxas by vouching that he had acted as an intelligence agent for the Americans during the Japanese occupation. Roxas' election to the presidency in 1946 was aided considerably by MacArthur's support. It was Roxas who was in power when independence came.

The problem of reviving the archipelago's economic life was most imperative. Damage to the cities, such as Manila, had been extensive. Prices spiraled as consumer's goods continued for a long time to be exceedingly scarce. Black marketeers profited at the expense of the hungry and the homeless. It was virtually impossible for the government to collect taxes and almost equally impossible for it to function without money. Aid and war damages were sent from America but not in large enough quantities.

In an effort to help in the recovery of the islands and to establish a basis for American trade relations with the independent Philippines, Rehabilitation and Trade Acts were promulgated by President Truman on April 30, 1946, slightly more than two months before the islands were granted their independence.⁹¹ The linking of rehabilitation aid and the preferential trade act excited widespread controversy in both countries. The Filipinos were placed in a position where they felt compelled to accept the Trade Act in order to receive the badly needed economic aid. The Trade Act provides for an adjustment period of twenty-eight years during which the islands will enjoy a preferential position with regard to the American tariff. The object of this measure was to make political independence effective through helping to provide economic stability by giving the Filipinos the security of the American market. Actually, the integration of the two economies had been made tighter during the war years so that complete and immediate severance would probably have resulted in economic chaos for the islands. The general effect of the act is to revive the trading regulations of pre-war years. Most resented was the stipulation that Americans should have equal rights with Filipinos in the development and use of natural resources. Since this

⁹¹ Discussion of their repercussions in the Philippines in Shirley Jenkins, "Great Expectations in the Philippines," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 169-74; consult also the same author's article, "Financial and Economic Planning in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, XXI (1948), 33-45.

"parity" provision ran counter to the Filipino constitution, a nationwide referendum had to be held to amend the supreme law in accordance with the American requirement of equal rights. Finally, the whole program is hinged to the stipulation that Americans should continue to possess a preferential economic position in the islands until 1974.

As a follow-up to the proclamation of Philippine independence and the Trade Act was the conclusion on March 21, 1947, of a five-year military assistance agreement and the granting to the United States of a ninety-nine year lease on fifteen naval and military bases in the islands. An American military mission was also dispatched to the Philippines to aid and advise the independent army. By such agreements the United States continues to exercise powerful economic, political, and military influence over Filipino affairs.

Urgent domestic problems have continued to plague the Philippines since independence. Aside from the economic problems attending rehabilitation, the government has been faced with the pacification of central Luzon. Here the discontented peasantry under Communist leadership established a stronghold euphemistically called Huklandia. Determined to make independence bring with it basic economic and social changes, the "Huks" sought for a time to work within the government. Despairing of success by pressure and legal means, the "Huks" in 1948 defied the government and resorted to terror and military action. In 1950, they constituted themselves as the National Liberation Forces and called for the overthrow of the bourgeois regime, the elimination of landlordism, and the expulsion of the American imperialists. Like other Communist movements in Asia, they avowedly began working for a "new democracy as a stage of transition on the road to full Communism."⁹²

Faced by internal upheaval, the government has sought to find answers to its complex economic and social problems by increasing production and trade, by planning a program of industrialization, and by military action against Communism. The death of Roxas in 1948 brought into power Elpidio Quirino, a new leader of the Liberal party. Such changes in government, however, should not be viewed as bringing new economic, social, or ethnic groups to the foreground. Both of the major parties, the Nationalists and Liberals, represent the urban business interests and the large landholders. Opposition to the government has usually been viewed as treasonable. Shackled with corruption and inefficient administration, the Manila government has not produced since independence the leadership, the administration, or the unified intentions necessary to carry through the fundamental reforms that must eventually appear if stability and order are to be achieved.

⁹² As quoted in Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

American and Filipino concern over developments in the Philippines led in 1950 to the organization of an economic survey mission under Daniel W. Bell. The report of the Bell mission⁹³ clearly pointed out the failure of the Filipinos (and of the American government before) to provide adequately for its citizens' welfare from the islands' abundant resources. Inefficient production and very low incomes, according to the Bell report, constitute the country's basic economic problems. Inequalities in income, the deteriorating position of the country in foreign payments, and the failure to diversify production also were censured. Although the Bell group advocated higher income taxes, little progress in that direction has so far been recorded.⁹⁴ While the Bell report recommended supervised aid from America, Filipino nationalists railed against supervision as an infringement on sovereignty.

While resisting outside interference in domestic affairs, the Quirino government supported America's international policies consistently.⁹⁵ The close association of the major economic and political groups in the islands with the United States and the omnipresent fear of the "Huks" has led the government to take a strong anti-Communist stand and to work positively for Pacific security. Unlike Indonesia, the Philippine Republic has not sought to remain neutral. In 1949, Quirino made an abortive attempt to organize an anti-Communist alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. In the United Nations, Carlos Romulo has taken a prominent place. After the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, Quirino sent a contingent of troops to fight with the United Nations. At home, meanwhile, under the able leadership of Ramon Magsaysay, the Minister of the Interior, a concerted attack upon the "Huks" reduced their threat to insignificance. As further security for the Philippines, a mutual defense treaty was signed with the United States on August 30, 1951, that provides for common action against a common danger.

Treaties and internal police action will alone produce no security for the Philippines. Concerted efforts to eliminate corruption in government, to reduce inefficiency in administration and production, to diversify agriculture, and to win a better balance of international payments, higher tax revenues, and greater equality in incomes are essential to continuing stability and development. Gratifying improvements in the elections of 1951 over those of 1949 constitute a step in the direction of greater democracy and orderly processes of change.⁹⁶ The defeat of Quirino and the election of the independent Magsaysay in 1953 provided

⁹³ *Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines* (Washington, October 9, 1950).

⁹⁴ See Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁹⁵ See Shirley Jenkins, "Philippines," in Rosinger (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 403-04.

⁹⁶ James J. Dalton, "Ins and Outs in the Philippines," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 117-23.

evidence of the islands' improved political stability.⁹⁷ Too frequently, however, Filipino leaders of the movement for independence have failed to realize that the independence fight is over and that the tough work of independent existence has just begun.

THE LESSER ISLAND GROUPS OF THE PACIFIC

The history of colonial Oceania in the twentieth century has reflected with remarkable clarity the rise and eclipse of great empires. In 1898, when the United States secured its hold upon the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and the eastern part of the Samoan group, Germany was permitted to purchase the remnants of Spain's colonial empire. During the First World War the Japanese navy took advantage of Germany's preoccupation in Europe to divest her of her Pacific empire in Micronesia. In the negotiations following the war, Japan was permitted to hold the former German possessions (the Carolines, Marianas, Marshalls, and the Bismarck Archipelago) under mandate to the League of Nations.⁹⁸ Although officially a Class C mandate, for practical purposes the island groups of the northern Pacific were annexed as an appendage to the expanding Japanese empire. The independence of Japan's administration can be most clearly brought out by mentioning that, after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), she continued to hold the islands and proceeded forthwith to fortify them as Pacific outposts of empire.

In general, American statesmen from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt were aware of and hostile to the strategic position which possession of the Pacific mandate accorded to Japan.⁹⁹ The islands became a vital point of issue as tensions between the two Pacific powers grew more intense. Japanese possession of Micronesia was of increased strategic importance after the Washington conference arrangements had placed a ban upon American, as well as Japanese, naval fortifications in the Pacific islands. Naval circles in America remained suspicious thereafter that Japan was not living up to the provisions of the mandate and that fortification was going on even before 1933. These suspicions were rendered particularly acute upon Japan's repeated refusals to permit the United States to send visiting naval vessels into the ports of the mandated islands.¹⁰⁰

Although wary of Japan, American naval strategy was based in the years before Pearl Harbor upon strengthening of American bases in the

⁹⁷ See Donn V. Hart, "Magsaysay: Philippine Candidate," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 67-70, for a picture of the man.

⁹⁸ On this important topic see Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), and Paul H. Clyde, *Japan's Pacific Mandate* (New York, 1935).

⁹⁹ Earl S. Pomeroy, "American Policy Respecting the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas, 1898-1941," *Pacific Historical Review*, XVII (1948), 49; also Werner Levi, "American Attitudes towards Pacific Islands, 1914-1919," *Pacific Historical Review*, XVII (1948), 55-64.

¹⁰⁰ See Pomeroy, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

western Pacific. Concern over the exposed position of the Philippines, Guam, and Midway stimulated discussion in the United States, and eventually action, on naval fortifications. It is, however, a notable fact that almost nothing had actually been completed by December, 1941. When Japan attacked, America's Pacific outposts were virtually as they had been twenty years before.

American planning and construction had been centered in the Hawaiian Islands. Located at the crossroads of Pacific trade, and situated strategically for command of the eastern Pacific, the history of the Hawaiian Islands since 1898 has been linked intimately to the growth of America as a world power. Although best known perhaps as a haven for tourists, the islands have also become an important cog in America's economic machinery, particularly after sugar and pineapple production advanced at a rapid rate. As the economy of the islands became increasingly dependent upon such export commodities, the American market became absolutely essential to Hawaii and ties between the islands and the mainland became correspondingly closer.¹⁰¹ Simultaneously, the problems of labor and capital also hit the islands, and the economy since 1945 has been handicapped by numerous strikes. With the establishment of closer economic and social bonds between the islands and the "states," agitation for Hawaiian statehood became an important political issue. So far, however, it has not been granted, although progress has steadily been recorded.

With the victory of the United Nations in the Second World War, the future of the oceanic regions again became a matter of international concern. In the islands themselves life had been changing rapidly during the last generation.¹⁰² Stirred by new needs and hopes, the indigenous peoples strayed far from their traditional ways of life. Contact with Westerners and Japanese, in peace and in war, served to stimulate their ambitions and to challenge their established customs. Even though living in a region distinctly colonial, the indigenous peoples have come to resent control from the outside and decisions from afar. Although it was hoped that the mandate system would help to guarantee progressive government, such was generally not the case under Japan. With these factors in mind, the statesmen of the world again approached the problem of the dependent areas immediately after the Second World War.

As early as the Yalta conference, the major powers had agreed that a Trusteeship System should replace the system of mandates. At the San Francisco conference, it was emphatically brought out that the welfare of dependent areas should properly be a matter of international con-

¹⁰¹ James H. Shoemaker, "Hawaii Emerges from the War," *Pacific Affairs*, XIX (1946), 182-92.

¹⁰² Consult especially Felix M. Keesing, *The South Seas in the Modern World* (New York, 1941); also Douglas L. Oliver, *The Pacific Islands* (Cambridge, 1951).

cern. Their vital importance as sources of manpower and supply, as strategic military, naval, and air bases, and their potentiality as markets brought them into the discussions of even the most exalted. Finally, in the Charter of the United Nations provision was made for a Trusteeship System based upon *international responsibility* for the administration and supervision of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

In November, 1946, the United States proposed in the United Nations Security Council that it should be given the trusteeship of the islands formerly under mandate to Japan.¹⁰³ Strikingly enough, no mention was made in the American proposal about other islands formerly held by Japan, such as the Liu-ch'ius (Ryukyus), the Bonin-Volcanos, and the Marcus. In 1954, most of these still remained under American military occupation with their future undetermined.¹⁰⁴ After bitter discussion, the Council granted to the United States the terms of its proposal and with but few modifications. Approved on April 2, 1947, the Trust Agreement provided for the establishment of the Territory of the Pacific Islands under the administration of the United States. For all practical purposes the trust territory has been administered as a part of the United States even though it is legally under the ultimate jurisdiction of the United Nations. Moreover, the United States possesses the right "to establish naval, military, and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory; to station and employ armed forces in the territory; and to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory." In addition, the United States as the administering power has the obligation to "promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples." The United States has also undertaken to promote economic advancement, to protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of the population, and to aid in the development of education.¹⁰⁵

Under control of the American navy the new "territory" has been developed in the post-war years mainly as a naval and air base centering around the Saipan-Tinian-Guam area. So far little has been done to hasten the overwhelming task of rehabilitation. Social and economic reconstruction from the ravages of war and post-war neglect is far from advanced.¹⁰⁶ A few projects for education have been launched, but progress has been slight. Lacking experience in colonial administration, the naval officers assigned to the isolated islands were overwhelmed by

¹⁰³ Text in *New York Times*, November 7, 1946.

¹⁰⁴ See Ralph D. Braibanti, "The Outlook for the Ryukyus," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 73-78.

¹⁰⁵ See particularly Francis B. Sayre, "American Trusteeship Policy in the Pacific," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* (June, 1948), 46-48; also John C. Vincent *et al.*, *America's Future in the Pacific* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1947).

¹⁰⁶ Consult editorial in the *New York Times*, January 21, 1948.

a multitude of strange problems. They were further handicapped by the lack of general directives from Washington. After 1947, the question of administration for America's Pacific possessions provoked a policy battle in Washington between the Navy and Interior departments. The Navy claimed that it needed to rule the Micronesians for purposes of naval security; the Department of the Interior felt that the Micronesian civilians should come under civilian authority. In 1950, President Truman decided on a gradual transfer of authority from the Navy to the Interior. The first step in this program was achieved with the decision on August 1, 1950, to grant American citizenship to the 26,000 inhabitants of Guam, to place the island under a civil governor, and to permit a limited amount of self-government. Since 1953, the American Trust Territory has been administered by a High Commissioner, Frank E. Midriff, with headquarters in Honolulu.¹⁰⁷

While the United States took over Micronesia, the British and French in the southern Pacific region returned to their old stands. As with the Americans, the Europeans in the Pacific acted beneficently toward the indigenous peoples so long as such acts did not run counter to their national interests. It was the Australians and New Zealanders who proposed in 1947 the establishment of a South Pacific Commission to the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Holland. Limited in its discussions to problems relating to the economic and social welfare of the island peoples, the Commission established headquarters near Noumea in French New Caledonia and launched in 1948 a two-year program. Although not an agency of the United Nations, this regional commission acts as an advisory body to the South Pacific administrations. In April-May, 1950, a conference of islanders from fifteen territories met at Suva on Fiji Island. This was the first time in history that spokesmen from these scattered territories met to discuss their common economic, social, and health problems.¹⁰⁸

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY

The defeat of Japan left numerous political vacuums in tropical Asia and Oceania. As the victorious powers accepted the Japanese surrender, awareness mounted that a new sense of nationalism and agitation for social and economic change pervaded the former colonial area. Under the leadership of India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Asian nations themselves took steps toward regional co-operation. In March, 1947, representatives from twenty-five Asiatic nations held an Inter-Asian

¹⁰⁷ For Midriff's report of 1954 to the UN Trusteeship Council see *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXXI (1954), 96-109.

¹⁰⁸ See Felix M. Keesing, *The Pacific Island Peoples in the Postwar World* (Eugene, Ore., 1950), pp. iii; 35-36.

Relations Conference at New Delhi. The exploratory discussions at this session brought out clearly that the Asian nations had similar problems that might require similar solutions. In January, 1949, a second conference was called at New Delhi to discuss matters of common concern, particularly the struggle between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. Since 1949, Nehru has sought repeatedly to establish a permanent organization for the promotion of Asian unity. In the divided world of mid-century, however, the creation of an Asian bloc uncommitted to either side in the world struggle has so far not been realized. In the newly independent countries, reliance on economic ties with the industrial countries has forced the Asian states to realize that more than geographical propinquity and common problems are required to promote regional unity. The Asian nations have nevertheless served notice on the rest of the world that they will no longer permit the Western nations and Russia exclusively to call the cadence in international affairs.

Until 1949 the Western nations either permitted events in southeastern Asia to follow their own course or sought to restore their pre-war regimes. At the end of the war the rush to disarm and return to normalcy in the United States left tropical Asia alone with its problems of nationalism, colonialism, and Communism. The swift advance of Communism in Europe forced the United States to take action in Europe. From 1947 to 1949 the Truman administration concentrated upon containing Communism and revitalizing the European states through Marshall Plan aid. In eastern Asia the United States meanwhile failed to assume the leadership expected by the nationalists in their fight for self-determination. Committed to support of the French and Dutch economies in Europe, Washington planners sacrificed good will among Asia's nationalists by initially supporting the colonial powers.¹⁰⁰ The rapid progress of European rehabilitation and the victory of the Communists in China in 1949 stimulated the United States to take positive measures in Asia.

In his inaugural address of 1949, President Truman proclaimed as Point 4 of his speech "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." Recognizing that the problems of underdeveloped areas were more complex than the revitalizing of the European economy, Truman asked for the co-operation of other countries and the United Nations in pooling resources and skills in "a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom." Disavowing all attachments to the old imperialism, the President announced "a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural

¹⁰⁰ For a critical discussion of America's "Europe-first" policy see George McT. Kahin, "Postwar Problems in the Southeast Asia Policy of the United States," in Thayer (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 34-39.

resources," with the end of achieving "the decent satisfying life that is the right of all people."¹¹⁰

Such a program of economic and technical development produced a ready response in the new countries of Asia. Although exhibiting highly different sets of traditions and problems, the new states of tropical Asia had all chosen to establish democratic and parliamentary forms of government. To give their democracy a social and economic content, the leaders, inept and opportunistic as many of them are, have slowly come to realize that foreign aid is necessary. The growth of native Communist movements and the determination of the Soviet Union to aid the expansion of Communism into backward areas are foremost among the factors prompting the new political leadership to view the Point 4 program cordially. Many of the new states, however, are determined to retain their freedom of action even while accepting technical aid. Whether they will be able to remain uncommitted in the world struggle probably depends upon numerous world developments far beyond their power to control.

The Point 4 program stimulated widespread activity in 1949 in Western educational¹¹¹ and governmental circles. With discussion it became increasingly apparent that a long-term program of the kind envisaged by the President would require patience, diligent preparation, and a relatively high degree of military security in eastern Asia. The British Commonwealth followed the American lead by holding a meeting of Commonwealth ministers from January 9 to 14, 1950, at Colombo in Ceylon. Here it was decided to launch a co-operative program for economic development of southeastern Asia, particularly Burma and Malaya. In May, 1950, the United States dispatched a mission to southeast Asia under Allen Griffin. On the recommendation of the Griffin group an immediate aid program for technical and economic development under the Economic Coöperation Administration (E.C.A.) was decided upon. Indo-China, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Malaya were listed as the countries most in need of such immediate aid. This was followed in October, 1950, by a Commonwealth decision to work out their aid program over a six-year period. The Colombo plan went into effect on June 30, 1951.¹¹²

Since the taking of these basic decisions, the business of implementing them has preoccupied the powers. Many problems in practical diplo-

¹¹⁰ See the speech as reproduced in the State Dept. Publication, *In Quest of Peace and Security* (Washington, 1951), pp. 95-96.

¹¹¹ Southeastern Asia area programs were shortly set up at the University of Pennsylvania and Cornell. Many other institutions introduced work on underdeveloped areas into their curricula. This pattern was also followed in England and the Netherlands. France has long concentrated on Indo-Chinese problems both in research and teaching. An excellent symposium was held in 1949 at the University of Chicago, the proceedings of which are included in Philips Talbot (ed.), *Nationalism and Regionalism in South Asia* (Chicago, 1949).

¹¹² The official version of the Plan is reported in *The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia* (London, 1950).

macy and economic planning have since had to be worked out with the countries concerned. Not the least of these has been the sensitivity of the new nations to supervision. At a conference held at Baguio in the Philippines, seven of the nations of southeast Asia in May, 1950, asserted their determination to be heard and demanded that the great powers should take no action affecting countries in the Far East without first consulting the Asiatic nations. Since 1951, American aid agreements have been signed with Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia.

While economic planning moved ahead, the need for military security against Communism became imperative. Development without security and stability became impossible to consider. Although Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced¹¹³ on January 12, 1950, that the nations of southeast Asia were "on their own" and that the United States would fight only if Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines were threatened, the determination to prevent Communism from expanding into continental southeast Asia has increasingly become a fundamental factor in Western strategy. The more vigorous military approach to the problems of southeast Asia was stimulated markedly by the North Korean attack on South Korea in June, 1950. Before the end of 1950 Washington had decided to grant substantial aid to the French and Bao Dai in their fight against the Viet Minh.

In May, 1951, American, British, and French military leaders met in Singapore to discuss joint strategy for the defense of southeast Asia. This was followed in July, 1951, by the conclusion of a Pacific defense treaty including the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.¹¹⁴ The basic difference between the Anzus Pact (as it is popularly called) and the North Atlantic Pact is that the latter does not commit the signatories to armed support of each other in case of attack. It has also been criticized as too limited in membership to act effectively in meeting the dangers of Asiatic Communism. Orientals have bitterly denounced it as a white man's pact that fails to provide security for the new Asiatic states. Australian laborites, not particularly impressed by the threat of Communism, have criticized it as bringing the continent "down-under" in too close a relationship with the American program of making Japan the sentinel of Asia. Fear of Japanese expansion in the future continues to plague the white countries of the Pacific region. Despite such misgivings, the signatory powers met at Honolulu in August, 1952, to discuss their common problems and to organize a Pacific Defense Council. India and Japan, as the two most important Pacific nations not included in the

¹¹³ *New York Times*, January 13, 1950.

¹¹⁴ Discussion of the implications of this treaty in E. D. L. Killen, "The Anzus Pact and Pacific Security," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXI (1952), 137-41.

treaty, continue to criticize it as too limited in membership and scope to provide the type of regional co-operation and security necessary to healthy development of the area. The Philippines, too, have been clamoring for admission to the Defense Council.

Possessing economic and military weapons against Communism, the Western powers have but recently begun to work on the development of psychological weapons.¹¹⁵ The disillusionment with the United States that set in after the war in Indonesia and Indo-China, especially, still pervades the atmosphere. The suspicion remains that the economic programs are economic imperialism in disguise, and that the white powers are fundamentally still interested in Asia for purposes of exploitation. Nor did the conclusion of the Anzus Pact without Oriental membership, or the United Nations air attacks in Korea, diminish the feeling of racial hostility. Through the Office of International Information the State Department has sought to reassure the Asiatics about American intentions through motion pictures, radio broadcasts, and printed materials. In May, 1951, an unofficial Committee for a Free Asia was organized in San Francisco to help in the psychological struggle in Asia. The objective in American propaganda so far has been directed toward convincing Asiatics that the Western powers are genuinely interested in working with the new governments and indigenous movements of Asia in the common struggle to raise the standard of living and remain free of totalitarian control.

The Communists, meanwhile, have not remained inactive or complacent. In April, 1950, the Far Eastern Liaison Bureau of the Cominform called upon fellow Communists to help sabotage the Point 4 program by halting American shipments of aid, by paralyzing communications in Asia, and by organizing paramilitary units in the new states of Asia.¹¹⁶ During the same period the Peking regime announced that it would do "its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad," and it attacked the anti-Chinese policies of the independent regimes of southeastern Asia.¹¹⁷ On December 9, 1951, the Russians proclaimed a seven-point program of encouraging nationalism, organizing United Fronts, preparing for transition to full Communism, and establishing close relationships with the Soviet Union.¹¹⁸ After 1951, the Chinese Communists regularly increased their aid to the Viet Minh. Unprepared to offer the new regimes financial aid, the Communists have had to rely upon organizing the distressed peasantry of southeastern Asia into resistance units. At the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference held at Peking in October, 1952, the Communists were forced

¹¹⁵ See Ball, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-05.

¹¹⁶ *New York Times*, April 13, 1950.

¹¹⁷ As quoted in Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 693.

¹¹⁸ As reported in Allison, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

to adjourn without producing much except a series of propaganda bar-rages against "American imperialism."

The international conflict in Asia has become progressively bitter since the war. Divided for a time in their objectives, the Western powers moved gradually toward the establishment of common objectives. The common effort in Korea helped to prepare the Western states for working out new arrangements for the remainder of Asia. The continuation of the war in Indo-China was particularly troublesome to the French and their Western colleagues. While sharing the French view that Indo-China must not fall to Communism, Great Britain and the United States urged the French to permit greater independence as the first step on the road to reconciliation. After the truce in Korea was concluded, the peninsula became the focal point of the international struggle in Asia.

For a time in 1953 it appeared as if the international struggle in Korea might have its locale transferred to Indo-China. None of the powers, however, seems to have had much enthusiasm for a prolonged test of strength in southeastern Asia. The diplomats still continued to talk about the general political conference agreed to in connection with the Korean truce. However, the great obstacle to convoking such a conference remained—the uncertain status of Communist China in international affairs. No power seriously believed that the troublesome problems of the Far East, such as those involving Korea, Indo-China, and Formosa, could be successfully resolved without the participation and agreement of Mao's China. In the United States, however, public and official sentiment continued to be firm in the conviction that Communist China should not be recognized, should not be given China's seat on the Security Council, and should not be permitted to dominate the politics of the Far East. While the United States professed such convictions, neither the American public nor its government was willing to implement such professions by arms. After the bitter experience of the Korean war, the United States was not willing to fight for the French cause (dubious as it was) in Indo-China. Washington, on the other hand, remained reluctant to acknowledge that Communist China had successfully "shot its way" into the international picture and that it would necessarily have a determining voice in the achievement of any future far eastern settlement.

It was while peace hung in the balance that secret conversations on European affairs were being held in Berlin during January and February, 1954. At these conferences Russia continued to insist that Communist China should be invited to participate in a general conference on world problems. While refusing to admit Mao's China to such a general council, the Western powers agreed on February 18 to a conference with China limited to far eastern problems. Such a concession was made largely at the insistence of France. After seven years of war in Indo-

China, the French were determined to achieve a settlement before going ahead with their commitments in Europe. The United States overcame its reluctance sufficiently to agree to the convocation of a conference at Geneva scheduled to begin on April 26. It was understood, however, that it should be a meeting of the four major powers to which the interested Asiatic states should be invited to send representatives for the purpose of resolving the Korean and Indo-Chinese issues. On the insistence of Washington it was further agreed that an invitation to the Communist regimes to participate in the discussions should not "be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded." It was under such inauspicious and strained circumstances that the world awaited a meeting of minds in 1954.

In the interim between the Berlin and Geneva conferences, the tempo of war in Indo-China was stepped up. With aid from China, the Viet Minh in the spring of 1954 forced the French to a showdown in the delta of the Red River. The strangulation of the strategic French fortress of Dienbienphu enhanced the Communists' bargaining strength at Geneva and forced the Western powers to recognize that the Communists could not be checked by threats and sword-rattling. In the United States, meanwhile, fears were expressed that Geneva might become a "Far Eastern Munich," and that China's price for a settlement would be recognition and admission to the United Nations. While eager to effect a settlement in eastern Asia, Washington remained determined not to become a party to capitulation. Meanwhile, the military pressure in northern Indo-China became increasingly more difficult for the French armies to withstand.

Despite predictions that it would accomplish nothing, the Geneva conference opened on April 26, 1954. Nineteen nations were represented at the opening sessions held in the *Palais des Nations*. The first substantive problem taken up was the future of Korea. After hearing the views of the delegates from both North and South Korea, Secretary of State Dulles stressed the need to follow the decisions of the United Nations on the Korean dispute. Since this meant in effect a return to the pre-1950 status of elections sponsored by the United Nations, the Communists emphatically rejected Dulles' suggestion and denounced the United States for meddling in Asian affairs. Although a number of the delegates still worked to produce a compromise formula for Korea's reunification, their efforts came to nothing. By June 15, the Korean phase of the conference ended in a deadlock. The Western nations promised South Korea to raise the problem again in the immediate future in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Communists,

especially those in Peking, kept calling for a new general conference on Korean unification.¹¹⁹

On May 3 the conferees in Geneva issued invitations to the interested governments of the Indo-Chinese peninsula to send delegates to the talks. Five days later France made its first formal proposal for truce in Indo-China. The French plan followed the general lines of the settlement earlier achieved in Korea and requested supervision of the armistice by the United Nations. Two days later Viet Minh presented its counter-proposal which called for the removal of all foreign troops, cessation of American aid, and a free general election without outside supervision. On May 12, Viet-Nam presented a third set of proposals which were designed to preserve its authority over the entire Annamese territory. Eventually all parties appeared willing to concede the independence of Laos and Cambodia. Subsequent discussions therefore centered on the arrangement of a truce in Annam, although the questions of Laos and Cambodia continued to be troublesome throughout the conversations.

Meanwhile, the deadlock on Indo-China precipitated a cabinet crisis in France. On June 10, the Laniel government resigned and Mendes-France took over. Nehru too became more active as a mediator. From June 25 to 29, Eisenhower and Churchill conferred on southeastern Asian plans. Finally, even though the United States formally refused to be a party to the agreement, a truce for Indo-China was concluded on July 21, just about one year after the initialing of the Korean truce. By the final terms of the Geneva truce,¹²⁰ the French agreed to evacuate their forces from the Red River delta, Hanoi, and Haiphong. The Viet Minh agreed to evacuate their forces from southern Viet-Nam and southern Laos to northern "concentration areas" in both states. The Communists further agreed to respect the territorial and political integrity of Cambodia and the southern Laotian provinces in return for a guarantee that military units in those two states be reduced to the number needed for self-defense. Elections for a unified government should be held, according to the truce agreement, throughout all of Viet-Nam within two years. Prisoners, military and civilian, were to be exchanged within thirty days, and other civilians were to be permitted to move at will between the Communist and non-Communist zones. A commission made up of representatives from Canada, India, and Poland was set up to supervise the truce. While not a party to the armistice and not pleased with some of its conditions, the United States indicated that it would not interfere with its imple-

¹¹⁹ U. S. Dept. of State, *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954* (Washington, 1954); cf. Chou En-lai's report on foreign affairs published as a supplement to *People's China*, September 1, 1954.

¹²⁰ Text in *New York Times*, July 24, 1954. Texts of the American statements on the declaration in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXI (1954), 162-64. See also Bernard B. Fall, "The Cease-Fire in Indochina," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIII (1954), 135-39; 152-55.

mentation and that Washington would view "with grave concern" any violation of its terms.

Thus, another war that had cost thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and untold suffering ground to a halt. The armistice terms also brought to an end France's control over Indo-China and permitted the Communists to assume control over northern Viet-Nam with its population of about 12,000,000 persons, and its territory of 77,000 square miles. Bao Dai was confirmed as the ruler of southern Viet-Nam with its population of 9,500,000 and its territory of 50,000 square miles. The best route to Laos continued to be held by Bao Dai's state. Without question, however, the forces of Ho Chi Minh ably supported by China and Russia had won a striking victory.

The meaning of the Communist success in Indo-China was not lost upon the other states of southeastern Asia or upon the Western powers. Even before the convocation of the Geneva conference, Secretary of State Dulles warned that security in the region would depend on the willingness of the non-Communist states to take united action. On April 10, Dulles flew to Europe to consult with British and French statesmen on how best to form a collective defense system against further Communist advance in southeastern Asia and the Western Pacific. Thailand and the Philippines at once expressed their interest in framing a defense pact, but the other Asian nations failed to react with equal enthusiasm. From the outset the European states ruled out the possibility of bringing South Korea or Formosa into the defense pact. They also resisted American efforts to conclude a Pacific pact while the Geneva Conference continued in session. In mid-June conversations between Churchill and Eisenhower at Washington helped to bring the Anglo-Saxon powers into closer accord. At a meeting of the Anzus powers on June 30, the need for the collective defense of southeastern Asia again received emphasis. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and India rejected overtures to participate in the bloc being organized by Dulles.

On August 14, the Anzus powers, Britain, France, Thailand, Pakistan, the United States, and the Philippines announced their decision to hold a conference at Manila beginning on September 6. The American proposals, set forth by Dulles in his conversations with the other foreign secretaries, were accepted as the basis for discussion. After three days of formal talks, the representatives of the eight powers produced three documents referred to jointly as the "Manila Pact"¹²¹ and designed to establish a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific. The SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) treaty pledged the signatories "to maintain and develop" their individual and collective

¹²¹ Text in *New York Times*, September 9, 1954; also in *The Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXXI (1954), 393-96.

abilities to resist armed attack and to check and act against subversion directed against "the territorial integrity and political stability" of the countries of southeastern Asia and the southwestern Pacific regions. On the insistence of the Asian signatories, the pact was not directed exclusively against Communist aggression, but was widened to include all types of aggression. By this device it was hoped that at some later date the nonco-operating Asian states might see fit to join SEATO. The United States, as the only signatory not possessing territorial interests in the treaty area, declared that only a Communist armed attack would be regarded as necessarily dangerous to its security. The participating states also agreed to co-operate in economic and technical programs and to establish a council for the co-ordination of their defense programs. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, SEATO has neither a unified military command nor a standing armed force. In addition to the treaty itself, the Manila conference ratified a protocol extending the protective and economic benefits of the pact to the nonsignatory states of Cambodia, Laos, and south Viet-Nam. The final document comprising SEATO arrangements was the Pacific Charter, the idea of President Magsaysay. Seeking to offset Communist and neutralist charges that SEATO would promote a new and integrated colonialism in Asia, the Charter promised that the signatories would uphold equal rights and self-determination in the area, would strive to extend self-government, and would co-operate to promote higher living standards.

At the end of 1954 the Far East continued to be one of the world's main trouble spots. Communism in China, victorious in 1949, had quickly upset the balance of power throughout the region. The United States continued to uphold the Chiang regime on Formosa and in November, 1954, concluded a mutual security pact with the Nationalist government. Korea and Indo-China, long the scene of internal ferment, had a Communist shadow quickly fall over their northern sectors. Japan, torn by war and reconditioned by the occupation, continued to strive for viable solutions to its economic and political problems. Whether the Communists would remain in check along the lines drawn by the Korean and Indo-Chinese truce arrangements or whether they would use their footholds outside of China for springboards to new conquests in the Far East continued to perplex the world. The American policy of containment, supported while being modified by America's European partners, had at least produced a stalemate. While the world balanced shakily between war and peace, danger spots like Formosa, Korea, and Indo-China were being carefully watched as the points that might set off the chain reaction leading to the world's first thermonuclear war.

PART V

SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The titles listed here and the comments on them are especially designed to lead the student through the maze of available literature in Western languages. Like the textual matter, the bibliography is focused on international relations rather than domestic history. Not everything cited in the bibliographical footnotes of the text will be found here. Periodical and newspaper articles, for example, are not included at all. For detailed study of a specific subject, refer to one of the appropriate and comprehensive bibliographies listed below.

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